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ABSTRACT 
On the basis of a critical review of the literature in chapter one, it is concluded that no 
existing theory of hypnosis is able to provide a satisfactory account of the entire set of 
behavioural, cognitive, social and physiological evidence pertaining to the phenomenon. 
In an attempt to rectify this situation, an integrative conceptual framework amalgamating 
existing theories of hypnosis into a single model on the basis of contemporary cognitive 
psychological theory is presented in chapters two and three. According to the model, 
successfully executed suggestions result from the automatic activation of perceptual and 
behavioural representations following the receipt of triggers by low level attentional 
systems. By this view, the processes involved in hypnotic and non-hypnotic suggestions 
are essentially the same; however, it is argued that contextual features and state changes 
associated with the hypnotic situation are responsible for the increased responsivity to 
suggestions typically displayed therein. 
In the following chapters, four studies designed to assess predictions from the model 
are described. In the first two, the related predictions that suggestibility is positively 
related to a low level processing predisposition and negatively related to a high level 
processing predisposition were assessed. Both studies provided support for the first 
hypothesis although no evidence for the second hypothesis was obtained. The third and 
fourth studies examined the related hypotheses that hypnosis is associated with (i) a low 
level processing bias; and (ii) a high level processing inhibition. Neither hypothesis 
received any significant empirical support. 
In the final chapter, the results of these studies are discussed with reference to the 
theoretical framework outlined in the introductory chapters. It is concluded that the 
model provides a fairly good account of suggestion, although certain revisions are 
required before an adequate account of hypnosis can be offered. Avenues for future 
research are explored. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Literature review 
1.1 Introduction 
What is hypnosis? The question remains as pertinent today as it was two hundred years 
ago when the scientific investigation of the phenomenon first began. A recent definition 
(see appendix I) adopted by the hypnosis division of the American Psychological 
Association describes hypnosis as "... a procedure wherein changes in sensations, 
perceptions, thoughts, feelings, or behaviour are suggested" (in Kirsch, 1994, p 143; 
emphasis added). To remain theoretically neutral, the definition emphasises the 
operational rather than the psychological. For while few researchers within the field 
would deny that, in susceptible individuals at least, hypnotic procedures regularly 
succeed in bringing about such changes in sensation, perception and so forth, probably 
fewer still would argue that the field was in any way agreed as to why or how this is the 
case. Two centuries of research and theory have yielded an abundance of findings 
concerning the cognitive, social, phenomenological and physiological nature of hypnosis 
and hypnotic susceptibility. And yet a single integrative theory of hypnosis which ties 
together these disparate strands into a unifying explanatory framework remains curiously 
lacking. 
In this thesis I aim to provide a tentative description of what such a unified theory 
might look like, and begin the task of assessing its validity empirically. In this chapter 
existing theory and research within the field will be examined in a bid to identify the 
current status of our knowledge concerning hypnosis and hypnotic susceptibility. In 
chapter two a model of the cognitive system based on contemporary cognitive 
psychological research and theory will be outlined which will then be used as a 
framework for the explanation of suggestion, hypnosis and hypnotic susceptibility in 
chapter three. In the subsequent chapters, four empirical studies designed to investigate 
the assertions laid out in chapters two and three will be described. In the concluding 
chapter the model will be evaluated in light of the findings of these studies and directions 
for future research will be discussed. 
1.2 The domain of hypnosis 
Before addressing contemporary hypnosis research and theory, some preliminary 
comments concerning the domain of interest to the current thesis are in order. 
Traditionally, and perhaps still within the public sphere, hypnosis has been regarded as 
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an altered state of consciousness (or 'trance') resembling sleep2, in which unusual or 
incredible mental and physical phenomena arc manifested. The methods by which 
hypnosis can be 'induced'3 vary enormously, although ritualistic instructions (or 
suggestionS4) from the hypnotist5 for sleep or relaxation, an inward focus of attention, 
and imagery are probably the most common, at least amongst proponents of so-called 
'direct' methods of induction (see e. g. Edmonston, 1986; Waxman, 1989). Following 
the hypnotic induction, suggestions are typically given for particular behaviours or 
experiences, with the nature of suggestions varying from one situation and purpose to 
another. On the behavioural side, extremely complex actions are possible during 
hypnosis although typical behavioural suggestions involve instructions for relatively 
simple motor movements such as the rising of arms or fingers. Suggestions for simple 
motor inhibitions, such as the inability to bend or move a limb, are also commonplace. 
What is apparently unusual about hypnosis is that the successful enactment of such 
suggested behaviours, is typically accompanied by a feeling of involuntariness, a 
phenomenon that has been labelled the 'classic suggestion effect' (Weitzenhoffer, 1953). 
Thus, the rising of an hypnotic subjects' arm following a successful arm levitation 
suggestion feels as though it is happening 'by itself and without any effort. Conversely, 
following a successful suggestion for motor inhibition, the individual seems to make 
every effort to overcome the inhibition and is often surprised at their inability to do so. 
The enactment of experiential suggestions during hypnosis are perhaps even more 
impressive. Following a set of simple commands from the hypnotist, a responsive subject 
can, for example, be inspired to display (i) behaviours consistent with the presence or 
absence of people or objects that seem in direct conflict with objective reality (positive 
and negative hallucination suggestions); (ii) an apparent insensitivity to pain (as in an 
analgesia suggestion), and (iii) an inability to remember extremely well4earned material 
(an amnesia suggestion); moreover, an individual may display suggested behaviours after 
the termination of the hypnotic session, as in the enactment of post-hypnotic suggestions. 
As with suggestions for hypnotic behaviours, experiential suggestions arc perceived as 
2 Indeed, the word hypnosis is derived from the Greek hypnos or 'sleep'. 
3 Scare quotes are used here to emphasise the fact that many theorists do not regard hypnosis as an altered 
state of consciousness and therefore not something that can be 'induced' as such. 
4 In a practical sense, the term 'suggestion' refers to the communication from an apparently authoritative 
source which implicitly or explicitly advances some proposition without supporting justification or 
evidence (Gwynn & Spanos, 1996). Hypnotic suggestions are distinctive only in that they are administered 
in a context which is explicitly labelled as hypnosis. 
5 In other words, the person attempting to induce hypnosis in the subject or client. 
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subjectively real, in that the hypnotic individual genuinely believes that they cannot feel 
pain, cannot remember and so on. 
It is such apparently incredible suggested behaviours and experiences that are 
responsible for the reputation that hypnosis maintains within the public sphere as a 
powerful and unusual phenomenon. Regardless of theoretical persuasion, few hypnosis 
researchers would doubt the validity of the subjective reality of suggested behaviours 
and experiences, and it is the explanation of such effects that is the primary focus of 
research within the field. However, the field is far from agreed as to the psychological 
mechanisms by which these effects are brought about. In contrast with the majority of 
previous theories, this thesis is unusual in that it represents an attempt to provide an 
account of the mechanisms involved in the production of these effects which is 
acceptable to theorists from across the conceptual spectrum. 
1.3 Hypnosis theory and research 
In this section several of the more popular contemporary accounts of hypnosis and the 
evidence cited in their support will be described and evaluated, as a backdrop and 
general introduction to the theoretical framework which will be outlined in chapters two 
and three. 
1.3.1 Ecio-r)svcho ooical theo 
Since the development of psychoanalysis by Freud and Breuer, psychodynamically 
oriented clinicians and researchers have had an interest in the nature of hypnosis and its 
potential value as a therapeutic tool. Possibly the most influential psychodynamic 
account of hypnosis is the ego-psychological model of Fromm (e. g. Fromm, 1979,1992). 
Fromm's account of hypnosis is based largely on the application of psychoanalytical 
concepts to hypnosis theory and research, and her own substantial clinical observations. 
More specifically it has theoretical roots in the tradition of ego-psychology originated by 
Freud (1923/1961) and borrows heavily from the work of Rapaport (1953/1967) and Gill 
and Brenman (1959). It is also similar in many respects to the later topographical 
regression theory proposed by Nash (199 1). 
Traditionally, psychoanalytic theory suggests that mental functions can be divided into 
the primary and secondary processes. The primary processes are emotional, illogical and 
image-based, developmentally immature and are said to be the seat of intuition. 
Conversely, secondary processes are developmentally mature, based on sequential logic 
and reason, and encode information as language and abstract propositions. Fromm 
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(1979) suggests that pure secondary and primary processes arc most usefully regarded as 
the extreme poles of a continuum of ego functioning representing the distinction between 
conscious and unconscious. 
All behaviour is controlled through the dynamic balance that exists between the 
primary and secondary processes, with normal functioning in the mature adult being 
biased towards secondary process activity. According to Fromm's ego-psychological 
model, hypnosis represents one way in which this balance becomes subject to change. By 
this view, during the course of an induction the individual enters a state of 'ego 
receptivity' (Deikman, 1971) by which a reduction in normal orienting functions 
(Generalised Reality Orientation; Shor, 1959) facilitates the relaxation of defensive 
barriers. In so doing the individual relinquishes a degree of secondary process activity 
biasing them towards the adaptive use of primary process thought; this shift from 
sophisticated, logical thought towards more primitive and illogical mental activity has 
been described by Gill and Brenman (1959) as a 'regression in the service of the ego'. 
Fromm (1992) suggests that one of the mechanisms by which this regression might occur 
during hypnosis is through the individuals' intense absorption (Tellegen & Atkinson, 
1974) in the imagery that is used in the course of a typical hypnotic induction, so-called 
'imaginative involvement' Q. Hilgard, 1974,1979). 
According to the ego-psychological view, the increase in suggestibility that 
accompanies hypnosis is a result of the reduction in critical thought associated with 
extremely focused attention and states of ego-receptivity. Other characteristics of 
hypnosis, such as the use of imagery and fantasy (see Sheehan, 1979, for a review), the 
incidence of 'trance logic' (the apparent tolerance for logical incongruities during 
hypnosis; Orne, 1959), heightened emotionality (e. g. Crawford, Clarke, Kitner-Triolo & 
Olesko, 1989), superior creativity (e. g. P. Bowers, 1967; Raikov, 1976,1977) and the 
sense of involuntariness that accompanies hypnotic behaviours are the product of the 
resultant bias towards primary process activity. 
A small number of studies inspired by psychoanalytic conceptions of hypnosis have 
investigated whether the hypnotic state is characterised by increased primary process 
activity with a corresponding decrease in the secondary processes. Fromm, Oberlander 
and Gruenewald (1970) administered an adapted version of the Rorschach test (with a 
scoring method designed to assess the degree and kind of primary process thought and its 
fluctuations; Holt, 1963,1969) to medium and high hypnotic susceptibles in both the 
waking and hypnotic states, with a four week interval separating the* two sessions to 
counteract the influence of memory on the test. As predicted, when calculated blindly by 
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three independent raters, scores indicated a significant increase in primary process 
activity during hypnosis. When this experiment was replicated and extended in a follow- 
up by Levin and Harrison (1976) including scores on a Thematic Apperception Test 
(TAT) as a further dependent variable, similar results were obtained. More recently, a 
study by Hammer, Walker and Diment (1978) using detailed content analysis of 
subjective responses to a poem presented to waking, hypnotic and simulating groups 
indicated a similar increase in primary process mentation. 
Although these studies have been cited as supporting the idea of a shift from secondary 
to primary process thinking during hypnosis, the validity of this conclusion can be 
seriously questioned on methodological grounds. Despite the popularity of projective 
methods in the psychoanalytic world, the Rorschach test is regarded by many in 
mainstream psychology as being somewhat inadequate as a psychometric device (e. g. 
Reber, 1985; Eysenck, 1986). According to Eysenck (1986), due to its deliberately 
amorphous nature, the Rorschach test is sensitive to almost any whim of an individual's 
personality; as such, it is extremely difficult to say with any certainty what the test is 
actually measuring, a product of the inherent generality that most psychoanalytical 
models have, over the years, been found guilty of, and of which the ego-psychological 
account of hypnosis is no exception. In addition, it is entirely plausible that subjects' 
responses on the Rorschach simply reflect their beliefs concerning hypnosis and not any 
fundamental change in information processing occurring therein. 
There is, however, some evidence in support of the ego-psychological assertion that 
hypnosis is associated with an unusual tolerance for logical incongruities, so-called 
'trance logic' (Orne, 1959,1966). In the original demonstration of the trance logic 
phenomenon (Orne, 1959), the responses of a group of highly suggestible individuals 
given an hypnotic induction and visual hallucination suggestion were compared to those 
of a group of low suggestibles instructed to simulate 6 hypnosis. Both groups of subjects 
were placed in front of a seated experimental confederate and told to close their eyes; at 
this point the confederate moved out of the subjects' line of sight, the suggestion that the 
individual was still sitting in front of them was given, followed by the instruction to open 
6 Orne's (1959) paper is considered by many to be a landmark in hypnosis research for its introduction of 
the so-called 'real-simulator' (RS) design (see also Ome, 1979). In the RS design, the responses of highly 
suggestible individuals following an hypnotic induction are compared to those of a group of low 
suggestibles (who are insensitive to the hypnotic induction) who have been instructed to fake the 
performance of a good hypnotic subject; this hypnotic 'simulation' is performed in a bid to fool the 
experimenter, blind to their group status, into believing that they are hypnotised, something which the 
majority of simulators are capable of doing with ease. The use of such a quasi-control group is intended to 
reveal what aspects of hypnotic behaviours and experiences are potentially the result of expectations and 
contextual cues present in the hypnotic situation, and those which cannot be explained by such factors. 
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their eyes. Many of the hypnotic 'reals', but none of the simulators, subsequently 
reported seeing a transparent image in front of them (the 'transparency response); 
moreover, when confronted by the actual confederate, the majority of hypnotic 'reals' 
reported seeing both the confederate and their hallucinated image (a so-called 'double 
hallucination'), while the simulators rarely reported seeing both. According to Orne 
(1959), such real-simulator differences are the product of the hypnotic individual's 
tolerance for logical incongruities (trance logic), something which, not being shown by 
hypnotic simulators, he argued was part of the 'essence' of hypnosis (i. e. not a product of 
'demand characteristics'). 
Although a number of studies have subsequently failed to find evidence for Ome's 
double hallucination phenomenon (e. g. Blum & Graef, 1971; Johnson, Maher & Barber, 
1972; McDonald & Smith, 1975; Sheehan, Obstoj & McConkey, 1976; Spanos, de 
Groot, Tiller, Weekes & Bertrand, 1985), the transparency effect has been replicated a 
number of times using a number of different stimuli and assessment techniques (e. g. 
Johnson et al, 1972; McDonald & Smith, 1975; Sheehan et al, 1976; Spanos, de Groot, 
et al, 1985; Stanley, Lynn & Nash, 1986). Moreover, the demonstration of a third 
phenomenon that apparently discriminates reals and simulators, so-called 'incongruous 
writing71 , has lent further support to the trance logic concept. Such apparent 
demonstrations of trance logic phenomena have not been without criticism, however. 
Most notably, a number of investigators (e. g. Barber, 1969; Spanos, 1986) have argued 
that the demands placed on reals and simulators are not comparable, and there is some 
evidence to suggest that these differential demands are responsible for the trance logic 
effect in visual hallucination (see e. g. Barber, 1969). Accordingly, alternative 
explanations of the trance logic phenomena have been proposed. Spanos and Radtke 
(1981), for example, sununarise evidence showing that individuals asked to imagine 
objects tend to describe their images as vague and transparent, contradicting the view 
that the transparency response is illogical and unique to hypnotic hallucination. 
According to Spanos (1986), simulating subjects do not show the transparency response 
to the double hallucination suggestion because the inherent demand is to behave as 
though the hallucinated object is "as real as real" rather than vague and incomplete. At 
7 The incongruous-writing effect (Peters, 1976; cited in Spanos, 1986) can be observed during the 
enactment of an hypnotic age regression to early childhood in which the regressed subject is asked to write 
a complex sentence such as 'I am participating in a psychological experiment'. Although the hypnotic 
subject completes the sentence in what appears to be child-like handwriting (in line with their apparently 
regressed state) they typically do so without making a single spelling-error, despite the fact that a young 
child would almost certainly be unable to do this. 
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present, existing evidence is insufficient to provide an unequivocal resolution to the 
dispute. 
There are also doubts regarding the ego-psychological account's prediction that 
hypnosis involves a significant increase in the amount and quality of imagery 
experienced by the hypnotised subject. While many studies (e. g. Sanders, 1967; Starker, 
1974) have found the expected increase in reported imagery during hypnosis compared 
to a relaxed, waking condition, a similar proportion have not (e. g. Barber & Wilson, 
1977; Coe, St. Jean & Berger, 1980). While such contradictory findings are not 
encouraging, at least some of the problem would appear to lie in the inadequacies of the 
self-report measures used in many of these studies. For example, Crawford (1979) has 
demonstrated how the limited range of scores on the most commonly used of these 
measures (the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire or VVIQ; Marks, 1973) can 
artifactually influence results by creating a ceiling-effect for high imagers during 
hypnosis. In addition, such measures are highly sensitive to subject expectations and 
demand characteristics; although scores on the VVIQ demonstrate a reasonable test- 
retest reliability (de Groh, 1989), their usefulness remains limited due to the subjective 
nature of the responses required. 
With regards more objective measures of imaginative processes during hypnosis, there 
is a considerable lack of empirical work. Findings indicating that high imagers perform 
certain tasks involving imagery in their mediation better than low imagers (e. g. Ernest, 
1977) has fuelled the suggestion that, for susceptible individuals, hypnosis enhances 
performance on imagistic tasks. However, despite the extensive investigation of mental 
imagery within cognitive psychology, very little of this work has actually been utilised to 
investigate the effect of hypnosis on imagery-related processing (Crawford, 1982a). A 
study by Crawford (1979) using a visual memory discrimination task (developed by Gur 
& Hilgard, 1975, as an objective, non-hypnotic test of imaging ability) to examine the 
differences between high and low susceptibles in the waking and hypnotic states is one 
notable exception. No differences between the two groups were revealed during ordinary 
waking, but under hypnosis the highly susceptible group demonstrated a clearly superior 
improvement on the task compared to the lows. Similar results were found in a more 
rigorous follow-up study using the same stimuli (Crawford & Allen, 1983). Perhaps an 
even more impressive example of this apparent facilitative effect of hypnosis on imaging 
has been the demonstration of eidetic-like (i. e. photographic) memory for complex visual 
stimuli (unfakeable Julesz stereograms) by a very few high, but not low, susceptibles 
during hypnosis (e. g. Walker, Garrett & Wallace, 1976; Wallace, 1978). 
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Although studies such as these have yielded results in line with the ego-psychological 
theory's predictions about the effect of hypnosis on imagery, sample sizes have generally 
been low and often the use of important control groups, such as Orne's (1979) hypnotic 
simulators used to control for expectation and task demands, has been neglected. 
Furthermore, some studies using objective measures have not supported this hypothesis 
(e. g. Cooper & London, 1973). Clearly there exists some relationship between imagistic 
processes and hypnosis but existing evidence remains insufficient to elucidate the nature 
of this relationship (Sheehan, 1979). Given the extensive history of the association 
between hypnosis and imagery, dating back to the findings of the Franklin commission 
in the eighteenth century, it is hard to reject the notion of increased imagery during 
hypnosis. However, whether imagery is intrinsic to hypnosis or is simply a product of the 
wording of hypnotic inductions is questionable, with recent evidence suggesting that 
imagery is not essential to hypnotic responding (Bartis & Zamansky, 1990; Hargadon, 
Bowers & Woody, 1995; although cf Heyneman, 1990) seeming to support the latter 
interpretation. 
Nevertheless, the idea that hypnosis involves an intense fascination with fantasy- 
related material which is central to the ego-psychological model is strongly supported by 
the work of J. Hilgard (1974,1979) concerning the phenomenological nature of 
hypnosis. Following a series of extended interviews, J. Hilgard noted that the most 
highly susceptible individuals tend to describe the hypnotic situation as one in which 
they experience "... almost total immersion in the [imaginal] activity, [and] with 
indifference to distracting stimuli in the environment" (1974; p. 5). In addition, Hilgard's 
research suggests that high susceptibles are more inclined to engage in similar activities 
in the course of their everyday lives. For example, sports which require absolute, 
absorbed concentration to excel such as archery and long-distance running are likely to 
yield a disproportionate amount of highly susceptible individuals. Other roles that entail 
this 'imaginative involvement' (e. g. acting) are also liable to be filled by high 
susceptibles. 
J. Hilgard's concept of imaginative involvement is practically synonymous (see Kirsch 
& Lynn, 1995) with Tellegen and Atkinson's (1974) concept of hypnotic absorption. 
Research using the Tellegen Absorption Scale (TAS; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), a self- 
report measure designed to assess subjects' experience of 'hypnotic-like' (e. g. Shor, 
1960; Lee-Teng, 1965) phenomena in the course of normal life, has shown that 
absorption consistently correlates with hypnotic susceptibility, typically in the region of 
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0.3 - 0.4 (Roche & McConkey, 1990) making it arguably the most successful personality 
predictor of susceptibility. 
More recently, the concepts of imaginative involvement, absorption and imagery have 
been tied together with the notion of the fantasy-prone personality (Wilson & Barber, 
1983). On the basis of work using the Inventory of Childhood Memories and Imaginings 
(Wilson & Barber, 1981), Lynn and Rhue (1986) have demonstrated a strong 
relationship between abnormally high levels of hypnotic susceptibility and a 
constellation of personality traits that converge on fantasy involvement and a preference 
for an imaginative cognitive style. In particular, these fantasy-prone individuals are 
likely to engage in disproportionately large amounts of image-based day-dreaming, 
become intensely absorbed in imaginative activities such as reading books or watching 
films and show high levels of imagery vividness (Crawford, 1982b). Furthermore, they 
are far more likely to experience physical reactions such as nausea to observed violence 
on television or in films, suggesting that fantasy-prone individuals are more sensitive to 
unconsciously evaluating stimuli on the basis of emotional valence than those who are 
less prone to fantasy. On the basis of this research, it is apparent that a fairly large 
proportion of the most highly susceptible individuals tend to engage in primary process 
activities in their everyday waking lives - they are emotional, absent-minded day- 
dreamers: according to Lynn and Rhue (1991 a) these individuals "... seem able to respond 
to non-hypnotic activities that require a temporary diminution of rational, reality-bound 
analytical thinking" (p. 203). The notion that individuals who are highly prone to 
engaging in fantasy-related activity involving the inhibition of rational and reality-based 
cognitive processes are extremely susceptible to hypnosis clearly seems to support the 
assertions of the ego-psychological model. However, it is apparent that the relationship 
between imaginative involvement, fantasy proneness and hypnotizability is not as strong 
as one might expect. According to the findings of Lynn & Rhue (1986), for example, not 
all fantasy-prone individuals are highly hypnotizable, demonstrating that there is more to 
hypnotizability than a simple propensity for fantasy. 
Evidence cited in support of the ego-psychological prediction that hypnosis will be 
characterised by an increase in creativity has also come under question in recent years 
(see Lynn & Sivec, 1992, for a review). Although a small number of studies have found 
that high hypnotizables show a significant increase in creativity performance on certain 
tasks during hypnosis (e. g. P. Bowers, 1967; Gur & Reyher, 1976; Raikov, 1976,1977) 
several others have not (see e. g. K. Bowers & van der Meulen, 1970; Perry, Wilder & 
Appignanesi, 1973); in addition, a study by Jackson and Gorassini (1989) found the 
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predicted increase in creativity during hypnosis for both high and low susceptible 
subjects, suggesting that relaxation rather than hypnosis may be the moderating variable. 
According to Lynn and Sivec (1992), the most robust finding regarding the creativity and 
hypnosis relationship is that high susceptibles seem to demonstrate superior creativity to 
lows, irrespective of the condition in which this is measured. Although interesting in its 
own right, this finding does not lend particular support to the ego-psychological view of 
hypnosis per se. 
1.3.2 Dissociation theories 
1.3.2.1 Neodissociation theory 
Since the turn of the century and the work of Pierre Janet, William James and William 
McDougall, hypnosis has been regarded by many as a form of dissociative phenomenon 
and neodissociation theory (e. g. Hilgard 1977,1986,1994) is firmly rooted in this 
tradition. In this context, dissociation has been defined as the splitting off of actions, 
thoughts, feelings etc. from conscious awareness. Neodissociation theory regards 
hypnosis as the state in which the hypnotised individual becomes subject to such 
dissociations in a controlled fashion, as manipulated by the suggestions of the hypnotist. 
Hilgard's theory has proved an extremely popular cognitive account of hypnotic 
responding, representing, until recent years at least, probably the most influential of the 
more traditional approaches to hypnosis. 
According to the theory, our cognitive architecture consists of a number of functionally 
autonomous, yet interacting cognitive control systems - corresponding to specialised 
behavioural routines - that are hierarchically arranged beneath a central executive ego. 
The executive ego is a limited capacity monitoring and controlling system that deals with 
planning and initiating goal-directed behaviours; moreover, it is under the conscious 
control of the individual and thus consumes attentional resources. The executive ego is 
responsible for selecting the appropriate cognitive control systems for any given task; 
however, in order to conserve the limited resources of the executive, once control 
systems are selected they are able to function with a considerable degree of autonomy 
from the executive, themselves monitoring environmental events for appropriate triggers 
and executing behaviours accordingly. As such, they have become dissociated from the 
executive ego, with their continued operation occurring largely outside awareness. In this 
way, well-learned behaviours can be performed effortlessly and concurrently. According 
to Hilgard, such processing dissociations are fundamental to human cognition, with the 
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Figure 1.1: The neodissociation account of non-volitional responding. Adapted from 
Kirsch and Lynn (1995). 
conscious representation of infori-nation being largely unnecessary for the execution of 
extremely complex behaviours. 
By Hilgard's view, the notion that the majority of cognitive activity, including complex 
operations such as low-level planning and monitoring, is realised outside conscious 
awareness provides the basis for understanding the nature of hypnotic responding. 
Although the selection of cognitive control systems is under the remit of the executive 
ego, the operation of the ego itself is constrained by both situational and dispositional 
factors. According to Hilgard, hypnosis represents one situation where the operation of 
the executive ego may become subject to external influences, in the form of suggestive 
communications from the hypnotist. Hilgard asserts that an hypnotic induction brings 
about the inhibition of executive functions creating a fractionation within the ego. 
Although part of the executive continues to function as normal during hypnosis, a 
second, dissociated part, is concealed from awareness by the formation of an amnesic 
barrier. This part of the ego can exert control in the usual fashion but such control is 
prevented from representing itself in consciousness by the amnesia (see figure 1.1). The 
hypnotist's suggestions operate by influencing the dissociated part of the executive to 
initiate changes in the cognitive hierarchy. In this way, cognitive control systems can 
become artiflcially dissociated from the controlling influence of the executive: their 
selection or inhibition can be controlled by the suggestions of the hypnotist, but once 
selected, and if left without further suggestion, they will function autonomously as 
normal, as though their action had been instigated in the usual fashion. As the hypnotised 
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individual is aware only of the resultant changes in behaviour and experience, and not 
the cognitive activity by which such changes were brought about, they experience the 
execution of suggestions as occurring involuntarily. 
Hilgard's notion that hypnosis brings about the fractionation of the executive ego was 
originally posited as being one of two dissociative mechanisms which are responsible for 
hypnotic phenomena (see Bowers & Woody, 1996). However, in recent years Hilgard 
has argued that the fractionation mechanism is the most plausible account of hypnotic 
responding, and it is now widely regarded as being the central tenet of the 
neodissociation model (see Kirsch & Lynn, 1995; Bowers & Woody, 1996). The second 
dissociative mechanism originally presented by Hilgard now forms the basis of the 
dissociated control model of hypnosis (e. g. Bowers, 1990,1992; Woody & Bowers, 
1994) and will be discussed presently. 
The assertion that hypnosis brings about the fractionation of the executive ego 
producing co-existing conscious and unconscious executive elements was partly inspired 
by a chance discovery made by Hilgard during a routine classroom demonstration of 
hypnotic phenomena. Following the successful implementation of an hypnotic deaffiess 
suggestion, the question arose as to whether or not the 'deaf' individual was at some 
level aware of the things being said around them, despite overt evidence to the contrary. 
Intrigued by the question, Hilgard asked the subject whether or not part of their mind 
could hear what was being said to them, and, if so, whether they could confirm this by 
raising a finger. The subsequent finger-raising and recounting of all that had transpired 
since the deafness suggestion was given signalled the discovery of what Hilgard (I 973a) 
has termed the 'hidden observer' phenomenon. This apparent demonstration that 'a 
hypnotised individual remains aware, at an unconscious level, of that which they 
seemingly cannot hear (or see, smell, feel, remember etc. according to the suggestion 
given; see Hilgard, 1977) has been cited by proponents of Hilgard's view as strong 
evidence for the executive split reportedly operating during hypnosis. 
Since this time, the hidden observer has been examined empirically in a number of 
studies designed to elucidate the validity of the neodissociation model, with mixed 
results. In apparent support of Hilgard's position, a study by Knox, Morgan and Hilgard 
(1974) demonstrated that virtually all (seven out of eight) of their highly susceptible 
subjects displayed the hidden observer phenomenon, as evidenced by reports of greater 
'hidden' ischernic pain than indicated by their hypnotised self following an analgesia 
suggestion. A number of subsequent attempts at replication (Hilgard, Morgan & 
Macdonald, 1975; Hilgard, Hilgard, Macdonald, Morgan & Johnson, 1978; Perry & 
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Laurence, 1980; Laurence & Perry, 1981) have, however, suggested that only a relatively 
modest proportion of highly susceptible subjects (between 40 and 50%) actually exhibit 
hidden observers. 
Perhaps more importantly, the finding that 75% of subjects instructed to simulate 
hypnosis also displayed behaviour apparently indicative of a hidden observer in the 
Hilgard et al (1978) study seems to indicate that the phenomenon might be a product of 
experimental demand characteristics (see also Nogrady, McConkey, Laurence & Perry, 
1983). This supposition was bolstered by a number of studies suggesting that the nature 
of hidden observer reports are extremely sensitive to the manipulation of situational 
demands by the use of, for example, different experimental instructions (e. g. Spanos & 
Hewitt, 1980; Spanos, Gwynn & Stam, 1983; Spanos, Radtke & Bertrand, 1984; Spanos, 
Flynn & Gwynn, 1988). As Nogrady et al (1983) have pointed out, many of the early 
studies demonstrating relatively high hidden observer rates invariably used instructions 
explicitly identifying this as the expected, and desired, outcome of the experiment, 
greatly increasing the likelihood of subject compliance 8. 
Nevertheless, one study investigating the hidden observer using the real-simulator 
design (Nogrady et al, 1983) appears to refute the social compliance hypothesis. In this 
study, 40% of highly susceptible subjects displayed hidden observers following 
ambiguous instructions concerning the expected outcome of the suggestion, while no 
high-medium or simulating subjects did so. Nogrady et al concluded that such a finding 
provided good evidence for dissociative processes operating during hypnosis. However, 
if the hidden observer is a genuine index of the hypothesised fractionation mechanism 
posited by neodissociation theory, then an alternative explanation for the behaviour of 
the remaining highly susceptible respondents (60% in this case) is clearly required. 
Nogrady et al propose that the two types of highly susceptible subjects might be 
executing the suggested responses in different ways. On the basis of their finding that 
subjects displaying hidden observers also appear to demonstrate duality9 during age 
regression, Nogrady et al suggest that the hidden observer might indicate the use of a 
8 The notion that hypnotic responses are the result of individuals simply complying with the wishes of the 
experimenter has been expounded most notably by Wagstaff (1981,1986). One aspect of this notion 
supposes that individuals are deliberately (i. e. consciously) pretending to be experiencing an hypnotic 
effect despite the fact that they are not; Spanos (1991) offers a similar explanation for many hypnotic 
responses. It is widely assumed that such an explanation can account for some hypnotic responses 
(particularly in certain situations e. g. stage hypnosis), but not all (e. g. the use of hypnotic pain management 
in the treatment of bums, to take an extreme example). The second aspect of the compliance notion 
suggests that this process occurs without the individual's awareness. 
9 In the context of an age regression suggestion, 'duality' refers to the subjects' experience of being both 
age regressed and adult at the same time, or in alternation. 
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divided attention strategy during hypnosis which allows the subject to switch between 
hypnotised and non-hypnotised modes according to suggestions. In contrast, subjects 
who do not experience the hidden observer might achieve suggested responses through 
their intense absorption in the imagery that accompanies the presentation of the 
suggestion. However, there is no evidence at this point that highly susceptible subjects 
who do and who do not experience the hidden observer differ on any variables pertaining 
to this hypothesis. 
In addition to assessing the validity of the neodissociation account using the hidden- 
observer paradigm, the predictions the theory makes regarding hypnosis and task- 
interference have also been examined. It is a long established fact that two tasks 
performed concurrently will, given a certain amount of task difficulty, interfere with one 
another such that both tasks will be performed worse than when either is performed 
alone. This dual-task interference effect will occur even when the two tasks do not 
require the same output systems, and is, according to many recent models of attention, 
the product of an executive system with only limited amounts of attentional resources to 
allocate to task performance at any one time (e. g. Kahneman, 1973). According to 
classical dissociation theory (e. g. Janet, 1901; Prince, 1929), the task-interference effect 
may be reduced or eliminated during hypnosis if suggestions are given for one of the 
tasks to be performed subconsciously. Early studies investigating this 'functional 
independence' hypothesis failed to find such an effect, however (for reviews see Hull, 
1933; Hilgard, 1977); indeed, this early evidence suggested that the opposite effect 
occurs during hypnosis, that is, task interference actually appears to increase when 
suggestions are given for one of the tasks to be performed subconsciously. This effect 
10 holds for both tasks, regardless of which is performed outside of awareness 
According to the neodissociation model, however, this is exactly what one would 
expect to occur during hypnotic dual-task performance (see Hilgard, 1977,1979). By this 
view, although a secondary task may appear to be effortlessly performed outside 
awareness given appropriate suggestions during hypnosis, this appearance is in fact 
illusory. Rather, the task continues to be performed effortfully by the executive but the 
representation of this effort is prevented from reaching consciousness by the amnesic 
barrier. Moreover, maintaining the amnesic barrier is in itself a cognitively demanding 
task; dual-task performance will, therefore, be worse during hypnosis than in a divided- 
" Whether or not it is valid to say that a task can be performed 'outside of awareness, is a contentious 
issue, especially given that verbal report has been the only measure used to validate this assertion. 
Assessing whether or not something has been performed unconsciously is notoriously problematic (see e. g. 
Jacoby, 1991). 
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attention condition because there are less attentional resources available. A small number 
of studies have confirmed the earlier findings in this regard (e. g. Knox, Crutchfield & 
Hilgard, 1975; Stevenson, 1976; Green & Lynn, 1995). However, although these 
findings support the predictions of neodissociation theory, several other studies have not 
found this pattern of results and appear to accord more with the classical view of 
dissociation; these findings will be examined presently when the dissociated control 
model of hypnosis is discussed. 
The predictions of neodissociation theory concerning hypnotic susceptibility have also 
been addressed empirically. According to the neodissociation account, an individual's 
susceptibility is a stable cognitive trait corresponding to their ability to experience 
dissociative phenomena. Evidence for the relationship between hypnotizability and 
dissociative ability has been obtained in a number of studies concerning patients with so- 
called dissociative psychopathology. Pettinati, Home and Staats (1985) and KTanhold, 
Baumann and Fichter (1992) for example, found that individuals suffering from Bulimia 
Nervosa tend to display extremely high levels of hypnotic susceptibility. A similar 
pattern of results has been found with individuals suffering from Dissociative Identity 
Disorder (Bliss, 1980,1983,1984) and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (e. g. D. Spiegel, 
1984; Stutman & Bliss, 1985; D. Spiegel, Hunt & Dondershine, 1988). In each of these 
cases, it has been suggested that the individual's ability to dissociate material from 
consciousness is used as an adaptive mechanism to protect themselves from 
overwhelming negative affect at times of extreme stress or trauma. It has been argued 
that such a dissociative ability coincidentally predisposes these individuals towards high 
hypnotic susceptibility also. 
Regarding less pathological forms of dissociation, however, results have been less 
conclusive. Most studies investigating this issue have used the Dissociative Experiences 
Scale (DES; Bernstein & Putnam, 1986), a self-report instrument originally designed as a 
diagnostic tool for the identification of patients with dissociative disorders. The DES 
consists of twenty-eight statements concerning the frequency of dissociative-like 
episodes experienced outside the hypnotic context. Although some studies (e. g. 
Frischholz, Braun, Sachs et al, 1992; Butler & Bryant, 1997) have found a significant 
correlation between the DES and standard measures of hypnotic susceptibility such as 
the Harvard (Shor & Ome, 1962) and Stanford scales (Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1959), 
other have not (e. g. DiTomasso & Routh, 1993; Faith & Ray, 1994). In addition, it has 
been argued that any such significant correlations can be accounted for by the overlap 
between the DES and the Tellegen Absorption Scale (TAS; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974; 
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Kirsch & Council, 1992). Factor-analytic studies of the DES suggest the existence of an 
absorption-like factor (e. g. Sanders & Green, 1994), and several other investigators have 
reported strong correlations between the DES and TAS (e. g. Nadon et al, 1991). A small 
correlation between the DES and susceptibility measures is therefore unsurprising given 
the relative reliability of the relationship between absorption and susceptibility (Roche & 
McConkey, 1990). Perhaps more critical for the relationship between hypnotizability and 
dissociation has been the finding that the correlation between susceptibility and the DES 
only holds when the two are measured in the same context (Kirsch & Council, 1992). 
Not all studies have found such a context effect, however (e. g. Butler & Bryant, 1997). 
It is possible that the unconvincing results obtained correlating the DES with 
hypnotizability measures are more a product of the inherent limitations of self-rcport 
measures than the lack of a relationship between susceptibility and dissociation. This is 
perhaps particularly true for a concept such as dissociation, which, by Hilgard's model, 
is a complex cognitive process that might not easily be captured by a questionnaire 
concerning events only of an apparently dissociative nature. While the DES may have 
face validity, its construct validity in this domain is far from beyond question; moreover, 
even if the DES can be linked in a meaningful way to clinical dissociation, the question 
of whether or not it is an appropriate measure of dissociation within normal populations 
is also open to doubt. 
Published attempts to construct more objective measures of dissociative ability have, 
however, been extremely rare. One such attempt is reported by Stava and Jaffa (1988), 
who offer three altemative views of dissociation based on Hilgard's theory, providing 
cognitive operationalisations of each. First, dissociation is described as a process of 
divided attention, such as when holding a conversation whilst driving a car, an example 
of dissociation provided by Hilgard himself; this is operationalised by Stava and Jaffa 
using a dual-task methodology similar to that used in the task-interference studies 
described earlier. Good dissociators by this view will experience less interference 
between the two tasks than those who are poor at dissociation. Second, dissociation is 
conceived as a process of selective attention, and is operationalised using a dichotic 
listening task. Rather than being asked to shadow (i. e. repeat aloud) speech presented to 
one ear whilst ignoring material presented to the other, as in the traditional dichotic 
listening task, subjects in this study had simply to attend to one ear and not the other; 
according to Stava and Jaffa good dissociative performance is demonstrated here by 
those best able to concentrate on the to-be-attended ear. Related to this notion is Stava 
and Jaffa's third account of dissociation, that of incidental learning, which is measured 
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by the amount of information that the subject learns about the material that is presented 
to the unattended ear in the dichotic learning task. Both the dual-task and dichotic- 
listening measures used two 'clerical-motor' tasks assessing digit copying and recoding 
speed, and four 'cognitive' tasks assessing reading speed and comprehension, in a 
variety of combinations. These measures were then correlated with susceptibility scores 
obtained using the HGSHS. 
With baseline performance statistically partialled out of the analysis, none of the 
dissociation measures correlated significantly with scores on the HGSHS, apparently 
contradicting the predictions of neodissociation theory. However, these findings can be 
strongly criticised on a number of conceptual and methodological grounds, particularly 
concerning Stava and Jaffa's conceptualisation of dissociation, which I would argue is, 
in part at least, inherently flawed. As we have seen, the essence of dissociation as stated 
by Hilgard is the operation of cognitive systems outside awareness. However, the point 
of a divided attention paradigm is to split attention and awareness between two 
concurrent tasks; if both tasks are performed consciously, a paradigm of this sort cannot 
be used as a measure of dissociation, at least not as defined by Hilgard. Indeed, Stava 
and Jaffa themselves explicitly state that their study differs from the task-interference 
studies discussed previously in that suggestions are not given for one of the tasks to be 
performed without awareness. Moreover, even if one could argue that one of the tasks in 
the divided attention paradigm was being carried out unconsciously, no measure of this 
was included in Stava and Jaffa's study. 
Stava and Jaffa's operationalisation of dissociation using a dichotic listening task is 
perhaps less controversial from a conceptual stand-point, as the ability to keep irrelevant 
material out of awareness whilst concentrating on another task appears fairly faithful to 
the account of dissociation offered by Hilgard. However, we have absolutely no grounds 
for assuming that subjects were not actually aware of the material presented to the 
unattended ear in Stava and Jaffa's dichotic listening task, as no measure of this was 
included in their study. This methodological concern also undermines Stava and Jaffa's 
incidental learning concept of dissociation, as we cannot tell whether material presented 
to the supposedly unattended ear was learnt incidentally or otherwise. Moreover, the 
question of whether subjects are alternating between the two ears during the dichotic 
listening task is also not addressed by Stava and Jaffa. If the incidental leaming element 
of the dichotic listening task is to be regarded as dissociative, then it is essential that 
subjects are simultaneously learning unattended information whilst exclusively attending 
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to another stimulus, and not simply switching between the two (cf. Zamansky & Bards, 
1985). 
In summary, the existing empirical evidence concerning the validity of neodissociation 
theory is at best inconclusive, and at worst contradictory. Regarding the hidden observer, 
the majority of studies have indicated that only a modest proportion of highly susceptible 
subjects exhibit the phenomenon. If, as Hilgard suggests, the hidden observer reflects a 
split in executive functions that is responsible for the execution of hypnotic behaviours, 
one would expect a considerably higher proportion of subjects to display the 
phenomenon, including those only moderately susceptible to hypnosis. As this is not the 
case, if we are to retain the concept of executive fractionation during hypnosis we must, 
at best, adopt a more diluted version of neodissociation theory which does not claim that 
all hypnotic behaviours are carried out in this way. However, it is not beyond question 
that the hidden observer actually reflects an executive dissociation as Hilgard suggests it 
does. It would appear that the nature of hidden observer reports is exquisitely sensitive to 
demand characteristics, indicating that it is more of a suggested effect like any other than 
a veridical reflection of what a dissociated, 'non-hypnotised' part of the individual is 
experiencing. 
Studies concerning hypnosis and dual-task interference are similarly inconclusive. 
Although some studies in this domain appear to support a neodissociation interpretation, 
in that hypnosis seems to increase interference between concurrent tasks, this is not a 
particularly robust finding, as will be demonstrated presently in a discussion of Bowers' 
dissociated control model. Moreover, even given the validity of the increased 
interference effect, this in itself is not particularly strong evidence for a neodissociation 
account of hypnosis, as sociocognitive theories predict a similar pattern of findings also 
(see Ruehle & Zamansky, 1997). 
Neodissociation theory also does not fare particularly well in studies assessing the 
relationship between dissociative ability and hypnotic susceptibility. In support of the 
theory, a number of studies have shown elevated levels of susceptibility in sufferers of 
so-called dissociative disorders. In non-clinical populations, however, the correlation 
between susceptibility measures and the Dissociative Experiences Scale is typically very 
small, often only apparent when both are assessed in the same context, and may be a 
product of an overlap between the DES and absorption. There has been very little 
research using more objective measures of dissociative ability, however. When this has 
been done, in the case of Stava and Jaffa's (1988) study, there have been serious 
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conceptual and methodological concerns about the operational isations offered, 
suggesting that further research is needed. 
The lack of objective means for testing the predictions of neodissociation. theory 
probably reflects how ill-defined the concept of dissociation actually is (Cardefia, 1994). 
In both clinical and research settings, 'dissociation' has been used as a generic term to 
describe a diverse array of apparently similar phenomena, both normal and pathological, 
on the basis of face validity alone. Whether it is valid to describe the processes operating 
in a complex disorder, such as DID, as being the same or even similar to those operating 
in a relatively simple task, such as talking whilst driving, is largely uncertain. This 
conceptual inclusivity probably underpins, to an extent at least, the popularity of 
neodissociation theory within the clinical sphere; for a scientific account of hypnosis, 
however, it is a considerable burden making objective assessment of its postulates 
extremely problematic. 
On the conceptual side, neodissociation. theory offers only a cursory examination of 
more phenomenological aspects of hypnosis and says little about the way social factors 
influence the nature of the hypnotic experience. Moreover, although Hilgard asserts that 
imaginative involvement might be one way by which the fractionation of the executive 
could occur, he does not indicate why or how this might be so. In addition, the theory 
does not provide an adequate account of how self-hypnosis fits within its explanatory 
scheme. Combined with its conceptual ambiguity and the lack of research support for its 
predictions, it is perhaps surprising that neodissociation theory remains as one of the 
leading contenders for explaining the nature of hypnotic responding (see Kirsch & Lynn, 
1995). 
1.3.2.2 Dissociated control theory 
Despite their adherence to a dissociation explanation of hypnosis, other theorists (e. g. 
Bowers, 1990,1992; Woody & Bowers, 1994) have been particularly critical of the 
'amnesic-barrier' notion that is central to Hilgard's exposition. If such a notion were 
correct it would imply that all hypnotic performances involve some degree of 
spontaneous amnesia, a phenomenon which has, in fact, proved extremely uncommon 
(Hilgard & Cooper, 1965). Moreover, such an amnesia would have to be highly 
selective, sparing the initial suggestion and accompanying imagery but not the actual 
realisation of the suggested phenomena (e. g. pain reduction in an hypnotic analgesia; 
Bowers, 1992). Furthermore, one would also expect individuals to experience suggested 
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Figure 1.2: The dissociated control account of nonvolitional responding. Adapted from 
Kirsch and Lynn (1995). 
experiencing a relatively large number of hypnotic phenomena yet attempts to induce 
amnesia for some aspect of their experience consistently meets with failure (Woody & 
Bowers, 1994). Indeed, the amnesia item on the Harvard and Stanford scales of hypnotic 
susceptibility is regarded by many as being one of the more 'difficult' items, and passing 
it is often used as a criterion for selecting groups of highly susceptible subjects (e. g. 
Wallace, Allen & Weber, 1994). 
Although the concept of executive fractionation is widely regarded as being the central 
hypothesis of neodissociation theory, a second dissociative mechanism by which 
hypnotic phenomena might operate was also offered by Hilgard (1977). Intrinsic to 
Hilgard's concept of executive fractionation is the assumption that hypnotic suggestions 
do not directly initiate the operation of appropriate cognitive sub-systems, but do so via 
that part of the executive ego that is concealed beneath the amnesic barrier (figure 1.1). 
In this sense, as Woody and Bowers (1994) have pointed out, recent instantiations of 
neodissociation theory may be regarded as being based on the idea of dissociated 
experience; that is, the hypnotised individual has the experience of a dissociation 
between higher and lower levels of cognitive control but this experience is in fact 
illusory. According to Hilgard's alternative mechanism of dissociation, however, rather 
than activating cognitive systems via a dissociated part of the executive, hypnotic 
suggestions are capable of circumventing the executive ego and directly activating or 
inhibiting the appropriate lower level systems themselves (see figure 1.2). Thus, 
hypnosis directly alters the way in which the selection of behaviour is controlled, not just 
experienced; this version of the theory has been described by Woody and Bowers (1994) 
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as the first instantiation of dissociated control theory. In many respects, the dissociated 
control model of Bowers and colleagues is extremely similar to this version of 
neodissociation theory. However, they have extended these ideas by conceiving them in 
terms of a more contemporary model of behavioural control, that of Norman and Shallice 
(1986), that is widely respected and supported by a growing literature in the fields of 
cognitive psychology and neuropsychology (see Shallice, 1988). 
The Norman and Shallice (1986) model of behavioural control views the organisation 
of the cognitive architecture in a similar vein to that proposed by neodissociation theory, 
with one fundamental difference. According to the model, control of routine behaviour is 
carried out via a hierarchical system of interactive schemata (analogous to Hilgard's 
cognitive control structures) operating according to a selection mechanism termed 
contention scheduling; this mechanism operates automatically and without consuming 
attentional resources. 
When novel demands are placed on the individual, a second, higher level system 
corresponding to Hilgard's executive ego can intervene to initiate behaviour via the 
active excitation or inhibition of schemata at the level of contention scheduling. This 
central cognitive structure, the supervisory attentional system, is both a monitoring and a 
controlling system in very much the same way as Hilgard's executive ego. Norman and 
Shallice (1986) suggest that the distinction between the selection of behaviours by the 
supervisory system and contention scheduling represents a phenomenological distinction 
between 'willed' and 'unwilled' acts respectively. 
The main difference between Hilgard's model of the cognitive system and that 
proposed by Norman and Shallice (1986) is that the higher level control structure is not 
needed to select lower level schemata when processing demands are routine. In the case 
of routine processing, environmental triggers and the competitive excitation and 
inhibition between schemata (contention scheduling) is sufficient to control behaviour. 
Broadly speaking, the supervisory attentional system intervenes only when existing 
schemata are unable or unsuitable to meet processing demands, as in the case of a novel 
situation or when a habitual response is no longer appropriate. However, the degree to 
which the supervisory system will be used in the control of behaviour is a function of 
both situational and dispositional factors, including the availability of attentional 
resources moderated by current processing demands, the perceived importance or 
difficulty of a situation, or other variables such as fatigue, intoxication or system 
damage. The occurrence of 'actions-slips' (Reason, 1979; Norman, 081) provides one 
example where an unplanned or inappropriate action is automatically triggered by 
34 
situational cues following a lack of monitoring by the supervisory system. The increased 
distractibility and inability to inhibit inappropriate behaviours characteristic of the frontal 
lobe syndrome result, according to Shallice (1988), from damage to the supervisory 
system. 
According to dissociated control theory (e. g. Bowers, 1990,1992; Woody & Bowers, 
1994), hypnosis represents one situation where supervisory system control is inhibited, 
leading to the hypnotised individual's over-reliance on situational cues for determining 
subsequent behaviour; in this regard, Woody & Bowers (1994) liken the hypnotised 
individual to the frontal lobe patient. By this view, the resulting dissociation between 
higher and lower levels of control allows for the automatic activation of suggestion- 
related schemata by the words of the hypnotist, at the level of contention scheduling (see 
figure 1.2). Put another way, the hypnotised individual relinquishes the conscious and 
volitional selection of behaviour to the hypnotist. As the experience of will is associated 
with schema-selection by the supervisory system, behaviours not selected in this way 
will be perceived as occurring involuntarily. Dissociated control theory proposes, then, 
that hypnotic behaviours are perceived as occurring involuntarily because they have not 
been performed intentionally. 
Dissociated control theory makes certain predictions regarding the operation of 
hypnotic responses that are in marked contrast to those offered by the executive 
fractionation version of neodissociation theory. As we have seen, the fractionation 
account proposes that competing tasks carried out during hypnosis will be performed less 
efficiently than outside hypnosis, due to the increased cognitive effort associated with 
maintaining an amnesic barrier. According to dissociated control theory, however, 
hypnotic suggestions are executed automatically and effortlessly by lower-level systems. 
Given that this is the case, one would expect the execution of hypnotic suggestions not to 
interfere with other tasks; if this supposition is correct, one might expect less dual-task 
interference during hypnosis given the appropriate suggestions. However, as we have 
seen, a number of studies have shown that the converse appears to be the case, that is, 
hypnotic dual-task interference is greater than without hypnosis (Knox, Crutchfield & 
Hilgard, 1975; Stevenson, 1976). In addition, studies by Bowers and Brenneman (1981) 
and Green and Lynn (1995) which have shown the effect predicted by dissociated control 
theory have used very easy secondary tasks, and have found no difference between 
hypnosis and passive attention conditions in any case. 
Although these findings would, at first glance, appear to contradict the dissociated 
control notion that hypnotically enacted behaviours are performed automatically, this is 
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not necessarily the case. I would argue that the performance of a task outside awareness 
(i. e. without executive control) will only reduce dual-task interference to the extent that it 
is actually possible to complete the task automatically. As most complex tasks, such as 
those used in dual-task methodologies, involve both automatic and executive elements 
(Tzelgov, Henik & Leiser, 1990), requiring the hypnotised individual to complete the 
task automatically can only have an adverse effect on their subsequent performance. 
Thus, in cases such as this, one would actually expect an increase in dual-task 
interference, and not the converse. I would argue, therefore, that the dual-task 
methodology is only of interest in this context when we are comparing the levels of 
interference associated with hypnotic and non-hypnotic means of achieving suggested 
behaviours. 
Two studies conforming to this paradigm have recently been reported. In the first, 
Miller and Bowers (1993) compared the effect of hypnotic analgesia and a stress 
inoculation procedure on a cognitively demanding competing task. If, as predicted by 
dissociated control theory, the level of analgesia achieved through hypnotic means is 
executed more automatically than that achieved via the stress inoculation procedure one 
would expect lower task-interference in the former case than the latter. Miller and 
Bowers found that hypnotic analgesia and stress inoculation showed a comparable 
reduction in cold-pressor induced pain, and both showed interference effects with the 
competing task. However, the competing task showed significantly more impairment in 
the stress inoculation condition, suggesting, in line with the predictions of dissociated 
control theory, that hypnotic analgesia is a relatively automatic process. 
More recently, Bowers and Woody (1996) used a variation of Wegner's (1989) 'white 
bears' paradigm to investigate the predictions of dissociated control theory regarding 
hypnotic amnesia. Wegner (1989) observed that subjects show a remarkable inability to 
suppress thoughts of a given item when instructed to do so, experiencing large numbers 
of mental intrusions of the to-be-ignored material; apparently the intentional attempt to 
suppress a given thought paradoxically brings the unwanted material to mind (see 
Wegner, 1994, for a more detailed account of this process). Following this line of 
reasoning, Bowers and Woody (1996) argued that if the dissociated control account of 
hypnotic amnesia is correct and amnesia is the result of an unintentional process, 
subjects should in this case show a significant decrease in the amount of white-bear 
intrusions. Results indicated that the amnesia suggestion was indeed successful in 
reducing the number of intrusions compared to conditions of waking and hypnosis 
without an amnesia suggestion, in support of the initial prediction. 
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Unlike neodissociation theory, Bowers' dissociated control theory concedes that social 
factors have an important role to play in explaining hypnotic phenomena. In a number of 
recent articles, Bowers and colleagues (e. g. Woody, Bowers & Oakman, 1992; 
Balthazard & Woody, 1992; Hargadon, Bowers & Woody, 1995; Woody, Drugovic & 
Oakman, 1997) have argued that social factors are particularly important in determining 
responses to the easier items (such as ideo-motor responses) on susceptibility measures 
such as the Harvard and Stanford scales; dissociated control, on the other hand, has a 
major role to play in explaining more difficult cognitive items such as amnesia, analgesia 
and hallucinations. In a recent study using a spectral analysis technique, for example, 
Woody et al (1997) showed how a measure of social suggestibility (using an alcohol 
placebo paradigm) correlated significantly with the easier but not the more difficult items 
on the Harvard scale, in support of their view. This finding has been replicated in our 
own laboratory (Frasquilho, R. Brown, Smith & Oakley, in preparation). Conversely, a 
study by Balthazard and Woody (1992) using similar techniques found that the more 
difficult items on the Harvard and Stanford scales are more strongly associated with 
absorption scores than the easier items. Following this finding, Hargadon, Woody and 
Bowers (1995) have suggested that the ability to become intensely absorbed in a given 
experience is one mechanism by which dissociated control might be brought about, 
although the two must be regarded as distinct processes in their own right. 
Two other studies concerning susceptibility may also be pertinent to the principles of 
the dissociated control model. Dixon, Brunet and Laurence (1990) and more recently 
Dixon and Laurence (1992a) have found that highly susceptibles. individuals are more 
prone to Stroop interference than low susceptibles, suggesting that susceptibility is in 
some way related to how automatically individuals' process language. Given that 
hypnotic phenomena are executed automatically by lower level systems as suggested by 
dissociated control theory, it seems plausible to expect that an everyday bias towards 
automatic processing should be related to the incidence of those phenomena. 
The dissociated control model of hypnosis is still very much in the early stages of its 
development, and one must be relatively cautious when attempting to draw any firm 
conclusions regarding its validity. However, it represents a considerable improvement on 
its precursor, neodissociation theory, in a number of important respects. First, it rejects 
the notion of an amnesic barrier, consequently distancing itself from the hidden observer 
phenomenon which for some is the major short-coming of the neodissociation model 
(e. g. Fellows, 1988). Second, while retaining its cognitive basis, it acknowledges that 
social factors play an important role in hypnotizability and the execution of hypnotic 
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responses. Third, it is conceived in terms of a wcll-rcspectcd model of bchavioural 
control developed within cognitive psychology and, on this basis, offers testable 
predictions with which to assess its validity. Finally, the small amount of empirical 
research conducted to test some of these predictions has, in most cases, supported the 
dissociated control view. For example, the work of Miller and Bowers (1993) and 
Bowers and Woody (1996) respectively suggest that hypnotic analgesia and amnesia 
appear to be more automatic than non-hypnotic means of achieving such effects. Work 
using spectral analysis techniques (e. g. Woody, Bowers & Oakman, 1992; Balthazard & 
Woody, 1992; Woody, Drugovic & Oakman, 1996) also seems to support the two- 
component view of hypnosis and hypnotizability offered by dissociated control theorists. 
Moreover, as we shall see, there is a certain amount of neuropsychophysiological 
evidence supporting its assertions also. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the dissociated control model also suffers from a number 
of short-comings. Although it acknowledges that social factors have an important role to 
play in explaining hypnotic behaviour, for example, it is not clear whether it goes far 
enough in this regard. According to dissociated control theorists (e. g. Woody, Bowers & 
Oakman, 1992; Balthazard & Woody, 1992; Hargadon, Bowers & Woody, 1995; 
Woody, Drugovic & Oakman, 1996) social factors are only important for the explanation 
of relatively simple hypnotic responses. However, a large number of studies have 
demonstrated that the occurrence and nature of more complex phenomena such as 
amnesia and analgesia are also sensitive to subtle manipulations in expectation and 
context (see e. g. Spanos, 1986). It is essential that the dissociated control model provides 
an account of why and how this is the case. 
Moreover, although the theory provides a relatively detailed explanation of how ideo- 
motor and challenge suggestions are performed (e. g. Woody & Bowers, 1994), this is not 
the case for other behaviours such as hallucinations, analgesia, amnesia and the like. 
Equally problematic, it is extremely difficult to reconcile the dissociated control model 
with the concept of self-hypnosis, which would, on the face of it at least, seem to require 
some form of higher-level control which is supposedly inhibited following the induction 
of hypnosis. 
In addition, the dissociated control account of hypnotic involuntariness is also not 
beyond question. As we have seen, dissociated control theory suggests that hypnotic 
behaviours are experienced as occurring involuntarily, being governed by automatic 
schema-selection at the level of contention scheduling. It is also worth recalling that the 
Norman and Shallice (1986) model suggests that the supervisory attentional system is 
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required only in situations that are novel or where lower level schemata are 
inappropriate; during routine situations, the process of contention scheduling alone is 
capable of directing behaviour. Given that both hypnotic behaviours and routine actions 
are executed automatically by the same contention scheduling mechanism, one must ask 
why the former are perceived as occurring involuntarily whereas the latter are not. 
Clearly, some revision needs to be made either to dissociated control theory or the model 
of behavioural control offered by Norman and Shallice (1986) to account for this. 
In summary, although the dissociated control model has much in its favour, a great deal 
of further work, both conceptual and empirical, needs to be done for it to provide a 
comprehensive account of hypnosis and hypnotic susceptibility. 
1.3.3 Sociocognitive theories 
The ego-psychological and dissociative accounts of hypnosis represent modem-day 
proponents of the traditional 'state' view of hypnosis. Such a view originated in the work 
of Mesmer and dominated hypnotic theorising in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. According to this school of thought, hypnosis is fundamentally different to 
ordinary waking, involving the implementation of a special state of psychological 
functioning characterised by unique cognitive, behavioural, phenomenological and 
physiological processes. Inspired by the work of White (1941; see Spanos & Coe, 1992), 
some more recent theorists have rejected this view, arguing instead that hypnosis is 
simply a complex personal interaction that can be explained in terms of the common- 
place processes of social psychology. By this view, the execution of hypnotic behaviours 
is, broadly speaking, the result of a normal process of social suggestion rendered unusual 
by popular accounts of the phenomenon. This so-called 'non-state' view has become 
increasingly popular in recent years and has been reformulated numerous times by 
different theorists over the last four decades. 
One of the earliest social-psychological accounts of hypnosis was Sarbin's (1950, 
1956) role-theory. According to this view, the hypnotic situation can be regarded as an 
on-going drama between two individuals playing the roles of hypnotist and hypnotised. 
The nature of this drama is determined by the individuals' perceptions concerning their 
roles, which are governed by their prior beliefs about hypnosis and the cues inherent 
within the hypnotic situation. The execution, or 'enactment', of hypnotic behaviours is a 
result of the subject's belief that such behaviours are appropriate to the role of a 
hypnotised individual. In other words, the hypnotic subject is behaving 'as if' they were 
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hypnotised in order to comply with the demands placed upon them by the hypnotic 
situation. 
Rather than being a passive automaton with little or no control over their behaviour - as 
suggested by dissociative models - the hypnotised individual by this view is an active 
agent who is consciously striving to fulfil the goal of behaving like someone who has 
been hypnotised. The apparently unusual nature of hypnotic behaviours is simply a by- 
product of the culturally derived and situationally reinforced belief that that is what 
hypnosis involves. Individual differences in hypnotic responsiveness are, by this view, 
the result of both situational variables and subject differences in motivation 11 9 
expectation, the ability to become engaged in the hypnotic role (as mediated by 
absorption and imaginative abilities), and their sensitivity to contextual demands (Coe & 
Sarbin, 1991). This is in stark contrast to more traditional state approaches to hypnosis, 
which typically view susceptibility as a stable personality/cognitive trait which is more 
or less uninfluenced by situational factors (Kirsch & Council, 1992). 
The role-theory account of hypnosis offered by Sarbin has been extremely influential 
within the field, with many investigators proposing similar accounts since this time (e. g. 
Barber, 1969; Coe, 1978; Diamond, 1974; Wagstaff, 1981,1986; Lynn, Rhue & Weekes, 
1989). Despite certain variations between these accounts, as Bowers and Davidson 
(1991) have noted, the similarities between them are far more apparent than the 
differences. For this reason I will concentrate largely on the work of Spanos (1982, 
1986) who has been possibly the most influential, and certainly the most prolific (see 
Bowers & Davidson, 1991), of contemporary social-psychological theorists, extending 
Sarbin's original position in a number of significant ways. 
Sarbin's original formulation may be criticised on the grounds that it focuses largely on 
the overt behaviours of hypnotic subjects and says little or nothing about their subjective 
experience of hypnosis. Many have argued that hypnotic subjects are not just behaving 
$as if' they were hypnotised, but actually believe in themselves that they are 
experiencing an authentic phenomenon (Ome, 1959). By this view, a subject report of 
hypnotic involuntariness reflects not just their compliance with situational demands in 
line with role perceptions, but a genuine belief that their behaviour has a non-volitional 
quality to it. As we have seen, dissociative theorists have argued that such a sense of 
In this context, motivation has been conceived on two levels: (i) the motivation to experience hypnosis 
and hypnotic phenomena; and (ii) the motivation to please the hypnotist by behaving like a 'good' subject, 
thereby fulfilling their part of the social contract which they have entered into by taking part. 
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non-volition results from the fact that hypnotic behaviours are the product of involuntary 
cognitive processes. 
While agreeing with the validity of involuntariness reports, Spanos (e. g. 1982,1986; 
Spanos & Coe, 1992) rejected the dissociation interpretation and offered an alternative 
account described in social-psychological terms. According to Spanos, the feeling of 
involuntariness that accompanies hypnotic suggestions is the result of a misattribution on 
the part of the hypnotic subject concerning the source of their behaviour while 
'hypnotised'12. This misattribution is a product, in part, of the subject's expectancy that 
involuntariness is a central feature of hypnotic responding, which is reinforced by 
situational cues such as the wording of hypnotic suggestions. By this view the arm- 
levitation suggestion "your hand is rising by itself', for example, carries with it an 
implicit request to experience any movement associated with the suggestion as being 
involuntary (Spanos, 1982). Thus, the role-demands of the hypnotic situation require the 
subject to feel, as well as to behave, as though they were hypnotised, a process which 
requires a considerable degree of self-deception (e. g. Spanos, 1986). In other words, 
although the hypnotised individual feels and behaves as though they are an automaton, in 
reality they are engaging in effortful, intentional behaviour; however, they are not aware 
of this fact (Lynn & Rhue, 1991b). 
Also contributing to this hypothesised misattributional. process is the hypnotic subject's 
use of certain cognitive strategies in the attempted execution of suggested behaviours. 
For example, in the case of an arm levitation suggestion, the use of, and subsequent 
absorption in, suggestion related imaginings (such as imagining the arm being pumped 
full of helium) diverts the subject's attention away from cues associated with volitional 
responding, and onto those that support a non-volitional interpretation (Spanos & Coe, 
1992). Such 'goal directed fantasies' are also regarded by some proponents of this view 
(although not Spanos; see Spanos & Gorassini, 1984) as being directly responsible for 
the overt behavioural response itself, following the idea that thinking about a particular 
action has the tendency to bring that action about (so-called 'ideo-motor action'; Arnold, 
1944). Attention-diversion strategies have also been posited to explain the occurrence of 
more complex phenomena such as hypnotic amnesia and analgesia (Spanos, 1986). 
The social-psychological assertion that hypnotic behaviours are the result of a process 
of social-suggestion that is moderated by situational, motivational and expectational 
factors has generated a vast amount of empirical research, with results largely supporting 
12 Scare quotes are used here to underline the fact that sociocognitive theorists reject the notion of hypnotic 
trance; in this context 'hypnotised' is simply a short-hand way of saying 'in the hypnotic situation'. 
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the social psychological view. The body of research findings relating to the 
sociocognitive view is too large to review in any detail here; for this reason only a small 
number of representative studies will be described - for a fuller account see Spanos and 
Chaves (1989). Moreover, a certain proportion of the research cited in support of the 
sociocognitive account has been based on attempts to invalidate relatively specific 
theoretical statements concerning experiments carried out by dissociation theorists (see 
e. g. Spanos, 1986). As the major substantive issues concerning dissociation models have 
been dealt with already, it would serve little purpose to review this research here. 
Early support for the sociocognitive stance was provided in a series of studies by T. X. 
Barber and his associates demonstrating that an hypnotic induction is actually 
unnecessary to produce supposedly hypnotic responses such as analgesia and amnesia; 
indeed, including an hypnotic induction appears to increase responsiveness to 
suggestions by only a very small degree (Barber, 1969; Barber, Spanos & Chaves, 1974; 
Spanos, 1982). Moreover, following the presentation of instructions designed to increase 
motivation, non-hypnotic subjects showed even greater increments in overt responsing to 
suggestions than a group receiving an hypnotic induction. The importance of motivation 
as a moderating variable is now widely accepted, and the use of such 'task-motivated' 
control groups (Barber, 1969) has become increasingly widespread within hypnosis 
research since this time. On this basis, virtually all behaviours previously attributed to an 
hypnotic 'trance' because of their apparently unusual or transcendent nature have, 
through repeated demonstrations, been shown to be equally possible without an hypnotic 
induction (see e. g. Spanos, 1982; Spanos & Coe, 1992). Perhaps more striking are the 
findings reported by Spanos and McPeake (1977; see also Spanos, Spillane & McPeake, 
1976) indicating that both hypnotic and task-motivated, non-hypnotic subjects report 
equivalent levels of involuntariness for the execution of suggestions also. 
Relatively simple contextual variables have also been shown to have a profound effect 
on the degree to which hypnotic subjects respond to suggestion. Balaschak, Blocker, 
Rossiter and Perin (1970), for example, found that hypnotic subjects show significantly 
fewer responses to suggestion when they believe the hypnotist to be inexperienced. 
Barber and Calverley (1965) found that subjects were significantly more or less 
responsive according to whether they were informed that a given induction was effective 
or ineffective. Barber and Calverley (1964,1965) found that subjects' responsiveness to 
suggestions could be enhanced simply by labelling the situation as 'hypnosis', even in 
the absence of any formal induction procedures. The view that labelling the context as 
hypnosis is more important than the nature or even the presence of an hypnotic induction 
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is bolstered by evidence showing that virtually anything described as hypnosis tends to 
produce 'hypnotic' effects. Studies using placebos (Glass & Barber, 1961), flashing 
lights (e. g. Kroger & Schneider, 1959), biofeedback (Council, Kirsch, Vickery & 
Carlson, 1983), alert inductions (Binyai & Hilgard, 1976), rapid inductions (J. Barber, 
1977) and direct vs. indirect suggestions (Lynn, Netifeld & Matyi, 1987) have all been 
shown to produce roughly equivalent levels of hypnotic responsivity. 
It has also been shown that the wording of suggestions is an influential factor in 
determining the nature of hypnotic responding. Spanos and Gorassini (1984), for 
example, assessed the notion that subjects interpret suggestions as implying that 
suggested behaviours will occur automatically and should be experienced as occurring 
involuntarily. Even in the absence of an hypnotic induction, Spanos and Gorassini found 
that subjects rated movements associated with suggestions as significantly more 
involuntary than those associated with direct instructions, in support of the 
sociocognitive view. Similar results have been reported by Spanos & Katsanis (1989). 
Most sociocognitive theorists have argued that contextual variables influence 
responsiveness by their effect on subject expectancies. A large number of studies have 
attempted to assess the influence of expectancies on subject response, with largely 
positive findings. Several investigators, for example, have shown that the manipulation, 
via bogus personality test feedback, of individuals' beliefs concerning their level of 
hypnotizability is a strong determinant of subsequent hypnotic responsivity (Saavedra & 
Miller, 1983; Wickless & Kirsch, 1989). Other studies have also shown that modifying 
individuals' expectancies can have profound effects on the degree to which they respond 
to suggestions. Wilson (1967), for example, examined the effect of expectancy 
modification on waking suggestibility. In this study, subjects were presented with 
waking suggestions for alterations in perceptual experience which were subtly confirmed 
by the experimenter's manipulation of environmental variables. For example, after 
presenting subjects with a suggestion for seeing the colour red, the experimenter 
gradually turned on a red light bulb that was surreptitiously hidden from the subjects' 
view. Such environmental manipulations produced substantial increases in waking 
suggestibility, presumably due to the fact that subjects consequently believed themselves 
to be more suggestible than they really were. In a carefully controlled partial replication, 
Vickery and Kirsch (1991) found a similar effect for hypnotic suggestibility, again 
confirming the role of expectancy in hypnotic responding. 
There is also a considerable body of evidence concerning the impact of expectancies 
on responses to specific hypnotic suggestions. One notable early example was reported 
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by Ome (1959), who informed one group of experimental subjects that arm catalepsy 
was a common characteristic of hypnosis, while not providing any specific expectancy 
information to the other. In subsequent hypnosis sessions, significantly more of the 
former group displayed catalepsy when tested for the phenomenon than did the latter. 
Similar findings concerning hypnotic amnesia have been reported by Young and Cooper 
(1972). A particularly striking example of this effect has been described by Spanos, 
Radtke and Bertrand (1984). In a study investigating hypnotic amnesia using the hidden 
observer paradigm, Spanos et al informed a group of eight highly susceptible subjects 
that they had two hidden parts, one aware of everything occurring in their right cerebral 
hemisphere, and the other aware of everything occurring in their left hemisphere. Half of 
the subjects were then informed that concrete and abstract words were stored in the left 
and right hemispheres respectively, while the other half were given the opposite 
information. Subjects were then asked to learn a list containing both abstract and 
concrete words. Following an hypnotic induction and a subsequent amnesia suggestion, 
the subjects' hidden observers were then contacted and asked to recall as many words as 
they could. Based on the expectancy information they had been given, subjects 
demonstrated selective amnesias according to which hidden part was contacted and 
which type of word was required for recall. In other words, those subjects who believed 
concrete words were stored in the left hemisphere showed no amnesia for these words 
when the left hidden part was contacted, and so on. A growing body of findings has 
confirmed that the effect of specific suggestions can be systematically manipulated by 
the use of expectancy information. Expectancy effects of this kind have been reported for 
amnesia breaching (Dubreuil, Spanos & Bertrand, 1983), the generality of amnesia 
(Spanos, Radtke & Dubreuil, 1982), and the nature of hidden observer reports of 
analgesia (e. g. Spanos & Hewitt, 1980; Spanos, Gwynn & Stam, 1983; Spanos, Radtke 
& Bertrand, 1984; Spanos, Flynn & Gwynn, 1988). 
Other studies have addressed the role of contextual and expectational variables on the 
subjective nature of hypnotic responses. Henry (1985; cited in Kirsch, 1991) showed that 
individuals' subjective reports concerning their first experience of hypnosis were largely 
determined by their beliefs about the phenomenon prior to the hypnotic session. For 
example, subjects rated time as passing either quicker or more slowly, the hypnotists's 
voice as nearer or further away and logical thought as either more or less difficult, 
according to what they believed constituted a genuine hypnotic experience. Lynn, 
Snodgrass, Hardaway and Lenz (1987) found that subjects' involuntariness ratings were 
significantly correlated with their pre-hypnotic beliefs about the ability of the hypnotist. 
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Such findings have been cited (e. g. Lynn & Rhue, 1991b) as supporting the view that 
Western cultures propagate the belief that involuntariness is a characteristic feature of 
hypnotic responding, which in turn dictates subjects' experiences of the phenomenon. 
Consistent with this view, a study by Lynn, Jacquith, Jothirathnam and Rhue (1987) has 
shown that a correlation between susceptibility and involuntariness reports is only found 
when subjects personally familiar with Western culture are tested, despite comparable 
levels of susceptibility between these and Eastern individuals. 
On the basis of this expectancy research, Kirsch (1985,1991; Kirsch & Lynn, 1997) 
has argued that all hypnotic behaviour is mediated by expectancy-related cognitive 
activity. According to Kirsch and Lynn (1997), most behaviour is executed automatically 
and effortlessly outside awareness and will therefore be experienced as nonvolitional 
unless the individual expects otherwise. Although individuals typically expect their 
behaviour to feel voluntary, the hypnotic situation is one which is associated with an 
abnon-nal sense of passivity and the loss of volitional control over one's behaviour. 
When an individual participates in a hypnosis experiment, this culturally mediated belief 
is activated and subsequent behaviour becomes subject to control by response 
expectancies. Although response expectancies and intentions are both types of response 
sets that prepare the individual for the automatic execution of behaviours (see Kirsch & 
Lynn, 1997; Lynn, 1997), the former can be differentiated from the latter in that 
behaviours executed in this manner are perceived by the individual as being outside their 
volitional control. Moreover, response expectancies tend to be self-confirming (Kirsch, 
1985) in that they tend to automatically bring about the subjective experiences that they 
refer to. When a particular hypnotic suggestion is given (e. g. arm immobilisation), the 
response expectancy generates the corresponding subjective experiences (i. e. arm 
stiffness) which in turn reinforces the expectancy thus producing the hypnotic behaviour 
(i. e. an inability to bend the arm) that is experienced as occurring involuntarily. 
Another avenue of research has concerned subjects' use of cognitive strategies in their 
attempt to achieve suggested effects. For example, Spanos (1986) has argued that the 
hypnotised individual's inability to recall following an amnesia suggestion is the result 
of an active effort to divert their attention away from target material. Supporting this 
contention, Spanos and D'Eon (1980) found that an attention-diversion strategy 
(counting backwards in threes) produced a similar degree of recall disorganisation to that 
found in partial hypnotic amnesics, undermining the dissociative view that recall 
disorganisation illustrates the hypnotised individual's loss of control over their normal 
recall processes. Other studies using non-hypnotic attention-diversion strategies to 
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investigate the nature of hypnotic amnesia have reported similar findings (e. g. Bertrand 
& Spanos, 1985). Spanos (1986) has also argued that a similar mechanism is in operation 
during hypnotic analgesia 
The concept of attention-diversion has also been posited to account for the sense of 
involuntariness that accompanies the execution of most successful suggestions. More 
specifically, Spanos and Coe (1992) have argued that the use of, and absorption in, 
suggestion-related imagery, or so-called 'goal-directed fantasies' (GDFs), increases 
involuntariness reports because they deflect subjects' attention away from those 
contextual cues which are normally used to define a given behaviour as voluntary. 
Supporting this assertion, a large number of studies have shown that subjects' ratings of 
hypnotic involuntariness are positively related to the degree to which they were 
engrossed in such GDFs (e. g. Spanos, 1971; Spanos & Barber, 1972; Spanos & 
McPeake, 1974; Spanos, Spillane & McPeake, 1976; Spanos & Gorassini, 1984; Lynn, 
Snodgrass, Rhue & Hardaway, 1987). Also consistent with this view is the evidence 
discussed previously indicating that individuals capable of becoming completely 
absorbed in imaginative and fantasy-based activities also show high levels of hypnotic 
responsivity (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974; J. Hilgard, 1974,1979; Crawford, 1982b; 
Lynn & Rhue, 1986; Roche & McConkey, 1990). 
It is clear that the sociocognitive account of hypnosis has received considerable 
empirical support for its assertions. A multitude of studies, too numerous to review in 
any detail here, have demonstrated that psychosocial factors have a profound role to play 
in determining (a) the extent to which individuals respond to suggestions and how the 
execution of those suggestions are experienced; and (b) the nature of responses to 
specific suggestions. Moreover, numerous studies have demonstrated that most 
apparently hypnotic responses can be achieved without any formal induction procedure, 
and that virtually any pattern of findings regarding hypnotic subjects' behaviour can be 
replicated by simulating or task-motivated controls given appropriate instructions. 
Indeed, the failure of state theorists to identify a single defining characteristic that is 
unique to hypnosis (see Kirsch and Lynn, 1995) underlines the legitimacy of the 
sociocognitive assertion that we must look to normal psychological processes for the 
explanation of hypnotic behaviour. While this may be the case, however, there are a 
number of reasons to believe that the sociocognitive account as it stands is an inadequate 
explanation of hypnosis and hypnotic susceptibility. For the sake of brevity, I will 
identify only what I consider to be the most substantive criticisms of the sociocognitive 
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account. For further discussion see Bowers and Davidson (1991) and the commentaries 
accompanying Spanos (1986). 
As we have seen, the sociocognitive account argues that hypnotic behaviours are 
simply the result of normal processes of social suggestion that are rendered unusual by 
factors such as expectancy and situational/contextual cues. In a bid to support this 
position, sociocognitive researchers have concentrated on providing examples of how 
subjects' responses to suggestions vary as a function of psychosocial factors. While this 
research has demonstrated the importance of understanding the role of these factors in 
the determination of hypnotic responses, it has not actually p rovided an account of how 
these responses are brought about. In short, the question of what suggestion, hypnotic or 
otherwise, actually is or how it works has not been addressed by sociocognitive theorists. 
Until this is done, the sociocognitive account will remain a description of the factors that 
moderate hypnotic responses and not those that mediate them. 
Furthermore, I would argue that, as they stand, the assertions made by sociocognitive 
theorists regarding how social factors moderate hypnotic responses are simply too 
descriptive to provide a particularly serviceable account of what is clearly an extremely 
complex phenomenon. Most sociocognitive theorists, for example, make repeated 
reference to supposedly explanatory constructs such as 'misattribution' (e. g. Spanos, 
1986) and the 'tacit interpretation of implicit contextual demands' (see e. g. Spanos & 
Coe, 1992). However, apart from identifying some of the factors which contribute to 
misattribution, sociocognitive accounts have not offered an explanation of how this 
process actually operates. Similarly, no account of what is meant by the tenn 'tacit 
interpretation' is provided, let alone any indication of how such interpretations might be 
arrived at. Moreover, the notion that hypnotised individuals are actively and effortfully 
striving to meet the demands of the situation whilst remaining unaware of this activity, a 
claim that is central to all sociocognitive models, has yet to be satisfactorily explained. I 
would argue, that in order to provide an adequate account of these processes, we must go 
beyond the relatively descriptive language of social psychology and offer explanations 
that are stated in more explicit cognitive terms. Although socially oriented research is 
crucial to our understanding of hypnosis, it can only ever represent one level of 
description which must be complemented by more mechanistic explanations of the 
phenomenon. 
On a more empirical note, the idea that absorption in goal-directed fantasies is 
instrumental in producing hypnotic involuntariness has been strongly challenged by a 
number of recent studies. Hargadon, Bowers and Woody (1995) addressed this 
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hypothesis using an hypnotic analgesia paradigm involving two groups, one presented 
with the analgesia suggestion accompanied by corresponding imagery, and the other 
presented with the suggestion alone. A manipulation check confirmed that the no- 
imagery group experienced significantly less images than those in the imagery group. 
Findings showed that the level of pain-reduction obtained was the same for both groups, 
indicating that imagery is not necessary for the execution of hypnotic analgesia. 
In a similar vein, a study by Zamansky & Ruehle (1995) has shown that suggestions 
are also just as effective when the hypnotised individual is engaging in imagery that runs 
counter to the suggested effect; imagining their arm being made of rubber, for example, 
had no effect on subjects' responses to an arm-immobilisation suggestion. In this case, 
precisely the opposite goal to that prescribed by the goal-directed fantasy was achieved. 
Also problematic for the goal-directed fantasy hypothesis are the findings obtained by 
Lynn, Nash, Rhue, Frauman and Stanley (1983) and Lynn, Snodgrass et al (1987). In 
these studies, both high and low susceptible subjects engaged in the same amount of 
fantasies and became absorbed in them to the same extent, despite the fact that the highly 
susceptible subjects showed significantly more overt and subjective responses to 
suggestions. These findings clearly dispute the hypothesis that goal-directed fantasies 
have a major role to play in explaining why subjects experience the execution of 
suggestions as involuntary. As a result, many theorists who remain loyal to a 
sociocognitive view have rejected the notion that goal-directed imagery is an essential 
part of hypnotic responding (e. g. Lynn et al, 1983,1987). 
Two other studies have disputed the attention-diversion account of hypnotic analgesia 
and amnesia also. First, the study by Miller and Bowers (1993) discussed previously 
demonstrated that hypnotic analgesia was significantly more effortless than a comparable 
stress inoculation procedure involving attention-diversion, despite equivalent levels of 
pain-reduction. This is a particularly important finding as it demonstrates that although 
apparently hypnotic effects can be achieved by non-hypnotic means, the possibility that 
they do so by different mechanisms is eminently plausible. Second, the study by Bowers 
and Woody (1996) using the 'white-bears' paradigm to investigate hypnotic amnesia 
showed that amnesia does not result from deliberate attempts to suppress thoughts as 
suggested by the sociocognitive account. 
Findings undermining the cognitive strategy hypothesis offered by the socio- 
cognitivists are particularly problematic for proponents of this view. Without recourse to 
the strategy notion, existing sociocognitive theory is unable to offer an account of how 
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suggestions are actually executed, and one of the main hypotheses underlying its account 
of hypnotic involuntariness is invalidated. 
Also difficult to explain in purely sociocognitive terms are the findings by Dixon, 
Brunet and Laurence (1990) and more recently Dixon and Laurence (1992a) showing 
that highly susceptible individuals process language more automatically than low 
susceptibles. It is unlikely that these results are due to highly susceptible subjects' 
interpretation of the desired outcome of the study -a common argument offered 
by 
sociocognitive theorists for observed relationships between susceptibility and 
cognitive/personality variables - as the experiment was conducted outside the hypnotic 
context. Moreover, it is highly implausible that high susceptibles would have been able 
to predict and enact the complex pattern of responses that were observed in this study 
(Dixon & Laurence, 1992b). The finding of a relationship between susceptibility and a 
cognitive variable with no face-valid association with hypnosis clearly seems to require 
an explanation that goes outside the bounds of much current sociocognitive theorising. 
1.3.4 The Neu ropsychophysiologica I Model 
Research investigating the psychophysiological concomitants of hypnosis and hypnotic 
susceptibility gained momentum in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Many studies during 
this period examined general differences in hemispheric dominance and EEG activity in 
hypnosis and waking conditions and between high and low susceptible subjects, with 
largely inconclusive results. Since this time, however, refinements in the methods used to 
assess brain activity have inspired a series of exciting developments within the field. 
While research in this arena continues to address simple hemispheric differences 
between subjects and conditions, researchers have now begun to examine more complex 
patterns of activation both between and within hemispheres during hypnotic rest and in 
the enactment of specific suggestions. In addition, greater efforts have been made to 
understand the cognitive differences between high and lows susceptible subjects and the 
physiological concomitants of such differences. Research within this sphere has yielded 
a number of theoretically important findings, and led to the development of the 
neuropsychophysiological model of hypnosis (Crawford & Gruzelier, 1992). 
According to the neuropsychophysiological model, hypnosis is an altered state of 
awareness during which highly susceptible individuals undergo shifts in cognitive and 
physiological activity involving the reallocation of attention. More specifically, 
following their intense absorption in the induction procedure, the susceptible individual 




mode; such a shift underpins a reduction in generalised reality testing (Shor, 1959) and 
an increase in dissociative experiences during hypnosis. Following the induction of 
hypnosis, specific suggestions bring about their effects through the reallocation of 
attention according to the nature of the suggestion given. 
As the neuropsychophysiological model was developed out of a broad programme of 
research there is a considerable body of findings in support of its postulates. Support for 
the notion that hypnosis involves increased focal attention has been provided in studies 
by Graham (1970,1975) indicating that high susceptibles experience a decrease in the 
deployment of attention in the peripheral portions of the visual field during hypnosis. In 
addition, a number of studies have shown that hypnosis involves an increase in mean 
high-range (5.5 - 7.5 Hz) theta power in both high and low susceptible subjects, with 
highs showing significantly greater theta than lows across frontal, temporal, occipital and 
parietal regions (e. g. Sabourin, Cutcomb, Crawford & Pribram, 1990; Crawford, 1990, 
199 1). High-range or 'class IF theta (Vogel, Broverman & Klaiber, 1968), particularly in 
the midline frontal region, has been associated with increased attention and performance 
on cognitive tasks (e. g. Nakagawa, 1988; Yamamoto & Matsuoka, 1990; both cited in 
Crawford & Gruzelier, 1992). Citing research using animal (e. g. Isaacson, 1982; cited in 
Crawford & Gruzelier, 1992) and human subjects (e. g. Arnolds, Lopes Da Silva, Aitink, 
Kamp & Boeijinga, 1980; cited in Crawford & Gruzelier, 1992), Crawford (1990) has 
argued that the increases in theta during hypnosis reflects the operation of the fronto- 
limbic attentional system in the disattention of irrelevant stimuli (see R. Miller, 1989, for 
a discussion of the role of the hippocampus in selective disattention). Supporting this 
contention, a study by Gruzelier and Brow (1985) demonstrated that high but not low 
susceptible subjects during hypnosis show increased habituation of the orienting 
response, also indicating superior focal attention for these individuals following an 
hypnotic induction. This finding has been replicated and extended by Gruzelier, Allison 
and Conway (1988), who also showed that increased habituation during hypnosis 
reliably differentiates between high susceptibles and motivated, simulating subjects. 
The notion that hypnosis subsequently involves a shift from an analytical to a holistic 
style of thinking was based on a number of early psychophysiological studies showing 
activity shifts from the left to the right hemisphere during hypnosis (e. g. Gur & Gur, 
1974; Morgan, Macdonald & Hilgard, 1974; Graham & Pernicano, 1979). It is widely 
held that the distinction between analytical and holistic processing corresponds to a gross 
functional distinction between the left and right hemispheres respectively (e. g. Springer 
& Deutsch, 1981). As Gruzelier (1988) has pointed out, however, many of these early 
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studies may be criticised on a number of methodological grounds concerning a lack of 
standardisation and the failure to consider the responses of low susceptible subjects. 
Since this time, a number of more methodologically sound studies have been carried out, 
with results largely supporting the latcrality hypothesis. A study by Gruzclier, Hancock 
and Maggs (1991), for example, showed that high and low susceptibles during hypnosis 
could be reliably distinguished on the basis of generalised delta, theta and alpha activity 
predominantly in the right hemisphere. McCormack and Gruzelier (1993) using a signal- 
detection paradigm found that high but not low susceptible subjects showed a significant 
left-field (i. e. right hemisphere) visual processing improvement during hypnosis. A study 
by Gruzelier and Brow (1985) showed that in high susceptible subjects electrodermal 
responses to tones were significantly lower on the left hand (i. e. right hemisphere) during 
hypnosis than in a waking condition, with low susceptibles not showing this difference. 
Also cited in support of the holistic-shift hypothesis, a study by Crawford and Allen 
(1983) found that high susceptible subjects' improvement on a visual memory 
discrimination task was accompanied by reports of a shift from a detail-oriented to a 
holistic processing strategy. 
Support for the idea that the shift towards more holistic, right hemisphere oriented 
processes during hypnosis is accompanied by the inhibition of the critical faculties of the 
left-hemispherc has been shown in two studies by Gruzelier, Brow, Perry, Rhonder and 
Thomas (1984). Using a haptic processing task, highly susceptible subjects in both 
studies showed a significant slowing in right hand (i. e. left hemisphere) sorting times 
following the induction of hypnosis, with the degree of slowing correlating significantly 
(r = 0.65; p :50.01) with susceptibility level. This effect was replicated by Cikurel and 
Gruzelier (1990) using an active-alert induction procedure (BAnyai & Hilgard, 1976). 
Studies by Gruzelier et al (1991,1993) have provided further support by showing that 
high susceptibles display a decrease in verbal memory performance, a task shown to 
preferentially involve the left hemisphere, during hypnosis. 
Other work has shown the importance of within-hemisphere dynamics during hypnosis 
also. Gruzelier & Warren (1993), for example, found that highly susceptible subjects 
showed a significant decline in performance on a word fluency task (involving left 
frontal regions) during hypnosis. However, using a design fluency task indexing right 
frontal function no such impairment was found during hypnosis, suggesting that the 
inhibitory effects of the hypnotic induction are specific to left frontal regions. In a more 
recent evoked-potential study by Gruzelier, Gray and Hom (cited in Gruzelier, 1996) a 
decrease in the difference between N120 components evoked by frequent and infrequent 
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tones from baseline, through early and then late stages of an hypnotic induction also 
strongly suggests that frontal regions have been inhibited by the induction of hypnosis. 
Taken together, Crawford and Gruzelier (1992; see also Crawford, 1994; Gruzelier, 
1996,1998) have argued that hypnosis is a three-stage process: (i) during the induction 
of hypnosis, focused attention on the words of the hypnosist with disattention to 
extraneous stimuli engages the supervisory attentional system of the frontal lobes, 
primarily in the left hemisphere; (ii) once attention has been sufficiently engaged, 
suggestions for relaxation bring about a left-frontal inhibition which corresponds to the 
hypnotic individual 'letting go' of critical thought and reality testing as they relinquish 
executive control to the hypnotist; and (iii) the subsequent use of suggestions for passive 
imagery engages posterior cortical sites, particularly in the right hemisphere (see 
Gruzelier, 1998). 
Given that this is the case, highly susceptible individuals will be those that (a) are best 
able to attend to the initial induction and disattend to extraneous stimuli; and (b) are best 
able to flexibly shift between states of awareness and cognitive strategies and structures 
in order to enter hypnosis (i. e. allow themselves to 'let go') and execute the suggestions 
given therein. There is a considerable body of evidence in support of both of these 
predictions. 
The notion that high susceptibles are good at sustaining attention sits well with the 
concepts of imaginative involvement and absorption, measures of which, as we have 
seen, consistently correlate with susceptibility. Since the development of these concepts, 
a number of studies have supported the relationship between attention and 
hypnotizability. Van Nuys (1973), for example, obtained results showing a negative 
correlation (r =-0.42) between hypnotizability and the number of intrusive thoughts on a 
meditational task requiring absolute concentration on one's breathing or a candle flame. 
More recently, Karlin (1979), using a modified version of a dichotic listening task, 
demonstrated that high susceptibles have superior selective attentional abilities compared 
to lows. In addition, Graham and Evans (1977) provide evidence to suggest that the 
ability to generate a series of random numbers, a difficult task thought to require 
considerable attentional abilities, is directly related to hypnotic susceptibility. Neither of 
these findings were replicated by Crawford, Brown and Moon (1993), however. 
Nevertheless, a number of studies (e. g. Wallace, Knight and Garrett, 1976; Crawford et 
al 1993) have shown that highly susceptible subjects are more responsive to ambiguous 
figures such as the Necker cube than their less susceptible counterparts. Evidence 
suggests that the number of apparent reversals reported in response to an ambiguous 
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illusion is directly related to sustained attention to salient cues in the figure, with 
selective disattention to non-salient cues (Power & Day, 1973; cited in Crawford et al, 
1993). Buttressing the idea that high susceptibles have superior attentional abilities are a 
number of findings revealing that highs show greater left-frontal cerebral activation 
outside hypnosis than lows (e. g. Gruzelier et al, 1984; Cikurel & Gruzelier, 1990; 
McCormack & Gruzelier, 1993; Gruzelier & Warren, 1993). As we have seen, left- 
frontal regions have been identified as the site of higher level supervisory attentional 
systems (e. g. Shallice, 1988; Pribrarn & McGuinness, 1992). 
The idea that high susceptibles are better able to shift between cognitive strategies and 
states of awareness than lows (i. e. have superior cognitive flexibility; Battig, 1979; 
Crawford, 1989) has also been supported by a number of findings. The studies by 
Crawford and Allen (1983) and Crawford et al (1989) mentioned previously have both 
been cited by Crawford (1994; Crawford & Gruzelier, 1992) as examples of high' 
susceptibles' ability to shift cognitive strategies to perform tasks. In addition, a series of 
studies utilising variants of the embedded figures task (EFT) using either words or 
complex figures (Priebe & Wallace, 1986; Wallace & Patterson, 1984; Wallace, 1988, 
1990; Wallace, Allen & Weber 1994) have shown that, regardless of the strategy most 
likely to yield superior performance on the task, high susceptibles consistently out- 
perform their low susceptible counter-parts. Zelniker (1989) suggests that the core 
element of the EFT is the ability to flexibly shift attention from one portion of the 
stimulus to another, using both holistic and analytic strategies to disembed figures or 
words. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that high susceptibles find it easier to 
get to sleep at night and are more prone to taking naps during the day than lows, 
suggesting they have a superior control over their ability to shift states of awareness 
(Evans, 1977). Moreover, as we have seen, high susceptibles appear to be more creative 
than lows (see e. g. Lynn & Sivec, 1992), also implying a superior cognitive flexibility in 
these individuals: as MacKinnon (1971) has noted "the truly creative person might be 
distinguished from the non-creative individual by his great ease in moving from more 
conscious and active to more unconscious and passive states" (p. 227). 
From the brief review provided here, it is evident that a considerable body of well- 
designed research studies support the predictions of the neuropsychophysiological model 
of hypnosis. The use of a broad range of cognitive, psychophysiological and 
neuropsychological. techniques to provide converging lines of evidence adds significantly 
to the considerable explanatory power of Crawford and Gruzelier's model. Furthermore, 
the use of these techniques has allowed the addition of a temporal element to their 
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theorising which other accounts of hypnosis lack. Moreover, by couching their work in 
terms of contemporary cognitive and psychophysiological research and theory they do 
much to bridge the divide between mainstream psychology and the field of hypnosis that 
has grown over the years. 
Despite its obvious explanatory power, the model of hypnosis offered by Crawford and 
Gruzelier cannot by itself provide a comprehensive account of the phenomenon however. 
Although it provides a detailed account of the cognitive and physiological markers of 
hypnosis and certain hypnotic suggestions, there is a clear explanatory gap between this 
and the way in which hypnotic phenomena are actually brought about. Furthermore, 
many studies in this area have not included appropriate control conditions and, as such, it 
is not clear whether any physiological changes occurring during hypnosis are unique to 
that situation 13 . Moreover, the model has very little to say about the way in which social 
factors influence the nature of hypnotic responses, and does not provide an account of 
the phenomenology of hypnosis. Clearly this is not what Crawford and Gruzelier set out 
to do when they developed the neuropsychophysiological model - they are simply 
providing one angle on a complex phenomenon which can be looked at in a number of 
different ways. 
However, certain aspects of the theory need to be clarified. For example, reference is 
made to concepts such as 'dissociation', 'holistic processing', and the 'reduction in 
reality testing' which are supposedly characteristic of hypnosis. As they stand, these 
concepts are ill-defined and for this reason are empirically as well as theoretically 
cumbersome; clearly work needs to be done to identify what these concepts actually 
mean in order to evaluate their explanatory adequacy. 
On a more substantive note, the research on which the neuropsychophysiological 
model is based exclusively uses a traditional hetero-induction involving relaxation and 
imagery. As Gruzelier (1998) himself has noted, such research is relatively limited in 
scope and, as such, the generalisability of these findings is not without question. In 
particular, one wonders whether the cerebral dynamics of self-hypnosis are similar to 
those involved in more traditional hetero-hypnosis. As with dissociated control theory, 
the assertion made by the neuropsychophysiological model concerning executive 
inhibition during hypnosis appears at odds with the existence of self-hypnosis which, on 
the face of it at least, would appear to require some level of executive control. One 
13 As the neuropsychophysiological model does not claim that this should necessarily be the case, this does 
not represent a substantive criticism of the model. The lack of control conditions does, however, limit the 
usefulness of the data in question. 
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possible explanation in keeping with the neuropsychophysiological model rests on recent 
findings concerning a dissociation in the effects of hypnosis on executive functions. A 
study by Kaiser, Barker, Haenschel, Baldeweg and Gruzclier (1997; cited in Gruzelier, 
1998) appears to indicate that hypnosis differentially affects the cognitive and affective 
executive functions of the anterior cingulate, as evidenced by a reduction in the 
psychophysiological indicators of error evaluation but not error detection processes. The 
finding that hypnosis inhibits some but not all executive functions suggests one possible 
explanatory route by which the neuropsychophysiological model (and, of course, 
dissociated control theory) might accommodate the existence of self-hypnosis. However, 
until research has addressed this question directly no firm conclusions can be drawn in 
this regard. 
1.4 Summary 
The selective review of hypnosis research and theory presented here provides a basic 
account of the most popular theories within the field at the present time: ego- 
psychological theory, neodissociation theory, dissociated control theory, sociocognitive 
theory and the neuropsychophysiological theory. An evaluation of the theories and the 
research that has been cited in their support has revealed that, while each may provide an 
account of certain aspects of hypnosis and hypnotic susceptibility, none of them alone is 
able to provide anything like a comprehensive account. 
In chapter two, a model of the cognitive system which captures the similarities between 
the different theories of hypnosis reviewed in this chapter will be presented; in chapter 
three, this model will then be applied to the understanding of suggestion, hypnosis and 
hypnotic susceptibility. On this basis, a preliminary model which attempts to integrate 
the different theories of hypnosis into a single explanatory framework will be presented. 
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CHAPTER TWO: A model of the cognitive system 
2.1 Introduction 
In chapter one, we saw how the ego-psychological, neodissociation, dissociated 
control, sociocognitive and neuropsychophysiological models attempt to explain the 
nature of hypnosis and hypnotic susceptibility, and the evidence which has been cited in 
their support. These accounts are commonly portrayed as theoretical opponents that are 
mutually incompatible (see e. g. Lynn & Rhue, 1991c; Fromm & Nash, 1992) and which 
must compete with one another for conceptual supremacy. Indeed, the 'great state 
debate' (Kirsch, 1992) that has plagued the field of hypnosis since the nineteenth century 
(Dixon & Laurence, 1992b) exists as a telling reminder of the conceptual divisions that 
still blight theorising within this sphere. A number of recent commentators (e. g. Kirsch 
& Lynn, 1995; Nadon, Laurence & Perry, 1991; Laurence, 1997; Nadon, 1997; cf 
Kihlstrom, 1997; Wagstaff, 1998) have, however, argued that such theoretical debates 
represent more of a historical legacy than any substantive conceptual incompatibility 
between the different accounts. According to this view, it is more likely that different 
theorists are simply looking at diverse aspects of the same phenomenon and providing 
accounts of hypnosis described in the terms most closely allied to the domain under 
scrutiny, be it the social, the cognitive or the physiological. Although different theories 
occupy different levels of the explanatory hierarchy, there is no need to suggest that any 
one theory is better than any other; which is the most useful is entirely dependent on the 
questions that one wishes to ask. 
What is important, however, is that the different levels of description correspond to one 
another in a consistent and meaningful way. As Nadon (1997) has pointed out, what the 
field needs is a unifying nomological network specifying how the social, cognitive, 
phenomenological and physiological aspects of hypnosis relate to one another, as a basis 
for the organisation of existing research and the generation of new hypotheses. In this 
chapter I will begin the process of specifying what such a nomological network might 
look like. 
2.2 The nature of the cognitive system 
Despite attracting widespread academic interest during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, the scepticism bom with the behaviourist revolution relegated the 
study of hypnosis to the periphery of mainstream psychology (Dixon & Laurence, 1991). 
Although hypnosis researchers have made considerable efforts to forge links between the 
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field of hypnosis and the wider psychological community since this time (see e. g. Sarbin, 
1950,1956; Hilgard, 1977,1986; Spanos, 1982,1986; Wagstaff, 1981,1986; Kirsch, 
1985,1991; Crawford & Gruzelier, 1992), the same cannot be said for those outside the 
field. One possible reason why the value of hypnosis research remains largely 
unrecognised in the broader academic domain might be that too little emphasis is placed 
on the insights that hypnosis and hypnotic phenomena can offer to an understanding of 
'normal' psychology. In this and the next chapter, I will outline an integrative model of 
hypnosis and suggestion which, through the use of research and theory from the field of 
cognitive psychology, attempts to redress the balance in this regard. In the following 
pages I aim to demonstrate (a) that the field of hypnosis stands to gain both conceptually 
and methodologically by conceiving hypnosis and suggestion in terms of contemporary 
cognitive psychology; and (b) that the study of suggestion and hypnosis raises a number 
of important issues with profound implications for cognitive psychology itself. The basic 
premise throughout is that hypnotic phenomena, while perhaps a little unusual 14 , are the 
product of ordinary psychological processes, and any account of them must be entirely 
described in these terms. By attempting to describe suggestion and hypnosis in terms of a 
contemporary cognitive psychological framework, it is hoped that greater 
communication and cross- fertilisation between these still relatively disparate fields may 
be engendered to their mutual benefit. 
In this chapter a model of the cognitive system will be presented, which will then be 
used as a framework for the explanation of suggestion and hypnosis in chapter three. 
Few of the ideas presented here are novel in their own right; the major change in 
emphasis lies in their combination and application to the understanding of hypnosis and 
suggestion. Although the account presented here is as much a model of cognition as it is 
a model of hypnosis, it should be noted that it is relatively descriptive from a cognitive 
standpoint, and provides more of a heuristic than a complete and tight description of the 
cognitive system. Nevertheless, as the basis for an account of hypnosis it is considerably 
more detailed than those provided by ego-psychological, neodissociation, dissociated 
control and sociocognitive theorists, and, I would argue, provides greater explanatory 
power and scope for hypothesis generation on this basis alone. Moreover, although the 
primary motivation for the current analysis is to provide an account of suggestion and 
hypnosis of use to researchers and theorists within that field, the integration of 
previously unrelated cognitive research, the emphasis that is placed on consciousness, 
14 In that they are not normally encountered outside the hypnotic situation. 
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and the implications of suggestion and hypnosis for its explanation and investigation, 
will hopefully offer something of interest to cognitive psychologists also. 
2.2.1 The Norman and Shallice model. automaticity and control 
As discussed in chapter one, the Norman and Shallice (1986) model of behavioural 
control has been particularly influential within the field of hypnosis in recent years, 
forming the basis of dissociated control theory and the recent sociocognitive view of 
Kirsch and Lynn (1997). It has also played a significant role in the development of the 
ideas presented here; in order to help elucidate the present position, this section begins 
with a reappraisal of the Norman and Shallice model. 
Norman and Shallice propose that the cognitive system is comprised of a large, 
distributed set of specialised processing systems under the guidance of a two-tiered 
cognitive control system. In routine situations, behaviours may be controlled exclusively 
by the operation of low-level cognitive control structures or schemata, which are 
triggered by cues in the internal and external environment in accordance with a 
contention scheduling mechanism. This is held to be an automatic process, requiring 
neither attention, awareness or volition for its operation. In the case of non-routine 
situations, however, where schemata are inappropriate or their triggering conditions are 
not present, a high-level supervisory attentional system may intervene to excite or inhibit 
schemata via the scheduling mechanism. The supervisory attentional system is a limited 
capacity structure and its operation requires attention, mental effort and volition. Its 
primary functions involve goal setting, planning, problem solving, decision making, and 
troubleshooting. 
The Norman and Shallice model has enjoyed considerable success in recent years and 
is supported by a growing literature in the fields of cognition and neuropsychology. In 
line with the dissociated control and recent sociocognitive theories, the model is viewed 
here as a useful starting point for the explanation of hypnotic behaviours. However, 
while the basic Norman and Shallice framework is broadly supported in this context, I 
would argue that there are a number of reasons why the model, in its present form at 
least, is unable to provide an adequate account of suggestion, hypnosis and hypnotic 
susceptibility. First and foremost, the intention of the Norman and Shallice model was to 
provide an account of the cognitive systems involved in the selection of behaviour. In 
this context we are interested in much more than simply the control of action, however. 
During hypnosis, suggestions call not only for hypnotic behaviours but also for hypnotic 
experiences, often requesting alterations in perception such as those involved in 
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suggestions for analgesia, hallucinations and the like. Indeed, explaining the 
phenomenological aspects of hypnosis is arguably the most important task for theorists 
working within this domain, particularly given the fact that hypnotic behaviours can 
easily be reproduced by simulating individuals. Although dissociated control theorists 
have appealed to the model as an account of the phenomenology of hypnotic behaviours, 
consciousness and subjective experience play only a small and relatively peripheral role 
in Norman and Shallice's theorising; the profound alterations in experience associated 
with the execution of certain hypnotic behaviours would seem to require an account 
which places much greater emphasis on the nature of perception and consciousness. 
A second problem with the Norman and Shallice model is the distinction that it makes 
between routine and non-routine behaviour, the former being controlled exclusively by 
automatic schema selection with the latter requiring the SAS for its management. As 
Jonides, Naveh-Benjamin and Palmer (1985) have noted, most complex behaviours, such 
as those often observed in the hypnotic situation, are comprised of numerous components 
and typically involve both higher and lower level control processes in their execution (cf. 
Tzelgov, Henik & Leiser, 1990; Uleman, 1989). In addition, the number of higher or 
lower level components that behaviours are comprised of will vary over the course of an 
individual's leaming history, with the number of automatic (i. e. routine) components 
increasing over time. Thus, rather than drawing a strict dichotomy between routine and 
non-routine behaviours, it makes more sense to view the two as opposite poles on a 
continuum described by the relative proportion of automatic and non-automatic control 
components comprising the behaviour in question (cf Uleman, 1989). By this view, the 
question of whether or not a particular complex hypnotic behaviour is automatic is 
relative rather than absolute (cf. Logan, 1988). The failure of both the 
neuropsychophysiological model and dissociated control theory to provide an adequate 
account of self-hypnosis arguably stems from having overlooked the importance of 
higher level processing in the management of complex behaviour'5. It is also important 
that one remains aware that many cognitive processes can be either automatic or 
controlled by higher level processes (see e. g. Posner, 1978); it is likely, therefore, that 
there will be both situational and individual differences in the degree to which a given 
behaviour is carried out in a routine or non-routine fashion. If we are to understand the 
control processes associated with hypnotic behaviours it is essential that such potential 
differences are taken into account. 
15 Although see section 1.3.4. 
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there are certain problems with the way that 
Norman and Shallice conceive of automaticity which challenge its use, at least in its 
present form, as an account of hypnotic behaviours. The central problem is well 
illustrated by the recent conflict between dissociated control theory and the 
sociocognitive model of Kirsch and Lynn (1997). According to dissociated control 
theory, hypnosis is one situation where the supervisory attentional system becomes 
inhibited, delegating the management of behaviour to lower level control systems at the 
level of contention scheduling. By this view, hypnotic suggestions bypass the 
supervisory system and serve to automatically activate sub-systems of control at the 
lower level. As the phenomenological sense of volition is associated with the operation 
of the supervisory system, behaviours controlled at the lower level will be experienced as 
non-volitional; in this way, dissociated control theory accounts for the sense of 
involuntariness that typically accompanies the successful execution of hypnotic 
behaviours. However, as Kirsch and Lynn (1997) have pointed out in their recent 
sociocognitive account of hypnosis, the Norman and Shallice model proposes that 
virtually all behaviours, at least in the case of routine situations, result from the 
automatic activation of lower level control systems. Given that this is the case, one may 
retain the notion that hypnotic behaviours are executed automatically without positing a 
state of supervisory system inhibition analogous to frontal lobe pathology; indeed, this is 
precisely what the sociocognitive model of Kirsch and Lynn (1997) maintains. By this 
view, hypnotic involuntariness is the product of a misattribution based on the 
individual's mistaken belief that hypnotic behaviours involve less control than normal 
ones. 
This conceptual dispute clearly highlights a fundamental problem with the Norman and 
Shallice model. On the one hand, the model postulates that the majority of behaviour is 
controlled automatically by lower level systems, while on the other it suggests that the 
phenomenological sense of volition is associated with higher level control. If this were 
true then one would expect all routine behaviour to be experienced as involuntary, which 
is clearly not the case. It is this inconsistency that underlies the conceptual problems 
associated both with the Norman and Shallice model and dissociated control theory 
which relies upon it. In order to accommodate this fact, Kirsch and Lynn (1997) argue 
that the sense of volition is not a product of whether a behaviour has been controlled 
automatically or not, but rather is an attribution based on the individual's perception of 
the causes of their behaviour. Clearly, however, this goes outside the bounds of the 
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Norman and Shallice model, which obviously requires revision if it is to take the notion 
on board. 
This conceptual problem with the Norman and Shallice model is a product of its 
reliance on the traditional view of automaticity and control (e. g. LaBerge & Samuels, 
1974; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Hasher & Zacks, 1979) 
derived from research into attention that posits a central processing system with limited 
resources (e. g. Kahneman, 1973). According to the traditional view, automatic and 
controlled processes occupy opposite sides of a mutually exclusive functional dichotomy 
based on four criteria: awareness, attentional efficiency, intention and control (see Bargh, 
1989,1994). Automatic processes are those that occur outside awareness, with little or 
no attentional effort, are involuntary in that they are triggered without intention, and are 
outside the direct control of the individual. Controlled processes, on the other hand, are 
conscious, intentional, consume attentional resources, and are controlled directly. For a 
process to be defined as automatic it must meet all four criteria; if it does not then it is a 
controlled process by definition. 
Despite the popularity of the traditional model of automaticity, the validity of this view 
has recently been called into question by a number of commentators (e. g. Logan, 1988; 
Bargh, 1989). The principal difficulty with the traditional dichotomy between automatic 
and controlled processes is cogently expressed by Bargh: 
... attention, awareness, intention, and control do not necessarily occur together in an all-or-none fashion. They are to some extent independent qualities that may appear in various combinations. As there is ample 
evidence that automatic processing is not unitary, such that all of its component properties do not co-occur, 
so also there are no compelling theoretical reasons to believe in its unitary nature (1989; p. 6). 
Rather than being a unitary construct as suggested by the traditional view, the concept of 
automaticity captures a range of related processes that vary in the degree of 
effortlessness, control, awareness, intentionality and attentional requirement associated 
with their operation (see Bargh, 1989, for a discussion of this research). Without further 
qualification, the suggestion made by Norman and Shallice that the operation of low 
level control systems is automatic is simply too vague, and is responsible for the kind of 
conceptual trap which dissociated control theory has unwittingly fallen into. The 
methodological implications are clear: whether a particular behaviour requires attention, 
effort, awareness or control is an empirical rather than a conceptual issue, and one that 
requires the assessment of each of the four factors in an independent and systematic 
fashion based on careful task analyses. The fact that this has not been done in recent 
research inspired by the dissociated control and sociocognitive theories may go some 
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way towards explaining the equivocal findings obtained in this regard (see Ruehle & 
Zamansky, 1997). 
2.2.2 Memo[y-based views of automaticity 
The conceptual problems associated with the traditional view of automaticity have 
been addressed in a number of recent theoretical models of the concept. The modal view 
of automaticity as a phenomenon of attention (e. g. LaBerge & Samuels, 1974; Shiffrin & 
Schneider, 1977; Norman & Shallice, 1986) regards the development of automatic 
processing as involving a general reduction in the amount of attentional resources 
required for a process to operate. Recent approaches to automaticity, however, have 
adopted a contrasting view in which the concept has been described more as one of 
memory than attention. According to proponents of this view (e. g. Anderson, 1982; 
Schneider, 1985; Logan, 1988), when an individual attempts to learn a novel task, a set 
of general-purpose problem solving algorithms are employed to assess the nature of the 
task and guide behaviour accordingly. As experience with the task increases so 
appropriate responses are learned, such that on subsequent attempts the individual can 
either complete the task via the use of general-purpose algorithms, or alternatively by 
retrieving the appropriate solution from memory. By this view, it is this transition from 
algorithm-based performance to performance based on the single-step retrieval of 
memory traces that characterises the development of an automatic process (e. g. Logan, 
1991; 1992), and not, as is traditionally held, a reduction in the attentional resources 
required for a process to operate. 
According to the memory-based view, automatic and non-automatic processes are 
simply different rather than opposite sides of a processing dichotomy as suggested in the 
traditional model. What defines a process as automatic is whether or not it is based on 
the direct retrieval of information from memory, rather than whether it can occur without 
attention, effortlessly, unconsciously, or unintentionally. Most automaticity-as-memory 
(Logan, 1991) theorists retain many elements of the traditional model, however. For 
example, automatic processes are still regarded by many proponents of this view as 
occurring rapidly, effortlessly and without awareness. Similarly, the operation of general 
purpose algoritluns is regarded by most as being a time-consuming and conscious 
process requiring sustained, focal attention and mental effort. However, according to this 
view these characteristics are due more to the differing nature of the cognitive operations 
which underlie automatic and non-automatic processes rather thad the amount of 
attentional resources required for them to occur. In this way, the memory view retains 
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the ability to account for the same range of qualitative findings as earlier models, without 
the associated conceptual problems (see Logan, 1988,1991, for a general discussion of 
the automaticity-as-memory position and its relation to more traditional views). 
It is proposed here that if we are to retain something like the Norman and Shallice 
model as an account of hypnotic behaviours then it must take on board the insights 
provided by memory-based views of automaticity, such as that offered by Logan (1988). 
Broadly speaking, Logan's account is compatible with the distinction between higher 
and lower level control processes adopted in the Norman and Shallice model. Shallice 
and Burgess (1996), for example, suggest that the operation of the supervisory 
attentional system in many ways resembles a problem-solving process based on multi- 
step general purpose routines. Such a notion clearly accords well with the definition of 
controlled processing offered by Logan (1988). Similarly, the direct activation of 
schematic information by environmental triggers corresponds closely with the idea of the 
single-step retrieval of representations that characterises the operation of automatic 
processes in Logan's account. As such, the Norman and Shallice model may adopt the 
view of automaticity offered by Logan without losing its basic theoretical structure; in so 
doing it would attain greater conceptual and mathematical16 precision, whilst avoiding 
the pitfalls that lie in wait for models that are based on the traditional 
automatic/controlled dichotomy. Such an integrated view is endorsed here. 
There is one further conceptual advantage of adopting this type of integrated approach 
which is of relevance here. In the traditional automatic/controlled dichotomy embraced 
by the Norman and Shallice model, the fact that certain processes normally performed 
automatically may be subject to conscious control (see e. g. Posner, 1978) was accounted 
for by relating control to the deployment of attentional resources. The degree of attention 
that an individual pays to a task directly determines how controlled their performance 
will be. Whilst accounting for certain qualitative differences, such a notion is unable to 
explain performance differences in situations where the amount of attention devoted to a 
task may be equal across subjects; one conceivable example might be the difference 
between expert and novice performance. The model of automaticity offered by Logan 
(1988) does not suffer such an explanatory shortcoming, however. According to Logan, 
the development of automaticity involves the laying down of memory traces which, once 
sufficiently numerous and well established, may support performance on a task which 
has previously required the operation of controlled processing algorithms for its 
16 See Logan (1988) for a demonstration of how the memory-based view provides a powerful account of 
the quantitative findings concerning the development of automaticity. 
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completion. Despite the possession of adequate memory representations to support 
automatic performance, however, the individual remains capable of using controlled 
processes to approach the task. Thus, performance may be either automatic or controlled 
depending on the processing circumstances of the time. By this view, the difference 
between expert and novice performance is accounted for by suggesting that experts and 
novices differ in the way that they perfonn tasks, that is, via the use of memory retrieval 
and algorithm-based processes respectively. Thus, although the same 'amount' of 
attention might be paid to the task in each case, the direction and nature of attention will 
differ significantly between the two. Such a view is compatible with the notion that there 
are situational and individual differences in the degree to which behaviours are 
controlled automatically or by higher level processes. 
2.2.3 Perception, automatic inference and the construction of consCiousness 
In the previous section it was suggested that the Norman and Shallice model could 
attain greater conceptual precision by adopting the Logan (1988) model of automaticity. 
As will hopefully become apparent in this section, Logan's model also offers a useful 
starting point for incorporating the concepts of perception and consciousness within the 
Norman and Shallice model. 
The question of how the cognitive system interprets the environment is a complex and 
multi-faceted issue reflected by the volume and diversity of research within the field of 
perception. The perceptual process as a whole, that is, from the receipt of physical 
information by the sensory apparatus to the conscious recognition of a stimulus by the 
perceiving organism, involves a series of computational stages whereby information is 
reduced, transformed and ascribed meaning by the cognitive system (see e. g. Marr, 1982; 
Kosslyn, 1980,1987). Lower-order perceptual processes, such as those involved in 
figure/ground segregation and parsing in the case of visual perception, are typically 
performed on the basis of stimulus properties alone (Kosslyn, 1987). At higher levels, 
where the perceptual units correspond to objects and their parts, information makes 
contact with representations derived from prior experience as a basis for perceptual 
classification, semantic analysis and, ultimately, conscious recognition (see e. g. Marr, 
1982); it is at this level that the perceptual process is influenced by 'top-down' or 
conceptually driven factors such as expectation and set. Although lower-order 
computations play a significant role in determining the nature of conscious percepts, in 
this context our interest is largely limited to high-order perceptual processes: it is here 
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that suggestions for alterations in perception will exert their influence on the perceptual 
process. 
Once lower-order perceptual analyses have been performed, the resulting information 
is passed on to associative memory where it is encoded for recognition (Kosslyn, 1987). 
According to the present model, representations of the world derived from previous 
experience are distributed throughout an associative memory network as patterns of 
activation between network nodes that broadly correspond to features of the 
environment. The encoding process serves to activate the appropriate nodes within the 
network providing a basis for recognition. According to Logan (1988), this process is the 
inevitable and automatic consequence of attention being paid to a stimulus, a concept 
which he has termed "the assumption of obligatory encoding". Following Logan's 
second assumption, that of obligatory retrieval, encoding of a stimulus also serves to 
automatically retrieve everything associated with that stimulus in the memory network. 
This parallel spreading of activation within associative memory may be viewed as an 
inferential process17 by which the cognitive system automatically computes an 
interpretation of the environment for the subsequent control of action (cf Smolensky, 
1988; Hinton, 1990; Sloman, 1996). This interpretation, which is a product of the 
interaction between existing knowledge and stimulus information, provides the system 
with (a) an understanding of the situation and what it involves; (b) what to expect and 
therefore what to attend or disattend to; and, most importantly (c) what to do and when. 
This process provides the cognitive system with a rapid and efficient method for the 
control of routine behaviour, requiring little or no mental effort and only a modicum of 
attention for its operation. 
Given that this process is somewhat chaotic, in that it involves multiple representations 
being active simultaneously and in a constant state of flux, the question remains as to 
why subjective experience is perceived as a coherent and unitary whole. According to 
Marcel (1983), the activation of representations actually serves to suggest an array of 
alternative interpretations of the environment which are activated in parallel and prior to 
awareness. These so-called perceptual hypotheses are organised representations of 
perceptual and categorical information stored in memory and are analogous to the 
schemata of Norman and Shallice. Once generated, these hypotheses are matched to 
temporally defined segments of sensory information in a search for the best-fitting 
interpretation; this interpretation subsequently serves to parse the relevant sense data into 
17 Indeed, there is a considerable body of literature concerning the inferential properties of associative 
networks (see Slornan, 1996). 
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an integrated perceptual whole corresponding to the individual's conscious percept. 
Conscious representations do not, therefore, possess a one-to-one correspondence with 
those used and derived by sensory and cognitive systems; rather they represent one way 
of organising sensory information out of a number of possible alternative organisational 
schemes (cf. Gheorghiu & Kruse, 1991). Moreover, the apparent unity and inevitability 
of conscious percepts conceals the multiple unconscious interpretations that have taken 
place in order to provide meaning to what is essentially ambiguous input. 
The essence of Marcel's exposition is that consciousness is a construction (cf. 
Ornstein, 1986; Chapman & Nakamura, 1998; Mandlcr & Nakamura, 1987) that is a 
product of the organisation placed on in-coming sensory information by existing 
representations. Which representations or hypotheses are selected to organise sense 
information is dependent on a number of factors, including the nature of the sense data 
received, its relative match to the representations competing for the control of 
experience, and how well learrit the representations are. In addition, the selection of 
hypotheses can be biased in a top-down fashion through the allocation of attention. Thus, 
what the individual perceives at any one time is an inference determined by the complex 
and dynamic interaction between situational features, existing knowledge and current 
processing concerns. Importantly, however, behaviour may be controlled prior to or 
without the process of hypothesis selection occurring. 
Assuming the validity of this account, what cognitive system systems might be 
responsible for the selection of hypotheses which provides the basis for the integration of 
information underlying consciousness? One plausible candidate might be the low level 
attentional systems described by Shallice (1988). According to Shallice (1988), the 
cognitive system requires some way of prioritising processing operations in order to 
reduce the demands placed on the limited resources available to it. Shallice suggests that 
this function might be performed, at least in part, by a series of de-centralised control 
structures or low level attentional systems 18 , which serve as a gateway between the 
parallel processing of information at lower levels of the cognitive system and the serial 
processing of information at higher levels; in the case of the Norman and Shallice (1986) 
model, this higher level processing would be performed by the supervisory attentional 
system. The notion that low level attentional systems serve as an interface between 
parallel and serial processing is clearly consistent with the claims of Marcel (1983). Also 
in line with Marcel's account, it is likely that low level attentional systems operate by 
18 Of which there are probably several, each relating to specific domains (e. g. vision). 
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integrating the available data into a unitary whole before passing it on for further 
processing, in order to retain the most information in as economical a way as possible. 
Moreover, Shallice (1988) has suggested that damage to a low level visual attentional 
system might be responsible for the deficits associated with visual neglect, closely 
paralleling Marcel's (1983) own position. 
2.2.4 A model of the cognitive system 
Figure 2.1 shows a diagrammatic representation of the cognitive system based on the 
discussion in the preceding sections. The similarities between this model and that 
provided by Norman and Shallice are readily apparent. In line with Norman and Shallice, 
it is proposed that the cognitive system is comprised of a large distributed set of 
specialised processing structures managed by a hierarchically organised cognitive control 
system. At the lower19 level, behaviour is controlled by the automatic activation of 
representations following the receipt of input from the stimulus environment. Lower 
level processing is regarded here as a default mode of cognition that is fundamental and 
basic to all cognitive activity; as such, it provides the foundation for the more complex 
processing operations associated with processing at the higher level. Although higher 
level systems are ultimately constrained by the input that they receive from lower level 
systems, they in turn serve to co-ordinate lower level activity allowing behavioural 
flexibility and the ability to deal with novel situations. 
The lower level control of behaviour is based on the automatic activation of 
behavioural representations. The basis for this process is the obligatory encoding of 
stimulus information following attention to the stimulus environment (Logan, 1988); the 
activation of the corresponding perceptual representation by the encoding process serves 
to automatically retrieve associated representations through the spreading of activation 
throughout associative memory (Logan, 1988). This process subserves recognition of the 
stimulus situation, which is an inference based on the relationship between existing 
19 The distinction between 'higher' and 'lower' levels of cognition brings with it certain unfortunate 
connotations, in that the term lower may be taken as implying that processing at this level is in some way 
inferior to its higher level counter-part. Tbis, of course, is not the case, as higher level systems are 
ultimately dependent on processing at the lower level for their operation. The higher/lower distinction is 
used here, following much cognitive theorising (see e. g. Shallice, 1988), as a convenient spatial metaphor 
which captures the hierarchical nature of the cognitive system. , 
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knowledge and stimulus information (cf. Marr, 1982; Kosslyn, 1987; Smolensky, 1988; 
Hinton, 1990; Sloman, 1996). The results of this process act as triggering input to the 
network of behavioural representations (i. e. thought and action schemata), which are 
executed when threshold activation levels are reached; this is analogous to the operation 
of the trigger data-base in the Norman and Shallice model. Behaviours executed on the 
basis of memory retrieval alone are regarded as automatic (cf. Logan, 1988). It is 
assumed that behavioural representations are mutually inhibitory, endowing the system 
with a mechanism for preventing the activation of conflicting behaviours; this 
corresponds to the contention scheduling mechanism proposed by Norman and Shallice 
(1986). 
In the present model it is assumed that, at its most basic level, this entire process 
requires only low level attentional systems for its operation. Low level attentional 
systems exist at the interface between the internal and external environment and co- 
ordinate activity between the two. Thus, in the situation where behaviour x is to be 
executed on the receipt of information y, low level attentional systems monitor the 
environmeneo for y-related information (as specified by the prior activation of x), which, 
when received, serves to define the parameters for the subsequent implementation of x 
accordingly. This process, which is rapid, dynamic and highly efficient, provides the 
system with a basis for the adaptive control of thought and action in situations with 
which it is- at least relatively familiar. At its purest level, it requires only that low level 
attention be paid to the stimulus environment for its operation; as such, it is not 
demanding of high level attentional resources or mental effort, and need not necessarily 
be conscious. Rather, the control of behaviour at this level is best regarded as an intuitive 
process which requires non-conscious rather than conscious awareness. The term non- 
conscious awareness has been chosen to indicate that low level activity need not 
necessarily be unconscious in the strict sense; rather, the individual may be aware on an 
intuitive (i. e. feeling) level of the operation of lower level systems, but be unable to put 
their intuitions into words. 
In order to prioritise processing operations, low level representational activity 
generated by stimulation from the internal and external world serves to suggest a number 
of alternative interpretations of the overall environment, or so-called perceptual 
hypotheses (cf Marcel, 1983). The perceptual hypothesis which provides the best 
interpretation of the current state of affairs (i. e. most representative and economical) is 
11 it is important to note that the present model uses the term environment to refer to activity in both the 
external stimulus world and the internal representational world. 
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selected by low level attentional systems and subsequently serves to synthesise sensory 
information into a coherent whole according to the organisational scheme provided by 
the perceptual hypothesis. This information is then passed onto higher level systems for 
further processing; at this point the information becomes the individual's conscious 
percept. 
Once information has been passed to higher level systems it is subject to numerous 
manipulations and transformations in order to meet current processing concerns. 
Following Norman and Shallice (1986), higher level processing operations 
in the present 
model are governed by the supervisory attentional system (SAS), a 
limited capacity 
structure associated with attention and mental effort; in addition, 
it is proposed that the 
operation of the SAS corresponds to conscious awareness in the strict sense, 
in that the 
information received and used by it is reportable by the individual2l. The SAS comprises 
a complex set of sub-systems working in concert to manage numerous high level 
processes including trouble shooting, behavioural inhibition, planning, goal setting, 
decision making and problem solving (for recent theoretical developments in this regard 
see e. g. Burgess & Shallice, 1996a, b; Shallice & Burgess, 1996). Unlike low level 
attentional systems which have direct control over the representations underlying 
perception and action, the SAS operates indirectly by setting up temporary schemata 
specifying the type of representations required for its purposes (Burgess & Shallice, 
1996b; Shallice & Burgess, 1996); as such, the processing operations available to the 
SAS are ultimately constrained by the information that it receives from low level 
systems. Nevertheless, the SAS serves to confer a level of organisation upon lower level 
systems, ensuring that the long term goals of the system are met and behavioural 
standards are kept within acceptable limits. Thus, the activity of low level attentional 
systems and the representations under their guidance is constrained, to an extent at least, 
by the moderating input they receive from higher level systems also. 
The SAS is required when the operation of existing representations under the guidance 
of low level attentional systems alone are unable to meet the processing demands of the 
situation. In novel situations, for example, where appropriate representations have not 
been formed through learning, the SAS intervenes to guide behaviour on the basis of 
general purpose problem solving algorithms (Shallice & Burgess, 1996; cf. Logan, 
1988). Extending the basic Norman and Shallice Position, however, it is proposed that 
21 Nevertheless, the quality of information received by the SAS is likely to vary considerably and, thus, so too will the individual's reports of it. Moreover, whether or not the individual will be able to provide an accurate description of the information received by the SAS is probably dependent upon factors that are more or less independent of the conscious status of it. 
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even relatively routine (yet complex) behaviours require the SAS at certain points for 
their successful operation. For example, in the case of visiting a restaurant, although 
many of the component behaviours may be executed on the basis of the automatic 
activation of representations alone, at certain critical junctures, such as when food is to 
be ordered, the SAS must intervene to make a decision before automatic behavioural 
control can resume. The extent to which the SAS is required is dependent on how many 
of the component processes in a given behavioural sequence can rely on automatic 
processing alone. This will vary according to the nature of the behaviour in question, 
how well learnt the behaviour is, and the interaction between the two. That is not to say, 
however, that a behaviour (or one of its components) that is typically automatic will 
necessarily be performed in this way: even though a behaviour has been well leamt, the 
individual retains the option to perfann it on the basis of higher level processes if they so 
wish (Logan, 1988), despite the fact that this may be inadvisable (Norman & Shallice, 
1986). Conversely, although certain behavioural. components may normally be executed 
by the SAS, the individual may still be able to provide an adequate response on the basis 
of automatic processing. Which mechanism the individual chooses will depend in part on 
the processing circumstances of the time: when under a heavy cognitive load, for 
example, the individual may be forced into responding automatically. In addition, the 
degree to which the SAS or lower level processes are relied upon to control behaviour is 
subject to individual differences in higher and lower level processing preferences and 
abilities. 
2.2.5 Higher and lower level 'modes' of processing 
Following the Norman and Shallice model, it has so far been suggested that the 
cognitive system is subject to control at two levels, higher and lower. In line with 
Norman and Shallice, the central premise of the current model is that there are 
fundamental differences in the way in which behaviour is controlled at each of these 
levels. However, the current model also asserts that there are reliable differences in the 
relative degree to which individuals rely on higher or lower level control processes in the 
everyday management of behaviour. By this view, two different individuals in 
comparable situations may differ in the degree to which their behaviour is controlled by 
higher or lower level processes, despite equivalent levels of learning. Given that 
individuals differ in terms of processing bias, it is likely that such differences will 
manifest themselves not only in the automaticity of behaviour, but also on a more 
general level in the types of cognitive and personality attributes that individuals display. 
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Accordingly, the current model extends the basic Norman and Shallice position by 
proposing that, in addition to differences in behavioural control, there are also more 
general psychological characteristics associated with higher and lower level processing. 
A distinction between higher and lower level 'modes' of cognition will therefore be 
made here. 
This distinction between higher and lower level modes of cognition is based partly on 
converging evidence from research and theory concerning the perception and 
categorisation of multidimensional stimuli. Consider three hypothetical stimuli, A, B and 
C, that vary on two dimensions within psychological 'space', such that A and D differ on 
one dimension, B and C differ on the second dimension, and A and C differ on both (see 
figure 2.2). We know the perceived similarities of A. B and B. C (i. e stimuli that differ on 
only one dimension); what is the perceived similarity between A and C, stimuli that 
differ on both dimensions? If we assume that the perceived similarity between stimuli is 
equivalent to the distance between them on this diagrammatic representation, then, 
according to standard Pythagorean laws of geometry, the perceived similarity between A 
and C is given by the formula dy = (d., 2+ d. )"'; this formula is known as the Euclidean 
metric and may be regarded as a holistic judgement as it calculates perceived similarity 
on the basis of family resemblance between stimuli. 
If, however, we were unaware of the laws of Pythagoras, we may believe that the 
perceived similarity between two stimuli that differ on two dimensions is given by the 
sum of the perceived similarities between the stimuli that differ on only one of these 
dimensions, that is d., y = d, + dy; this formula has been described as the city-block metric, 
as the way in which we get from one point in psychological space to another is 
analogous to the fashion in which one must traverse the streets of a city. This may be 
regarded as an analytical method of perceived similarity calculation, as it is based on the 
separation of dimensional values prior to their summation (for a more detailed discussion 
from which this was taken see Gamer, 1974). 
A considerable number of studies in this area have employed tasks based on this 
concept to assess which perceptual metric subjects use when perceiving stimuli that 
differ on two dimensions. An important step-forward in this research was the realisation 
that the nature of the stimulus dimensions themselves dictate, to an extent at least, the 
nature of the processing operations by which the stimulus is perceived (Shepard, 1964; 
Lockhead, 1972; Garner, 1974). A substantial body of evidence demonstrates that certain 
dimensional combinations (such as those between values of saturation and brightness, 







Oxy = (dx 2+ dy2)/a 
(Euclidean metric) 
d,. y = d,, + dy 
(City-block metric) 
Dimension x 
Figure 2.2: Alternative methods of calculating the perceived similarity between 
multidimensional stimuli. Adapted from Garner (1974). 
resembling the Euclidean metric; these have been described as 'integral stimuli' 
(Lockhead, 1972; Gamer, 1974) because they are perceived as unitary wholes rather than 
as a conjunction of analysed parts. Conversely, other combinations of dimensions (such 
as that between size and brightness) give rise to similarity judgements seemingly based 
on the city-block metric; these have been described as 'analysable' (Shepard, 1964; 
Lockhead, 1972) or 'separable' stimuli (Gamer, 1974) because they tend to be perceived 
as being composed of distinct elements. These findings generalise across a broad range 
of tasks, with the distinction being based on a set of converging operations (see Garner, 
1974) that clearly defines the difference between those stimuli that encourage integral 
processing and those that are commonly processed separably. 
What is it about certain dimensional combinations that gives rise to these distinct forms 
of processing? Torgerson (1958) suggests that separable stimuli are processed on the 
basis of an analytical operation because the dimensions of which they are composed are 
more 'obvious and compelling' than those of integral stimuli. For example, stimuli 
composed of variations of size and brightness are separable because their components 
are more psychologically 'real' for subjects. However, combinations of saturation and 
brightness are typically regarded as an archetypal example of integral stimuli. Thus, it is 
not simply the dimensional elements themselves, but the relationship between them that 
determines the nature of the stimulus: it is the difference between dimensions of size and 
brightness that encourages separable processing because it is this which has 
psychological reality for the subject. The difference between dimensions of saturation 
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and brightness is not so readily apparent and hence stimuli composed of these 
dimensions are processed holistically. 
However, as Garner (1974) has pointed out, the ability of subjects to separate hue, 
saturation and brightness led to the development of the Munsell colour system on which 
the majority of research concerning the processing of colour is based. This highlights an 
important point: both integral and separable stimuli may, under certain conditions, be 
processed separably and integrally respectively. For example, stimuli composed of 
dimensions of size and brightness, the prototypical example of separable stimuli, are 
commonly processed holistically (i. e. integrally) under incidental conditions or with 
concurrent task demands (see e. g. Foard & Kemler Nelson, 1984; J. D. Smith & Kemler 
Nelson, 1984). Thus, it is not simply the stimulus that determines the nature of the 
processing operation performed, but task requirements also. Furthermore, as Torgerson 
(1958) has noted, what determines the integrality or separability of a stimulus involves 
the 'psychological reality' of the dimensions under scrutiny. This would seem to suggest 
that subject factors may also play a significant role in the perception of the nature of a 
stimulus, a suggestion that has received considerable empirical support (Foard & Kemler 
Nelson, 1984). For example, a number of studies have shown that cognitive development 
appears to proceed in parallel with a shift from a holistic (i. e. integral) to a more 
analytical (i. e. separable) form of perceptual processing (e. g. Shepp, 1978,1983; L. B. 
Smith & Kemler, 1977,1978). Thus, young children tend to process stimuli commonly 
perceived as separable by adults in a holistic fashion, with this tendency diminishing as 
the child matures. Furthermore, older retarded children are more likely to process 
separable stimuli holistically, in a similar fashion to their younger counterparts. 
Foard and Kcmler Nelson (1984) have suggested that these findings indicate that 
holistic processing is a primitive default mode of operation of the cognitive system. The 
observed trend from integral to separable processing that proceeds in line with cognitive 
development strongly supports this notion. The nature of the task manipulations 
(concurrent task requirements, incidental conditions and manipulations of instructional 
set) that invite the integral processing of separable stimuli by adult subjects are also 
consistent with this idea. Foard and Kemler-Nelson argue that such manipulations 
encourage adult subjects to abandon their normally deliberative and analytical stance and 
adopt more efficient but primitive forms of processing for the control of behaviour. 
The notion that the cognitive system has two modes of processing, one primitive but 
efficient mode operating according to holistic (i. e. integral) principles, and the other a 
more advanced but slower mode operating according to analytic (i. e. separable) 
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principles, is strongly supported by research that has developed in parallel with the 
perceptual literature and concerns the way that humans acquire concepts. In traditional 
laboratory studies of concept leaming, research has focused almost exclusively on the 
acquisition of concepts under intentional learning conditions, whereby the subject 
engages in deliberate attempts to memorise information concerning artificial categories. 
Theories concerning this process invariably regard the learner as an active hypothesis 
tester who analyses the available data for common attributes or underlying rules on 
which the category structure has been based (e. g. Bruner, Goodnow & Austin, 1956; 
Trabasso & Bower, 1964). However, Rosch and Mervis (1975) have suggested that such 
an approach does not represent the most ecologically valid way of understanding the 
acquisition of category information. They argue that the ma ority of natural categories do 
not conform to a structure whereby category membership is defined by a number of 
criterial attributes or underlying rules. Rather, natural categories tend to have a strong 
'family-resemblance' structure so that several attributes usually predict membership of 
that category (J. D. Smith, 1989). Members tend to be grouped together on the basis of a 
number of common attributes that tend to naturally co-occur; rather than category 
structure being defined by criterial (i. e defining) features, it is the general overall 
similarity between members that creates the category. This absence of defining features 
suggests that the active, analytical method of concept acquisition is not the most natural 
way of learning category information: it is more adaptive to attend to several features at 
once in a diffuse fashion so as to capture the overall similarity relations between stimuli 
rather than the origins of that similarity. 
In contrast to traditional studies of concept learning which use categories formed on 
the basis of one or two defining attributes, Brooks (1978) put this idea to the test using 
categories formed purely on the basis of overall similarity relations. His results revealed 
that subjects are, in fact, extremely adept at recovering information acquired on this 
basis. On the basis of his results Brooks argued that the storage of categories with a 
simple family-resemblance structure may be linked to incidental learning conditions, 
suggesting that under these circumstances individuals rely on a non-strategic fall-back 
mode of cognition rather than analysing the components of potential category members 
to see if any are criterial. 
The work of Brooks concerning analytical and non-analytical concept learning (for a 
review, see Jacoby & Brooks, 1984) is of particular significance because it draws on the 
same sense of analytic and holistic modes of processing that formed the basis of the 
distinction between integral and separable perceptual analysis discussed previously. As 
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J. D. Smith (1989) has pointed out, the independence of category attributes cmphasised 
by analytical models of concept learning and the computations on which these are based 
are reminiscent of the city-block metric described by Garner (1974). Conversely, models 
of category learning that emphasise the non-independence of category attributes have 
much in common with the Euclidean metric. Furthermore, Brooks' suggestion that the 
learning of concepts based on family-resemblance is directly linked to a primitive, 'fall- 
back' mode of cognition is compatible with that presented by Foard and Kemler Nelson 
(1984), who suggested that the integral perception of separable stimuli by young 
children, and by adults under certain task conditions, is due to the lack of available 
resources (or experience) to process analytically. 
The notion that primitivizing conditions (e. g. concurrent tasks, incidental learning 
situations etc. ) lead to categorisation on the basis of family resemblance rather than 
componential analysis was put to the test by Kemler Nelson (1984). A concept learning 
task was devised such that it could be completed according to either analytic or holistic 
strategies and presented in both intentional and incidental learning conditions. Results 
indicate that under intentional conditions, adults strongly favour categorisation on the 
basis of active hypothesis testing for criterial attributes of category membership. 
However, under incidental conditions, categorisation was frequently based on overall 
similarity relations rather than the more analytical strategy used when learning 
intentionally. In a fourth experiment Kemler Nelson (1984) went on to provide 
converging evidence for this fall-back mode of cognition idea through an investigation of 
the developmental nature of holistic and analytically based concept learning. Kemler- 
Nelson devised two more similar tasks drawing on the same conception of analytic and 
holistic categorisation, one that strongly favoured concept learning on the basis of family 
resemblance and a second that was most adaptively performed via criterially based 
similarity judgements. While fifth grade students performed comparably well on each of 
the tests, the performance of pre-school children on the analytically based version of the 
task was clearly inferior to that involving the learning of similarity based concepts. 
Perhaps more significantly, no difference was found between the groups on the holistic 
version of the task, providing a direct parallel to the developmental trend observed for 
the perceptual processing of integral and separable dimensions discussed previously (e. g. 
Shepp, 1978,1983; L. B. Smith & Kemler, 1977,1978). 
The assertion that the cognitive system has a basic, yet rapid and efficient default or 
fall-back mode that provides the basis for more complex and deliberative forms of 
processing corresponds closely to the model of the cognitive system outlined thus far. 
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Integral perception and concept learning involves relatively effortless and automatic 
cognitive processing based on diffuse, passive attention (J. D. Smith & Kemler Nelson, 
1984,1988), and yields a direct interpretation or representation of the world which is 
unanalysed and based on the general similarity (or 'family-resemblance') between 
objects or category members. In a similar vein, the current model of the cognitive system 
also views the low level control of behaviour as an effortless and automatic process 
requiring only low level (i. e. passive) attention for its operation; in addition, the 
spreading of activation within associative memory which serves to provide an 
interpretation of the environment is also a similarity-based process (see Sloman, 1996). 
Separable perception and concept learning, in contrast, involves the analysis of stimuli 
into their constituent parts and is based on effortful and deliberative cognitive processing 
requiring active attention. Such a description corresponds closely to that of the higher 
level processes in the model of the cognitive system described here. 
The preceding discussion of the perceptual integrality literature supports the assertion 
that low level processing is relatively quick and effortless and higher level processing is 
slower and more effortful and deliberative. In addition, the rapid low level processing 
style appears to be associated with more primitive, holistic forms of cognition, while 
slow, high level processing seems to support more sophisticated and analytical forms of 
cognition. How might such differences manifest themselves on a more general 
behavioural level? One possibility is that low level processors will be more impulsive 
and stimulus-driven than their high level counterparts, who will tend towards a slower 
and more deliberative approach to behaviour. The fact that one of the behavioural 
characteristics of patients with frontal lobe damage (i. e. individuals with a high level 
processing deficit) is the inability to inhibit behavioural responses (e. g. Burgess & 
Shallice, 1996a) certainly seems to support this hypothesis. 
Research concerning the cognitive style dimension of reflection-impulsivity (RI; 
Kagan, Rosman, Kay, Albert & Phillips, 1964; Kagan, 1965) may shed some light on 
this issue. The concept of RI was originally proposed to account for cognitive 
performance differences between children that were otherwise equivalent in terms of 
motivation and intelligence. Kagan et al (1964) proposed that such differences were the 
product of the speed with which individual children respond to the tests in question; 
those children who respond quickly tend to do worse than their slower counter-parts, a 
finding which appears to be attributable to the fact that the quicker individuals have not 
spent long enough considering the validity of the answers that they provide. Clearly, the 
more time that is spent weighing up alternative hypotheses concerning a given problem, 
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the more likely it is that incorrect solutions will be identified and rejected, thus 
improving the individual's performance. Kagan et al (1964) dubbed those individuals 
with long response latencies and low effor-rates 'reflectivcs', while those individuals 
with short response latencies and high error-rates were termed 'impulsive'. Impulsive 
individuals appear to be highly stimulus driven and have difficulty in behavioural 
inhibition (see Kagan, Moss & Sigel, 1963). In contrast, reflectivcs are less stimulus 
driven and able to inhibit behavioural responses until their validity has been determined. 
In addition to the differences between reflective and impulsive individuals in their 
general speed and accuracy in problem solving situations, a number of other cognitive 
and behavioural differences between the two have been noted. In particular, reflective 
individuals tend to display a more analytical processing bias in conceptual tasks than 
impulsives who tend to display a more global response set (Kagan et al, 1963; Lee, 
Kagan & Rabson, 1963; Kagan et al, 1964). Thus, when describing the similarity 
between objects, reflectives tend to analyse the objects into their constituent parts and 
use individual object features as a basis for categorisation. In contrast, impulsives tend to 
categorise objects in terms of their general relations to one another rather than on the 
basis of individual components. Further evidence for the notion that impulsive and 
reflective individuals display holistic and analytical forms of cognition respectively is 
provided by research indicating that the RI dimension is related to the concept of 
separable versus integral perceptual processing discussed previously (e. g. Ward, 1983; 
Kemler Nelson & J. D. Smith, 1984; J. D. Smith & Kemler Nelson, 1988). Several studies 
have shown that both impulsive adults and children tend to perceive separable stimuli in 
an integral fashion, whereas reflectives typically perceive most stimuli separably. 
According to J. D. Smith and Kernler Nelson (1988), such findings support the notion 
that integral perception and impulsivity are characteristic of a lower level or fall-back 
mode of cognition that provides the foundation to more complex, high level cognitive 
operations. Further support for this idea is provided by evidence indicating that there is a 
developmental component to the RI dimension. Although RI remains relatively stable 
over time, Messer and Brodzinsky (1981), for example, present results suggesting that 
there is a trend from an impulsive to a reflective cognitive style as development 
progresses. 
On the basis of the convergence between the model of the cognitive system offered in 
this chapter and research concerning reflection-impulsivity and the perception and 
categorisation of multidimensional stimuli, an account of the differences between higher 
and lower level processing modes may be offered. Table 2.1 presents a comparison of 
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Table 2.1: Comparison of lower and higher level processing mode attributes. 
Lower level processing mode Higher level processing mode 
Intuitive: "non-conscious awareness" Deliberate: "consciousness" 
Automatic: controls behaviour by the Non-automatic: controls behaviour by 
direct activation of representations the direction of low level systems using 
multi-step processing algorithms 
Based on low level attentional systems: Based on high level attentional systems: 
passive and diffuse process not requiring Requires active attention and 
mental effort mental effort 
Associative inference Inference based on the controlled 
manipulation of representations 
(e. g. logical thought) 
Rapid operation based on parallel Delayed operation based on serial 
processing processing 
Impulsive behavioural style Reflective behavioural style 
Holistic: processing based on overall Analytical: processing based on 
similarity between unanalysed stimuli differences between stimuli on derived 
dimensions 
Typically employed in routine situations Typically employed in novel situations 
or where high level resources are scarce or those requiring inhibition, decision 
making, trouble-shooting or goal-setting 
Primitive default mode of cognition: Sophisticated mode of cognition: 
Developmentally immature Developmentally mature 
the attributes of each of these processing modes. By this view, low level behavioural 
control involves the automatic activation of representations governed by a passive and 
diffuse mode of attending based on low level attentional systems. As a result of this 
passive attentional set, the individual will tend to perceive the envirorunent in an integral 
fashion, viewing stimuli as unanalyscd wholes rather than combinations of dimensions 
(Foard & Kemler-Nelson, 1984). As such, the similarity between objects or events will 
tend to be calculated on the basis of overall family resemblance rather than dimensional 
analysis and summation (Shepard, 1964; Lockhead, 1972; Garner, 1974). Furthermore, 
the relational organisation of the representations stored whilst processing in this mode 
will also conform to a family-resemblance structure (Jacoby & Brooks, 1984). In 
addition, low level processors will tend to be stimulus driven and display an impulsive 
behavioural style characterised by rapid, error-prone responding. In contrast, the 
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individual processing in a high level mode necessarily adopts an active attentional set 
that underlies a tendency to perceive the environment in a separable fashion, viewing 
stimuli as combinations of dimensions rather than unanalysed wholes (Foard & Kemler- 
Nelson, 1984). As such, the similarity between objects or events will tend to be 
calculated on the basis of dimensional analysis and summation rather than overall family 
resemblance. Furthermore, the organisation of the representations stored whilst 
processing in this mode will also conform to a dimensional structure (Jacoby & Brooks, 
1984). Finally, high level processors will tend towards a more deliberative and reflective 
behavioural style characterised by slow but accurate responding. 
The distinction between higher and lower level cognition made here has much in 
common with a number of other theories which draw similar dichotomies (e. g. Taggart 
& Torrance, 1984; Epstein, 1994; Hinton, 1990; Sloman, 1996). In due course, some of 
these complementary positions, and the methodologies which have been used to assess 
them, will be examined in a bid to provide empirical support for the model of suggestion 
and hypnosis that will be outlined in the next chapter. 
2.3 Summary 
In the preceding sections a model of the cognitive system based on contemporary 
cognitive psychological research and theory was described. The basic structure of the 
model has much in common with the Norman and Shallice (1986) model which has 
proved popular in recent theorising within the field of hypnosis. However, in the model 
presented here, the basic Norman and Shallice framework has been revised and extended 
in a number of important ways. First, the conceptual problems associated with the 
traditional model of automaticity embraced in the Norman and Shallice model have been 
addressed by reconceiving the model in terms of the memory-based view of automaticity 
offered by Logan (1988). By this view, automatic processes are regarded as those that 
are based entirely on the activation of low level representations, rather than those that 
require no attention, intention, effort or awareness for their operation. Second, the 
question of how the concepts of perception and awareness might be conceived within the 
Norman and Shallice model was addressed with reference to Logan's (1988) model of 
automaticity, the work of associative inference theorists such as Smolensky (1988), 
Hinton (1990) and Sloman (1996), and Marcel's (1983) theory of consciousness. 
According to this view, high level perception is the product of the automatic spreading of 
activation within associative memory following attention to the stimulus environment. 
This process serves to suggest a number of possible interpretations of the environment, 
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the best-fitting interpretation being selected by low level attcntional systcms and used to 
organise sensory inforrnation to form a conscious percept when it is receivcd by 
high 
level attentional systems. 
In addition to differences in behavioural control at higher and lower levels of the 
cognitive system as outlined in the Norman and Shallicc model, a number of othcr 
distinct cognitive characteristics associated with processing at each of these levels were 
also proposed. As such, a distinction was drawn between higher and lower level 'modes' 
of processing. Finally, the likelihood of situational and individual differences in the 
degree to which high and low level control systems arc relied upon in the management of 
behaviour was acknowledged. 
In chapter three the question of how the concepts of suggestion, hypnosis and hypnotic 
suggestibility might be conceived within this explanatory framework will be addressed. 
81 
CHAPTER 3: A model of suggestion and hypnosis 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a model of the cognitive system based on contemporary 
cognitive psychological research and theory was proposed. In this chapter, this model 
will be applied to the explanation of suggestion, hypnosis and hypnotic suggestibility. 
The model of the cognitive system outlined in chapter two draws a distinction between 
higher and lower level modes of cognition, each of which serve complementary 
functions in the management of behaviour. As R. Brown and Oakley (1997) have shown, 
the distinction between higher and lower level cognition has played a fundamental role in 
recent theorising within the field of hypnosis and, as I intend to demonstrate presently, 
provides a scheme by which the different accounts of hypnosis reviewed in chapter one 
might be integrated into a single theoretical model. 
3.2 The nature of suggestion 
In the first chapter I concentrated exclusively on the major contemporary theories of 
hypnosis and have largely avoided reference to suggestion until now. The concepts of 
hypnosis and suggestion have, however, been inextricably linked since the late 
nineteenth century and the work of Bernheim and the Nancy School (Gheorghiu, 1989a). 
Bernheim (1888/1964) described a theory of hypnosis based entirely on the notion of 
suggestion, arguing that it is both the vehicle by which hypnosis is induced and the 
mechanism by which hypnosis and hypnotic phenomena might be explained. Moreover, 
Bernheim regarded increased suggestibility22 as the primary defining characteristic of the 
'hypnotised' individual. Although Bernheim's account of hypnosis has since declined in 
popularity (see Gheorghiu, 1989a), the concept of suggestion remains central to the study 
of hypnosis. Suggestions, be they direct or indirect, continue to be the predominant 
method for the induction of hypnosis, and most scales designed to assess individual 
differences in hypnotic responsivity, such as the Harvard and Stanford scales, do so by 
measuring the number of suggestions that an individual responds to following an 
hypnotic induction. 
22 The term 'suggestibility' refers to the individual difference dimension describing the degree to which 
suggestions are accepted as veridical. If suggestions are presented in the hypnotic context, this is typically 
labelled 'hypnotic' suggestibility; if suggestions are presented outside the hypnotic context, this is 
typically labelled 'waking' or 'non-hypnotic' suggestibility. Kirsch (1997) has argued that, contextual 
differences aside, there is little difference between these concepts and has proposed a reappraisal of the 
classification scheme used to describe the two; according to Kirsch, both waking and hypnotic 
suggestibility are examples of 'imaginative suggestibility'. 
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Of particular relevance to the relationship between hypnosis and suggestion is the 
finding that so-called 'waking' and 'hypnotic' suggestibility correlate with one another 
to a substantial degree (Kirsch, 1997; Kirsch & Lynn, 1997); this is not surprising, given 
the evidence indicating that all so-called hypnotic responses are possible even in the 
absence of an hypnotic induction, with the induction increasing responsivity to 
suggestions by only a small degree (Barber, 1969). These findings have been interpreted 
(see e. g. Kirsch & Lynn, 1997) as indicating that an 'altered-state' premise is not 
required for the explanation of hypnotic behaviours, but rather that responses to waking 
and hypnotic suggestions are governed by the same causal mechanisms. It is nevertheless 
clear, however, that an individuals' responsivity to suggestions may be significantly 
increased by the induction of hypnosis; although modest, this increase is both highly 
consistent and more or less comparable to the effect size observed in most studies 
demonstrating the successful effect of a psychological manipulation (Kirsch, 1997). 
Given that this is the case, the most fruitful avenue for theoretical development would 
seem to entail addressing the nature of suggestion outside the hypnotic context first, and 
only then considering the way hypnosis fits within this explanatory scheme. This 
approach will be adopted here. 
Before attempting to explain suggestion 23 , 
it is worth confirming exactly what it is that 
we are trying to understand. Although the types of suggestions used in the hypnotic 
context vary widely, all verbal suggestions conforrn to a consistent theme in which one 
individual attempts, through the use of words, to induce a specific behaviour or alteration 
in experience of another individual. In many cases, though in some individuals more than 
others, the suggestion attempt is successful in producing the desired response. On the 
face of it, however, instigating a behaviour in another person is not in itself particularly 
remarkable: a simple request is capable of generating the same response. What is 
remarkable is the fact that the individuals' experience (i. e. hypnotic involuntariness) is 
completely unlike that which typically accompanies analogous behaviours in so-called 
normal situations. The experiential changes brought about by suggestions for alterations 
in perception are perhaps even more remarkable. The subjective reality of a successfully 
suggested hypnotic analgesia, for example, can be convincing enough for some 
individuals to request and/or accept its use during major surgery. Explaining the 
phenomenological aspects of suggestion and hypnosis is arguably the most important 
23 The theorising presented here will be restricted to what Kirsch has described as 'imaginative' 
suggestion. No attempt will be made to incorporate other types of suggestion (e. g. interrogative suggestion; 
Gudjonsson, 1984) within the current framework. 
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task for theorists working within this domain, particularly given the fact that so-called 
hypnotic behaviours can easily be reproduced by simulating individuals. Although a 
simulating individual may be able to feign an insensitivity to pain, there is not the 
concomitant reduction or amelioration in pain experience that typically accompanies a 
successful hypnotic analgesia suggestion. 
In order to explain how suggested alterations in experience are possible, the concept of 
experience itself must first be addressed. In the model of the cognitive system described 
in chapter two, the contents of consciousness were identified as the information received 
by high level attentional systems from low level attentional systems. According to this 
view, the best-fitting perceptual hypothesis suggested by automatic representational 
activity is selected by low level attentional systems and used to organise sensory data 
into a coherent and integrated perceptual whole; it is this information which is passed on 
to high level attentional systems and therefore this information which forms the contents 
of consciousness. It follows, then, that for a suggestion for an alteration in perception to 
be successful, in that it is experienced as subjectively real, it must exert its influence 
prior to the low level selection of perceptual hypotheses for further processing. The only 
plausible candidate for the site of this influence is at the level of the representations 
themselves, and the low level attentional systems which govern their activation and 
selection: activity at this level not only governs the basic interpretation of the 
environment and the control of behaviour, but also what information is passed on for 
further, conscious processing at higher levels of the system. Conceivably, if one is able 
to influence the memory retrieval process, then one will be able to control, to an extent at 
least, what the individual perceives, attends to and does. This is precisely what one is 
attempting to do in the suggestive context. - 
The notion that the automatic activation of representations provides the basis for 
suggestive phenomena is the central assumption of the dissociated control theory of 
hypnosis. Where dissociated control theory falls down is in its assertion that this process 
occurs as a result of the inhibition of higher level attentional systems, which, as Kirsch 
and Lynn (1997) have pointed out, is not necessary for the automatic activation of 
schemata 24 . Although it rejects the higher level inhibition hypothesis, the recent 
sociocognitive model of hypnotic involuntariness offered by Kirsch and Lynn (1997) is 
based on a similar idea concerning the automatic activation of representations, although 
24 It should nevertheless be noted that an inhibition of higher level control mechanisms would certainly 
necessitate an over-reliance on automatic schema activation for the control of behaviour. The pattern of behaviour displayed by individuals with frontal lobe pathology provides, according to Norman and Shallice (1986; see also Shallice, 1988), one such example. 
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that account is limited to the explanation of relatively simple hypnotic behaviours and 
does not extend to an understanding of suggested alterations in experience as is the 
present theoretical goal. The ego-psychological theory of hypnosis (e. g. Fromm, 1992) 
also regards hypnotic behaviours as the product of low level, automatic processes; in this 
case, however, the model is too descriptive to provide an adequate account of how this 
process operates. With regards research and theory concerning suggestion per se, the 
model offered by Gheorghiu and Kruse (1991) also rests on similar premises concerning 
the automatic activation of representations. Moreover, as Gheorghiu (1989a, b) has 
noted, despite widespread disagreement over the explanation of suggestion, the majority 
of theorists tend to view suggested effects as the product of an inhibition or reduction in 
critical thought, a notion very similar to that proposed by dissociated control theory. 
Clearly, the notion that suggested effects are the product of the automatic activation of 
representations is an appealing one, but one which has not been developed in sufficient 
detail for it to provide an adequate account of suggested behaviours and experiences. The 
current model attempts to redress the balance in this regard. 
The basic position offered here is that a suggested effect is the product of the automatic 
selection of a behavioural or perceptual schema25 (or perceptual 'hypothesis'). In the 
case of a straightforward verbal suggestion (hypnotic or otherwise), receipt of the 
suggestive communication by low level attentional systems creates a pattern of activation 
across representational networks corresponding to the behavioural and experiential intent 
of the suggestion 26 . This process is likely to be particularly effective when mediated 
by 
language which, as a second signalling system (Luria, 1966), is commonly used by the 
cognitive system for the activation of representations in goal-directed behaviour. In the 
case of a behavioural suggestion, if the activation level of the corresponding 
representation reaches threshold the suggested behaviour is automatically executed (see 
figure 3.1). Broadly speaking, this process is no different to the way in which much of 
behaviour is controlled normally. If a suggestion for a delayed behavioural response is 
required (such as 'when I click my fingers you will get up and open the window'), low 
level attentional systems monitor the environment for the relevant information which, 
2' As such, the execution of a routine act provides the archetypal example of a suggested effect. 
26 As it is perceived by the individual, something which is ultimately dependent upon the nature of the 
representations present and activated within associative memory. 
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when received, automatically triggers the behavioural representation. This process 
corresponds to what Kirsch and Lynn (1997) have described as setting up an 
'implementation intention', a process which allows goal-directed activity to occur 
automatically rather than on a controlled (i. e. higher level) basis. In the case of a 
perceptual or cognitive suggestion, however, a further stage is required. Unlike a 
behavioural suggestion which only requires the appropriate action schema to reach 
activation threshold, for a perceptual suggestion to be successful its associated pattern of 
representational activity (or perceptual hypothesis) must also be selected by low level 
attentional systems as the best fitting account of ongoing activity (figure 3.2). It is 
conceivable that for this process to be successful the cognitive system must in some way 
be deceived into believing that the suggested interpretation of reality is more plausible, 
than actual reality. Some form of positive feedback confirming the suggested reality is 
therefore likely to be required, a process which works in tandem with the initial 
activation of representations within associative memory. In the case of an analgesia 
suggestion, for example, the respective activation and inhibition of 'no pain' and 'pain' 
representations causes the individual's attention to be directed away from pain related 
information within the environment; this process serves to further decrease the activation 
of pain representations, producing positive feedback indicating that the suggested state of 
affairs is veridical27 . At this point, the pattern of activation corresponding 
to the 
27 Such an explanation has, on the face of it, much in common with that provided by Spanos (1986), who 
argued that both hypnotic analgesia and armesia are, in part, the product of the individual directing their 
attention away from the relevant pain or memorial information. Ile present account differs from that of 
Spanos (1986), however, in that it asserts that the process of attention diversion is automatic rather than 
done deliberately (i. e. consciously chosen) by the subject. 
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Figure 3.2: The execution of a perceptual suggestion. Dashed arrows represent the 
passing of perceptual infonnation. 
analgesia suggestion is more likely to be accepted as the best-fitting perceptual 
hypothesis, with the individual's subsequent experience reflecting this fact. 
Such an account may go some way towards explaining why perceptual and cognitive 
suggestions tend to be more difficult than those for simple ideo-motor or challenge 
behaviours, as a further stage of processing is required for the former compared to the 
latter. One of the potential problems of such an account, however, is that it seems unable 
to account for the experience of involuntariness that typically accompanies the successful 
execution of hypnotic behaviours: if hypnotic behaviours are simply the product of the 
automatic activation of action schemata without concomitant attentional selection, how 
can they be accompanied by experiential qualities? The position adopted here is that 
hypnotic involuntariness is not a direct accompaniment of hypnotic behaviours but is a 
post hoc interpretation of them. In other words, the cognitive system observes that a 
behaviour has been executed and attributes it a sense of involuntariness after-the-fact, in 
light of the existing activational patterns across representational systems; such an 
account corresponds closely to that of Kirsch and Lynn (1997). By this view, hypnotic 
involuntariness is a product of the belief that suggested 
28 behaviours feel involuntary, a 
representation which is activated when the individual enters the suggestive situation. In 
29 It should be noted that responses to behavioural suggestions outside the hypnotic situation are also 
typically accompanied by a sense of involuntariness (see Lynn, Rhue & Weekes, 1990). 
87 
this way one can retain the notion that responses to ideo-motor and challenge suggestions 
are easier than those for perceptual and cognitive alterations as only the latter actually 
require attentional selection for their operation: although hypnotic involuntariness is the 
product of the selection process, in itself it is not required for the successful execution of 
the behaviour. Such a notion is essential to the present account of suggestion: by this 
view, all automatically activated behaviours are suggested and yet only those presented 
as 9suggestions' (in the traditional sense) are accompanied by feelings of involuntariness; 
as such, involuntariness cannot be an inevitable concomitant of suggested behaviours. 
Thus, both suggested behaviours and experiences are the result of the automatic 
activation (and selection in the case of the latter) of low level representationS29 . In both 
cases, this process is determined, to an extent at least, by the activation values of the 
representations being monitored by low level attention. Broadly speaking, therefore, 
anything which augments the activation of a particular representation will increase its 
likelihood of execution/selection. There are three potential sources of activation: the 
receipt of triggering input from the internal and external environment, lateral activation 
or inhibition by complementary or competitive representations respectively, and 
attentional input from higher level systems (see Norman & Shallice, 1986). In addition, 
the probability of selection is also determined by the representation's resting activation 
threshold: schemata with relatively low activation thresholds, such as those that have 
been well learnt through repeated use, require less activational augmentation for their 
selection by low level attentional systems. Moreover, it is worth noting here that 
selection is also a relatively self-perpetuating process: the selection of a particular 
representation directs low level attention towards information related to it in the 
environment, increasing the likelihood of its continued activation. Furthermore, the 
activation of a representation decreases its activation threshold, making it more likely to 
be selected on subsequent occasions. In this way, the system develops a certain 
behavioural and perceptual constancy, with familiar situations being perceived and 
responded to in an increasingly consistent fashion over time. Thus, an individual's initial 
29 According to this position, suggested effects are limited to those for which an adequate representation is 
available; as such, suggestion is more appropriately regarded as a routine rather than a novel psychological 
process. Such a view may appear at odds with the apparently unusual phenomena often observed within 
the hypnotic situation. A negative hypnotic hallucination, for example, involves not seeing something that 
is present, a rare occurrence for which, on the face of it, there would be few, if any, existing 
representations. Such an effect may, however, be achieved by hallucinating the presence of something 
obscuring the to-be-ignored stimulus, a process which could involve almost any existing representation. It 
is nevertheless likely that the execution of some suggestions involves the on-line creation of high level 
representions which are then used to direct the activity of lower level systems. Sugggested effects 
produced by such representations could conceivably be regarded as novel in the strict sense. 
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experiences with suggested effects are likely to have a strong influence over their 
subsequent experiences of them. 
The selection of schemata is therefore determined by the dynamic balance between 
environmental factors and the nature of the representations themselves. The extent to 
which behaviour and experience are controlled by the automatic activation of 
representations will vary from one situation and individual to another, however. In 
situations or individuals where high level control influences over low level attentional 
systems are particularly strong, for example, the likelihood of an environmental cue 
automatically activating a representation (and hence suggestibility) will be reduced 
considerably. 
The current model therefore extends previous theoretical formulations by providing a 
more detailed account of how the automatic activation of representations underpins 
suggested behaviours and experiences and the factors which affect this process. 
Moreover, the present model easily accommodates the existence of self-suggestion and 
hypnosis: the only difference in this case is that the suggestive communication comes 
from higher level systems rather than the external environment 30. The advantage of such 
a view is that it brings the explanation of suggested phenomena firmly within the remit 
of everyday psychology. As we have seen, automatic memory retrieval provides the 
basis for the adaptive control of all behaviour and is inextricably linked to conscious 
experience. By this view, then, suggestion is not just conceived as a process by which 
direct verbal statements serve to generate unusual alterations in behaviour or perception, 
but as a ubiquitous phenomenon that is a fundamental aspect of the interaction between 
organisms and their environment: it is simply the process by which adaptive behaviour in 
a complex and changing world is maintained on the basis of previous experience. The 
implications of such a view should its validity be established would be far-reaching 
indeed, both for the study of hypnosis and that of cognition and consciousness in general. 
3.2.1 Hypnotic suggestion 
Having adopted the position that hypnotic suggestions operate according to the same 
fundamental processes that govern non-hypnotic suggestions, the question of how the 
model of suggestion provided in the previous section relates to the concept of hypnosis 
30 Although it is likely that the locus of suggestion will play a significant role in determining the efficacy 
of a given suggestion attempt. Some individuals, for example, may be extremely responsive to hetero- 
suggestions but show no responsivity at all to self-suggestions (and vice versa). The relative degree to 
which individuals rely on a higher or lower level processing mode for the everyday control of behaviour 
may be one influential factor in this regard. 
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must now be considered. The central question of interest concerns why, given that the 
same mechanisms are operating in both, the hypnotic situation is consistently associated 
with elevated levels of responsivity to suggestions compared to non-hypnotic situations. 
In addressing this question two general issues will be considered: the nature of the 
hypnotic situation and the role of absorption. 
3.2.1.1 The hypnotic situation 
While the hypnotic situation may, in terms of its components, have much in common 
with other more mundane situations, it is more or less unique with regards to the entire 
mosaic of cognitive and social demands that it places on the individual. In addition, the 
beliefs and attitudes that the participating individual brings to the hypnotic situation are 
largely unlike those which they bring to so-called normal situations. As sociocognitive 
theorists have been quick to point out, the unusual nature of the hypnotic situation, and 
the beliefs and attitudes associated with it, are likely to have a profound role in shaping 
the character and occurrence of the behaviours; and experiences encountered therein. 
Indeed, as we saw in chapter one, there is a good deal of evidence in support of such an 
assertion. According to the model of suggestion presented in the previous section, the 
nature of suggested behaviours and experiences is inextricably linked to situational and 
expectational factors. 
To begin with, it is important to consider what the subject brings to the hypnotic 
situation in terms of their beliefs and attitudes about hypnosis. In the case of a naive 
subject, it is highly likely, within Western culture at least, that they will possess 
vicariously derived beliefs and attitudes about hypnosis, based on the experiences of 
their friends and relatives, or from watching stage, film or television shows involving the 
use of it. Through such a process of cultural transmission, the individual may associate 
hypnosis with a number of things, including sleep, relaxation, alterations in 
consciousness, responding to suggestions and the loss of control over one's behaviour 
(e. g. McConkey, 1986; McConkey & Jupp, 1986). On the basis of these beliefs, the 
individual enters the hypnotic situation expecting and, assuming they have a willing 
rather than a resistant attitude, wanting certain things to happen. In addition, they may 
also be aware of what patterns of behaviour might be expected and desired from them as 
an hypnotic subject (cf. Spanos, 1982,1986); indeed, such a sense of reciprocity is the 
inevitable consequence of any social situation. Furthermore, the hypnotic situation is also 
embedded in a wider social context, such as that of a psychological study or a therapeutic 
90 
relationship 31 , and will entail all of the beliefs, expectations and 
desires associated with 
these situations also. In particular, the subject will be sensitive to their obligation to 
maintain motivation and co-operate with the demands that are placed upon them, thereby 
fulfilling their part of the social contract which they have entered into by participating. 
The individual's prior beliefs about hypnosis do not exist in isolation, however, but in 
interaction with the context provided by the specific hypnotic situation encountered. 
There are a number of contextual factors associated with the hypnotic situation that 
might be identified as potentially important. First, there is the hypnotist and their 
apparent level of confidence, experience and proficiency (Balaschak et al 1970), plus 
more general factors such as their age, sex, appearance and personality. Second, there is 
the preamble to the hypnotic induction, which might include a description of what the 
hypnotic session will involve, what the subject will be asked to do and what they are 
likely to experience. Third, there is the hypnotic induction itself. Although the induction 
may vary considerably from one hypnotic situation to another, instructions to relax, 
engage in imagery, respond to suggestions and concentrate on the hypnotist's words and 
requests to the exclusion of all else are commonplace, particularly in the experimental 
context where the standardised inductions included in the Harvard and Stanford 
susceptibility scales will often be used. 
In terms of the model of suggestion described previously, an individual's beliefs 
concerning hypnosis (or, indeed, anything for that matter) may be regarded as a set of 
related schemata within the overall network of representations stored in memory. Upon 
entering the hypnotic situation, the activation levels of each of these schemata are 
automatically increased through attention by lower level systems while those of 
conflicting schemata are reduced through lateral inhibition. As such, the individual enters 
the hypnotic situation expecting32 certain things to happen; the strength of these 
expectations is dependent on how well learnt the belief-representations are, as indicated 
by their activation threshold. Effectively, this process of schema activation and inhibition 
serves to provide a framework for the individual's interpretation of the hypnotic situation 
31 It is, of course, true that other types of hypnotic situation exist, such as those involved in stage or 'party' 
hypnosis. These situations may provide a context that is, in many ways, entirely different to that described 
here; however, as the vast majority of research pertains to hypnosis in an experimental or clinical context, 
the analysis offered here will be limited to this domain. 
3' Not necessarily consciously, however; the fact that the individual may, if questioned, be able to describe 
what they expect to happen during the hypnotic situation does not necessarily mean that they will be 
conscious of those expectations when they enter it. In any case, whether or not they are is largely irrelevant 
to the position presented here, as the effect of expectations on subsequent behaviours and experiences may 
arise regardless of whether they are conscious. 
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and the management of their behaviour within it. The nature of this interpretive 
framework is modified on-line with the increased activation and inhibition of further 
schemata by the contextual cues present in the hypnotic situation itself-, however, which 
schemata receive activation from contextual cues is, to an extent, moderated by those 
that have already received activation by prior beliefs: the activation of representations 
serves to prime the individual to attend to information within the environment that is 
consistent with them (and to ignore information that is not), producing something of a 
snowball effect. 
Following the definition adopted here, the increase of schema activation by the 
interaction between beliefs and contextual cues may in itself be viewed as a process of 
suggestion. Working in concert they serve to create a 'hypnotic' frame of mind which 
will influence how the individual processes information in the hypnotic situation, thereby 
shaping the character of the behaviours and experiences that they produce within it: 
anything which is subsequently selected by low level attentional systems will reflect this 
pattern of schema activation. Using the terminology of Sarbin (1950,1956), one might 
label this frame of mind the hypnotic role. It is important to note, however, that the 
individual has not consciously decided to behave in an hypnotic way as suggested by 
classical role-theory; rather, they assume such a mind-set automatically and without 
conscious consideration as a product of the interaction between their beliefs and the cues 
present within the hypnotic situation. Several sociocognitive theorists have alluded to a 
similar process in their assertion that the individual's behaviour is governed by their 
implicit or tacit perceptions of the role requirements involved in the hypnotic situation 
(e. g. Spanos & Coe, 1992; Kirsch, 1991; Lynn & Rhue, 1991c). This process is 
analogous to the way in which we automatically adopt the roles of offspring, sibling, 
ffiend, lover, teacher, footballer and so on according to who we are interacting with (and 
where) at any given moment. 
By this view, the nature of hypnotic behaviours and experiences are intimately related 
to the beliefs that the individual brings to the hypnotic situation and the contextual cues 
that they encounter within it. As was discussed in the previous chapter, however, 
expectational. and contextual factors may vary considerably between hypnotic situations 
and individuals. As such, one would predict that the nature of hypnotic behaviours and 
experiences will also vary considerably from one situation and individual to another, a 
hypothesis borne out by a substantial body of evidence. When conducting research into 
hypnotic behaviours and experiences it is essential, therefore, that one obtains an account 
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of the participating individual's beliefS33 concerning hypnosis and conducts a careful 
analysis of the specific hypnotic context used: without such information it would be 
impossible to assess which aspects of hypnotic behaviours and experiences are the 
product of suggestion and which are not. 
So far it has been argued that expectational and contextual variables are instrumental in 
determining the nature of hypnotic responses. What effect, if any, will these factors have 
on the success rate of specific suggestive communications? Certain expectational and 
contextual factors are likely to be of particular importance in this regard. To begin with, 
it is conceivable that the more motivated an individual is, the more likely he/she will 
respond positively to hypnotic suggestions; contextual features which increase 
motivation may, therefore, be an important factor in increasing suggestibility. If the 
subject likes and trusts the hypnotist, for example, he/she may be more likely to be 
motivated and co-operative and might be more suggestible for this reason. Indeed, as de 
Groh (1989) has shown, positive rapport is a relatively reliable predictor of 
responsiveness to suggestions, at least in the hypnotic context. Anyone who has used 
hypnosis with any regularity, however, will be all too familiar with individuals who, 
although highly motivated, fail to show any responsivity to suggestions at all, much to 
their own annoyance and frustration. It is more likely, therefore, that motivation is a 
necessary rather than a sufficient condition for responsivity to suggestions (de Groh, 
1989). 
A more important factor in bringing about increases in suggestibility in the hypnotic 
situation is likely to be the belief that one of the defining features of hypnosis is an 
increased responsivity to suggestions. As a number of investigators have shown, such a 
view is extremely common within the general population, as is the related belief that 
hypnosis involves a loss of control over one's actions (e. g. McConkey, 1986; McConkey 
& Jupp, 1986). Given the profound role that beliefs (i. e. schemata) have in determining 
both the nature and occurrence of behaviour, it seems likely that such views will 
significantly influence the degree to which individuals respond to suggestive 
communications. Thus, simply labelling the situation as involving hypnosis will in itself 
be sufficient to produce increments in suggestibility14 ,a hypothesis borne out 
by the 
investigations of Barber and Calverley (1964,1965) discussed in chapter one. 
33 Those that are verbalisable at least. 
34 According to Wagstaff (1998), labelling a situation as hypnotic should be considered a suggestion in and 
of itself-, by this view, the hypnotic label is a suggestion indicating that the recipient is entering a special 
state (i. e. hypnosis) associated with an increased responsivity to suggestions. Such a view is entirely 
consistent with that presented here 
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In addition to this potential effect, there are two other factors associated with the 
hypnotic situation that may bring about increases in an individual's responsivity to 
suggestive communications according to the model presented here. First, the hypnotic 
situation is associated with a high degree of ambiguity because the management of the 
situation is more or less handed over to the hypnotist when the induction begins; in 
addition, any expectations that the participating individual has are typically general and 
do not relate to specific behavioural or experiential responses (Kirsch, 1991). A high 
degree of situational ambiguity leads to an increased sensitivity to information within the 
external environment for the activation of schemata (i. e. suggestibility). Arguably, 
however, this may not necessarily lead to significant increases in responsivity to 
suggestions in the hypnotic context compared to that of a waking suggestibility context, 
as the latter is also likely to be associated with a relatively high degree of situational 
ambiguity for the same reasons. 
Second, there are certain features of the hypnotic situation that, taken together, strongly 
indicate that the individual should adopt an uncritical mode of responding and allow 
themselves to be influenced by the suggestions presented to them during the hypnotic 
session. This is not only an expectancy that the individual may bring to the hypnotic 
situation but something that is both implied and explicitly stated in a typical hypnotic 
induction and the preamble which often precedes it. As Spanos and Gorassini (1984) 
have noted, typical hypnotic inductions tend to be worded in a passive style which 
emphasises that hypnotic effects are something that happen to the individual rather than 
something that they actively do themselves. The induction included in the Harvard 
susceptibility scale, for example, instructs the subject not to think about what is 
occurring during hypnosis and ". .. just let whatever is happening ... happen by itself' 
(Shor & Orne, 1962). Although the individual may be asked to think along with the 
hypnotic instructions, it is made clear that he/she is not supposed to question them in any 
way, or critically analyse their experiences in order to assess their validity. As has been 
discussed already, the notion that the hypnotic individual relinquishes critical thought 
and accepts as veridical events that normally would be regarded as logically impossible, 
so-called 'trance logic' (Orne, 1959), is regarded by many as a defining feature of 
hypnosis, including proponents of both the ego-psychological and 
neuropsychophysiological theories (see e. g. Fromm, 1992; Crawford & Gruzelier, 1992). 
It is also a central component of virtually every major theory of suggestion (Gheorghiu, 
1989a, b). 
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Through such situational and cxpectational cues the individual is encouraged to adopt a 
passive bchavioural mode during the hypnotic session (cf. Bowers & Brenneman, 198 1); 
such a behavioural stance, according to the model presented in the previous chapter, is 
associated with a reliance on predominantly lower level or fall-back cognitive processes 
for behavioural control. Whilst biased towards processing in this mode the automatic 
activation of memory representations is facilitated, making the activation of a suggested 
behavioural or experiential state of affairs more likely; as such, suggestibility is likely to 
be significantly increased for this reason also. 
3.2.1.2 The role of absorption 
In emphasising the relationship between suggestion, contextual cues and expectations 
in determining the nature and occurrence of hypnotic behaviours and experiences, I have 
so far described an account of hypnosis which has much in common with earlier 
sociocognitive theories such as those presented by, for example, Sarbin (1950,1956) and 
Spanos (e. g. 1982,1986). 1 have extended these accounts by describing the concepts of 
suggestion, role-playing and tacit interpretation in cognitive terms, as well as specifying 
how cxpectational and situational factors might contribute to hypnotic responding on a 
functional level. However, the present model of hypnotic responding departs 
significantly from the general theme of sociocognitive theories in its emphasis on the 
importance of understanding the state changes associated with hypnosis as well as its 
more contextual and expectational features. In the previous section it was argued that 
certain contextual and expectational features in the hypnotic situation are important 
because they encourage the subject to adopt a passive mode of responding where 
behavioural control is biased towards lower level processes. This interaction between 
contextual and state factors during hypnosis was cited as one of the primary mechanisms 
underlying the increased suggestibility associated with the hypnotic situation. In this 
section the role of state changes in the hypnotic situation will be examined in more 
detail. 
As was discussed in chapter one, one of the most commonly reported experiences 
during the hypnotic situation is one of intense but effortless concentration or 'absorption' 
in whatever it is the participating individual has been asked to do during the hypnotic 
session. In a discussion of the closely related concept of imaginative involvement, J. 
Hilgard (1974) describes the hypnotic individual's experience of hypnosis as one of 
"... almost total immersion in the [imaginal] activity, [and] with indifference to distracting 
stimuli in the environment" (p. 5). This state of extremely focused attention or absorption 
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is, in many respects, the modem-day equivalent of the hypnotic 'trance' notion, and, as 
we saw in chapter one, there is a good deal of cognitive and psychophysiological 
evidence is favour of such a concept. Accordingly, the concept has enjoyed considerable 
support within the field, being embraced by theorists from across the conceptual 
spectrum. Indeed, in a review of the state of hypnosis research, Spanos and Barber 
(1974) identified these constructs as being the single most significant point of 
convergence between the state and non-state positions. Such conceptual overlap in many 
ways underlines the futility of the on-going debate between state and non-theorists: not 
only does no-one really disagree as to whether or not hypnosis involves state changes, 
there is also considerable agreement concerning what the nature of those changes might 
be. Theories may differ in the relative explanatory emphasis that is placed upon state and 
non-state variables in the explanation of hypnotic phenomena, but they can no longer be 
delineated by whether they regard hypnosis as an altered state35 or not (Kirsch & Lynn, 
1995; see Wagstaff, 1998, and the accompanying commentaries for a recent treatment of 
these issues). 
According to the present model, absorption is a common aspect of the hypnotic 
situation and one which has important functional significance in determining the 
frequency and nature of hypnotic responses. However, it is assumed that similar episodes 
of absorption are common-place outside the hypnotic situation also, as in cases of reverie 
or 'highway hypnosis' (Hilgard, 1973a). As such, the present model adopts a 'neo-state' 
view of hypnosis (Oakley, 1998), or what Kirsch (1998) has described as a 'weak' 
version of the hypnotic state hypothesis. Given what has already-been said about the 
nature of suggestion and the cognitive system, what influence might a state of extremely 
focused attention have on the degree to which individuals will respond to suggestions 
during hypnosis? 
In the model described above, suggestion is conceived as a process by which memory 
representations are automatically activated by cues within the internal and external 
environment following monitoring by low level attentional systems. For a given 
suggestive communication to be effective in bringing about the desired reaction the 
representations associated with it must reach a certain level of activation for them to be 
triggered as behaviours or selected as a valid perceptual hypothesis by low level 
35 Although they may differ in whether or not they regard those state changes as being unique to hypnosis; 
even this position, however, is no longer widely held within the field. 
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attentional systems. Given that representations receive activation through attention 36 
being paid to things associated within them in the environment, it follows that the more 
attention a stimulus receives then the more likely it is that its associated representation 
will reach appropriate activation levels for its execution or selection. When the 
individual is in a state of extremely focused attention, therefore, whatever it is that the 
given suggestion calls them to attend to will receive greater activation than when they 
are not. In addition, by focusing strongly on one particular thing to the exclusion of all 
else, there are fewer competing representations for low level attention to monitor or 
choose from, also increasing the likelihood of selection of the suggcstion-related 
representation. 
According to the current model absorption is inextricably linked to the shift towards 
low level processing that is regarded as central to the increased suggestibility 
characteristic of hypnosis. By this view, the demand to inhibit critical thought, which is 
both explicitly and implicitly part of the hypnotic situation, helps to achieve a state of 
absorption by maximising the degree of focal attention paid to the induction and the 
suggestions given during and thereafter 37 . In turn, the state of absorption 
38 that is 
subsequently achieved helps maintain a reduction in critical thought thus biasing the 
control of behaviour and experience towards low level cognitive processes 39 . Such a 
36 The notion of 'paying attention' to something is perhaps less clear when a distinction between high and 
low level attentional systems is made as in the model here. Unless otherwise stated, in the current model 
4paying attention' to something corresponds to the monitoring of information by high level attentional 
systems. As high level attentional systems monitor information from low level attentional systems, use of 
the former always implies use of the latter in any case; however, as the converse is not always true (in that 
information may be 'noticed' by low but not high level attentional systems), some qualification of terms is 
required here. 
37 The assertion that critical thought might interfere with the attainment of absorption corresponds closely 
to the original conception of absorption which proposes that it is achieved through the inhibition of reality 
testing (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). 
39 It should be noted, however, that there are probably many levels of absorption; saying whether someone 
is 'absorbed' or not will therefore always be a relative judgement involving a certain degree of 
arbitrariness. 
39 The notion that highly focused attention may lead to a state of mind characterised by a passive mode of 
attending appears, on the face of it, self-contradictory. A contradiction only arises, however, if one 
assumes that highly focused attention is the exclusive product of high rather than low level cognitive 
systems, an assumption explicitly rejected here. According to the current model, the focus of attention is 
controlled by both high and low level attentional systems depending on dispositional factors and the nature 
of on-going processing concerns. Although high level systems may be responsible for sustaining this focus 
over time in many cases, a similar effect may be produced by the persistent reactivation of appropriate low 
level representations. While the overall product may be similar (i. e. a state of sustained, focused attention), 
there may be important experiential differences between the two processes. Whereas sustaining attention 
through the operation of high level systems may be associated with perceived intention and mental effort, 
it is likely that similar states achieved through low level processes will be experienced as more passive and 
automatic (cf. P. Bowers, 1979). 
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processing bias in itself leads to an increased responsivity to suggestions, which is 
further maximised by preventing the activation of competing representations through the 
operation of critical thought processes. 
By this line of reasoning, the degree to which individuals will respond to suggestions 
outside the hypnotic situation will also vary according to the relationship between 
absorption, critical thought and processing bias. It is only if we have reason to believe 
that absorption is greater during hypnosis than outside it that the idea becomes useful. 
There are several reasons why one might expect attentional focus to be particularly 
strong during hypnotic relative to non-hypnotic conditions. It is conceivable, for 
example, that individuals believe that extremely focused attention is an inherent part of 
the hypnotic experience. Even if they do not possess it before hand, they are often 
explicitly provided with this belief during the hypnotic induction and its preamble. In the 
introduction to the Harvard susceptibility scale, for example, the participating individuals 
are informed that hypnosis is a state of intense interest in whatever it is they are doing, 
and is compared to those occasions when one becomes so involved in a book or a film 
that one is no longer aware of our surroundings. During the induction to the Harvard 
more explicit suggestions to achieve a state of focused attention are delivered, with the 
individual being requested to concentrate solely on the voice of the hypnotist to the 
exclusion of all else. 
By the present model, therefore, certain state changes associated with the hypnotic 
situation (viz. absorption, reduced critical thought and a low level processing bias) play a 
fundamental role in determining the degree to which individuals respond to suggestions 
during hypnosis. However, the way in which these state changes are brought about is 
intimately linked to social, contextual and expectational factors; thus, understanding the 
interaction between state and non-state variables is, according to this model, of primary 
importance in the explanation of hypnotic behaviours and experiences (cf. Nadon, 
Laurence & Perry, 1991). 
One final point concerning absorption is worth mentioning here. In recent years, it has 
been argued that absorption is not necessary for the successful execution of hypnotic 
suggestions (see e. g. Bartis & Zamansky, 1990; Hargadon et al 1995). Hargadon et al 
(1995), for example, found comparable levels of pain reduction following hypnotic 
analgesia in a group of subjects who were absorbed in imagery and a group that was not. 
This in itself does not refute the notion that absorption is central to hypnotic responding, 
however. What the Hargadon et al study has shown is that absorption in imagery is not 
essential for successful hypnotic responding; it has not refuted the notion that absorption 
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per se is essential. It is quite conceivable that the subjects in the no-imagery group in the 
Hargadon et al study were just as absorbed as the subjects engaging in imagery (e. g. in 
words, ideas or even, perhaps, 'nothingness'); without any measure of whether or not 
this is the case we have no way of knowing whether absorption per se has any affect on 
suggestibility levels. 
3.2.2 HyQnotic suggestibility 
Having provided a model of suggestion and an account of how hypnosis fits within this 
explanatory scheme, the discussion will now turn to the concept of hypnotic 
suggestibility. What is it that makes some individuals more responsive to suggestions 
during hypnosis than others? Since the development of reliable scales to measure 
hypnotic suggestibility in the late 1950s and early 1960s, considerable efforts have been 
made to provide an answer to this question, with the relationship between suggestibility 
and a plethora of personality, cognitive, expectational and situational factors being 
assessed during this time. Rather than reviewing this substantial body of research 
pointing out which findings support the model presented here, I will approach the issue 
from the opposite direction. As such, I will address what individual difference factors are 
likely to be of importance according to the current model and cite supporting evidence 
where appropriate. 
In brief, the position offered here is that suggestion is the process by which memory 
representations are automatically retrieved following low level attention to stimuli within 
the internal and external environment. For a suggestion to be successful in bringing 
about the desired response, the representations associated with it must reach threshold 
activation and, in the case of suggestions for perceptual alterations, be selected by low 
level attention as the most appropriate account of the environment. So far we have 
examined the influence that a number of factors will have on this process, including 
attentional absorption, a bias towards low level cognition, expectation and context. 
Presumably, any situational variations in these factors which have an impact on 
suggestibility will be moderated by individual differences in these domains also. These 
will be considered in turn. 
In the previous section, it was argued that a state of extremely focused attention or 
absorption significantly increases the likelihood of representations reaching threshold 
levels and hence suggestions being successfully executed. One might anticipate, 
therefore, that the ability to sustain focused attention, and hence become absorbed, would 
be positively related to the ability to respond to suggestions. As we saw in chapter one, 
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there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that this is the case. In addition to the wealth 
of evidence demonstrating that high suggestibles experience more episodes of absorption 
in everyday life than lows (see Roche & McConkey, 1990), studies by Van Nuys (1973), 
Wallace, Knight and Garrett (1976), Graham and Evans (1977), and Crawford, Brown 
and Moon (1993) have all shown that highly suggestible individuals are significantly 
better at performing tasks requiring sustained focal attention than their low suggestible 
counter-parts. Furthermore, a number of physiological studies have demonstrated that 
highs show greater left-frontal cerebral activation outside hypnosis than lows indicative 
of superior higher level supervisory attentional functioning (e. g. Gruzelier et al, 1984; 
Cikurel & Gruzelier, 1990; Gruzelier & Warren, 1993; McCormack & Gruzelier, 1993). 
In the discussion of absorption in the previous section, it was suggested that one of the 
processes underlying the attainment of an absorbed state might be the inhibition of 
critical thought. It was proposed that such an inhibition of critical thought would also 
bring about an increase in suggestibility because it would necessitate a reliance on lower 
level cognitive processing and therefore the automatic retrieval of representations for the 
control of behaviour. In addition to such manipulated shifts towards lower level 
processing, an everyday preference or bias for processing at this level might also be 
associated with responsivity to suggestionS40 . There 
is some evidence to suggest that this 
is the case. For example, studies by Dixon, Brunet and Laurence (1990) and more 
recently Dixon and Laurence (1992) have shown that highly suggestible individuals 
process language more automatically than low suggestibles, indicative of an everyday 
bias towards low level processing in the former. In addition, the significant correlation 
between suggestibility and Gestalt closure performance found by Crawford (198 1) might 
be interpreted as suggesting that highly suggestible individuals have a greater preference 
for a holistic, and therefore lower-level, processing style compared to low suggestibles. 
Work concerning the 'fantasy-prone personality' (Wilson & Barber, 1981,1983; 
Crawford, 1982b; Lynn & Rhue, 1986) may also be viewed as supportive of the 
relationship between suggestibility and lower level processing preference. On the basis 
of work using the Inventory of Childhood Memories and Imaginings, Wilson and Barber 
(1981) have demonstrated a strong relationship between abnormally high levels of 
hypnotic suggestibility and a constellation of personality traits that converge on fantasy 
involvement. In particular, these individuals are likely to engage in disproportionately 
large amounts of image-based day-dreaming, become intensely absorbed in imaginative 
40 It is also presumably easier to undergo a shift (e. g. through absorption) towards lower level processing if 
one is biased towards processing in this mode in the first place. 
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activities such as reading books or watching films and show high levels of imagery 
vividness (Crawford, 1982b). Furthermore, they arc far more likely to experience 
physical reactions such as nausea to observed violence on television or in films, 
suggesting that fantasy-prone individuals are more sensitive to unconsciously evaluating 
stimuli on the basis of emotional valency than those who are less prone to fantasy. It is 
thus apparent that this group of so-called hypnotic virtuosos are prone to a lower level 
processing bias in every-day life: according to Lynn and Rhue (1991 a) these individuals 
0 ... seem able to respond to non-hypnotic activities that require a temporary diminution of 
rational, reality-bound analytical thinking " (p. 203). 
The ability to sustain attention and a preference or bias towards lower level processing 
are both variables that are likely to influence how responsive one is to suggestions, both 
in the hypnotic context and outside it. Other variables are more likely to be specifically 
related to the actual testing situation itself, however. For example, the attitudes and 
expectancies which the subject brings to the hypnotic situation are likely to influence 
suggestive responding in that context but probably not outside it. Thus, if the 
participating individual comes to the hypnotic situation with a resistant attitude due to 
their belief that responding to hypnosis is indicative of a weak character, they may 
deliberately display extremely low levels of suggestibility in order to demonstrate their 
strong mindedness. As such, both their attitude and belief are likely to be related to the 
level of suggestibility exhibited in the hypnotic context; outside of the hypnotic context, 
however, any predisposition to respond to suggestions will be unrelated to the 
individual's beliefs concerning hypnosis. This might explain why some individuals are 
actually more responsive to suggestions outside of the hypnotic context than within it 
(Kirsch, 1997). 
3.3 General issues 
3.3.1 An integrative theo[y of hypnosis? 
One of the central aims of this thesis is to provide a theoretical account of hypnosis that 
serves to integrate the major contemporary theories of the phenomenon into a single 
nomological network. To what extent has this goal been achieved? 
The fundamental guiding principle throughout the theorising presented here is that 
hypnotic behaviours and experiences are non-nal phenomena entirely explicable by 
general psychological priniciples. Accordingly, the current theory is based on a model of 
the cognitive system derived from contemporary cognitive psycholog ical research. As 
such, the theory narrows the gap between hypnosis research and psychology in general, 
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something which is essential if the study of suggestion and hypnosis is to progress 
successfully. Moreover, this account of the cognitive system is, in itself, an integrative 
model that combines the theoretical work of Norman and Shallice (1986), Logan (1988), 
Sloman (1996) and Marcel (1983) into a single general framework with greater 
parsimony and explanatory power. 
On the basis of this cognitive framework, it has been argued that responses to both 
hypnotic and non-hypnotic suggestions operate according to the same fundamental and 
mundane psychological mechanisms. In this regard, the model presented here is 
consistent with sociocognitive accounts of hypnosis such as those offered by Sarbin 
(1950) and Spanos (1982,1986). Moreover, the present theory adopts the basic 
sociocognitive position by emphasising the profound role that attitudes, beliefs and 
contextual cues play in determining the degree and nature of suggested responses. In 
addition, the notion that automatic memory retrieval represents the principle underlying 
suggestive phenomena has much in common with the sociocognitive model of hypnotic 
involuntariness presented by Kirsch and Lynn (1997). The view that hypnotic 
involuntariness is the product of a post hoc interpretation of the causes of hypnotic 
behaviours is also similar to that offered by Kirsch and Lynn (1997). However, the 
current model extends existing sociocognitive theory by providing a more detailed 
explanation of how these processes operate; in this regard, an explicit cognitive account 
of suggestion, rolc-theory and the tacit interpretation of situational demands has been 
provided. Furthermore, the model of suggestion provided here serves to integrate some 
of the ideas offered by Gheorghiu and Kruse (1992) within a general account of the 
cognitive system and applies them to the understanding of both hypnotic and non- 
hypnotic suggestion. 
Although, following sociocognitive theory, the present model places considerable 
emphasis on the importance of situational, expectational and dispositional factors in 
suggestive responding, it also embraces the notion that there are important state changes 
occurring during the hypnotic situation that are responsible for the increased 
suggestibility displayed therein; as such, the present model also embraces a number of 
concepts fundamental to more state-oriented theories of hypnosis. The notion that the 
hypnotic situation typically engenders a state of extremely focused attention or 
absorption is central to accounts of hypnosis from across the theoretical spectnun. In 
particular, it is regarded by ego-psychological theory as one of the mechanisms by which 
adaptive regression can occur during hypnosis. In addition, sustained focal attention (as 
evidenced by increased cortical and sub-cortical activity in frontal regions) in the early 
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stages of the hypnotic induction represents the first step in the neuropsychophysiological 
model of hypnosis. Secondly, the notion that absorption is bound up with a reduction in 
critical thought not only preserves the core of the original formulation of the concept 
(Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), but also corresponds to (i) the ego-psychological position 
that hypnosis involves a reduction in generalised reality orientation (Shor, 1959), a 
notion also embraced by Nash (1991); (ii) the dissociated control view that hypnosis 
involves an inhibition of higher level systems; (iii) the second stage of the 
neuropsychophysiological model where the hypnotic subject 'lets go' by abandoning 
reality testing and conceding executive control to the hypnotist, as evidenced by reduced 
activation in frontal sites particularly in the left hemisphere. Third, the notion that 
absorption and a reduction in critical thought bias cognitive and behavioural control 
towards lower level processing corresponds closely to (i) the ego-psychological notion 
that hypnosis involves a shift towards primary process mentation; (ii) the 
neuropsychophysiological view that the process of 'letting go' involves a shift towards 
more holistic forms of information processing (stage 3 of the model where activation in 
right hemispheric sites increases); and (iii) the dissociated control position concerning 
the processes involved in the execution of suggested responses. Thus, through the use of 
three related 'state' concepts the current model ties together these different positions into 
a single explanatory framework. Moreover, the model extends these previous 
formulations by providing a more detailed account of the processes involved, their inter- 
relationships and how they might be operationalised (see chapter 2). 
Finally, by providing a detailed account of how state and non-state factors interact 
during hypnosis to produce the behaviours and experiences exhibited therein, the present 
theory provides an extension to the interactionist position advocated by Nadon, Laurence 
and Perry (1991). 
3.3.2 YVhat is hyQnosis? 
Despite having provided an account of hypnotic and non-hypnotic suggestion, the 
question asked at the beginning of the first chapter still remains: what is hypnosis? In 
answering this question it is typical to begin by stating which side of the state vs. non- 
state divide one falls upon. In the context of the present theoretical model this is not an 
option, however. By incorporating elements from both state and non-state theories of 
hypnosis, the current model attempts to provide some way of straddling the boundary 
between these previously disparate camps. On the one hand, the current model suggests 
that hypnotic behaviours and experiences are perfectly normal phenomena explicable in 
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terms of everyday psychological processes and without reference to the notion of a 
unique altered state. However, the model also suggests that the use of hypnotic 
procedures may bring about certain non-unique state changes, such as absorption and a 
shift towards lower level cognitive processes, which make suggested phenomena more 
likely to occur. As the existing definition of hypnosis seems to emphasise only the 
procedural aspects of hypnosis as a compromise between the state and non-state theorists 
(see Kirsch, 1994 and the accompanying commentaries; see also Fellows, 1994), 
whereas the current model aims to find the middle ground between these two camps, an 
attempt at revising the APA definition on the basis of this model seems appropriate in 
this context. As such, the following descriptioriý' of hypnosis is proposed: 
Hypnosis is a procedure during which suggestions for alterations in sensations, 
perceptions, thoughts or behaviour are given. Although successful responses to such 
suggestions are common outside the hypnotic situation, the extent to which this occurs 
may be elevated following hypnotic procedures for a number of reasons. Of primary 
importance in this regard is the belief that hypnosis involves increased responsivily to 
suggestions. Other beliefs may play a profound role in shaping suggested responses 
although this is truefor hypnotic and non-hypnotic situations alike. In addition, certain 
alterations in the subject's psychological state that can be brought about by hypnotic 
procedures, such as a state of extremely focused attention or absorption, may also 
increase responsivity to suggestions. The induction of these state changes by hypnotic 
procedures is related to the belief that this is appropriate in the hypnotic situation 
coupled with instructions to help subjects experience them. However, such state changes 
are not unique to hypnosis and may be displayed in a number of different contexts 
otherwise unrelated to hypnosis. Nevertheless, it is the interaction between state changes 
and subjects' beliefs and expectations that shapes the nature and occurrence of 
suggested behaviours in the hypnotic context. The degree to which individuals respond to 
suggestions during hypnosis is a product of their propensity to respond to suggestions in 
non-hypnotic situations, their beliefs concerning hypnosis, and their capacity to 
experience the state changes calledfor in the hypnotic situation. 
41 For comparative purposes the full APA definition of hypnosis is presented in appendix I. Those 
paragraphs of the original definition referring to the misconceptions surrounding hypnosis and the use of 
hypnosis in clinical and research settings are endorsed by the current author and no revision of these will 
be offered here. In contrast to the position advocated by the APA, the term description is regarded as more 
appropriate than definition and is endorsed here. 
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Clearly, much work needs to be done to refine and extend this definition and, in its 
present form at least, it is sure to engender some level of disagreement from workers 
within the field. Nevertheless, it represents an attempt to move away from the purely 
procedural definition currently endorsed by the APA, and emphasise the more 
psychological aspects of suggestion and hypnosis. As recent discussions concerning the 
APA definition have shown (see Kirsch, 1994 and the accompanying commentaries; see 
also Fellows, 1994), many hypnosis researchers and practitioners would prefer to see 
such an approach adopted; this definition hopefully represents at least a step-forward in 
this regard. 
3.3.3 General ftlications of the model 
One of the primary purposes of developing a model of the cognitive system derived 
from contempomry cognitive psychological research and theory was to allow an 
exploration of the possible insights that research into suggestion and hypnosis could 
offer psychology in general. Although empirical substantiation for the model is required 
before any firm conclusions can be drawn, a brief examination of the possible 
implications of the model in this regard is nevertheless appropriate here. 
One of the most noteworthy features of the current model is its assertion that suggested 
behaviours and experiences (both hypnotic and non-hypnotic) are, on a functional level 
at least, no different to many normal behaviours and experiences. What makes responses 
in the suggestive context different from those outside it is simply the fact that the 
suggestive context typically demands unusual behaviours and experiences, whereas so- 
called normal situations typically require normal behaviours, and experiences. The fact 
that unusual requests, reinforced by beliefs, expectations and situational features, are 
able to produce such unusual responses underlines the lability of conscious experience 
and offers an insight into how it may be manipulated with a view to further 
understanding its nature. Indeed, arguably the biggest growth area within hypnosis 
research at present is in the psychophysiological arena, where research is often not 
directed at hypnosis itself but rather uses hypnotic suggestions as a tool to manipulate 
conscious experience (see, for example, the recent neuroirnaging work of Rainville, 
Duncan, Price, Carrier, & Bushnell, 1997, and Szechtman, Woody, Bowers & Nahmias, 
1998). Such an approach offers a powerful way of examining the relationship between 
brain activity and specific aspects of phenomenology, with the present model offering a 
framework by which such research can be related to more general cognitive and 
psychological issues. Few, if any, other areas within psychology have provided such 
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powerful tools by which conscious experience can be manipulated, underlining the 
increasing importance of research into suggestion and hypnosis based on a general 
psychological framework. 
On the clinical side, the current model may have important implications for the 
understanding of a number of conditions where disturbed phenomenology is a primary 
symptom. Possible explanations of certain aspects of post-traumatic stress disorder, 
functional amnesia and other conversion and somatoform symptoms such as paralysis, 
blindness and pseudoseizures are potentially within the remit of the current model, 
although such an analysis extends outside the theoretical goals of the present 
undertaking. Nevertheless, recent work by the present author indicates the potential value 
in such an endeavour (R. Brown & Trimble, 1999, in preparation). 
Suggestion and hypnosis are not just tools by which the nature of conscious experience 
can be examined, however. According to the current model, the induction of absorption 
and reduction of critical thought occurring during hypnosis brings about a processing 
shift towards lower level cognitive control. Although great strides have been made in 
understanding the nature of higher level systems (see e. g. Burgess & Shallice, 1996a, b; 
Shallice & Burgess, 1996), very little is known about lower level cognition and its 
relationship to behaviour, thought, experience and high level processing itself. Given the 
functional importance of lower level processes it is essential that this area is addressed in 
future research; the possibility that hypnotic interventions are capable of bringing about a 
shift towards this type of processing suggests one way in which future research could 
approach this issue. 
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter an account of hypnotic and non-hypnotic suggestion was provided, 
based on the model of the cognitive system outlined in chapter two. The model is an 
attempt to provide an integrative position which encompasses the central elements of the 
ego-psychological, dissociated control, neuropsychophysiological and sociocognitive 
theories of hypnosis in a single nomological network. The basic structure of the model 
may be summarised as follows: 
(i) Suggestion is the process by which perceptual and behavioural representations are 
automatically triggered by cues from the internal and external environment to control 
experience and action. 
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(ii) The nature of suggested responses will vary according to the pattern of activation 
spread across the representational network and the nature of the network itself-, thus, they 
will vary according to the interaction between prior expectancies and the cues present in 
the suggestive context. 
(iii) The degree to which an individual responds to suggestions is multiply determined by 
(a) motivation; (b) a complementary pattern of representational activity; (c) the degree of 
attentional absorption; (d) the level of critical thought; (e) predominant processing mode; 
and (f) the relationship between (c), (d) and (e). 
(iv) Responses to suggestions, both hypnotic and non-hypnotic alike, are governed by the 
same fundamental and normal psychological mechanisms; thus, an hypnotic induction is 
not required for successful suggestive responding. 
(v) Responsivity to suggestions is typically increased during hypnosis due to (a) the 
belief that that is what hypnosis involves; (b) a reduction in critical thought; (c) 
absorption; (d) a bias towards the low level control of behaviour; (e) the relationship 
between (b), (c) and (d). 
(vi) Individual differences in suggestibility (regardless of context) will vary according to 
(a) the ability to sustain focused attention and avoid critical thought; and M an everyday 
propensity towards the low level control of behaviour; these will, in turn, be moderated 
by positive expectancies and attitudes concerning the particular suggestive context under 
examination (e. g. the hypnotic situation). 
On the basis of this model, a revision to the existing APA definition of hypnosis, 
emphasising both procedural and psychological aspects, was proposed. The implications 
of the model for the understanding of consciousness, certain types of psychopathology 
and the nature of lower level processing were then discussed. In the next chapter, some 
of the predictions of the model will be examined and the practical issues that they raise 
will be discussed. This discussion will serve as a general introduction to the empirical 
work, designed to assess the validity of the current model, reported in chapters five to 
nine inclusive. 
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CHAPTER 4: Introduction to empirical work 
4.1 Introduction 
In chapter three a novel model of hypnosis and suggestion was outlined; the task now 
turns to the empirical assessment of its validity. In this chapter, the main predictions of 
this model will be examined and the practical issues that they raise will be discussed. On 
this basis, four hypotheses will be formulated and four studies designed to assess these 
hypotheses will be described; this discussion will serve as a general introduction to the 
empirical work reported in chapters five to nine inclusive. 
4.2 Model predictions and empirical assessment 
The model of hypnosis and suggestion outlined in chapter three was formulated to 
provide an explanatory framework by which existing research within the field could be 
organised as a basis for the generation of new hypotheses. In many respects the model 
provides an original perspective on suggestion and hypnosis and, where this is the case, 
novel predictions are made; the empirical examination of some of these predictions will 
be one of the aims of the research described in this thesis. Being based on existing 
theories within the field, however, some of the predictions of the current model also 
follow those of its theoretical precursors. Nevertheless, where this is the case the present 
model provides new, potentially more valid, ways of addressing these hypotheses 
empirically; accordingly, the examination of some of these hypotheses is the second aim 
of the research reported here. 
According to the model of suggestion outlined in the previous chapter, suggested 
behaviours and experiences are the product of the automatic activation (and, in the case 
of cognitive suggestions, attentional selection) of low level representations following the 
receipt by low level attentional systems of cues from the internal and external 
environment. A number of factors which may affect the efficacy of this process have 
been described, including the triggering input received from environmental sources and 
the nature and activation levels of the representations in question. In addition, the model 
proposes that control influences from higher level attentional systems may also have a 
significant effect on the activation of representations involved in suggestive responding. 
For example, if an individual is biased towards the higher level management of everyday 
behaviour, the operation of such higher level processes in the suggestive context may 
interfere with the activation of the representations required for the successful execution 
of the suggested response. For instance, high-level rumination on negative thoughts such 
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as "niis is not working" during the presentation or the suggestion will serve to activate, 
in a top-do%%m fashion. representations which conflict with those whose activation is 
rcquircd for the suggestion attempt to be succcssrul. 17hrough the process or lateral 
inhibition, the activation or these conflicting representations serves to reduce the 
activation or the suggestion representations, thereby making the suggestive attempt less 
likely to succeed. One prediction from such an account would be that individuals who 
havc a predisposition towards highcr level bchavioural control will be less likely to 
respond succcssrully to suggestions than those who do not, due to the possible inhibitory 
effect that higher level cognition may have on the activation or appropHatc 
rcprcscntat ions. Conversely, one might predict that thosc individuals who do not possess 
good higher level abilities will be more suggestible than those who do, as these 
individuals arc less likely to be predisposed towards the higher level control or 
behaviour. On the face of it, such hypotheses appear at odds with the findings of 
previous research indicating that hypnotic suggestibility is associated with a number or 
apparently higher level abilities (scc chapter one). A number of studies have shown, ror 
cxamplc, that hypnotic suggestibility is associated with cognitive flexibility (e. g. Priebe 
& Wallace, 1986; Wallace ct at, 1994) and the capacity to sustain attention over time 
(e. g. Graham & Evans, 1977; Crawford ct al, 1993). Moreover, the ncurophysiological 
work or Gruzclicr and colleagues indicates that highly suggestible individuals havc 
greater baseline cerebral activity in brain areas associated with high level aticritional 
processing than low suggcstibics (c. g Gruzclicr aA 1984; Gruzelicr & Waff cn, 1993). 
The first hypothesis, that hypnotic suggestibility is negatively associated with a high 
level processing prcrcrcncc, is not contradicted by this tcscarch, however, unless one 
assumes that processing preference is inexorably linked to processing ability. Although it 
is likely that there will be a relationship between the two, it is equally likely that thcrc 
will also be considerable variation in processing prcrcrcnce between individuals of 
comparable processing ability. Moreover, we have no reason to assume that increased 
levels orblood flow in brain areas associated with high level attention will be associated 
with any particular cognitive bias. Ilic validity or the second hypothesis rests not upon 
the distinction between prcrcrcncc and ability, however, but on the distinction between 
different types or high level processing. %Vlicrcas previous research lias shown that 
suggestibility is linked to high level attcntional abilities, the present preposition relates 
more to high level cognition and problem solving. As Shallicc and Burgess (1996; 
Burgcss & Shallicc, 1996a, b) have demonstrated, the supervisory attcntional system is 
composed of a diverse array of processing components which work in tandem as a higher 
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level control structure. Although a functional relationship exists between individual sub- 
components of the system, there is likely to be a high degree of relative specialisation 
such that some components operate more (or less) efficiently than others. As such, an 
individual may possess the ability to sustain their attention or switch between cognitive 
strategies, for example, but be relatively unable to engage in effective problem solving 
due to the absence of appropriate processing algorithms. It would not be conceptually 
invalid, therefore, to hypothesise a negative relationship between hypnotic suggestibility 
and certain aspects of higher level processing ability other than cognitive flexibility or 
the sustaining of attention. 
As the successful execution of suggestions directly involves the processes involved in 
the low level management of everyday behaviour, one can also predict that those 
individuals who have a general predisposition towards such low level behavioural 
control will be more responsive to suggestions than those who do no t42. In each case, 
only the model of suggestion outlined in this thesis makes such predictions explicitly and 
therefore research designed to assess them provides a direct test of the current model. 
However, assessing which type of processing (high vs. low) individuals have a positive 
bias towards as a basis for the everyday control of behaviour is not an easy task, as it is 
difficult to diagnose whether a particular behaviour is based on the automatic activation 
of memory representations or higher level processing algorithms (Logan, 1988); this is 
particularly so given the fact that most behaviours involve both automatic and controlled 
components anyway. Even in the case where a behaviour is comprised mainly of 
automatic elements, one cannot be sure of this simply by, as is commonly done, 
assessing whether or not the behaviour in question requires intention, awareness or 
attentional effort. Although such attributes (or the lack of them) may be characteristic of 
many, if not all, automatic behaviours, being independent qualities that may or may not 
co-vary according to the nature of the behaviour in question they do not provide a 
suitable foundation on which to base an operationalisation of automaticity. While 
information concerning whether or not a behaviour requires attention, effort, awareness 
or intention for its management is certainly important, one must seek additional ways of 
addressing which processing mode is predominant in any given situation or individual. 
42 It is important to note that a positive attitude or bias towards low level behavioural control need not 
necessarily imply that an individual will therefore have a negative attitude or bias towards high level 
behavioural control. Thus, rather than viewing higher and lower level control as opposite ends of a 
unipolar processing style construct, attitudes towards the two may also be regarded as individual 
dimensions in their own right. In this case, an individual's position on either dimension need not be related 
to their position on the other dimension. Nevertheless, some of the measures used in this thesis do adopt a 
unipolar view and any discussion of findings obtained using these measures will reflect this fact. 
110 
Through the accumulation of converging lines of evidence one will hopefully be able to 
state with some certainty which processes are involved in suggestion and which are not; 
work concerning the attention, effort or awareness involved in suggested behaviours, 
although it may contribute, cannot by itself provide this information. 
In order to assess empirically which type of processing a particular individual or 
situation is biased towards, a different operationalisation of each type of processing is 
therefore required. However, as the distinction between higher and lower level modes of 
processing outlined in chapter two is novel, its generality is as yet unknown; thus, 
although it is highly likely that individuals will differ in the relative degree to which they 
prefer higher or lower level processes for the management of behaviour, how such 
differences might manifest themselves is largely uncertain. It is possible, for example, 
that processing predisposition plays a profound role in shaping an individual's 
personality, their attitudes and their behaviour in general, to the extent that processing 
preferences will be clearly measurable on these levels. On the other hand, it is possible 
that differences in processing predisposition have more subtle manifestations that, for the 
time being at least, are observable only on a cognitive or physiological level. As such, an 
explorative approach addressing both of these possibilities is required. Accordingly, 
research and theory from a number of different psychological literatures which bears a 
close resemblance to the processing distinction made in this thesis has been examined, 
and a number of measures apparently assessing a different aspect of this distinction have 
been selected. These measures have been chosen for their coverage of the domain 
described above, addressing concepts as diverse as personality, reasoning, cognitive 
style, creativity, learning and perception, using both self-report and behavioural indices. 
In studies I and 2 the predictions concerning hypnotic suggestibility outlined above will 
be assessed through the use of these measures; these studies will be reported in chapters 
five and six respectively, where the conceptual and empirical origins of these measures 
will be described in detail. In chapter seven, the generality of the processing distinction 
made here will be assessed through an examination of the relationships between these 
measures. 
In addition to making specific predictions concerning the person-situation interaction 
involved in suggestion, the current model also makes predictions concerning hypnosis 
itself According to the model, the hypnotic situation is associated with increased 
suggestibility for two main reasons: (1) subjects believe that that is what hypnosis 
involves; (2) the induction of an absorbed state during the hypnotic situation brings about 
a reduction in critical thought (proposition 2a) and a resulting bias towards lower level 
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behavioural control (proposition 2b). As has been discussed previously, there is a good 
deal of research pertaining to the first of these and, as such, no attempt to assess this 
prediction will be made here. With regards the second proposition, however, less 
research exists and that which does can often be criticised on methodological grounds 
(see chapter one). Accordingly, two studies designed to assess the two aspects of this 
proposition will be described in this thesis. In the first, described in chapter eight, the 
prediction that hypnosis is associated with a bias towards lower level processing will be 
assessed; in the second, described in chapter nine, the prediction that hypnosis is 
associated with a reduction in critical thinking ability will be assessed. In each case, a 
prediction made not only by the current model of hypnosis but also by existing 
theoretical frameworks such as those provided by the ego-psychological, dissociated 
control and neuropsychophysiological theories is being assessed. However, in these 
studies a novel43 methodological approach based on the distinction between higher and 
lower level cognition will be adopted. In this way, the current research provides an 
answer to the methodological criticisms levelled at studies previously designed to assess 
these predictions. Moreover, as with the research concerning hypnotic suggestibility 
outlined above, the use of alternative methodological paradigms derived from general 
psychology allows an appreciation of the potential for cross-fertilisation between the 
present field and psychology as a whole. 
4.3 Summary 
In this short chapter the main predictions made by the model of suggestion and 
hypnosis outlined in chapter three were described and some of the methodological issues 
pertaining to their empirical assessment discussed. On this basis, four studies"designed 
to assess these predictions have been briefly outlined; these will be reported in chapters 
five to nine inclusive. The findings of these studies and their implications for the models 
outlined in chapters two and three will be discussed in some detail in the concluding 
chapter. 
One final point is worthy of mention here. In contrast to many research projects, the 
empirical work described in this thesis does not follow a linear format but takes a broad, 
explorative approach investigating a number of related strands in parallel. As such, this 
thesis does not present a series of research studies with each new study building on the 
43 At least within this field. 
"" In each case, ethical approval has been sought and obtained from the relevant bodies. 
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methodological and conceptual insights of the last. Rather, each of the studies described 
here examines something of a separate issue and therefore each empirical chapter, to an 
extent at least, stands alone. The reasons for such a non-linear approach are twofold. 
First, the preliminary nature of the conceptual framework described in chapters two and 
three lends itself well to an explorative approach, a method that may yield more useful 
information in the early stages of theoretical development than alternative approaches. 
Second, and most importantly, practical issues have precluded the use of a linear 
approach to data collection in the current context. In the first instance, a considerable 
delay was encountered during the process of obtaining ethical approval for the research 
described here. Having obtained ethical approval, the compilation of hypnotic 
suggestibility data proved to be considerably more time consuming than anticipated, with 
suggestibility testing continuing throughout a two-year data collection period. As a 
result, obtaining sufficient numbers of study participants proved extremely difficult, 
meaning that the results of individual investigations were not available before the design 
and execution of further studies was required. Although running studies concurrently is 
clearly not the most ideal method of data collection, the explorative nature of this thesis 
fortunately allows for the pursuit of parallel lines of investigation. It is hoped that the 
strands of greatest potential interest may be identified in the work described here, which 
could then be followed up in a more linear fashion in future research. 
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CHAPTER 5: Empirical study I 
The relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and several self-report measures of 
thinking style. 
5.1 Introduction 
As discussed in chapters three and four, the model presented in this thesis predicts that 
suggestibility will be positively related to an everyday predisposition for low level 
cognition and negatively related to a predisposition for high level cognition. In this 
chapter, the first of two studies designed to assess the validity of these predictions will be 
described. 
As discussed in chapter three, individual differences in high and low level processing 
preference may potentially manifest themselves in a number of ways, such as in the 
general information processing style of the individual, but also in their personality and 
behaviour in general. The validity of this assertion is supported by research and theory 
from general psychology which parallels the distinction between higher and lower level 
cognition outlined in this thesis. This distinction has played a central role in the 
psychological literatures concerning cognition, personality and cognitive style, with 
theoretical opinion within these spheres converging on a view of the cognitive system 
that has much in common with that offered here. As such, measures obtained from these 
literatures offer a way of investigating the predictions outlined in chapter three, which in 
turn further serves to bridge the gap between hypnosis research and psychology in 
general. 
5.1.1 Cognitive-Exl2eriential Self-Thg= 
The distinction between higher and lower level cognition is a fundamental element in 
the global theory of personality, Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST; Epstein, 
1973,1980,1990,1994). According to CEST, conscious deliberation is not necessary for 
adaptive behaviour in familiar situations, and may often serve to delay or distort 
responses which the organism has learnt are appropriate through experience with the 
environment. By this view, the most efficient and adaptive way of responding to 
incoming data is to automatically process it prior to awareness, and select only that 
information of particular salience or novelty to the individual for more detailed 
conscious analysis. CEST postulates that these forms of information processing are 
carried out separately by two discrete systems - the experiential and rational systems 
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respectively - with all behaviour being the product of the dynamic balance between the 
two. Table 5.1 presents a comparison of the attributes of these systems. 
The experiential system is composed of a hierarchically organised set of schemata 
derived from emotionally significant past experience. It is both phylogenetically ancient 
and developmentally immature, and provides the basis for adaptive behaviour until the 
individual is sophisticated enough to process information consciously. Throughout the 
course of everyday life, infonnation received by the individual is interpreted by the 
experiential system, and, depending on the degree and nature of the emotional salience of 
the event in light of previous experience, the results of this processing may be passed on 
to the rational system for further analysis. The rational system is the executive' of the 
organism; it is here that complex, analytical tasks that require delayed responses are 
performed under the jurisdiction of the conscious self. It is therefore associated with 
conscious attention and mental control. By this view, all behaviour is the result of the 
dynamic balance between the two systems: what is represented in the rational system has 
arrived there through processing performed by the experiential system; in turn, 
experiential processing is influenced, and may be over-ridden, by the operation of the 
rational system. 
The similarities between CEST and the model of the cognitive system outlined in 
chapter two are readily apparent. In line with the model presented here, CEST postulates 
a hierarchical organisation to the cognitive system based on the distinction between 
higher (i. e. rational) and lower level (i. e. experiential) cognition. According to CEST, 
Table 5.1: Comnarison of the exneriential and rational svstems in CEST 
Experiential system Rational system 
1. Holistic operation 1. Analytic operation 
2. Affective: Pleasure-pain oriented 2. Logical: Reason oriented 
3. Associationistic structure 3. Logical structure 
4. Behaviour mediated by 'vibes' from past 4. Behaviour mediated by conscious appraisal of 
experiences events 
5. Encodes reality in concrete images, metaphors 5. Encodes reality in abstract symbols (words and 
and narratives numbers) 
6. Rapid processing: Oriented towards immediate 6. Slower processing: Oriented towards delayed 
action action 
7. Slower to change: Changes with repetitive or 7. Changes more rapidly: Changes with speed of 
intense experience thought 
8. More crudely differentiated: Broad 8. More highly differentiated 
generalisation gradient; stereotyping 
9. More crudely integrated: Dissociative; context- 9. More highly integrated: Cross-context 
specific processing processing 
10. Experienced passively and preconsciously 10. Experienced actively and consciously 
11. Self-evidently valid: "Experiencing is 11. Requires justification via logic and evidence 
believing" I I 
From "Cognitive-Experiential Self-T'heory: An integrative theory of personality" by S. Epstein, In R. C. Curtis, 771e relational seU* 
I"heoretical convergences in psychoanalysis and social psychology, New York: Guilford Press. Copyright 1991 by Guilford press. 
Adapted by permission. 
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lower level processing is automatic, rapid, holistic, associationistic and preconscious, 
while higher level processing is controlled, slow, analytical and conscious. Such a 
description of the higher/lower level distinction closely parallels that described in the 
model of the cognitive system outlined in chapter two. 
According to CEST, the fact that much of behaviour, including thought, is determined 
by a system outside of our conscious control has profound implications for any theory of 
personality. Effectively, and this is the essence of CEST, the individual comprises two 
4selves' - the experiential self and the rational self - both of which have a stake in 
controlling thought and action; according to Epstein, an individual's personality is, in 
part at least, determined by the relative degree to which experiential or rational 
processing is 'favoured' by their cognitive system. Indeed, Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj 
and Heier (1994; Epstein, Norris & Pacini, 1995) have developed an instrument - the 
Rational Versus Experiential Inventory (RVEI) - to measure this dimension. Given the 
similarity between CEST and the model of the cognitive system outlined here, the RVEI 
represents one measure by which the predictions concerning the relationship between 
suggestibility and processing predisposition might be assessed. 
5.1.2 Learning stvle and the creative Dersonalit 
The distinction between higher and lower level cognition has also played a significant 
role in research concerning the strategies individuals use when learning information in an 
educational setting. More specifically, a distinction has been made within the leaming 
styles literature between analytic and holistic learning strategies, the former involving 
the critical, raticnal analysis of information and the latter involving assessing the 
similarities and relationships between information. Such a distinction corresponds 
closely to that between higher and lower level modes of processing in the model 
described here. 
The role of analytic and holistic processes in learning has been most extensively 
investigated by Schmeck and colleagues using the Inventory of Learning Processes 
(ILP; Schineck, Ribich & Ramaniah, 1977). Over the course of a number of years, 
several factor-analytic studies have revealed a four factor structure of the instrument, 
based on four different clusters of learning strategies that together represent individual 
learning styles (Beyler & Schmeck, 1992); these styles have been described as deep 
processing, elaborative processing, fact retention and methodological study. Of these the 
first two are of interest here because they represent two measures of the degree to which 
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individuals flexibly use both analytic and holistic strategies in the course of learning 
(Geisler-Brenstein & Schmeck, 1989; Beyler & Schmeck, 1992). 
A number of studies have revealed that scores on the elaborative and deep processing 
scales of the ILP are related to a wide variety of cognitive skills (for a review see 
Schmeck, 1988). These findings would appear to indicate, as suggested, that high scorers 
on these scales are the most flexible processors, using both analytic and holistic 
strategies in learning situations to produce the most successful results. However, 
although these scales reportedly measure integrative cognitive functions, each would 
appear to be associated with a particular preference for either an analytic or holistic 
processing style. More specifically, high scorers on the deep processing sub-scale tend to 
engage in the critical evaluation of information and score more highly on measures of 
verbal ability than elaborative processors (Schmeck, 1983), indicative of an analytical 
preference. On the other hand, Schmeck and Ribich (1978) present data suggesting that 
elaborative processors score more highly on measures of academic curiosity and mental 
imagery than those scoring highly on the deep processing sub-scale, suggesting a more 
holistic orientation. As such, the ILP represents one further method for assessing the 
hypothesised relationships between suggestibility and processing predisposition. 
In addition to learning style research, the distinction between analytic and holistic 
cognitive processes has also played an important role in research concerning creativity 
and the so-called 'creative personality' (Taggart & Torrance, 1984). A particularly 
influential account of creative problem-solving is that of Wallas (1926) who regarded the 
problem solving process as being composed of a series of discrete stages, termed 
preparation, incubation, illumination and verification. According to Wallas' account, 
once the individual has recognised the problem and made some cursory attempts to solve 
it, it is put aside and no longer thought about consciously. However, during this period of 
'incubation', unconscious processes are at work on the problem until a solution is found, 
at which point the individual experiences a flash of insight or 'illumination' as a 
primitive form of the answer is delivered to consciousness. After this moment of insight, 
the rough solution is consciously refined and formalised in the verification stage of the 
process. By this view, therefore, problem solving is discontinuous and involves both 
analytic (in the verification stage) and non-analytic (in the incubation stage) cognitive 
operations. 
The theory of creative problem solving provided by Wallas (1926) provides the basis 
for Taggart and Torrance's (1984) theory of creativity and the creative personality. In 
line with Wallas, Taggart and Torrance suggest that there are both analytical and non- 
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analytical elements to the creative process which must both be used in a flexible fashion 
in order for the individual to be truly creative. According to this view, however, 
individuals often differ in the stages of the creative process to which they are best suited, 
with this difference affecting the type of creative products that they are most likely to 
produce. Some individuals are better suited to the verification aspects of the creative 
process and tend to create by improving existing material; Taggart and Torrance (1984) 
have described these individuals as possessing 'left-brain 45 creativity. In contrast, other 
individuals are better suited to the more non-analytical elements of the process and tend 
to be creative by inventing entirely original products (see Torrance & Rockenstein, 
1988); these individuals have been described as possessing 'right-brain' creativity. 
Taggart and Torrance (1984) have devised an individual difference measure, the Human 
Information Processing Survey (HIPS), designed to assess the degree to which 
individuals tend towards either left or right brain creativity, or the flexible integration of 
the two. 
According to Taggart and Torrance (1984), left-brain creativity is characterised by an 
analytical, abstract, and temporal processing style and a preference for verbal material, 
while right-brain creativity is characterised by a holistic, concrete, spatial and intuitive 
processing style and a preference for non-verbal material (see also Torrance & 
Rockenstein, 1988). It is thus readily apparent that the distinction between left and right 
brain creativity styles bears a close relation to that between the higher and lower level 
processing modes respectively irf the model of the cognitive system described in chapter 
two. As such, the HIPS offers, in addition to the RVEI and ILP, one further way that the 
predictions concerning the relationship between processing predisposition and 
suggestibility might be assessed. 
5.1.3 The measurement of suggesfibft 
As was discussed in chapter three, the model outlined in the present thesis follows the 
work of Kirsch (1997) in its assertion that suggestive responding in both hypnotic and 
non-hypnotic situations is governed by the same fundamental psychological mechanism 
(i. e. memory retrieval). Given that this is the case, assessment Of an individual's 
responsivity to suggestions may be carried out in either hypnotic or non-hypnotic 
45 The biological metaphor used by Taggart and Torrance (1984) was based on research indicating that the 
characteristics of the left and right brain creativity styles correspond closely to the functions of the left and 
right cerebral hemispheres (e. g. Springer & Deutsch, 1981; Omstein, 1986). Although the validity of this 
metaphor has since been questioned, there is good evidence to believe that the theoretical constructs 
underlying the dimensions of the HIPS are sound (Beyler & Schmeck, 1992). 
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contexts with the same basic construct being addressed in each case; this is evidenced by 
the extremely strong correlation obtained between hypnotic and non-hypnotic 
suggestibility (Kirsch, 1997). Although assessing suggestibility in an hypnotic context 
may, to a certain extent, contaminate the suggestibility measure with attitudes and 
expectations concerning hypnosis, the vast majority of research within the field has 
assessed suggestibility within the hypnotic context, and so this practice was followed in 
the present thesis also. Such an approach maximises the generalisability of the current 
research, although the issue of possible contamination will be addressed in the discussion 
provided in chapter ten. 
There is a considerable range of instruments developed to provide reliable and 
standardised assessments of hypnotic suggestibility, with at least fourteen distince 6 
measurement scales, varying in content and the context of their presentation, being 
available to researchers and clinicians working within the field (Perry, Nadon & Button, 
1992). Given such a range it is not immediately obvious which scale is the most suited to 
the research issues addressed in the context of this thesis. Certain tests are rarely used 
and have little, if any, psychometric data reported for them (see Perry, Nadon & Button, 
1992); as such, they will not be considered here. There are nevertheless three scales 
which, being widely used and requiring no special training to administer, are potentially 
appropriate for the current purposes, the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, form C 
(SHSS: C; Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962), the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic 
Susceptibility, form A (HGSH3: A; Shor & Orne, 1962) and the Carleton University 
Responsiveness to Suggestion Scale (CURSS; Spanos, Radtke, Hodgins, Stam & 
Bertrand, 1983). 
The three scales all conforin to a roughly similar structure whereby the individual 
receives an initial hypnotic induction followed by a series of test suggestions. The 
individual's response to these test suggestions (either behaviourally, subjectively or both 
according to the particular scale) determines their hypnotic suggestibility. The main 
points of difference between these measures are whether they are administered 
individually or to a group, how long they take to complete, how easy they are to 
administer, the amount of psychometric data available for them, and how often they have 
been used for research purposes within the field. It is on these points of difference, and 
certain issues concerning validity, that scale selection will be based for the purposes of 
the present studies. 
46 That is, if one regards separate forms of the same general test (e. g the Stanford Scale of Hypnotic 
Susceptibility forms A and B; Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1959) as representing distinct scales. 
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Of the three scales, the SHSS: C and HGSHS: A are by far the most well researched and 
used (Fellows, 1988; Perry, Nadon & Button, 1992); the CURSS is a relatively new scale 
with the majority of the psychometric data pertaining to it having been obtained by its 
authors following its initial development. Both the SHSS and HGSHS take 
approximately one hour to administer, with the former being an individually presented 
scale and the latter being designed for group presentation. The CURSS takes about 25-30 
minutes to administer and is also suitable for group presentation. Although the excellent 
psychometric properties of the SHSS: C have earrit it a reputation for being the 'gold 
standard' of suggestibility measurement (Kurtz & Strube, 1996), its individual 
administration format makes it an impractical choice where time constraints are of 
paramount concern (Kihlstrom, 1985); given the considerable time restrictions placed on 
the current research and the existence of more practical yet psychometrically acceptable 
alternatives, use of the SHSS: S must unfortunately be rejected here. 
As such, the choice of suggestibility measure is limited to that between the HGSHS: A 
and CURSS, both suitable for group administration and therefore potentially appropriate 
for the current research purposes. On a practical level, the CURSS is the obvious choice 
taking approximately half the time to administer compared to the HGSHS: A. Practical 
issues are only one of the concerns in choice of suggestibility measure, however. 
Although both scales correlate more or less equally well with the SHSS: C (Perry, Nadon 
& Button, 1992) and demonstrate good psychometric properties in terms of internal 
consistency and reliability (Kihlstrom, 1985; Fellows, 1988), there is considerably more 
evidence pertaining to the HGSHS: A than the CURSS, an unsurprising fact given the 
respective ages of the two scales. Unlike the CURSS, normative data on the HGSHS: A 
has been collected in a variety of cross-cultural samples and over a considerable period 
of time. In all, norms have been provided for American (Shor & Orrie, 1963; Coe, 1964), 
Australian (Sheehan & McConkey, 1979), Czech (Svoboda, 1989), Canadian (Laurence 
& Perry, 1982), German (Bongartz, 1985), Spanish (Lamas, del Valle-Inclan, Blanco & 
Diaz, 1989), Danish (Zachariae, Sommerlund & Molay, 1996) and Finnish (Kallio & 
Ihamuotila, in press) samples. An evaluation of this data suggests that the HGSHS: A is 
relatively stable across both culture and time (Perry, Nadon & Button, 1992). As such, 
the HGSHS: A would appear to be a more useful measure in terms of its generalisability 
than the CURSS, at least according to existing evidence; underlining its comparative 
value, the HGSHS: A is also probably the most widely used suggestibility measure within 
the field (Perry, Nadon & Button, 1992). While the CURSS may have the potential to 
supersede the HGSHS: A given its practical benefits, further evidence pertaining to it is 
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required before this can be achieved. On the basis of both precedent and its sound 
psychometric properties, the HGSHS: A was used as the suggestibility measure in this 
thesis. 
In summary, this study aimed to investigate the related hypotheses that suggestibility is 
positively related to a low level processing predisposition and negatively related to a 
high level processing predisposition. In order to do this, a number of self-report measures 
of low and high level processing predisposition taken from a diverse set of literatures 
within psychology were presented to a large group of individuals who had been screened 
on a widely used measure of hypnotic suggestibility. 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Subiects 
Subjects were 209 graduate and undergraduate students from University College 
London, of which 60 were male and 149 female. The mean age of the entire sample was 
21.39 years (s. d. 4.43 years; range 18-48 years). 119 of the subjects were volunteers who 
were recruited in response to advertisements placed around the University requesting 
participants for a study on hypnotic suggestibility and thinking style. Of this group of 
subjects, 42 were male and 78 were female. This sample had an average age of 22.47 
years (s. d. 4.96 years; range 18-48 years). Informed consent was obtained from each of 
these subjects who received L5 for participating in the HGSHS: A and D for completing 
the questionnaires. The remainirig 89 subjects participated in this study as one of the 
requirements of a laboratory class in statistics and research methods; they received no 
payment for participation. Of this group of subjects, 18 were male and 71 were female. 
This sample had an average age of 20.08 years (s. d. 3.18 years; range 18-35 years). This 
group of subjects was infonned that they had the right not to participate if they so 
wished; three members of the laboratory group chose not to take part. 
5.2.2 Materials 
Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, form A (HGSHS. -A): The HGSHS: A 
(Shor & Ome, 1962) was developed as a group version of the earlier Stanford Hypnotic 
Susceptibility Scales, forms A and B (Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1959) and conforms to a 
similar testing format. Following a short standardised introduction presented by the 
experimenter in a bid to establish rapport, the group of subjects is played an audio-tape 
(to ensure control over possible multiple testing occasions) comprising the main body of 
the scale. The scale consists of an hypnotic induction followed by twelve different test 
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suggestions, of roughly increasing difficulty, from across the domain of hypnosis (E. 
Hilgard, 1973b) including ideo-motor (e. g. hands moving together), challenge (e. g. 
finger lock) and cognitive (e. g. amnesia) items. After the de-induction of hypnosis, 
subjects are required to complete a response booklet indicating their responses to each of 
the suggestions following a dichotomous format (i. e. 'Yes, I behaved in the suggested 
fashion' vs. 'No, I didn't behave in the suggested fashion). Whether or not the amnesia 
suggestion has been passed is based on the number of test items that the subject records 
in the response booklet over a three minute interval following the termination of 
hypnosis but prior to the amnesia reversal cue. The individual's susceptibility score 
corresponds to the number of suggestions that they have successfully passed; 
susceptibility scores may therefore range from zero to twelve. Presentation of the scale 
and completion of the response booklet takes approximately one hour in total. 
The HGSHS: A possesses good psychometric properties. According to the original 
nonns, the scale has an internal consistency of 0.80 (Shor & Ome, 1963). In addition, 
Gwynn, Spanos, Gabora and Jarrett (1988) present findings indicating that it has a test- 
retest reliability of . 55 
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. As was discussed in the previous section, the HGSHS: A has 
been assessed in a variety of cross-cultural contexts with results suggesting that the 
HGSHS: A is relatively consistent across both time and culture (Perry, Nadon & Button, 
1992). The scale possesses reasonable convergent validity, yielding correlations of about 
0.6 with the SHSS: C (Coe, 1964; Register & Kihlstrom, 1986), and 0.62 with the 
CURSS (objective scale; Spanos, 'Radtke, Hodgins, Bertrand, Stam & Moretti, 1983). 
A number of investigators have examined the factor structure of the HGSHS: A and 
there is some evidence to suggest that the scale comprises a three factor solution 
corresponding to challenge, ideo-motor and cognitive suggestion items (e. g. Peters, 
Dhanens, Lundy & Landy, 1974; McConkey, Sheehan & Law, 1980). Such a three factor 
solution provides evidence for the notion that the three different types of suggestion 
operate according to fundamentally different psychological mechanisms, and studies 
investigating the relationship of the HGSHS: A to other personality or cognitive variables 
have often treated the three suggestion types as separate in analysis (e. g. Laidlaw & 
Large, 1997): clearly, if the three types of suggestion operate according to different 
psychological mechanisms, then they should show differential patterns of correlations 
between further individual difference dimensions which might be of considerable 
theoretical interest. Accordingly, the factor structure of the HGSHS: A will be analysed 
47 There is, however, some evidence to suggest that susceptibility as measured by the HGSHS: A may be 
modified through training (see Spanos & Coe, 1992). 
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for the present sample and, if evidence for the three factor solution is obtained, the 
cognitive, challenge and ideo-motor items will be treated as separate in analysis. If no 
evidence for such a solution is found then total HGSHS: A scores will be used instead. 
Although the HGSHS: A is used in its unmodified form in many studies, a number of 
studies have been reported in which the scale has been modified in certain ways. In 
particular, a number of researchers have altered the wording of the induction, removing 
all references to sleep and replacing them with relaxation. It was decided that this would 
not be done in the present investigation in order to maximise the potential for 
comparison with other studies; as Perry, Nadon and Button (1992) have pointed out, such 
alterations are unlikely to significantly affect scores on the HGSHS: A in any case. 
Rational Versus Experiential Inventory, Short Form (RVEI-S): The RVEI-S (Epstein, 
Norris, & Pacini, 1995), was developed as a measure of individual differences in the 
preference for experiential and rational modes of processing as embodied in Cognitive- 
Experiential Self-Theory (CEST; Epstein, 1973,1980,1990,1994). The RVEI-S consists 
of four main scales divided into a further eight lower-order sub-scales; the core of the 
RVEI-S is formed by two of the main sub-scales, the experiential and rational scales 
(Epstein et al 1995), which are the scales used here. 
The experiential scale evolved out of the sensing-intuiting sub-scale of the Myers 
Briggs Type Inventory (MBTI; Myers & McCauley, 1985) and is designed to assess the 
degree to which individuals prefer to rely on their emotions (e. g. 'I tend to use my heart 
as a guide for actions') and intuitions (e. g. 'A solution to a problem will often come to 
mind without having to consciously reason it out) when making decisions. The rational 
scales was derived from the Need For Cognition scale (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) 
and is designed to assess the degree to which individuals enjoy engaging in intellectual 
activities (e. g. 'I prefer to do something that challenges my thinking abilities rather than 
something that requires little thought'), how good they believe themselves to be at them 
(e. g. 'I have no problem in thinking things through carefully'), and whether they rely on 
these capacities for decision making (e. g. 'I usually have clear, explainable reasons for 
my decisions'). 
Although the experiential and rational scales are divided into separate preference and 
ability dimensions there is some doubt as to the validity of such a split; for the sake of 
conceptual clarity and statistical power scores on the ability and preference dimensions 
will be combined to form superordinate experiential and rational processing scores. Each 
combined scale is composed of ten statements, to which subjects must rate the 
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truthfulness as it relates to them on a five-point Likert scale ranging from zero 
('completely false') to four ('completely true'). Five items on the rational scale are 
negatively scored, creating a range for this scale of -20 to 20; three items on the 
experiential scale are negatively scored, creating a range for this scale of -12 to 28. 
Being a relatively new scale, very little research has been carried out on the RVEI-S, 
although the MBTI and the NFC from which it is derived have received rather more 
research interest. On this basis, there is good evidence to support the construct validity of 
the dimensions in question (see Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Myers & McCauley, 1985). 
Nevertheless, there is some psychometric data on the RVEI-S including norms and 
internal consistency assessments; both experiential and rational scales have fairly good 
internal consistency, with alpha values of . 73 and . 80 respectively (Epstein et al 1995). 
In addition, the RVEI-S has been correlated in a large sample (N = 1145) with a number 
of other state and trait inventories, with results supporting the construct validity of the 
scale (Epstein et al 1995). 
If suggestibility is related to a preference for low-level information processing one 
would predict a significant correlation between the HGSHS: A and the experiential scale 
of the RVEI-S. In addition, if a preference for high-level information processing 
militates against suggestive responding one would predict a significant negative 
correlation between the HGSHS: A and the rational scale of the RVEI-S. 
Human Information Processing. Survey (HIPS): Developed out of the creativity and 
learning style literatures, the HIPS (Taggart & Torrance, 1984) was devised to assess 
what the authors have termed 'cerebral hemispheric preferences'. According to Taggart 
and Torrance (1984), individuals conform to one of three information processing styles 
which they have labelled left-brained, right-brained and integrated. Left-brain individuals 
are those that prefer processing information verbally, analytically and logically, while 
right-brain individuals prefer non-verbal, holistic and intuitive information processing. In 
contrast, integrated individuals have no preference for either type of processing but use 
both in an integrative and flexible fashion. The HIPS was devised as a measure of these 
putative processing preferences. It is comprised of 40 items presented in a multiple 
choice format with three possible responses, one each for left-brain, right-brain and 
integrated preferences; thus, the HIPS yields three scores corresponding to the three 
processing preferences, each of which has a maximum value of 40. The items cover a 
wide range of activities and events which the authors have identified as relevant to their 
model of creativity and learning. 
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Taggart and Torrance (1984) present evidence suggesting that the HIPS has good 
reliability, with internal consistencies of 0.84 for the right, 0.86 for the left and 0.82 for 
the integrated sub-scales being reported. Furthermore, although there is reason to doubt 
the biological metaphor on which it is based, the underlying processing-style constructs 
of the HIPS appear to be sound (Beyler & Schmeck, 1992). In addition, Taggart and 
Torrance (1984) present data indicating the good convergent validity of the scale, with 
scores on it significantly predicting a number of relevant personality and cognitive 
attributes. 
If hypnotic suggestibility is related to a preference for low-level information 
processing one would predict a significant correlation between the HGSHS: A and the 
right-brain sub-scale of the HIPS. In addition, if a preference for high-level information 
processing militates against hypnotic responding one would predict a significant negative 
correlation between the HGSHS: A and the left-brain sub-scale of the HIPS. 
Inventory of Learning Processes (ILP): The ILP consists of four main sub-scales, deep 
processing (named as such by Schmeck, 1983), elaborative processing, fact retention and 
methodological study. Of these the deep and elaborative processing sub-scales are of 
interest here: according to Beyler and Schmeck (1992) both scales, like the integrated 
scale of the HIPS, represent a flexible, integrated system of analytic and holistic 
processes. However the deep and elaborative processing modes differ in the relative 
emphasis they place on analytic and holistic processes: although they are entirely capable 
of both, deep processors demonstrate a general preference for analytic processing 
whereas those scoring high on the elaborative scale generally prefer to process 
holistically. 
More specifically, in the revised version of the ILP (ILP-R; Schmeck, Geisler- 
Brenstein & Cercy, 1991) the deep and elaborative sub-scales have been further sub- 
divided into deep thinking, deep semantic memory, elaborative episodic memory and 
elaborative self-actualising sub-scales. Such a division draws heavily on the episodic- 
semantic memory distinction of Tulving (1985) - according to the model, elaborative 
processors rely more heavily on episodic memory systems by relating new materials to 
their own experiences, whereas deep processors prefer to organise material hierarchically 
without reference to themselves, thereby relying more heavily on semantic memory 
systems. A number of studies have supported this distinction (for a review see Schmeck, 
Geisler-Brenstein & Cercy, 1992) and the ILP-R clearly benefits from deriving its 
theoretical base from mainstream cognitive psychology. In all, the deep thinking, deep 
125 
semantic, elaborative episodic and elaborative self-actual i sing scales each comprise five 
statements that subjects must rate the extent to which they agree with on a six-point 
Likert scale ranging from zero ('strongly disagree') to five ('strongly agree'); thus, each 
scale has a range from zero to 25, except the deep semantic scale which has a single 
negatively scored item making the range for that scale from -5 to 20. 
The ILP has attracted a good deal of research within educational psychology and has 
been related to a number of cognitive and personality variables, including the intuitive 
sub-scale of the MBTI (Schmeck, in press) and the integrated sub-scale of the HIPS 
(Beyler & Schmeck, 1992). Furthermore, it has consistently yielded reliable test-retest 
results (r = . 88 for the total deep processing scale; r= . 80 for the total elaborative 
processing scale), good internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha = . 82 for deep 
processing; Cronbach's alpha = . 67 for elaborative processing), a reliable factor structure 
and incremental validity (Schmeck, Geisler-Brenstein & Schmeck, 1992). 
If suggestibility is related to a preference for low-level information processing one 
would predict a significant correlation between the HGSHS: A and both of the 
elaborative processing sub-scales of the ILP. In addition, if a preference for high-level 
information processing militates against suggestive responding one would predict a 
significant negative correlation between the HGSHS: A and both of the deep processing 
sub-scales of the ILP. 
Social Desirability Scale (SDS, -. Crowne & Marlowe, 1965): Many of the statements 
forming the questionnaires used here have potentially socially desirable responses (e. g. 'I 
have a logical mind', an item on the rational scale of the RVEI-S); as such, the Crowne 
& Marlowe (1960) Social Desirability Scale (SDS) was used as a partial correlate to 
control for any potential influences of this sort. The scale is the most commonly used 
instrument for assessing the influence of individual differences in the need for good 
social presentation (A. Furnham, 1996; personal communication). It comprises thirty- 
three true-false statements of which each has a desirable and an undesirable response; the 
total score is given by the number of desirable responses made. Crowne and Marlowe 
(1960) present psychometric data on the SDS which indicates that is has good internal 
consistency (KR-20 = . 88) and test-retest reliability (r = . 89). 
The SDS has been used before as a covariate in hypnosis research (e. g. Lynn & Rhue, 
1986), although a small body of research has shown that there is little or no evidence in 
support of a relationship between suggestibility and social desirability (e. g. Kumar, 
Pekala & Cummings, 1996; Ost, Fellows & Bull, 1997). Nevertheless, there is some 
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evidence pointing to a relationship between social desirability and compliant responding 
in the hypnotic situation (Spanos, Perlini, Patrick, Bell et al, 1990). Moreover, many 
sociocognitive theorists (e. g. Spanos, 1986) would regard positive self-prcsentation to be 
a fundamental aspect of hypnotic responding. Accordingly, a positive correlation 
between the HGSHS: A and the social desirability scale was predicted here. 
5.2.3 Design and 12mcedu 
This study followed a basic correlational design. The questionnaires were placed in an 
envelope in a random order following a latin squares design. Subjects were requested to 
work through the questionnaires in the order that they were placed in the envelope to 
ensure randomisation. The subjects participating in the laboratory class completed the 
questionnaires as a group in supervised conditions; these subjects were separated from 
one another spatially in order to reduce the possibility of subjects being influenced by 
each others' responses. The laboratory class was jointly conducted by the experimenter 
and three confederates. The vast majority of the remaining subjects also completed the 
questionnaires in supervised conditions in small groups of 2-5 individuals; however, a 
small number (n = 24) completed the questionnaire package unsupervised. These 
individuals were requested to complete the questionnaires alone and in quiet conditions 
where they would not be disturbed. All subjects were asked to complete the 
questionnaires as honestly and accurately as possible; in order to maximise honest 
responding, all subjects were informed that their answers would be anonymous. Half of 
the subjects participated in the HGSHS: A before completing the questionnaire package 
while the other half received the HGSHS: A after completing the questionnaires. The lab 
class sub-sample completed the audio-taped HGSHS: A in a large, dimly-lit and quiet 
room in two groups each of about 45 individuals. Similar conditions were used for the 
remaining subjects who completed the HGSHS: A in small groups of 2-10 individuals. 
These sessions were jointly conducted by the experimenter and two confederates. At 
least one day separated questionnaire presentation and suggestibility measurement. 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Data screening and preliminary analyses 
A small number of subjects (n = 18) failed to respond to single items on individual 
questionnaires. As the number of non-responses was small and appeared upon inspection 
to be randomly distributed the mean of the remaining items on the relevant sub-scale was 
calculated and the nearest whole integer was taken as the response on the missing item in 
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Table 5.2: Means and standard deviations for overall, lab class and non lab class 
samples (t-values and significance levels for the differences between the lab and non lab 





















HGSHS 6.54 2.72 6.43 _ 2.58 1 6.63 2.83 . 604 ns 
Age 21.39 4.43 20.08 3.18 22.37 4.96 -4.94 . 000 
SDS 11.90 5.01 12.51 4.79 11.45 5.14 -1.51 ns 
RVEI-RAT 6.95 5.90 5.21 6.41 8.24 5.15 3.79 . 000 
RVEI-EXP 13.87 5.26 13.78 4.70 13.94 5.66 0.22 ns 
HIPS-L 10.67 4.29 10.64 4.16 10.69 4.40 0.10 ns 
HIPS-R 13-53 4.96 12.99 4.19 13.91 5.43 1.51 ns 
HIPS-I 16.05 4.85 16.37 4.86 15.81 4.85 -0.10 ns 
ILP-DS 18.42 3.04 17.93 3.06 18.78 2.99 2.01 ns 
ILP-DT 12.47 3.75 11.70 3.26 13.04 4.00 2.60 ns 
ILP-ES 18.44 3.14 18.65 2.62 18.29 3.48 -0.8 rILP-EE 18.91 2.93 18.26 3.07 19.40 2.73 2.84 ns 
KEY 
HGSHS: Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility; SDS: Social Desirability Scale; RVEI: Rational 
Versus Experiential Inventory (RAT = Rational scale; EXP = Experiential scale); HIPS: Human 
Information Processing Survey (L = Left hemisphere scale; R= Right hemisphere scale; I= Integrated 
scale); ILP: Inventory of Learning Processes (DS = Deep semantic scale; DT = Deep thinking scale; ES 
Elaborative self-actualising scale; EE = Elaborative episodic scale). 
these cases. Prior to analysis the data-set was screened for missing values. Three missing 
values were identified, one each for the social desirability scale, the RVEI rational scale 
and the RVEI experiential scale 48 . In each case the missing value was replaced 
by the 
mean for all cases within the particular sample in question (i. e. lab class vs. Not lab 
class). Inspection of the distributions for each of the samples on each of the variables 
revealed that all variables were nonnally distributed except age which showed a 
pronounced positive skew. Table 5.2 shows the descriptive statistics for each of the 
variables for the entire sample, and the lab and non lab class samples individually. 
Independent samples Wests (two-tailed) were performed on each of the variables 
comparing the lab and non lab class samples 49 ; t-values and their significance levels are 
also shown in table 5.2. A Mann Whitney U test was used to assess differences in age 
between the two samples due to the non-normal distribution of the age variable. To take 
" In each case the missing values arose from individuals failing to complete the entire scale or a significant 
proportion of it 
49 All analyses described in this thesis were performed using version six of the Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS). 
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into account multiple comparisons, a Bonferroni correction was made and an alpha value 
of 0.004 for each of the comparisons was used, preserving an overall alpha value of 0.05. 
Inspection of table 5.2 reveals that the lab and non lab class samples show significant 
differences on only two variables, age and the Rational scale of the RVEI: the lab class 
sample was significantly younger and endorsed items on the Rational scale to a 
significantly lesser degee than the non lab class sample. As the rational scale of the 
RVEI is one of the central measures in this study, separate correlations will be performed 
for both lab class and non-lab class sub-sarnples for this variable. However, as age is not 
a variable of central importance to the present study differences between the two samples 
on this dimension will be ignored in this context. In order to maximise statistical power, 
therefore, the two samples will be collapsed into a single sample for all analyses not 
involving the RVEI-RAT variable. 
The combined sample was screened for univariate and multivariate outliers and 
violations of the assumptions of multivariate analyses. One case with extremely high z 
scores for the HIPS-L and ILP-ES variables was found to be a univariate outlier (p :ý 
0.001) and was deleted, leaving 208 cases for subsequent analyses. Calculation of 
mahalanobis distances revealed that no multivariate outliers were present in the data-set. 
Inspection of the resulting distributions indicated that each of the variables was normally 
distributed except for age which showed a pronounced negative skew. As age is not a 
factor of importance to the present study the non-normal distribution of this variable will 
be ignored here. 
Table 5.3: Means and standard deviations for overall sample, plus male and female sub- 














(n = 60) 
Male 
s. d. 
HGSHS 6.52 2.72 6.75 2.51 5.97 3.12 
Age 21.39 4.44 21.11 3.79 22.08 5.73 
SDS 11.90 5.02 12.03 5.05 11.58 4.97 
RVEI-RAT 6.94 5.91 6.29 5.75 8.53 6.05 
RVEI-EXP 13.94 5.19 13.92 5.31 13.98 4.90 
HIPS-L 10.61 4.18 10.98 4.27 9.68 3.86 
HIPS-R 13.34 4.90 12.78 4.89 14.72 5.07 
HIPS-I 16.05 4.88 16.24 5.03 15.60 4.48 
ILP-DS 18.43 3.04 18.33 3.12 18.68 2.86 
ILP-DT 12.47 3.76 12.25 3.63 13.00 4.05 
ILP-ES 18.50 3.03 18.59 2.99 18.30 3.14 
ILP-EE 18.92 2.93 18.87 2.98 19.03 - 2.83 
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Table 5.3 presents descriptive statistics for the entire sample and for the male and 
female subsets of the sample. In order to assess possible differences between men and 
women on each of the variables, independent samples Wests (2-tailed) comparing the 
two were performed; as before, an alpha value of 0.004 for each of the analyses was used 
to correct for multiple comparisons. No significant differences were found between men 
and women on any of the variables. As such, male and female scores were combined and 
treated as a single sample in subsequent analyses. 
Prior to analysis of the relationship between processing preference and suggestibility, 
an examination of the HGSHS data is required to assess the validity of the distinction 
between ideo-motor, challenge and cognitive suggestion items discussed previously. If 
such a distinction has both construct as well as face validity, then treating the three types 
of suggestion as separate in subsequent correlational analyses would be appropriate. If 
the three different types of suggestion operate according to different mechanisms, it is 
conceivable that a differential pattern of correlations will be found between each 
suggestion type and the variables under scrutiny in this study, a finding which could have 
great significance theoretically. If no evidence for a valid distinction between the three 
different types of suggestion is found, then drawing such a distinction would be entirely 
arbitrary and provide no meaningful basis for analysis. 
The sample mean of 6.52 (s. d. 2.72; see table 5.3) is somewhat lower than the original 
normative score of 7.39 obtained by Shor and Ome (1963) with an American sample. 
However, this value is by no means exceptional, being comparable to the normative 
HGSHS: A mean values obtained previously for other European samples (see e. g. 
Bongartz, 1988; Kallio & Ihamuotila, in press). To provide a further index of the 
comparability of the HGSHS: A scores obtained from this sample, individual item 
difficulties were calculated by assessing the proportion of subjects passing the item in 
question. Item pass rates and their ranked difficulty are presented in table 5.4. 
In line with most previous normative studiesso of the HGSHS: A, the easiest item (i. e. 
most often passed) was item 3, hand lowering. Moreover, the second easiest item was 
item 7, hands moving together, in line with the normative data obtained from Danish, 
German and Australian samples. In line with the majority of previous research, the most 
difficult items were items II and 9, post-hypnotic suggestion and fly hallucination 
respectively. The remaining items fell between the two extremes. 
so See section 5.1.3 for details of previous normative studies on the HGSHS: A. 
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Table SA: Pass rates, ranked difficulty (I = difficult, 12 = easy) and corrected itcm-total 
correlations for HGSHS: A items. 
(N = 208) 
HGSHS: A Item 




1. Head falling 74.9% 9 . 2974 
2. Eye closure 79.7% 10 . 2328 
3. Hand lowering 82.1% 12 . 1321 (n. s) 
4. Arm immobilisation 43.0% 3 . 3433 
5. Fingerlock 59.4% 8 . 5212 
6. Ann rigidity 46.9% 5 . 5240 
7. Moving hands together 81.2% 11 . 3660 
8. Communication inhibition 50.7% 7 . 4296 
9. Fly hallucination 21.7% 2 . 3669 
10. Eye catalepsy 47.3% 6 . 4642 
11. Post-hypnotic suggestion 20.8% 1 . 2567 
12. Amnesia 46.4% 4 . 3222 
In order to assess the reliability of the individual scale items, point-biserial correlations 
between the item and the total HGSHS: A score minus that item were calculated. Given 
the large number of subjects, an alpha value of 0.0005 was taken as an acceptable alpha 
criterion for item reliability. The corresponding reliability estimates (corrected item-total 
correlations) are also shown in table 5.4. All item-total correlations were significant at p 
< 0.0005 (one-tailed) except item 3, hand lowering, which was non-significant (p = 
0.029). This would appear to suggest that hand lowering does not provide a valid index 
of an individual's responsivity. to suggestions. However, in order to maximise the 
generalisability of the findings obtained here, this item will not be removed from 
HGSHS: A scores used in subsequent analyses. The overall reliability of the scale (co- 
efficient alpha) was . 7109 which is acceptably 
high and comparable to previous 
estimates (e. g. Gwynn et al, 1988). 
In order to assess the assertion that the HGSHS: A has a three factor structure 
corresponding to the distinction between ideo-motor, challenge and cognitive items, a 
principal components analysis with varimax rotation was performed on the individual 
HGSHS: A item scores. Bartlett's test of sphericity confirmed the factorability of the 
data-set, while the Kaiser-Meyer Olkin measure of sampling adequacy established the 
validity of the principal components analysis (KMO = . 76912). Four 
factors with an 
Eigen value greater than 1 were extracted, accounting for 55.3% of the total variance. 
Table 5.5 presents the communalities and factor loadings of the variables, plus the Eigen 
values and percentage of variance accounted for by each of the factors. Examination of 
table 5.5 reveals that there is little evidence for the hypothesised distinction between 
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Table 5.5: Factor loading, communalitics, Eigcn values and percentages of variance for 
principal components extraction with varimaX rotation on HGSHS: A data. 

















































Note: All factor loadings less than 0.50 have been omitted for case of interpretation. 
ideo-motor, challenge and cognitive suggestion items of interest here. Rather, it seems 
far more likely that the factor structure obtained here is a spurious one formed on the 
basis of item difficulty rather than any similarity in psychological mechanisms 
underlying the scale items. Factor 1, which accounts for 25.7% of the total variance, has 
relatively strong positive factor loadings for the arm immobilisation, finger lock, arm 
rigidity and amnesia items. Although the first three items are all of the challenge type, 
amnesia is clearly not, and the remaining challenge items (communication inhibition and 
eye catalepsy) also do not load on this factor. However, the four items correspond to the 
3rd, 4th, 5th and 8th most difficult items on the HGSHS: A. Similarly, factor 2, which 
accounts for 11.8% of the total variance, comprises the 2nd and 4th easiest items on the 
scale (head falling and moving hands together respectively), while factor 3 (accounting 
for 9.1% of the variance) comprises the 6th, 7th and 10th most difficult items (eye 
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catalepsy, communication inhibition and eye closure respectively). Factor 4, which 
accounts for 8.7% of the variance, has a relatively strong positive factor loading for the 
post-hypnotic suggestion (the most difficult item) only. Neither the hand lowering or fly 
hallucination items loaded strongly on any of the factors. 
Regardless of the interpretation of the factor loading presented in table 5.5, the 
relatively low item communalities, factor loadings and total proportion of variance 
accounted for appear to indicate that the HGSHS: A does not possess a particularly robust 
factor structure in any case, at least in this sample. Accordingly, rather than separating 
the HGSHS into separate ideo-motor, challenge and cognitive factors the total HGSHS 
score will be used as the suggestibility measure for analysis in this thesis. 
5.3.2 Main study analyses 
In order to assess the predictions that suggesibility is positively related to a low level 
processing preference and negatively related to a high level processing preference, 
partial correlations (I tailed) were calculated between each of the variables assessed. 
Social desirability was taken as a partial correlate in each case. Separate correlations 
were taken for the lab class and non-lab class sub-samples for the RVEI-RAT variable. 
The combined samples partial correlation matrix excluding the RVEI-RAT variable is 
presented in table 5.6. Partial correlations for the RVEI-RAT variable for both sub- 
samples are presented in table 5.7. Although, strictly speaking, Bonferroni corrected 
alpha values should be used where multiple correlations are being performed, in this 
context the precedent set by the majority of psychological research will be followed and 
an alpha value of 0.05 will be adopted for those correlations that have been predicted a 
priori i. e. those between hypnotic suggestibility, each of the putative low and high level 
processing preference measures, and the social desirability scale. Each of the remaining 
correlations will be assigned an alpha value of 0.0001. 
Inspection of table 5.6 reveals that the HGSHS: A showed significant but very modest 
positive partial correlations with three of the four low level processing preference 
measures: the experiential scale of the RVEI (r = . 2284; p50.0001), the elaborative 
episodic scale of the ILP (r = . 1671; p :50.01), and the right hemisphere scale of the 
HIPS (r = . 1704; p<0.05) as predicted. Inspection of the scatterplots for these 
correlations confirmed a linear relationship between the variables in each case. Contrary 
to prediction, the correlation between suggestibility and the elaborative self-actualising 
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Table 5.7: Partial correlations between RVEI-RAT and all other study variables for lab 
class and non-lab class sub-samples, taking social desirability as a partial correlate (for 
variable key see table 5.6) 
Sample 
Variable Lab Class (n = 89) Non-Lab Class (n =120) 
RVEI-EXP -. 1978 -. 0024 
HIPS-L -. 0447 -. 0142 
HIPS-R -. 4269 -. 0531 
HIPS-I . 4072 . 0695 ILP-DS . 5197 . 3471 ILP-DT . 4205 . 4662 ILP-ES -. 0731 -. 0756 
ILP-EE . 3980 
* 
. 2915 HGSHS: A . 0759 -. 0480 
* Significant at p:: ý 0.0001 
suggestibility and social desirability was also positive and significant as predicted (r = 
. 1776; p :50.01); confirmation of this relationship was provided by inspection of the 
scatterplot. However, no significant correlations were found between the HGSHS: A and 
any of the high level processing preference variables. 
Of the remaining partial correlations for the combined sample, the experiential scale of 
the RVEI correlated significantly with both the left and right hemisphere sub-scales of 
the HIPS and the elaborative self-actualising scale of the ILP. The left hemisphere scale 
of the HIPS correlated significantly with the elaborative episodic and elaborative self- 
actualising scales of the ILP, while the right hemisphere scale correlated significantly 
with the elaborative self-actuali sing and elaborative episodic scales. The elaborative 
episodic scale also correlated significantly with all of the other ILP scales, as did the 
deep semantic and deep thinking scales, with the exception of the elaborative self- 
actualising scale in both cases. In addition, all three of the scales of the HIPS showed 
significant inter-correlations with one another. All of the remaining partial correlations 
were non-significant. 
Regarding the partial correlations between the RVEI-RAT variables and the other 
study variables for lab and non-lab class sub-samples (see table 5.7), a number of 
differences were obtained. Whereas significant partial correlations with the RVEI-RAT 
variable were obtained for the ILP-DT and ILP-DS variables in both samples, only the 
lab class sample showed significant partial correlations between the RVEI-RAT and the 
HIPS-R, HIPS-I and ILP-EE variables. Such differences may be due to the increased 
endorsement of RVEI-RAT items in the non-lab class sub-sample. As no significant 
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Table 5.8: Means (and standard deviations) for high and low suggestibility groups on 
study variabIcs. 
Variable Low suggestibles 
(n =49) 
High suggestibles 
(n = 51) 
Value of t 
HGSHS: A 2.92 (l. 30) 10.00 (1.06) Not analvsed 
ILP-ES 18.33 (2.62) 19.25 (2.78) -1.72* 
ILP-EE 18.39 (2.76) 19.33 (3.04) -1.63* 
ILP-DS 18.22 (2.87) 18.76 (3.01) -. 92 
ILP-DT 12.22 (3.89) 12.41 (3.74) -. 25 
RVEI-EXP 13.22 (5.02) 16.33 (4.87) -3.14 
"r- 
RVEI-RAT 6. Mt 5.48) 7.40( 6.04) -. 91 
HIPS-L 10.47 (4.18) 10.59 (4.03) -. 14 
HIPS-R 13.02 (4.81) 14.08 (5.16) -1.06 
HIPS-I 16.51 (4.94) 15.33 (4.08) 1.30 
SDS 10.41 (4.84) 12.98 (4.88) -2.64** 
* Sig at p: 5 0.05 (one-tailed) ** Sig at p :50.005 (one-tailed) *** Sig at p: 5 0.001 (one-tailed) 
partial correlations were found between RVEI-RAT and HGSHS: A for either sub- 
sample, these differences will be ignored in this context. 
As a further assessment of the relationship between processing predisposition and 
suggestibility, an interquartile split was pcrfonncd on the HGSHS: A data. and groups of 
low (HGSHS: A :5 4) and highly (HGSHS: A ; >- 9) suggestible individuals were formed. 
The high suggestible group consisted of 12 males and 39 females while the low 
suggestible group consisted of 19 males and 30 females. Table 5.8 presents descriptive 
statistics for these two groups on each of the variables used in this study. In order to 
assess the differences, between the high and low suggestible groups, independent Wests 
were carried out on each of the variables (except suggestibility which will inevitably 
show a significant difference given group selection); t-values are also shown in table 5.8. 
Inspection of table 5.8 indicates that, with the exception of the HIPS-R, each of the 
variables previously showing significant correlations with the HGSHS: A (ILP-EE, 
RVEI-EXP, SDS) showed a significant difference between high and low suggestibles. 
Such a pattern of findings lends support to the observed relationships between the 
HGSHS: A and these measures although some doubt is cast on the relationship between 
suggestibility and the HIPS-R. In addition, the high and low suggestible groups also 
showed a significant difference on the ILP-ES, with high suggestibles scoring 
significantly higher than lows. Thus, although the correlation between the ILP-ES and 
the HGSHS: A was non-significant contrary to expectation, a comparison between high 
and low suggestibility groups clearly indicates that a relationship exists between 
suggestibility and low level processing preference as measured by the ILP-ES, in line 
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Table 5.9: Standard multiple regression of low level processing and social desirability 
variables on hypnotic suggestibility. 





. 2249 . 
0944* . 1803 . 0284 
ILP-EE . 1620 . 1467 . 
1113 . 1202 . 0136 
HIPS-R . 1402 . 3429 . 2287 . 
0435 . 0785 . 0051 
SDS . 1776 . 0005 -. 0136 -. 1448 . 
1030** . 1905 . 0354 
Intercept 1.313 
Rý 10481 Adj. R2 -. 0872 R= . 323 8 
*** 
Sig. at p:: 5 0.01 * Sig. at p :50.005 *** Sig. at p :! ý 0.0005 
t Unique variability =. 0825 ; shared variability = 0.0223 
with prediction. Evidently, this relationship was obscured by the amount of irrelevant 
variation in suggestibility in the mid-range. 
In order to address their independent contribution to variation in hypnotic 
suggestibility, the significantly correlated low level processing preference (i. e. RVEI- 
EXP, ILP-EE and HIPS-R) and social desirability variables were entered into a standard 
multiple regression with the HGSHS as the dependent variable. As the correlation 
between the ILP-ES and HGSHS: A was non-significant, the ILP-ES was not entered into 
the equation to preserve degrees of freedom. Table 5.9 shows the variable correlations 
51 
P 
the unstandardised regression copfficients (B) and intercept, the standardised regression 
coefficients (P), the semi-partial correlationS52 , R, R2 and adjusted 
R2. The multiple 
correlation coefficient R was significantly different from zero, F(4,203)"= 5.94, p :50.0005, 
accounting for 10.48% of the variation in suggestibility. Inspection of table 5.9 reveals 
that only the RVEI-EXP and the social desirability scale accounted for a significant 
" Correlation values refer to the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient r, and not the partial 
correlations presented in table 5.6. 
" The squared semi-partial correlation obtained here through multiple regression provides a better estimate 
of the importance of an independent variable than the partial correlation (presented in table 5.6) in most 
cases. This is because the squared semi-partial correlation only removes variance attributable to the 
nuisance variable (i. e. social desirability) in the IV and not the DV. 
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proportion of unique variance in suggestibility. The social desirability scale accounted 
for a unique 3.54% of the variance, T(1,203) = 2.834, p :50.005, making it the best 
predictor of suggestibility out of the variables used here. The experiential scale of the 
RVEI accounted for a unique 2.84% of the variance, T(1,203) = 2.539, p _-ý 
0.01. Although 
non-significant, the ILP-EE accounted for a unique 1.36% of the variance, while the 
HIPS-R accounted for a unique 0.5%. The remaining 2.23% of the variance in 
suggestibility accounted for by the regression equation was shared amongst the four 
variables. 
It is noteworthy that the unique proportion of variance in suggestibility (3.54%) 
accounted for by the social desirability scale is somewhat larger than the 3.15% that 
would be expected given the zero-order (i. e. unpartialled) correlation between the two (r 
= . 1776). Such a finding appears to indicate the presence of a suppressor variable 
that is 
obscuring the relationship between the HGSHS and SDS, rendering the zero-order 
correlation between the two smaller than would be expected if no suppression were 
occurring. This was confirmed by a comparison of the beta weight for the social 
desirability variable and the correlation between social desirability and the HGSHS (see 
table 5.9). The negative correlations between the social desirability scale and the ILP-EE 
and HIPS-R (see table 5.9), all of which correlate significantly and positively with the 
HGSHS, suggest that one or both of the ILP-EE and HIPS-R variables are responsible 
for the suppression effect. 
However, as the relationship between suppressor and suppressed variables is 
notoriously difficult to interpret adequately (see Darlington, 1968; Cohen & Cohen, 
1983), and the magnitude of the suppression effect is small and non-significant (as 
assessed through calculation of the F ratio for the increase in Sr2 ), it will be not be 
investigated further in this context 53 . 
In order to assess whether the increase in predictive power of the regression equation 
provided by the inclusion of the RVEI-EXP, ILP-EE and HIPS-R variables after 
controlling for the effects of social desirability is statistically significant, a hierarchical 
regression entering social desirability in the first block and RVEI-EXP, ILP-EE and 
HIPS-R in the second block of the regression equation was performed. The increase in 
R2 brought about by the inclusion of the three low level processing preference variables 
was 0.0733 which is significantly different from zero, F(3,203)': " 5.541, p -: 5 
0.05. Thus, it 
51 it should be borne in mind, however, that any improvement in predictive power of the regression 
equation brought about by inclusion of the remaining variables after prior entry of the social desirability 
variable will, in part, reflect the operation of this effect. This is true for the hierarchical regression analysis 
performed here. 
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can be concluded that 7.33% of the variation in suggestibility is accounted for by the 
three low level processing preference variables used here, after controlling for the effects 
of social desirability (although see footnote 54). 
In order to assess the relative power of the ILP-EE, RVEI-EXP and HIPS-R variables 
at predicting suggestibility, a mixed standard-statistical regression was performed taking 
the HGSHS as the dependent variable 54 . Social 
desirability was entered in the first block 
of the regression equation as a covariate, while the three low level processing 
questionnaires were subject to step-wise entry in the second block of the regression. On 
the basis of this method of variable entry-order, the RVEI-EXP entered the regression 
equation first, bringing about an increase in R2of . 05054, which 
is significantly different 
from zero, F(1,204) ý_- 11.2896, p :50.005. The ILP-EE entered the regression equation 
next, bringing about an increase in R2 of . 01765, which 
is significantly different from 
zero, F(1,2o4) = 3.9994, p :50.05. At this point the regression terminated, leaving the 
HIPS-R out of the regression equation. Thus, on statistical grounds alone, the best low 
level predictors of suggestibility are the RVEI-EXP followed by the ILP-EE. 
If the low level processing preference variables used in this study are measuring the 
same underlying construct, as one might predict from the conceptual background to each 
of the measures, one would expect a pattern of strong correlations between the variables. 
However, examination of the correlation matrix in table 5.6 reveals that this is not the 
case; although the correlations between the low level processing questionnaires used here 
are, in most cases, statistically siýmificant, the magnitude of the correlation co-efficients 
are relatively small and suggest that different, but related, constructs underpin these 
measures. The lack of a common latent variable between these measures may have 
important methodological and conceptual implications for the understanding of low level 
processing preference and further analysis of this possibility seems appropriate. As such, 
an exploratory principal components analysis with varimax rotation was performed on 
the set of variables used in this study. An initial run of the analysis indicated the presence 
s" The significant positive inter-correlations between the ILP-EE, HIPS-R and RVEI-EXP supports the 
assertion that they are measuring related constructs, and validates their previous simultaneous entry into 
the regression equation as a functional set. No attempt has been made here to separate the three 
questionnaire scales (and their underlying constructs) as existing research is not sophisticated enough to 
identify how such a separation should be performed. Use of the standard-stepwise regression is therefore 
indicated. 
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Table 5.10: Factor loading, communalities, Eigen values and percentages of variance for 
principal components extraction with varimax rotation on questionnaire and 
suggestibility data. 









































Note: 'Ihe loading of suggestibility on factor 2 has been included for illustrative purposes, Cespite Demg 
less than 0.50. 
of singularity in the correlatiori matrix which was identified as resulting from the 
inclusion of the HIPS-I variable; accordingly, HIPS-I was dropped from the subsequent 
analysis. Bartlett's test of sphericity and the presence of several significant correlations 
within the correlation matrix confirmed the factorability of the data-set, while the Kaiser- 
Meyer Olkin measure of sampling adequacy established the validity of the principal 
components analysis (KMO = . 71330). Three factors with an Eigen value greater than I 
were extracted, accounting for 60.1% of the total variance. Table 5.10 presents the 
communalities and factor loadings of the variables, plus the Eigen values and percentage 
of variance accounted for by each of the factors. Factor loadings of less than 0.50 have 
been omitted for ease of interpretation. An inspection of the pattem of factor loadings 
presented in table 5.10 suggests a tentative interpretation of the latent variables 
underlying the measures used in this study 15 . Factor 1, which accounts for 27.6% of the 
"Any confidence in this interpretation must, however, be tempered by the relatively low communalities 
for a number of the variables entered into the analysis. In particular, the communality of 0.58144 for 
hypnotic susceptibility shows that only a relatively small proportion of the variance (58%) in susceptibility 
is accounted for by the three factors extracted here. 
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total variance, has strong positive loadings for the rational scale of the RVEI and the 
deep thinking, deep semantic and elaborative episodic scales of the ILP. With the 
exception of the ILP-EE scale, each of the remaining variables with strong loadings on 
factor I were included in this study as measures of a high level processing preference, 
suggesting that factor I corresponds to this latent variable. Factor 2, which accounts for 
20.1% of the total variance, has strong positive loadings for the experiential scale of the 
RVEI, the right hemisphere scale of the HIPS and the elaborative self-actualising scale 
of the ILP. In addition, the left hemisphere scale of the HIPS shows a strong negative 
loading on factor 2. 
Such a pattern of factor loadings suggests that factor 2 corresponds to the latent 
variable of low level processing preference. Thus, despite the low correlations between 
these variables, prinicipal components analysis appears to suggest that a single construct 
underlies each. It is worth noting that the loading of hypnotic suggestibility on this factor 
is a modest 0.24656. Factor 3, which accounts for 12.4% of the total variance, has strong 
loadings for only the social desirability and hypnotic suggestibility variables. Although 
the interpretation of factors with large loadings on only two variables can be somewhat 
speculative (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996), this finding appears to suggest that factor 3 
represents a social desirability variable. However, it should be noted that only 30% and 
40% of the variation in the hypnotic suggestibility and social desirability measures 
respectively is accounted for by factor 3. This would appear to suggest that, whatever the 
latent variable underlying fact6r 3 may be, the social desirability scale is not a 
particularly good measure of it, underlining the tentative and speculative nature of the 
interpretation of this factor. 
5.4 Discussion 
Following principal components analysis of the HGSHS: A items, no evidence was 
found for the notion that the ideo-motor, cognitive and challenge suggestion items on the 
scale are subserved by distinct psychological mechanisms (cf. Peters el al, 1974; 
McConkey et al, 1980). Rather, it is apparent that the factor structure of the HGSHS: A, 
at least in this sample, is a spurious one reflecting differences in item difficulty that 
results from the use of principal components analysis on exclusively dichotomous 
variables (see e. g. Oakman & Woody, 1996). Accordingly, all reported correlations 
between suggestibility and the measures used in this study refer to the total HGSHS: A 
score. 
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The results obtained in this study provide partial support for the model of hypnosis 
outlined in chapter three. In support of the prediction that suggestibility is related to a 
low level processing preference, with social desirability controlled for the HGSHS: A 
(total score) correlated significantly and positively with the experiential scale of the 
RVEI, the right hemisphere scale of the HIPS and the the elaborative episodic scale of 
the ILP, all putative low level processing measures; however, the magnitude of these 
partial correlations was only very modest, ranging from. 1671 to . 22 84. These correlation 
were all confirmed by analyses comparing high and low suggestibility quartiles. 
Contrary to prediction, no significant correlation was found between the HGSHS: A and 
the elaborative self-actualising scale of the ILP, which was also included in this study as 
a low level processing preference variable. However, a comparison of high and low 
suggestibility quartiles indicated that highs do actually score significantly higher on the 
ILP-ES than the lows 
As predicted, a small but significant correlation between hypnotic suggestibility and 
social desirability was also found, supporting the sociocognitive assertion that high 
suggestibles have a need for positive self-presentation, and validating the inclusion of the 
social desirability variable as a partial correlate and covariate in this study. 
Standard multiple regression analysis revealed that the best single predictor of 
HGSHS: A scores was the social desirability scale, followed by the experiential scale of 
the RVEI; neither the HIPS-R nor the ILP-EE predicted unique proportions of the 
variance in suggestibility. Hierarchical regression analysis revealed that the RVEI-EXP, 
HIPS-R and ILP-EE taken together significantly improved the predictive power of the 
regression equation after controlling for the effects of social desirability, accounting for a 
further 7.33% of the variation in suggestibility. However, the existence of a suppression 
effect indicated that the observed relationship between social desirability and the 
HGSHS: A was smaller than would be expected if no suppression were occurring; as 
such, a small (and non-significant) proportion of the increase in predictive power of the 
regression equation provided by the low level processing preference variables is 
attributable to social desirability also. 
Thus, while there does appear to be some support for the notion that suggestibility is 
related to a low level processing predisposition, this support is not particularly strong. 
Nevertheless, although the proportion of variance in suggestibility accounted for by the 
low level processing preference questionnaires is relatively small, such a finding is not 
uncommon within hypnosis research generally, where the relationship between 
suggestibility and other personality or cognitive individual difference dimensions has 
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been assessed. In addition, the large sample size obtained in this study suggests that this 
finding is quite robust. 
No evidence was found for the hypothesis that suggestibility is negatively related to a 
high level processing preference: none of the high level processing preference variables 
(i. e. RVEI-RAT, HIPS-L, ILP-DS, ILP-DT) correlated significantly with suggestibility 
in this study. Such a finding clearly indicates that an empirical, as well as a conceptual, 
dissociation can be drawn between high and low level processing: rather than the two 
types of processing representing opposite ends of a cognitive continuum, the two appear 
to be discrete entities in their own right (cf. Epstein, 1995). The pattern of findings 
obtained in this study suggest that it is lower level rather than higher level processing (at 
least addressed by self-report) that is of importance in understanding the nature of 
suggestibility, a finding with potentially important theoretical implications. 
The question remains as to why the experiential scale of the RVEI, the elaborative 
episodic scale of the ILP, and the right hemisphere scale of the HIPS all correlated 
significantly with suggestibility but not the elaborative self-actualising scale of the ILP. 
The fact that high and low suggestibility quartiles differ significantly on the ILP-ES 
seems to suggest that mid-range suggestibility scores are subject to greater irrelevant 
variation than those at, the extremes and this obscures any relationship between the 
HGSHS and the ILP-ES. Nevertheless, this does not explain why the other low level 
processing scales should correlate significantly with the HGSHS and not the ILP-ES, 
unless the relationship between the latter is simply weaker than that between the former. 
This is certainly a possibility but why this should be the case is not clear, particularly 
given the strong correlations between the ILP-ES and the remaining low level processing 
predisposition questionnaires and their common factor loadings in the prinicipal 
components analysis. Clearly, more research is required before an answer to this 
question can be offered. 
The preceding discussion highlights one of the central problems encountered in the 
present study. The questionnaires employed here were selected because they have all 
been cited as capturing in some way the distinction between, on the one hand, lower 
level, intuitive or holistic cognitive processes, and on the other higher level or analytical 
cognitive processes. However, despite the fact that on a descriptive level the similarities 
between the different research traditions embraced here are considerable, this distinction 
is often conceived quite differently from one area to the next. Although ego- 
psychological theory, for example, groups together emotion, intuition, holism and 
imagery within a common rubric labelled primary processing, the relationships between 
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these constructs are more of a conceptual assumption than any kind of established 
empirical fact. This assumption has also been made here. and the findings obtained in this 
study highlight the potential dangers of such a practice. 
A second problem with the present study, and indeed all of the studies reported in this 
thesis, is the degree of measurement error associated with suggestibility testing. 
Although the Harvard group scale is generally regarded as a reliable and valid measure 
of suggestibility in an hypnotic context, suggestibility scores obtained through its use are 
subject to several significant sources of irrelevant variation, at least in this context. For 
example, subjects who have negative attitudes towards hypnosis are likely to have low 
suggestibility scores regardless of how suggestible they actually are (de Groh, 1989). In 
addition, the fact that suggestibility was measured here in several groups of differing size 
may be an additional source of measurement error; for example, those individuals tested 
in large groups may have been subject to greater social pressures than those tested in 
small groups (or vice versa), and their subsequent suggestibility scores may reflect these 
differences. Unfortunately, in the present context there is little that can be done to 
overcome these differences after-the-fact; future research involving the measurement of 
suggestibility should, nevertheless, take these points into account. 
A third problem with the present study is that it uses only self-report measures of 
processing preference. While such measures may be able to provide information 
concerning an individual's perceived processing preferences, whether or not the 
individual's actual cognitive predilections and their perceptions of them correspond in a 
meaningful way is something of a moot point. Moreover, self-report instruments are 
notoriously sensitive to individual differences in response bias, the interpretation of 
questions, and, perhaps most importantly, perceptions of the questions' relevance to the 
study in hand. It is, for example, conceivable that the observed relationships between 
suggestibility and the low level processing measures have arisen through subjects' 
beliefs about the relationship of cognitive style to hypnotic suggestibility. It is possible 
that subjects believe that highly suggestible individuals will be those who are more in 
touch with their emotions and intuitions that those who are less suggestible, with such 
beliefs influencing subjects' subsequent responses on the questionnaires, suggestibility 
test or both. Future questionnaire research in the field would be well advised to present 
the non-hypnotic measures in an entirely non-hypnotic context (cf. Laurence, 1997), 
thereby preventing any such effects from occurring. Alternatively, measures which are 
not so transparent in what they are measuring (and how) should be used (see e. g. Dixon 
& Laurence, 1992b). In the next chapter, a study investigating the relationship between 
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suggestibility and processing preference which takes this particular approach will be 
described. In addition, the study described in the next chapter utilises more objective 
behavioural measures of processing style, thereby insulating itself from the criticisms of 
self-report measures as outlined above. 
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CHAPTER 6: Empirical study 2 
The relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and some behavioural measures of 
processing preference and ability 
6.1 Introduction 
In chapter five an empirical study assessing the prediction that hypnotic suggestibility 
is positively related to a low level processing propensity and negatively related to a high 
level processing propensity was described. In that study, moderate support for the theory 
of suggestibility outlined in chapter three was obtained in the form of significant 
correlations between suggestibility and three of the four putative low level processing 
scales used. In contrast, no evidence was found in support of the hypothesis that 
suggestibility is negatively related to a high level processing preference. One of the 
central problems with empirical study one, however, is that it employed only self-report 
measures of higher and lower level processing propensity. While such measures may be 
able to provide an index of the individual's perceived processing styles and propensities, 
they do not offer a way of objectively assessing how the individual actually processes 
information and the types of cognitive biases or predilections that may influence the 
nature of this process. In addition, the amount of uncontrolled variance associated with 
self-report measures is also likely to be relatively high, due to subjective differences in 
the interpretation of questions and the individual's beliefs about what an appropriate 
response might be. 
In this chapter a second empirical study assessing the prediction that hypnotic 
suggestibility is positively related to a low level processing propensity and negatively 
related to a high level processing propensity will be described. In this study, however, 
only objective behavioural measures of processing preference and ability were used, 
thereby circumventing some of the problems associated with empirical study one, and, in 
so doing, extending the research base concerning the relationship between suggestibility 
and processing preference and ability. 
6.1.1 Perceptual integrality and separability 
The concept of higher and lower level 'modes' of processing which is central to the 
model of the cognitive system presented in chapter two is largely based on research and 
theory concerning the perception and categorisation of multidimensional stimuli. As 
discussed in chapter two, this line of research has demonstrated that multidimensional 
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stimuli may be perceived and categorised in two different ways, depending on the nature 
of the dimensions in question, the processing circumstances of the time and the cognitive 
characteristics of the perceiving individual. On the one hand, a multidimensional 
stimulus may be perceived as an integrated perceptual unit with categorisation of that 
stimulus being based on its overall similarity or 'family resemblance' to other stimuli. 
Such an 'integral' mode of perceiving is regarded as being fundamental and basic to 
human cognition, acting as a default or fallback mode of processing when resources are 
scarce through situational or developmental constraints. On the other hand, a 
multidimensional stimulus may be perceived analytically as a combination of individual 
dimensions with its categorisation being based on relative dimensional values. Such 
'separable' perception is regarded as a sophisticated mode of processing requiring higher 
level resources and a certain degree of developmental maturity. Although described as 
separate, purely integral and separable perception are typically viewed as opposite ends 
of a processing continuum, with the predominant mode at any one time varying 
according to a number of situational and individual factors (L. B. Smith & Kilroy, 1979; 
Foard & Kemler Nelson, 1984). 
According to the model described in chapter three, hypnosis represents one situation 
where the individual is biased towards lower level processing for the control of 
behaviour; by this view, such a processing bias is responsible for the increased 
suggestibility observed during hypnosis. Following this account, suggestibility is related 
to the degree to which the individual relies on lower level processing for the control of 
behaviour in everyday life. Accordingly, one would expect highly suggestible 
individuals to display a predisposition towards integral perception, while their low 
suggestible counter-parts would show a preference for more separable perceptual 
processing. The most obvious, and the most valid, way of evaluating this prediction is to 
assess the relationship between suggestibility and some of the measures that have been 
used in research concerning perceptual integrality and separability. As the distinction 
between integral and separable perception is based on a set of converging operations (see 
Garner, 1974) there is no shortage of measures by which this might be done. 
Possibly the most commonly used measure within research investigating perceptual 
integrality and separability is the triad classification task described in chapter two; as 
such it was included as a measure in this study also. In this task, subjects are presented 
with three stimuli that vary on two dimensions (see figure 6.1), such that two of the 
stimuli are identical on one dimension but very different on the other (pair A), and 
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Dimension I 
(e. g. increasing 
size) 
Pair A: Identical on one dimension (i. e. same size) 
x/ 
x- Pair B: Similar but not the same on 
X'11ý both dimensions 
.1 
Dimension 2 
(e. g. increasing brightness) 
Figure 6.1: Schematic figure showing relationships between three hypothetical stimuli 
varying on two dimensions. 
two of the stimuli have similar but not identical values on both of the dimensions (pair 
B); the third pairing have completely different values on both dimensions. The subject's 
task is to identify which two of the three stimuli 'go together the best'. An integral (i. e. 
lower level) response has been made if pair A is selected while a separable (i. e. higher 
level) response has been made is pair B is selected. If suggestibility is related to a lower 
level processing predisposition one would expect a significant positive correlation 
between suggestibility and the proportion of integral responses made on this task. 
As we have seen, integral and separable processing are regarded. as opposite ends of a 
continuum of sophistication with separable processing being effectively more difficult 
than its integral counter-part. The triad classification task offers only an index of the 
individual's preferred processing mode, however, and cannot tell us anything about their 
perceptual capabilities (J. D. Smith & Baron, 1981). It is conceivable that if high 
suggestibles have a low level processing predisposition it is because they are relatively 
incapable of higher level processing, rather than just preferring to process in that mode. 
As this inability will not reveal itself on the triad classification task, a second measure 
sensitive to such differences was included here to assess this possibility. 
When an individual is asked to rapidly sort two-dimensional stimuli on the basis of 
only one of the dimensions, it has been shown that the speed and accuracy with which 
the subject is able to do this is affected by the nature of the dimensions in question (see 
Garner, 1974). In the case of separable stimuli, for example, variation on the irrelevant 
dimension tends not to affect how well the individual is able to sort on the basis of the 
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relevant dimension. In the case of integral stimuli, however, the individual's sorting 
performance is adversely affected by variation on the irrelevant dimension; the 
assessment of such 'interference' effects by perceptual filtering tasks of this sort 
represents one of the original set of converging operations identified by Garner (1974) as 
defining the difference between integral and separable stimuli. The degree to which 
irrelevant variation affects the speed and accuracy of sorting is not just a function of the 
stimulus dimensions themselves, however, but also varies according to the individual's 
ability to ignore the irrelevant dimension. Such perceptual filtering tasks therefore 
represent one way by which an individual's ability to engage in higher level (i. e. 
separable) processing can be assessed; accordingly, a task of this sort was included here. 
If hypnotic suggestibility is related to a low level processing predisposition brought 
about by an inability to engage in higher level processing then one would predict that 
suggestibility will be positively related to the degree to which the interference effect is 
displayed on the perceptual filtering task. 
In addition to the triad classification and perceptual filtering tasks described above, a 
number of other measures were included in this study. Each of these measures was 
selected on the basis of its relationship to the higher/lower level distinction and will 
therefore hopefully provide further information concerning the hypothesised relationship 
between processing mode and hypnotic suggestibility outlined in chapters three and four. 
6.1.2 Reflection-imoulsivit 
In addition to research concerning perceptual integrality and separability, the 
distinction between higher and lower level modes of processing advanced here was 
derived from the literature concerning the cognitive style dimension of reflection- 
impulsivity (RI; Kagan et al, 1964). As was discussed in chapter two, research 
concerning RI has revealed that an impulsive cognitive style is characterised by a fast, 
holistic and error-prone response pattern in decision making situations involving high 
response uncertainty. In contrast, reflective individuals exhibit a more analytical, slow 
and accurate response pattern compared to impulsives. According to the model presented 
in chapter two, a reflective cognitive style is associated with higher level processing 
whereas an impulsive cognitive style is associated with lower level processing. 
The most common way of assessing RI is through the use of the Matching Familiar 
Figures Test (MFFT; Kagan et al, 1965; Kagan, 1965); accordingly, the MFFT was 
included as a measure in this study. In the MFFT, the individual is presented with four, 
six or eight (according to age) variations of a relatively complex figure, and the task is to 
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pick which variant exactly matches a target figure. A reflective strategy is evidenced by 
long response latencies and few errors on the tasks, while an impulsive strategy is 
evidenced by short response latencies and large numbers of errors. Following the 
hypotheses outlined in chapter four, one would predict that highly suggestible 
individuals will display a more impulsive cognitive style (quick, error-prone) than less 
suggestible individuals who will display a more reflective (slow and accurate) cognitive 
style. 
6.1.3 Hiaher level reasoninci 
According to the model of the cognitive system developed in chapter two, higher level 
systems tend to calculate appropriate responses in novel situations by the controlled 
analysis and manipulation of information according to abstract rules. If highly 
suggestible individuals possess a propensity towards lower level processing that is a 
result of their relative inability to engage in effective higher level processing, then one 
might expect a significant negative correlation between suggestibility and measures 
designed to assess such rule-based reasoning abilities. Accordingly, two rule-based 
reasoning measures were included in the present study: a syllogistic reasoning task and 
Raven's (1965) Advanced Progressive Matrices. 
Syllogistic reasoning tasks represent one of the most commonly used instruments for 
the assessment of rule-based reasoning processes within the laboratory (Johson-Laird & 
Byrne, 1991). A typical syllogism requires the individual to arrive at a logical deduction 
on the basis of information provided in two initial premises; Alesandrini, Wittrock and 
Langstaff (1984) have described such tasks as measures of verbal analytic ability. In 
contrast, Raven's (1965) Advanced Progressive Matrices requires the use of analytical 
and deductive rules to solve complex problems involving illustrations rather than 
language. As such, it was included here as a measure of non-verbal rule-based reasoning 
perforinance. If hypnotic suggestibility is associated with a relative inability to carry out 
rule-based reasoning tasks then one would expect a significant negative correlation 




Subjects were 8 156 graduate and undergraduate students from University College 
London, of which 21 were male and 60 were female. Mean age was 23.35 years (s. d. 
5.95 years; range 18 - 48 years). Of the 81 subjects, 74 had completed both the 
HGSHS: A and the questionnaires used in empirical study 1, while the remaining 7 had 
completed only the HGSHS: A. All subjects were volunteers who were contacted 
following their participation in the HGSHS: A; each received E5 for taking part. Informed 
consent was obtained from all subjects. 
6.2.2 Materials 
Following the recommendations of study one, social desirability was included as a partial 
correlate in all analyses performed here. For details of hypnotic suggestibility and social 
desirability measurement see section 5.2.2. 
Filtering task: The perceptual filtering task used here follows the methodology employed 
by J. D. Smith and Baron (1981) and uses lines of varying size and angle. Three sets of 
filtering cards were constructed, two control sets, one for angles (where angle varies but 
size is kept constant), and one for size (where size varies but angle is kept constant), and 
an interference set where size and angle both vary together. The control angle (CA) set 
consisted of 24 cards each with i 2.54cm (I inch) line drawn in a lmrn black pen in the 
middle of the card. For 12 of the cards, the line was drawn at 5011 to the horizontal; for 
the remaining 12 cards the line was drawn at 65" to the horizontal. The control (CS) size 
set consisted of 24 cards each with lines drawn at 50" to the horizontal in the centre of 
the cards in a lmrn black pen. For 12 of the cards, the line was 2.2cm. in length; for the 
remaining 12 cards the line was 2.5cm in length. The interference (IF) set consisted of 24 
cards, 12 with 2.5 cm lines (6 each at 50" and 65' to the horizontal), and 12 with 2.2cm, 
lines (6 each at 50" and 651). 
Subjects were given a set of cards and asked to sort them, as quickly but with as few 
errors as possible, into two piles. For the CA and CS sets, subjects were asked to sort the 
cards into piles of small and large angles and short and long lines respectively. For the IF 
set, subjects were asked to sort into small and large angles or short and long lines 
" It was originally hoped that considerably more participants could be obtained for this study (i. e. 120 or 
more) to make certain multivariate analyses (e. g. factor analysis) possible. Unfortunately, however, only 
81 participants could be persuaded to take part, despite the best efforts of the experimenter. 
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depending on the particular instructions given. An interference effect is evidenced by a 
difference in sorting time between the control and interference sets; thus, a subject 
exhibiting an interference effect for the size dimension would sort the CS set 
significantly faster than the IF set with size instructions. 
The interference effect is most reliably studied at sorting time asymptote (Kemler 
Nelson, 1996, personal communication). For this reason, subjects were required to make 
20 sorts in all, 10 for size categorisation and 10 for angle. This procedure differed 
slightly from that of Smith and Baron (1981) in that those investigators used 12 sorts for 
each primary dimension, making 24 sorts in all. It was decided that 20 sorts would be 
used in this context on the basis of pilot work using five undergraduate subjects which 
indicated that (a) 24 sorts was not necessary to achieve asymptotic performance on this 
task; and (b) subjects quickly lose motivation on the task with this effect increasing 
dramatically over sorts. As such, 20 was regarded as a suitable number of sorts to 
achieve a suitable balance between performance and motivation. The order of sorting 
dimensions was counter-balanced across subjects. Within each 10 sorts, subjects 
alternate between control and interference sets completing 5 sorts with each. If the 
subject was alternating with the CS set, they were instructed to sort into different lengths 
with the IF set; if they were alternating with the CA set they were instructed to sort into 
different angles with the IF set. The alternation between control and interference sets was 
also counter-balanced across subjects. In order to remove the possible influence of 
practice effects, the first four sorts within each dimension were timed but not included in 
the analysis. Subjects received feedback concerning the number of errors they made for 
the non-practice sorts only. The average length of time taken to sort the control and 
interference packs (ignoring practice times) for each dimension was recorded, as well as 
the average number of errors made on each. Calculation of the magnitude of interference 
effects on the basis of this data will be addressed in the results section. 
All subjects received the standardised instructions included in appendix II, which were 
read verbatim by the experimenter. 
Triad classification stimuli: As triad classification data from this study will be used for 
comparison purposes in a subsequent within subjects design study with two further 
conditions, three sets of triad stimuli (sets A, B and Q were constructed. Although 
practice effects in the triad classification paradigm are fairly uncommon (Kemler- 
Nelson, 1996, personal communication), it was felt that the potential damage that such 
effects might cause was sufficiently high to justify the use of alternate sets in this 
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Figure 6.2: The four basic stimulus triad forms; x and y correspond to the two stimulus 
dimensions in question (e. g. size and brightness). N. B. In each case, the position of 
stimulus C can be on either side of stimulus B, as long as it is no nearer stimulus A (see 
Cin diagram 4). 
context. In order to secure the validity of such a procedure, a concerted effort has been 
made to ensure that the alternate sets are equivalent in every way possible (see below). In 
addition, possible significant differences between the sets will be assessed, and, if 
necessary, separate analyses will be conducted for different triad sets. 
Each set consisted of thirty triads conforming to the general structures shown in figure 
6.2, ten each from the three dimensional combinations of (i) size and brightness; (ii) 
colour and form; and (iii) angle and length. Each of these dimensional combinations has 
previously been shown to yield different levels of separable responding on a response 
continuum from integral to separable (e. g. Torgerson, 1958; Shepard, 1964; L. B. Smith 
& Kemler, 1978; L. B. Smith & Kilroy, 1979; Foard, 1979); all three combinations were 
included to maximise the possibility of identifying possible individual and situational 
differences in triad classification. 
Following J. D. Smith and Kemler Nelson (1988), a5x5 stimulus space 57 was drawn 
for the dimensional combination of size 58 and brightness (i. e. shade of grey). The five 
values of size were 1,11/4,1 V2,11/4 and 2 inches. The five values of brightness 
corresponded to the Colaraid achromatic paper values of 1,2,4,5 and 7, ranging from 
almost white to almost black; pilot data from five undergraduates demonstrated that 
subjects are able to correctly order the colours, in terms of brightness, validating the 
selection (cf. L. B. Smith & Kemler, 1978). Thus, there were 25 different stimulus 
17 In this context, a 'stimulus space' simply corresponds to a graph with axes corresponding to the 
particular dimensions in question (see e. g. figures 2.2,6.1 and 6.2). Thus, a5x5 stimulus space for size 
and brightness has one axis for size comprising 5 values and one axis for brightness comprising 5 values. 
58 The term size refers to the length of the side of a square. 
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squares of systematically varying form (e. g. squares of side I inch with brightness values 
of 1,2,4,5 and 7, squares of side 11/4 inches with brightness values of 1,2,4 5 and 7 
etc). Sampling both dimensions equally and completely yields 32 possible triads of 
squares conforming to the general structures in figure 6.2,16 for each primary dimension 
(i. e. the dimension on which two of the squares, A and B, share a value). Of these 32 
possible triads, two were randomly selected (one for each primary dimension) and 
discarded, leaving 30 triads. These 30 triads (consisting of 30 x3 squares cut from the 
appropriate Coloraid papers) were mounted on the central vertical axis of white cards of 
widtif II V2cm and length 20cm, such that the top and bottom squares were 1.5cm from 
the top and bottom edges of the card respectively; the centre square was placed 
equidistant between the top and bottom squares. The positions of the squares that would 
yield separable (i. e. A and B), integral (i. e. B and Q or haphazard classifications (i. e. A 
and Q was counter-balanced according to a latin squares design. 
A6x6 stimulus space was drawn for the dimensional combination of colour and 
forM59. The six values of colour ranged from yellow to red and corresponded to the 
Coloraid paper values of Y, Yw, Yo, 0, Ro, Rw; pilot data on five undergraduates 
indicated that subjects are able to correctly order the colours supporting the system used 
here. The six heights which provide the basis for variations in triangular form were 3/4, 
7/8,1,1 3/8,1 5/8 and 2 inches. Thus, there are 36 stimulus triangles of systematically 
varying colour and form. Sampling both dimensions equally and completely yields 40 
possible triads of triangles conforming to the general structures in figure 6.2,20 for each 
primary dimension. Of these 40 possible triads, 10 were pseudo-randomly selected (5 for 
each primary dimension: I from each triad form, plus one extra) and discarded, leaving 
30 triads. These 30 triads (consisting of 30 x3 triangles cut from the appropriate Coloraid 
papers) were mounted on the central vertical axis of white cards of width 11 V2 cm and 
length 20cm, such that the uppermost point of the top triangle and the base of the bottom 
triangle were 2cm from the top and bottom edges of the card respectively; the centre 
triangle was placed equidistant between the top and bottom triangles. The positions of 
the squares that would yield separable, integral or haphazard classifications was counter- 
balanced according to a latin squares design. 
Following J. D. Smith and Baron (1981), an 8x8 stimulus space was drawn for the 
dimensional combination of angle 60 and length. The eight values of angle were 20', 25", 
59 Form refers to the shape of a triangle of constant area which varies according to triangle height. 
60 Angle refers to the angle of the line as measured from the horizontal. 
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30*, 35*, 40*, 45', 50" and 55'. The eight values of length were 1.7,1.9,2.2,2.5,2.9, 
3.3., 3.8 and 4.3cm. Thus, there are 64 stimulus lines of systematically varying angle and 
length. Sampling both dimensions equally and completely yields 56 possible triads of 
lines conforming to the general structures in figure 6.2,28 for each primary dimension. 
Of these 56 possible triads, 26 were pseudo-randomly selected (13 for each primary 
dimension: 3 from each triad form, plus one extra) and discarded, leaving 30 triads. 
These 30 triads were drawn with a Imm. black pen on the central vertical axis of white 
cards of width II Y2cm and length 20cm, such that the lower end of the top and bottom 
lines were 5cm from the top and bottom edge of the card respectively; the centre line was 
placed equidistant between the top and bottom lines. The positions of the lines that 
would yield separable, integral or haphazard classifications was counter-balanced 
according to a latin squares design. 
The 90 triad cards were pseudo-randomly divided into three sets (A, B and C) of thirty 
cards, such that each set had ten cards from each type of dimensional combination. The 
30 cards within each set were then randomly ordered to produce the final set versions. 
Presentation of set was counter-balanced across subjects for this study. For each subject, 
the proportion of similarity-based responses for each of the dimensional combinations 
was calculated, with each score having a possible range from 0 to 1. 
All subjects received the instructions included in appendix III, which were read 
verbatim by the experimenter. 
Raven Advanced Progressive Matrices Test (RPMT): There are four main versions of the 
RPMT, the simpler Standard Progressive Matrices Test and Coloured Progressive 
Matrices Test, and the more complex Raven Advanced Progressive Matrices, sets I and 
IL The simpler versions of the RPMT are typically used as measures of intellectual 
capacity within the general population, while the high mean and low standard deviation 
of intelligence within college populations requires the use of the more difficult advanced 
matrices tests to provide the necessary discriminative power (Raven, 1965). Of the 
advanced tests, set I consists of 12 problems and typically takes less than 10 minutes to 
complete; in contrast, set II consists of 36 problems and usually takes 30-40 minutes to 
complete. Although set II, which has a greater proportion of more difficult items, has 
greater discriminative power than set I (see Hunt, 1974; Carpenter, Just & Shell, 1997), it 
was decided that the shorter and more practical set I would be used here given the 
relatively large number of tests involved in this study. 
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The Ravcn Advanced Progressive Matrices Test Set I consists of 12 problems 
conforming to a similar presentation format. Each problem consists of a3x3 matrix of 
elements of which the bottom right-hand element is missing. Based on the nature and 
organisation of the elements in the completed part of the matrix, the subject must 
determine which of the eight possible alternatives represents the missing element. In 
order to be able to do this, the subject must analyse the matrix and induce the set of rules 
which governs the organisation of the elements within it. Subjects score one point for 
each problem correctly solved giving a possible range of total scores from 0 to 12. 
Although both overall score and average time per problem are normally measured in 
the Advanced Matrices test, in this context it was decided that only score data would be 
collected. Despite the fact that response time data is important in determining an 
individual's intelligence level as measured by the test, in this context it is the general 
capacity to solve abstract reasoning problems which is of interest, and not how quickly 
those problems are solved. Given that a demand to respond quickly might increase the 
probability of impulsive responding on the test (i. e. saying the first answer that comes to 
mind) and thus artificially increase error rates, it was felt that such an alteration to the 
original testing format was justified. 
All subjects received the instructions included in appendix IV, which were read 
verbatim by the experimenter. In order to reduce any loss of motivation that might result 
from incorrect responding, subjects were not given feedback concerning the accuracy of 
their answers. 
Matching Familiar Figures Test (MFFT,, Kagan, 1965): The MFFT was devised as a 
measure of the cognitive style dimension of reflection-impulsivity (Kagan, 1965). In the 
MFFT, subjects are presented with a simple line drawing of a familiar figure on the top 
page of an 8! /2 xI 1-inch loose-leaf notebook. On the bottom page, eight very similar 
simple line drawings are presented, only one of which is identical to the top figure; each 
of the remaining drawings differs from the top figure in a subtle yet discernible fashion. 
The subject's task it to identify the identical figure as quickly as they can, but making as 
few errors as possible. There are twelve items in all, preceded by two practice figures 
with only six response alternatives. The experimenter measures the time ftom the initial 
presentation of the item to the subject's first response, with the average first response 
time across all twelve items being taken as the overall latency score. The experimenter 
also counts the number of errors (if any) that the subject makes on each item, with the 
average number of errors across all twelve items being taken as the overall error score. 
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In research using the MFFT (e. g. Smith & Kemler-Nelson, 1988), latency and error 
rates are used to classify subjects on the reflection-impulsivity cognitive style dimension. 
Subjects who score above the median latency and below the median error rate are 
classified as reflectives; subjects who score below the median latency and above the 
median error rate are classified as impulsives. In order to assess the possibility that 
reflective and impulsive cognitive styles are associated with suggestibility, a chi-squared 
analysis based on this double median split procedure will be performed here. In this 
analysis one would expect to find significantly more high suggestible subjects falling 
into the impulsive cell (as defined by the double-median split) than low suggestibles, 
with the converse being true for the reflective cell. In addition, the individual time and 
error scores for the MFFT will also be included as correlates in the analyses performed 
here. By preserving the richness of the MFFT data, the inclusion of these variables 
allows a greater understanding of the relationship between cognitive style and 
suggestibility. In this analysis one would predict a significant negative correlation 
between suggestibility and time scores on the MFFT (i. e. high suggestibles are quicker 
on the MFFT than low suggcstibles, indicating an impulsive cognitive style), and a 
significant positive correlation between suggestibility and MFFT errors (i. e. high 
suggestibles make more errors than lows, also indicating an impulsive cognitive style). 
Subjects received the standard instructions (see appendix V) for the task which were read 
verbatim by the experimenter. 
Syllogistic reasoning task: Although syllogistic reasoning is well studied within 
cognitive psychological research, there are no standardised syllogistic reasoning tasks 
available within the literature. As such, it is common for investigators interested in 
syllogistic reasoning to construct their own tasks, based on the existing literature, and in 
accordance with the particular factors under scrutiny. This approach was adopted here. 
A syllogistic reasoning task comprising 15 different syllogisms was constructed (see 
appendix VI). These syllogisms were pseudo-randomly selected from the list of 27 
possible syllogisms with valid conclusions (i. e. with a correct answer) provided by 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) to capture a range of difficulty levels, as assessed by the 
proportion of subjects providing correct answers to the syllogisms in previous research. 
The choice of 15 items was semi-arbitrary, though based on pilot work suggesting that 
15 items yielded an adequate range of scores but did not take an impractical amount of 
time to complete (approximately 10-15 minutes). The 15 items were presented in a 
response booklet with 5 items to a page, with room to write an answer beneath each 
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syllogism. Each item consisted of two premises (e. g. Allpainters are teachers and Some 
painters are not cyclists) and subjects were asked to state what could be logically 
concluded on the basis of those premises (in this case the only valid conclusion is Some 
teachers are not cyclists). It was decided that subjects should be required to provide their 
own responses to the syllogisms rather than respond to a set of multiple choice options as 
has often been the case in previous research. It is possible that the latter format may 
allow subjects to complete the syllogisms without making any inferences, whereas the 
alternative format cannot. Subjects scored one point for each problem correctly solved 
giving a possible range of total scores from 0 to 15. 
All subjects received the instructions included in appendix VII, which were written on 
the front page of the response booklet for the task. 
Mood measures: In addition to the cognitive measures used in this study it was decided 
that state measures of happiness and relaxation would be included. Happiness was 
included as a mood variable because it has been shown to have a significant effect on 
reasoning performance which is under scrutiny in this study (e. g. Oaksford, Morris, 
Grainger, Williams & Mark, 1996). Using happiness as a partial correlate for syllogistic 
reasoning and Raven's matrices scores will hopefully provide a picture of performance 
on these tasks that is undistorted by relevant mood variations. Relaxation was included 
as a mood variable because a relaxed attitude has been shown to significantly affect triad 
classification performance (e. g. Ward, Foley & Cole, 1986). In addition, relaxation was 
included because of its potential relevance to study 3 which includes scores on the triad 
classification and filtering tasks obtained here as a baseline measure of performance on 
these tasks. Using a relaxation measure as a covariate in study 3 may serve to eliminate 
any differences in performance across conditions that are simply the product of 
relaxation and not hypnosis per se. 
Bothrnood/state variables were measured using visual analogue scales (see appendix 
VIII) comprising lines 138min in length 61 with anchors of 'As unhappy/unrelaxed as I 
can be' and 'As happy/relaxed as I can be'. Subjects were presented with the scales and 
the statement 'At this moment in time, how happy/relaxed do you feel? Please indicate 
on the line below'. 
61 In line with tradition, the VAS employed here was originally constructed using a length of 100nim. However, as a result of a change in word processing software, the length of the VAS was inadvertently increased to 138mm, an increase that was not noticed until a number of subjects had already been assessed. 
As the actual length of the VAS is arbitrary unless one wishes to compare across studies, this was not 
considered a problem in this context. 
158 
6.2.3 Design and procedure 
This study followed a basic correlational design. Upon entering the experimental 
situation, subjects were thanked for their interest in the study and given a brief 
description of what would take place during the session. They were informed that the 
study was an investigation into the relationship between thinking style and hypnotic 
suggestibility and that they would receive five tasks designed to assess their style of 
thinking. Subjects were reassured that the purpose of the study was not to assess the 
relationship between intelligence and hypnotic suggestibility, and that their responses on 
each of the tests would be kept strictly confidential. Answers to any questions were then 
provided and consent forms were completed by each of the subjects, followed by the 
mood rating scales. Subjects then completed the triad classification and filtering tasks in 
that order. These tasks were presented first to enable comparison with other experimental 
conditions in study 3 where Raven's matrices, the MFFT and the syllogistic reasoning 
test were not included. The triad classification task was presented prior to the filtering 
task for all subjects because of pilot work indicating that subjects tend to respond more 
quickly on the classification task when it is preceded by filtering than when it is not. 
Rapid responding on ftee classification tasks has been shown to produce an abnormal 
number of similarity based responses across subjects (J. D. Smith & Kemler Nelson, 
1984); such an effect might increase the likelihood of ceiling effects for similarity 
classification, thereby reducing the probability of observing possible task motivated and 
individual differences in classification performance. 
After completing the triad classification and filtering tasks, subjects completed Raven's 
matrices, the syllogistic reasoning task and the MFFT. The order of presentation of these 
tests was counter-balanced across subjects according to a latin squares design. Following 
completion of the tasks, which in total took approximately one hour, subjects received 
payment and thanks for their participation. It was decided that subject debriefing was 
inappropriate in this context because many of the subjects would be required for 
participation in subsequent studies where subject naivete may be an important factor. 
Finally, a note about blind-testing is in order. Obviously, every possible effort was 
made to ensure that the experimenter was blind to the suggestibility scores of the 
subjects participating in this study. While this was relatively easy in the early stages of 
subject testing, towards the latter stages this became more difficult to achieve with 
complete satisfaction. As participation in the present study was a prerequisite for 
participation in studies three and four (each of which included only high and low 
suggestible subjects), an increased effort had to be made in the latter stages of this 
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research to specifically recruit high and low suggestible subjects; as such, the 
experimenter could not be entirely blind to suggestibility scores in the present study. 
However, as the experimenter could remain blind to whether the individuals recruited in 
the latter stages were high or low in suggestibility, it is hoped that any such deviations 
from complete blindness will not affect the results in a significant or systematic fashion. 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Calculation of interference on the filterinq task 
In order to obtain a valid measure of the interference effect on the filtering task, subject 
times and errors in the control and interference conditions were standardised (i. e. 
converted to z scores). Each subject's standardised time and error scores within each 
condition were then added to produce a composite measure of performance for the two 
conditions. The difference between the composite measures for each condition (i. e. 
interference condition performance - control condition performance), was than calculated. 
This value was taken as the interference effect for each subject (see J. D. Smith & Baron, 
1981, for details concerning the calculation of interference effect magnitude from which 
this was taken). As the particular dimension used as a basis for speeded sorting may have 
an effect on the magnitude of interference, the dimensions of angle and size were treated 
as separate. 
6.3.2 Data screening and prelimina[y analyses 
Prior to analysis the data-set was screened for missing values. Thirteen missing values 
were identified, seven for the social desirability variable, four for syllogistic reasoning 
and two for Raven's matrices. The seven missing values for the social desirability 
variable corresponded to the seven individuals who had completed the HGSHS: A but 
had not completed the questionnaires used in empirical study one. One of the missing 
values on the syllogistic reasoning task arose from a dyslexic subject who had difficulty 
in appreciating the syntax of the questions, making appropriate responding impossible. 
The remaining six missing values were a product of time limitations that arose from 
unusually slow subject responding on the other measures. The thirteen missing values 
were replaced with the variable mean 62 in each case. 
62 lie conservative nature of this approach ensures validity but potentially reduces the amount of variation for the variable in question (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). As validity is of paramount importance, any loss 
in variance brought about as a result of this procedure was considered acceptable. 
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The data-set was then screened for univariate and multivariate outliers and violations 
of analysis assumptions. Five univariate outliers were identified, one for the syllogistic 
reasoning variable (extremely low z score) and two each for the Raven's matrices (both 
with extremely low z scores) and filtering interference (angles) variables (one with a high 
and the other with a low z score). In order to reduce the impact of the Raven's matrices 
outliers on subsequent analyses while retaining the remaining data from these subjects, 
the two scores were changed to one unit below the next most extreme score in the 
distribution, following the recommendations of Tabachnick and Fidell (1996). 
Accordingly, both scores were changed from four to six. This procedure was also 
performed for the outlier on the syllogistic reasoning variable; accordingly, the outlying 
case score of 0 was changed to 2. As this procedure is not suitable for the filtering 
interference variable due to the nature of the measurement scale used, the two outlying 
cases on this variable were deleted, leaving an overall sample size of 79 for further 
analysis. Calculation of mahalanobis distances indicated that no multivariate outliers 
were present in the data-set. 
Distributions of the variables were normal in most cases. However, the triad 
classification (angles), syllogistic reasoning and Raven's matrices variables were all 
significantly negatively skewed (p :50.001). Accordingly, the syllogistic reasoning and 
Raven's matrices variables were reflected and logarithmically transformed to produce 
normality. The more seriously skewed triad classification (angles) variable was reflected 
and then inversely transformed. * 
Table 6.1 presents descriptive statistics for the entire sample and for the male and 
female subsets of the sample. In order to assess possible differences between men and 
women on each of the variables, independent Wests (2-tailed) comparing the two on each 
variable were performed. To take into account multiple comparisons for non-predicted 
differences, an alpha value of 0.004 was adopted, preserving an overall alpha value of 
0.05. Males and females differed significantly on only the interference (size) variable, 
t(77)= -3.01 (p :50.004), with women showing a significantly greater interference effect 
for the dimension of size than men. In order to assess possible influences of gender, 
separate analyses for males and females will be performed for this variable. 
Prior to further analysis, the three triad classification sets were compared to assess 
whether any differences between the packs in terms of proportion of similarity based 
responses were present (see table 6.2 for descriptive statistics). The triad classification 
sets were compared using one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), taking 
the three stimulus types (i. e. angles, squares and triangles) as dependent variables. Using 
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Table 6.1: Means and standard deviations of study 2 variables for the entire sample and 
the male and female sub-samples. 
Variable Sample: mean 
(s. d. ) 
(N 79) 
Male: Mean (s. d. ) 
(n = 21) 
Female: Mean (s. d. ) 
(n = 58) 
HGSHSA 6.38 (2.94) 5.05 (3.06) 6.86 (2.76) 
Interference: An,. T -. 132ý (1.02) -. 170 (1.08) -. 097; (1.01) 
Interference: Size W( 1.21) -. 0571 (l. 25) . 3411 (l. 12) 
Triad: Angles . 88 (. 14) . 90( . 15) . 87 (. 14) Triad: Squares . 35 (. 24) . 32 ( *20) . 35 (. 26) Triad: Triangles . 48 (. 28) . 53( . 28) . 47 (. 28) RavensT 10.17 (1.56) 10.25 (1.44) 10.14 (1.61) 
Syllogisms 10.63 (2.43) 10.73 (3.21) 10.60 (2.12)_ 
MFFT: Time 31.67 ( 17.14) 37.79 (20.41) 29.45 (15.39) 
MFFT: Errors 11.29 (6.61) 8.76( 5.83) 12.21 (6.69) 
SDS 11.71 (5.02) 10.69 (4.92) 12.08 (5.05) 
Mood: Relaxed 82.03 ( 26.55) 82.17 ( 27.21) 81.98 (26.55) 
Mood: Happy 88.42 ( 24.26) 83.83 (21.77) 90.04 (25.08) 
T Refers to untransformed scores 
T For both interference dimensions the median rather than the mean is shown; this is because the scores are 
comprised of standardised values and therefore have a mean of zero. 
KEY: HGSHS = Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Suggestibility; Interference = Interference effect on 
filtering task (Ang = angles); Triad = triad classification; Syllogisms = Syllogistic reasoning task; Ravens 
= Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices, set 1; MFFT = Matching Familiar Figures Test; SDS = Social 
Desirability Scale. 
Wilks' criterion, the three triad sets differed significantly on the combined DVs, F(3,74) -ý 
4.180, p: 5 0.001. Univariate F tests revealed that the triad sets did not differ significantly 
on either the angle or square stimuli; however, a significant difference between the triad 
sets was found for the triangle stimuli, F(2,76) = 4.371, p :50.05 (see appendix XVI, 
summary table 2A). An examination of the descriptive statistics in table 6.2 indicates that 
the source of this difference is the inflated level of similarity based responding for the 
triangle stimuli in triad set C. Accordingly, triad set will be accounted for in subsequent 
analyses. 
6.3.3 Main study analyses 
In order to assess the prediction that low level processing measures will be positively 
related to suggestibility and high level processing measures will be negatively related 
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Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics for the proportion of similarity responses on the three 
triad classification sets and the three stimulus types. 
Mean proportion of Mean proportion of Mean proportion of 
Triad set similarity similarity similarity 
responses: Squares responses: Triangles responses: Anglest 
Set A . 31(. 24) . 
45(. 25) . 90(. 11) 
Set B . 41(. 25) . 
39(. 33) . 84(. 17) 
Set C . 33(. 23) . 60(. 22) . 
89(. 15) 
All sets . 35(. 24) . 48(. 28) . 
88(. 14) 
-A 
Alote: Standard deviations are included in parentheses. 
t Untransformed scores are presented for triad classification (angles) in table 6.2, although ANOVA for 
this variable used the transformed scores. 
to suggestibility, partial correlations were calculated between each of the variables 
assessed. Following the recommendations of study one, social desirability was used as 
partial correlate in all analyses. For Raven's matrices and the syllogistic reasoning 
variable, mood (happiness) was included as a partial correlate. For the triad classification 
variables, mood (relaxed) was taken as an additional partial correlate. The resulting 
partial correlation matrix is presented in table 6.3. In order to account for gender 
differences on the filtering interference (size) variable, squared semi-partial correlations 
(sr) were calculated via hierarchical multiple regression 63 , taking gender as an 
additional covariate on the first block of the regression equation. In order to account for 
differences between triad sets on the triad classification (triangles) variable, squared 
semi-partial correlations were calculated via hierarchical multiple regression, taking triad 
set as an additional covariate on the first block of the regression equation. Accordingly, 
table 6.3 values for these variables refer to 4sr2 (semi-partial correlation) to enable 
comparison with the partial correlations obtained for the other variables. As in study one, 
an alpha value of 0.05 will be adopted for those correlations that have been predicted a 
priori i. e. those between hypnotic suggestibility and each of the putative low and high 
level processing measures. The correlations between the different processing 
predisposition measures will be addressed in the next chapter. 
" The triad set variable is unsuitable as a standard partial correlate due to its categorical nature. As such, 
hierarchical multiple regression taking triad set as a covariate is the most appropriate way of assessing the 
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Inspection of table 6.3 indicates that hypnotic suggestibility correlated significantly 
with only three of the ten processing measures used. As predicted, hypnotic 
suggestibility correlated significantly and positively with the proportion of similarity 
based responses in triad classification for the square stimuli (r = . 1958; p : -ý 0.05, one 
tailed). Also as predicted, hypnotic suggestibility correlated significantly and negatively 
with MFFT time (r = -. 1961; p: 5 0.05, one-tailed). Furthermore, the syllogistic reasoning 
task correlated significantly and negatively 64 with suggestibility (r = . 1929; p :50.05, 
one-tailed) also in line with prediction. However, contrary to prediction, the triad 
classification (triangle and angle stimuli), filtering interference (size and angles), and 
MFFT (errors) variables did not correlate significantly with suggestibility. Also contrary 
to prediction, rather than showing a significant negative correlation with hypnotic 
suggestibility, the Raven's matrices variable showed a significant positive correlation 
with suggestibility (r = -. 2358; p: 5 0.05, two-tailed). 
As a second test of the hypothesis that hypnotic suggestibility is related to processing 
mode preferences and abilities, an interquartile split of the hypnotic suggestibility data 
was taken as the basis for planned comparisons between high and low suggestibility 
groups. Such an approach has the advantage of precluding mid-range suggestibility 
scores where the associated error variance is likely to be high, a possible reason for the 
small correlations obtained between suggestibility and the processing measures. 
Descriptive statistics for the two suggestibility groups are presented in table 6.4. 
Examination of table 6.4 reveals that the high (HGSHS ; -> 
9) and low (HGSHS :5 4) 
suggestibility groups showed mean scores in the expected direction on only the triad 
classification (squares), syllogistic reasoning and Matching Familiar Figures Test (time 
and errors) variables. The upper and lower suggestibility quartiles were compared on 
each of the variables using one-way analysis of covariance (one-tailed). Social 
desirability acted as a covariate in each case, mood (relaxed) and triad set were taken as 
additional covariates in analyses involving the triad classification variables, mood 
(happy) was taken as an additional covariate in analyses involving the syllogistic 
reasoning and Raven's matrices variables, and gender was taken as an additional 
covariate in the analysis of filtering interference (size). The high and low suggestibility 
"" Despite the positive correlation coefficient the use of the reflected syllogistic reasoning variable means 
that this correlation is negative rather than positive. Similarly, the negative correlation between 
suggestibility and the Raven's matrices variables indicates a positive relationship between the two. 
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Table 6A Descriptive statistics for low and high suggestibility quartiles and the entire 
sample (standard deviations are shown in parentheses). 
Variable 
Total sample mean 
and s. d. 
(N = 79) 
High suggestibility 
quartile mean and 
s. d. (n = 22) 
Low suggestibility 
quartile mean and 
s. d. (n = 22) 
HGSHS 6.38 (2.94) 9.91 (. 87) 2.73( l. 39) 
Triad (Angles) - . 88 (. 14) . 88( . 13) . 88( . 16) 
Triad (Squares) . 35 (. 24) . 39( . 27) . 32( . 18) 
Triad (Triangles) . 48 (. 28) . 48( . 29) . 51( . 28) Interference (Ang. -. 132 (1.02) -. 234 (1.15) -. 082 (. 93) 
Interference (Size)t . 81( l. 21) -. 007 (1.23) . 064( l. 24) Syllogisms 10.63 (2.43) 10.48 (2.15) 10.91 (2.98) 
Ravens 10.17 (1.56) 10.50 (1.47) 9.56( l. 82) 
MFFT: Time 31.67 (17.14) 25.88 ( 13.80) 37.78 ( 18.04) 
MFFT: Errors 11.29 (6.61) 12.41 (6.85) 9.14( 6.99) 
SDS 11.71 (5.02) 12.66 (4.88) 10.55 (4.56) 
f Median scores are shown for the filtering task interference variables. 
Note: All statistics shown here are based on the untransformed raw scores for each variable and have not 
been statistically adjusted for covariates. 
groups were also compared for differences on the social desirability variable using an 
independent Mest. As before, an alpha value of 0.05 was adopted for the assessment of a 
priori predicted differences. The high and low suggestibility quartiles were significantly 
different on only two of the ten variables on which they were compared, triad 
classification (squares; F(1,39) =2 5.169, p :50.05) and MFFT (time; F(1,41) 2-- 5.203; p 
0.05). See appendix XVI, summary tables 2B to 2J inclusive. 
The findings of the correlations and comparisons performed here concerning the 
relationship between suggestibility and the MFFT are of some interest and merit further 
analysis. As predicted, a significant negative correlation between MFFT (time) and 
suggestibility was found, indicating that high suggestibles perform more quickly on the 
MFFT that their low suggestible counterparts; this was confirmed through one-way 
ANCOVA. A low response time on the MFFT is typically taken as being indicative of an 
impulsive response set, which was the basis for the predicted relationship between this 
measure and hypnotic suggestibility. However, no significant relationship was found 
between suggestibility and MFFT errors, indicating that high suggestibles, although 
quicker on the MFFT, make the same number of errors as lows 65 . Such a finding runs 
contrary to the typical view of impulsivity as defined by the MFFT, which regards 
65 The correlation between suggestibility and MFFT (errors) did, however, approach significance. 
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Table 6.5: Contingency table showing number of high and low suggestible individuals in 




Impulsive Reflective Efficient Inefficient 
Lows (n = 22) 7 12 2 1 
Highs (n = 22) 12 6 1 3 
KEY: Impulsive (high errors, low time); Reflective (low errors, high time); Efficient (low errors, low 
time); Inefficient (high errors, high time) 
impulsives as those who make large numbers of errors as well as respond quickly. In 
order to assess whether MFFT (time) still contributes to variation in suggestibility after 
the effects of MFFT (errors) have been statistically removed, a hierarchical multiple 
regression was perforined on the HGSHS, taking MFFT (errors) on the first block and 
MFFT (time) on the second block. The squared semi-partial correlation coefficient for 
MFFT (time) was non-significant, sr2 = 0.024, p>0.05, indicating that MFFT (time) 
does not contribute significantly to any further variation in suggestibility after MFFT 
(errors) have been removed. Thus, the error score is clearly contributing to the 
relationship between suggestibility and MFFT time, a finding which provides some 
support for the interpretation that high suggestibles are more impulsive than lows, 
despite a significant correlation only being obtained between suggestibility and the 
MFFT (time) variable. 
In order to further understand the relationship between suggestibility and cognitive 
style as measured by the MFFT, a chi-squared analysis was performed comparing the 
frequency of high and low suggestibility subjects in the four MFFT performance 
categories. The numbers of high and low suggestible subjects in the four MFFT 
categories are presented in table 6.5. Examination of table 6.5 indicates that, in line with 
expectation, a greater proportion of the high suggestible subjects fall into the impulsive 
category than the low suggestibles, who demonstrate a greater propensity towards 
reflective responding. However, there were no significant differences between the high 
and low suggestibility subjects in MFFT category placement, X2 (3) = 4.649, p>0.10 
(one-tailed). Such a finding indicates that, although there is some evidence supporting 
the notion that high suggestibles are more likely to be impulsive than low suggestibles 
who are more likely to be reflective, this evidence is not particularly strong and does not 
provide a basis for categorising suggestibility groups according to. cognitive style 
differences. 
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In order to further understand the relationship between hypnotic suggestibility and the 
significantly correlated processing predisposition variables, a sequential multiple 
regression taking hypnotic suggestibility as the dependent variable and simultaneously 
entering the social desirability, triad classification set, mood (relaxed) and mood (happy) 
variables as covariates on block one, and triad classification (squares), syllogistic 
reasoning, Raven's matrices and Matching Familiar Figures Test (time) variables on 
block two was performed. The multiple correlation coefficient R was significantly 
different from zero, F(8,70): -- 2.722, p :: 5 0.01, accounting for 23.7% of the variation in 
suggestibility (R = . 48712). Examination of the predicted scores against residuals and the 
distribution of standardised residuals confirmed the linearity of the regression equation. 
The increment in R2 brought about by inclusion of the variables in block two was . 13 618, 
which was a significant increase in the predictive power of the regression equation, F(4,70) 
= 3.125, p :50.025. Thus, the four variables account for a further 13.6% of the variation 
in suggestibility after the effects of mood, social desirability and triad classification set 
have been controlled for. None of the variables in the regression equation accounted for a 
significant unique proportion of the variance, although Raven's matrices (T = -1.906; p= 
. 0608) and triad classification with squares (T = 1.787; p= . 0782) did approach 
significance. 
In order to assess the relative predictive power of the four processing predisposition 
variables a mixed standard-statistical regression 66 was performed with the HGSHS as the 
dependent variable. After simultaheous entry of the social desirability, triad classification 
set and mood (relaxed and happy) variables as covariates in the first, standard block of 
the multiple regression equation, the four processing predisposition variables were 
entered in a stepwise fashion in block two. Only triad classification (squares) entered the 
regression equation on the basis of this method of variable entry; entry of this variable 
increased Rý by 0.0517 which is significantly different from zero, F(1,73) = 4.455, p -5 
0.05. Thus, the triad classification (squares) variable accounts for a further 5.2% of the 
variation in suggestibility after mood, triad set and social desirability have been 
controlled for. 
66 Given the exploratory nature of this research, the use of stepwise regression was considered more 
appopriate than the sequential alternative, particularly given the unexpected pattern of correlations between 
the HGSHS and the Raven's matrices and syllogistic reasoning variables. 
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6.4 Discussion 
The findings obtained in this study, as with study one, provide only partial support for 
the prediction, derived from the model of hypnosis and suggestion outlined in chapter 
three, that suggestibility is positively related to a low level processing predisposition and 
negatively related to high level processing abilities. As predicted, a significant positive 
correlation was found between the HGSHS and triad classification (squares), suggesting 
that high suggestibles have a preference for more low level responding in triad 
classification than lows, at least using square stimuli. This finding was confirmed using 
one-way ANCOVA comparing high and low suggestibility quartiles. However, neither 
of the other triad classification stimuli (angles and triangles) were significantly correlated 
with suggestibility or yielded any differences between high and low suggestibility 
quartiles. It is conceivable that only the square stimuli yielded a significant correlation 
with suggestibility because the dimensions of size and brightness of which they are 
composed are typically regarded as a combination that yields analytical rather than 
similarity-based responses; in contrast, the angle and triangle stimuli are more biased 
towards similarity-based responding (see e. g. Foard & Kemler Nelson, 1984). As such, 
the square stimuli allow greater scope for response variation towards the similarity-based 
end of the scale, whereas the opposite is the case for the angle and triangle stimuli. Thus, 
the square stimuli may be a more sensitive index of individual variation in similarity 
based (i. e. low level) responding than either angles or triangles, something which should 
be taken into account in further research addressing the relationship between 
suggestibility and triad classification. 
Also as predicted, a significant negative correlation was obtained between the HGSHS 
and MFFT (time) indicating that high suggestibles take less time to their first response 
on the MFFT than lows, suggestive on an impulsive response set. This difference was 
also confirmed using one-way ANCOVA. Despite finding no significant correlations or 
quartile differences for suggestibility and the MFFT error variable, hierarchical multiple 
regression indicated that the MFFT (time) variable was not a significant predictor of 
suggestibility once MFFT (effors) was partialled out of the analysis. Taken together 
these findings appear to confirm that high suggestibles are more impulsive (i. e. more 
biased towards low level processing) than their low suggestible counterparts. However, 
this finding is tempered by the chi-square analysis which revealed that the relative 
frequency of high and low suggestibles in the impulsive and reflective MFFT categories 
was not significantly different from zero. 
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A significant correlation between the HGSHS and the syllogistic reasoning variable 
appears to confirm the prediction that hypnotic suggestibility is negatively related to high 
level processing abilities. However, this conclusion appears to be contradicted by the 
positive relationship obtained between suggestibility and the Raven's matrices variable, 
which seems to suggest that suggestibility is associated with superior, and not inferior, 
high level abilities. In order to account for this somewhat surprising pattern of findings, 
the question of whether or not the syllogistic reasoning and Raven's matrices variables 
provide valid indices of high level processing abilities must be considered. While there is 
no apparent reason to assume that the syllogistic reasoning task does not provide a valid 
measure of high level processing ability, this is perhaps not the case for Raven's 
matrices. Hunt (1974), for example, has suggested that certain items on the advanced 
matrices test may be completed according to one of two problem solving algorithms, one 
of which involves an analytical (i. e. higher level) process, with the other being a more 
holistic (i. e. lower level) process. It is possible that the obtained positive relationship 
between suggestibility and Raven's matrices results from subjects successfully using low 
rather than high level mechanisms to complete the task. Future research designed to 
further investigate the relationship between suggestibility and processing preferences and 
abilities should take this possibility into account by a careful task analysis to ensure that 
only those items which can only be performed on the basis of higher level, analytical 
algorithms are included. 
Contrary to prediction, neither of the filtering interference variables correlated 
significantly with the HGSHS, and no differences were observed between the high and 
low suggestibility quartiles. Despite high suggestibles showing a preference for low level 
processing, as indicated by the significant positive correlation between suggestibility and 
triad classification (squares), these findings appear to suggest that such a preference is 
not a product of the high suggestibles' inability to engage in analytical (i. e. higher level) 
perceptual processing. 
The findings obtained in this study therefore provide limited support for the model of 
suggestibility outlined in chapter three, and indicate that research using a refined set of 
variables and a larger number of subjects is warranted. This conclusion is supported by 
the findings of the sequential multiple regression analyses taking the set of variables used 
here as predictors of suggestibility. With the variance attributable to mood (relaxed and 
happy), triad set and social desirability having been statistically removed, the remaining 
variables (Raven's matrices, syllogistic reasoning, MFFT time and square triad 
classification) added significantly to the predictive power of the regression equation, 
170 
accounting for an extra 13.6% of the variation in suggestibility. Stepwise regression 
revealed that the best predictor of suggestibility out of the processing predisposition and 
ability variables was triad classification (squares). 
The question remains as to why the findings obtained in this study, while warranting 
further investigation, are so equivocal. First and foremost, the number of subjects 
assessed is relatively low, particularly given the number of variables under examination. 
Any correlation would have to be quite strong for it to reach significance at the alpha 
values adopted here, and it is conceivable that the relationships between suggestibility 
and the variables of interest in this study (should they exist at all) are only relatively 
modest. Secondly, as discussed in chapter five, the amount of measurement error 
associated with hypnotic suggestibility assessment is likely to be relatively high, which 
would automatically make any correlations between it and other variables lower than 
would be expected if measurement error was smaller. Thirdly, on the basis of the insights 
obtained through running this experiment, it is apparent the measurement error 
associated with some of the variables used here is also likely to be fairly high. The 
majority of subjects found the filtering task to be extremely tedious, for example, and it 
is possible that a lack of motivation may have increased the amount of measurement 
error for this variable, particularly if motivation is more important for the interference 
trials of the task than the control trials, which seems plausible given the greater difficulty 
of the former compared to the latter. 
A different problem is faced by the Matching Familiar Figures Test. The original 
scoring format of the test states that the average number of errors on the task plus the 
average time to the first response be recorded. However, in some cases an individual 
might make their first response very quickly and then spend a long time deciding 
between the remaining alternatives having made this mistake. This approach was 
frequently observed during the running of this experiment. Such an approach is, for all 
intents and purposes, relatively reflective in comparison to that of the genuinely 
impulsive individual who also makes their second, third, fourth etc. responses very 
quickly; however, both individuals will record a low timing score, despite this strategy 
difference. Timing every response for each item would be one possible way of 
overcoming this potential problem, and is recommended for future research using the 
MFFT. 
There are also methodological concerns about the syllogistic reasoning task used here. 
According to Johnson-Laird and Steedman (1978), responses to syllogistic reasoning 
problems can be quite sensitive to subjects' beliefs and expectations about the material 
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included in the premises and solutions used. In particular, subjects' tend to endorse or 
suggest solutions to syllogisms that seem likely rather than those that seem unlikely; 
thus, even though the valid conclusion for a given syllogism might technically be correct, 
it may not be endorsed because it seems unlikely in the real world. However, as the 
author was unaware of this research at the time that the syllogistic reasoning task was 
constructed, no effort was made to take this issue into account; future research of this 
sort should be aware of this potential problem and accommodate it accordingly. Indeed, 
chapter nine presents an empirical study investigating syllogistic reasoning performance 
in hypnosis and relaxation conditions which takes this potential problem into account. 
A second problem with the syllogistic reasoning task used in this study was that no 
measure of completion time was taken here. Clearly, an individual who completes the 
task as accurately as another individual who takes twice the time to complete it is better 
at the task than their slower counterpart. However, as only total reasoning scores were 
taken in this study, the correlation between suggestibility and reasoning performed here 
may not provide an adequate test of the hypothesis that suggestibility is associated with a 
relative inability to carry out higher level taskS67. 
The studies described in this and the previous chapter provide some support for the 
notion that suggestibility is positively related to a low level processing preference, as 
assessed by both self-report and behavioural measures. The question remains, however, 
as to the generality of the high and low processing mode constructs which form a central 
part of the theoretical framework presented here. In the next chapter, the data obtained 
from this and the previous study will be combined to assess the relationship between 
self-report and behavioural measures of processing preference and ability in an attempt 
to address this issue. 
67 Not taking a time measure for the Raven's matrices test used here is considered valid because a set of 
possible responses is available to the respondent. As such, the possibility of impulsive responding resulting 
from time constraints is far more apparent for this task than the syllogistic reasoning task. 
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CHAPTER 7: Empirical study 2b 
The relationship between behavioural and self-report measures of high and low 
level processing preference and ability. 
7.1 Introduction 
In chapters five and six, two studies designed to assess the relationship between 
suggestibility and a number of self-report and behavioural measures of processing style 
and preference were described. In both cases partial support for the model of hypnosis 
and suggestion presented in chapter three was found: using both self-report and 
behavioural measures there is some evidence to suggest that suggestibility is positively 
related to a low level processing preference, as predicted. However, contrary to 
prediction, there is no evidence to suggest that self-reported high level processing 
preference is negatively related to suggestibility, although a significant negative 
correlation between the HGSHS and syllogistic reasoning suggest that susceptibility is 
related to a relative inability to perform high level processing operations. 
The theoretical work presented in this thesis is not limited to the sole explanation of 
hypnosis and suggestion, however. The model of suggestion and hypnosis presented in 
chapter three is based on a novel model of the cognitive system outlined in chapter two, 
and the validity of the former rests to a considerable degree on that of the latter; it is 
therefore essential that every attempt is made to assess the validity of this cognitive 
model where possible. Being derived from a number of other, better established, models 
of the cognitive system (e. g. Marcel, 1983; Norman & Shallice, 1986; Logan, 1988), 
existing research concerning those models provides solid support for the general 
structure of the present theory. However, the notion that there are more general 
behavioural and cognitive characteristics specifically associated with the lower and 
higher level control of behaviour is a novel idea which requires empirical examination in 
its own right. In chapters five and six, two studies investigating the relationship between 
suggestibility and processing predisposition were described. In each case, processing 
predisposition measures were selected on the basis of the prima facie similarities 
between the research and theory from which they were derived and the distinction 
between higher and lower level modes of processing outlined in chapter two. Due to the 
exploratory nature of the research presented in this thesis, a wide range of such measures 
were selected from a number of different psychological literatures, in a bid to maximise 
the chance of obtaining pertinent information concerning the relationship between 
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suggestibility and processing predisposition. Given the apparent generality of the 
highcr/lower level processing mode distinction which guided measure selection in this 
thesis, the question remains as to what extent this apparent generality translates into an 
empirical reality. For example, does the individual who self-reports a preference for low 
level processing also show a low level processing preference on more objective 
behavioural tasks purportedly assessing the same thing? Similarly, does the individual 
who self-reports a high level processing preference show superior performance on 
measures of high level processing ability? The answers to such questions would provide 
information concerning the generality of the higher/lowcr level processing mode 
distinction and the measures used in this thesis to assess it; such information could prove 
invaluable in guiding further theoretical development and suggesting the most 
appropriate methodological strategies for future research. 
If, as has been assumed here, the different low (or high) level processing measures are 
measuring aspects of the same general construct (viz. low or high level processing 
predisposition), then one would predict that each of the measures will be significantly 
correlated with one another. Having collected data on both the self-report and 
behavioural measures of processing preference and ability for a number of subjects, an 
opportunity to perform this analysis presents itself; this will be the focus of the present 
chapter. 
7.2 Method 
In addition to the Harvard susceptibility measure, each of the low and high level 
processing preference and ability measures used in studies one and two were included in 
analysis here. Analysis was by correlation and multiple regression alone: the low cases- 
to-variables ratio renders the use of potentially profitable multivariate techniques such as 
factor analysis inappropriate in this context. 
The two sets of measures are classified as follows: The low level processing variables 
were the elaborative episodic and elaborative self-actualising scales of the Inventory of 
Learning Processes (ILP-EE and ILNES), the right hemisphere scale of the Human 
Information Processing Survey (HIPS-R), the experiential scale of the Rational Versus 
Experiential Inventory (RVEI-EXP), and triad classification (angles, squares and 
triangles). 
The high level processing variables were the deep thinking and deep semantic scales of 
the Inventory of Learning Processes (ILP-DT and ILP-DS), the left hemisphere scale of 
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the Human Information Processing Survey (HIPS-L), the rational scale of the Rational 
Versus Experiential Inventory (RVEI-RAT), syllogistic reasoning and Raven's matrices. 
The Matching Familiar Figures Test (MFFT; time and errors) and filtering interference 
(angles and size) variables were included as measures of relative (i. e. high vs low) 
processing predisposition; these measures were correlated with both high and low level 
processing variables. 
For details of all of these measures see sections 5.2.2 and 6.2.2. 
7.2.1 Subiects 
74 subjects participated in both study one and study two; of these, 19 were male and 55 
were female. Average age was 23.08 years (s. d. = 5.70 yrs; range 18-48 yrs). 
7.3 Results and discussion 
Prior to analysis the data-set was screened for missing values. Nine missing values 
were identified, three for the syllogistic reasoning variable, two for the Ravens matrices 
variable, one for the social desirability variable, and one each for the RVEI- EXP and 
RVEI-RAT variables (see sections 5.3 and 6.3). The missing values were replaced by the 
series mean in each case. The data-set was then screened for univariate and multivariate 
outliers. Four possible univariate outliers were identified, one for the ILP-EE variable 
which had a high z score, one for the syllogistic reasoning variable which had a very low 
z score, and two for the Raven's matrices variable which both had very low z scores. As 
the potentially outlying ILP-EE score had only a moderately high z score it was retained 
for analysis without alteration. However, following the recommendations of Tabachnick 
and Fidell (1996), the potential outliers for the syllogistic reasoning and Raven's 
matrices variables were replaced by the next highest values in their respective ranges. In 
the case of Raven's matrices two scores of 4 were replaced by a score of a 6. In the case 
of the syllogistic reasoning task, a score of zero was replaced by a score of 3. 
Calculation of Mahalanobis distances revealed that there were no multivariate outliers 
in the data-set. The variables were then screened for normality. All of the variables were 
normally distributed except the triad classification (angles), syllogistic reasoning and 
Raven's matrices variables which all showed moderate negative skewness. In each case, 
the non-normal variables were transformed by reflection and square root. As in chapter 
six, the interpretation of any correlations with these variables should be reversed due to 
the reflection transformation. 
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In order to assess the relationships between the low level processing variables multiple 
partial correlations were carried out. Social desirability acted as a partial correlate in 
each case, while mood (relaxed) was used as an additional partial correlate for all 
correlations involving the triad classification variables. The resulting partial correlation 
matrix is presented in table 7.1. As in chapter six, for the interference (size) and triad 
classification (triangles) variables squared semi-partial correlations (sr) were calculated, 
taking gender and triad set respectively as covariates in hierarchical multiple regression. 
The values for these variables in table 7.1 refer to 4sr2 (semi-partial correlation) to 
enable comparison with the partial correlations obtained for the other variables. As in 
chapters five and six, individual partial-correlation (or squared semi-partial correlation) 
alpha values of 0.05 for a priori analyses were adopted. Unless otherwise stated, the 
linearity of the obtained correlations has been verified through inspection of the 
corresponding scatterplot. 
Examination oftable 7.1 reveals two notable departures from the results reported in 
chapter five and six. As in chapter five, the HGSHS correlated significantly and 
positively with the HIPS-R (r = 2163; p :50.05), RVEI-EXP (r = . 335 1; p :50.005) and 
ILP-EE (r = . 2175; p :50.01); in each case the magnitude of the correlation was higher 
than with the entire sample. However, with this subset of subjects, a significant positive 
correlation was also obtained between the HGSHS and the ILP-ES (r = . 2731); indeed, 
with this sample, the magnitude of the correlation between the ILP-ES and the HGSHS 
was higher than those between the HGSHS and the HIPS-R and ILP-EE. Despite the fact 
that the obtained partial correlations are likely to be less robust than those obtained with 
the larger sample size reported in chapter five, the finding of a significant positive 
relationship between the HGSHS and the ILP-ES is nevertheless important and provides 
further tentative support for the prediction that suggestibility is related to a low level 
processing preference. Moreover, such a finding is consistent with the significant 
difference found between the high and low suggestibility quartiles on the ILP-ES in 
study one. 
As in chapter six, a significant positive correlation between the HGSHS and triad 
classification (squares) was again obtained (r = . 2000; p :50.05); however, with the 
removal of the seven subjects who had not completed the questionnaires in study 1, the 
obtained partial correlation between the HGSHS and MFFT (time) was no longer 
significant at the 0.05 level. Such a finding seems to suggest that the relationship 
between suggestibility and MFFT (time) is not particularly robust, confirming the results 
of study two. 
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The HIPS-R, RVEI-EXP, ILP-EE and ILP-ES all showed significant positive inter- 
correlations as predicted, ranging from a relatively small correlation between the RVEI- 
EXP and ILP-EE (r = . 2639; p :50.01), to a strong correlation between the RVEI-EXP 
and ILP-ES (r = . 6346; p :50.0001). Related and complementary findings have been 
reported by Beyler and Schmeck (1992). Such a pattern of intcr-corrclations appears to 
support the prediction that the four putative low level processing questionnaires all 
measure related aspects of a similar low level processing construct, a construct which is 
significantly and positively related to hypnotic suggestibility. 
Within the triad classification variables, significant positive correlations were obtained 
between the square and the angle stimuli (r = -. 2518; p _-5 0.05), while significant squared 
semi-partial correlations were obtained between the triangle and angle stimuli (qsr2 = 
. 2588, p: ý 0.05) and the triangle and square stimuli (qsr2 =. 5339, p _-5 0.0001). A similar 
pattern of findings have been reported by J. D. Smith and Baron (198 1). Such a pattern of 
inter-correlations again suggests that the three triad classification tasks are differentially 
assessing a similar construct. 
The MFFT time and error variables showed a strong negative correlation as expected (r 
-. 6636; p :50.0001), indicating that quicker subjects tend to make more errors on the 
task; this is in line with previous uses of the MFFT (e. g. Kagan, 1965). 
The two filtering interference measures showed a significant squared semi-partial 
correlation with one another (qsr2 = . 2345, p :50.05), although the magnitude of this was 
fairly small given that the two measures are purportedly measuring the same construct. 
However, it is likely that a low or non-existent correlation between the two filtering 
dimensions is a product of the differential difficulty level between the two (cf J. D. 
Smith &Baron, 198 1). 
Although the correlations within specific measure types (i. e. MFFT, filtering 
interference, triad classification) are all significant as expected, the inter-correlations 
between the different types of behavioural measure of low level processing preference do 
not provide support for the notion that a common processing construct is being assessed: 
none of the partial correlations between the different behavioural measure types was 
significant at the 0.05 level. However, the lack of a significant correlation between the 
triad classification and filtering interference measures, both of which derive from the 
same literature, is in line with those of J. D. Smith and Baron (1981). Such a finding 
clearly demonstrates the difference between processing abilities (as assessed by the 
filtering tasks) and processing preferences (as assessed by the triad classification tasks). 
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It is apparent that one may prefer either high or low level processing, but such a 
preference is independent of whether or not one is capable of processing in a particular 
fashion. 
Having assessed the correlations within each general measure type (i. e. behavioural, 
self-report), the correlations between the measures types must now be addressed. 
Examination of table 7.1 reveals that there is only very modest support for the prediction 
that the self-report and behavioural low level processing variables are assessing related 
aspects of the same underlying construct. On the positive side, the correlation between 
the ILP-ES and triad classification (squares) variables approached, but did not reach, 
significance (r = . 1807; p=0.059). Similarly, the squared semi-partial correlation 
between the ILP-ES and triad classification (triangle) variables also approached 
significance (4sr-2=. 2191, p=0.060). However, the correlation between the ILP-ES and 
the triad classification (angles) variables was non-significant. None of the other self- 
report measures of low level processing preference correlated significantly with any of 
the behavioural measures, with one exception: that between the interference (size) and 
the HIPS-R variables (qsr2=3661, p :50.01, two-tailed). However, examination of the 
scatter-plot between these variables indicates that this squared semi-partial correlation is 
in the opposite direction to that predicted, suggesting that a low level processing 
preference, as indexed by the HIPS-R, is actually related to a high level processing 
ability, as indexed by the filtering task. There is no immediately obvious interpretation 
for such a finding, although it again underlines the importance of drawing a distinction 
between processing preferences and abilities. 
Thus, although there does appear to be some evidence in support of the relationship 
between self-report and behavioural measures of low level processing preference, such 
support is very modest and highly specific to certain measures. Nevertheless, it is 
noteworthy that the significant self-report/behavioural correlation obtained was between 
measures purportedly assessing a low level processing preference rather than ability. 
Such a finding validates, to an extent at least, the use of self-report measures as 
instruments for the assessment of processing style. 
In order to assess the combined power of the self-report and behavioural measures in 
predicting suggestibility, those measures which showed significant correlations with 
suggestibility (the RVEI-EXP, ILP-ES, ILP-EE, HIPS-R and triad classification with 
squares) were entered into a hierarchical regression taking HGSHS scores as the 
dependent variable. Social desirability, mood (relaxed) and triad classification set were 
entered simultaneously into the first block of the regression equation as covariates, while 
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the significantly correlated low level processing measures were entered simultaneously 
into the second block of the regression equation. The increment in R2 brought about by 
inclusion of the low level processing variables was 0.183 66, suggesting that the low level 
processing variables account for a further 18.4% of the variance in suggestibility after 
accounting for social desirability, triad classification set and relaxation. This increase 
was significantly different from zero, F(5,65) = 3.384, p _-ý 0.01. The only 
low level 
processing variables accounting for significant unique proportions of variance in 
suggestibility were RVEI-EXP and triad classification (squares). RVEI-EXP accounted 
for a unique 6.1% (sr2 = . 06103) of the variation in suggestibility, F(1,65) = 5.622, p :5 
0.025. Triad classification (squares) accounted for a unique 5.4% (sr2 = . 05408) of the 
variation in suggestibility, F(1,65) = 4.982, p: 5 0.05. The remaining proportion of variation 
in suggestibility (6.9%) accounted for by inclusion of the low level processing variables 
was shared. As there are no conceptual grounds for deciding which of the variables (self- 
report vs. behavioural) should be entered first in any subsequent hierarchical regression, 
an explorative mixed standard-statistical regression was performed taking HGSHS as the 
dependent variable. Social desirability, triad set and relaxation were simultaneously 
entered as covariates in the first, standard block of the regression equation while the five 
low level processing variables were subject to step-wise entry in the second block. Only 
the RVEI-EXP entered the regression equation on the basis of this method of variable 
entry-order; the inclusion of the RVEI-EXP brought about an increase in R2 of . 11865, 
which is significantly different ýom zero, F(I `= 10.624, p :50.005. Thus, on purely , 69) ' 
statistical grounds, the RVEI-EXP appears to be the best predictor of suggestibility, 
accounting for 11.9% of the variation after controlling for the effects of triad set, 
relaxation and social desirability. As such, it can be concluded that, taken together, the 
self-report and behavioural measures of low level processing preference predict a 
relatively large and significant proportion of the variation in suggestibility; moreover 
both behavioural and self-report measures uniquely contribute to the prediction of 
suggestibility, validating the use of both in any subsequent research addressing the 
hypotheses under investigation here. However, there is statistical evidence to suggest that 
the best predictor of suggestibility out of the all the low level processing predisposition 
variables is the RVEI-EXP. 
In order to assess the relationships between the high level processing variables a 
second set of partial correlations was carried out. Social desirability acted as a partial 
correlate in each case, while mood (happy) was used as an additional partial correlate for 
all correlations involving the syllogistic reasoning and Raven's matrices variables. The 
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resulting partial correlation matrix is presented in table 7.2. For the interference (size) 
variable, squared semi-partial correlations (sr) were calculated, taking gender as a 
covariate in hierarchical multiple regression. The values for this variable in table 7.2 
refer to qsr2 (semi-partial correlation) to allow comparison with the partial correlations. 
As in chapters five and six, individual alpha values of 0.05 for a priori analyses were 
adopted. 
An initial inspection of table 7.2 reveals that, contrary to the findings reported in 
chapter six, removal of the seven subjects who had not completed both behavioural and 
self-report processing measures renders the correlation between the HGSHS and Raven's 
matrices (r = -. 1883) and the correlation between the HGSHS and syllogistic reasoning 
(r = . 0576) non-significant. As in chapters five and six, none of the other high level 
processing variables correlated significantly with suggestibility. Such a pattern of 
findings clearly indicates, as with the relationship between the HGSHS and MFFT, that 
the relationships between the HGSHS, Raven's matrices and syllogistic reasoning are not 
as robust as was previously thought. Evidently, the correlations between these variables 
were subject to considerable leverage by the scores of the seven additional subjects 
included in the analysis described in chapter six, a finding which must cast doubt on the 
validity of the obtained relationships; in any event, it is clear that an attempt at 
replication must be made before any firm conclusions can be drawn about the 
relationship between these variables. 
Examination of table 7.2 reveals a similar pattern of correlations between the high level 
processing questionnaires to those obtained and reported in chapter five. As predicted, 
strong significant positive correlations were obtained between the ILP-DS and RVEI- 
RAT variables (r = . 3453; p<0.005), the ILP-DS and ILP-DT variables (r = . 6893; p :5 
0.0001), and the ILP-DT and RVEI-EXP variables (r = . 6412; p :50.0001). Such a 
pattern of correlations strongly supports the notion that these measures are tapping 
related aspects of a similar construct. However, the HIPS-L variable did not correlate 
significantly with the ILP-DS, ILP-DT or RVEI-RAT, indicating that the HIPS-L is not a 
valid measure of this construct. Moreover, the correlation between the ILP-DS and 
HIPS-L approached two-tailed significance indicating a potential negative relationship 
between these variables (r = -. 2103). Such a finding has no obvious interpretation but at 
the very least proscribes the use of the HIPS-L as a measure of high level processing 
preference. 
The inter-correlations between the putative high level processing variables suggests a 
greater degree of cross-measure consistency than was obtained for the low level 
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processing variables discussed previously. A significant positive correlation between the 
syllogistic reasoning and Raven's matrices variables (r = . 2211; p :50.05) supports the 
assumption that the two are tapping, to an extent at least, a high level processing ability 
associated with reasoning. In addition, significant correlations were obtained between the 
MFFT errors measure, the syllogistic reasoning task 68 (r = . 194 1; p --ý 0.05) and Raven's 
matrices (r = . 4279; p :50.0001), as predicted. 
Such a finding indicates that those 
individuals who show good high level processing abilities, as indexed by the Raven's 
matrices and syllogistic reasoning variables, are less likely to make errors on the MFFT 
than those with inferior high level processing abilities. This again supports the prediction 
that these variables are tapping related constructs. A significant negative correlation was 
also obtained between the MFFT time measure and Raven's matrices (r = -. 2285), 
suggesting that individuals with good high level reasoning abilities tend to take longer on 
the MFFT than those without. Taken together with the previous finding, this result 
suggests that good high level processors tend to have a more reflective cognitive style 
than relatively poor high level processors which leads to better performance on the 
MFFT. 
None of the MFFT variables, Raven's matrices or the syllogistic reasoning task 
correlated significantly with either of the filtering interference tasks. Given the pattern of 
intercorrelations between the former variables, such a pattern of findings appears to 
question the assertion that the filtering interference tasks measure processing ability (cf. 
J. D. Smith & Baron, 1981). Ai the very least, if the filtering interference task does 
measure an aspect of processing ability it is not one that it is related to that associated 
with the MFFT, Raven's matrices and the syllogistic reasoning task; if this were the case 
then the notion of high and low level processing modes proposed in chapter two would 
clearly have to be rethought. 
No evidence was found for a relationship between the self-report and behavioural 
measures of high level processing, with one exception: a significant correlation was 
found between the Raven's matrices and RVEI-RAT variables (r = -. 1983; p :50.05), 
suggesting that those individuals who claim to be rational thinkers are actually better at 
rational thinking than those who do not. Although the magnitude of this correlation is 
very modest, it does appear to support the notion that individuals have some insight into 
68 As with the triad classification (angles) variable, interpretation of correlations with the Raven's matrices 
and syllogistic reasoning. variables should go in the opposite direction to that indicated by the sign of the 
correlation coefficient, due to reflection of these variables. However, as both the syllogistic reasoning and 
Raven's matrices variables have been reflected, interpretation of the correlation between these two 
variables follows the sign of the correlation coefficient. 
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their reasoning abilities, and validates, to an extent at least, the use of self-rcport 
measures to assess such things. 
7.4 Summary 
The results obtained here provide only very modest support for the generality of the 
distinction between higher and lower level modes of processing made by the model of 
the cognitive system presented in chapter two. As in chapter five, each of the low level 
processing mode questionnaires showed significant correlations with one another as 
predicted, suggesting that each is assessing related aspects of a similar construct. In 
addition, the three triad classification tasks all showed significant inter-correlations, as 
did the filtering interference tasks, and the different measures taken by the Matching 
Familiar Figures Test. Clearly, there is evidence to suggest that the different variations 
within a particular measure type are measuring similar constructs as predicted. However, 
contrary to prediction, no significant correlations were found between the different 
behavioural tasks and very few of the behavioural tasks correlated significantly with the 
self-report measures. The only possible exceptions were the relationships between the 
ILP-ES and triad classification (triangles and squares) variables that approached, but did 
not reach, significance. Such a pattern of correlations is encouraging and suggests that 
there is some degree of overlap between these different tasks. The fact that both the ILP- 
ES and triad classification measures are both purportedly addressing a low level 
processing preference rather thýfti ability provides modest support for the distinction 
between higher and lower level processing modes presented in chapter two. 
After removal of the seven subjects who had not completed the questionnaires in study 
one, the previously significant correlations between the HGSHS and the MFFT (time), 
Raven's matrices and syllogistic reasoning variables were reduced to non-significant 
levels. Such a finding suggests that the relationships between these variables are not as 
robust as the evidence presented in chapter six seems to indicate; clearly, attempts at 
replication of these relationships are required before any firm conclusions can be drawn. 
Nevertheless, results of hierarchical regression analysis revealed that both self-report 
(ILP-EE, ILP-EE, HIPS-R and RVEI-EXP) and behavioural (triad classification for 
squares) low level processing measures predict unique aspects of hypnotic susceptibility, 
indicating that both are potentially useful ways of investigating the nature of suggestion 
and hypnosis on the basis of the model presented in this thesis. 
The pattern of inter-correlations between the high level processing measures are 
slightly more encouraging than those for the low level measures. The syllogistic 
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reasoning task, Raven's matrices and the Matching Familiar Figures Test also showed 
significant inter-correlations as predicted, suggesting that each is measuring a related 
aspect of high level processing ability. However, none of these measure showed 
significant correlations with either of the filtering interference tasks, a finding which 
casts doubt on the notion that the filtering task is measuring an aspect of processing 
ability. A significant correlation was, however, obtained between the Raven's matrices 
and RVEI-RAT variables, suggesting that subjects have, to an extent, some insight into 
their high level processing abilities and are able to report them reliably. 
Having addressed the related hypotheses that suggestibility is positively related to a 
low level processing predisposition and negatively related to a high level processing 
predisposition in chapters five and six, and , 
the generality of the processing mode 
construct in the present chapter, our attention will now turn to the predictions of the 
current model concerning hypnosis itself. In the following two chapters, two studies 
designed to assess these predictions will be described. 
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CHAPTER 8: Empirical study 3 
A comparison of perceptual integrality and separability in baseline, relaxation and 
hypnosis conditions. 
8.1 Introduction 
In chapters five and six, two empirical studies designed to assess the prediction that 
suggestibility is positively related to a low level processing propensity and negatively 
related to a high level processing propensity were described. These studies were 
designed as an empirical assessment of the predictions concerning suggestibility made by 
the model of suggestion and hypnosis outlined in chapter three. In this chapter and the 
next, two studies designed to assess the predictions of that model concerning hypnosis 
itself will be outlined. In each case studies designed to assess the related predictions that 
hypnosis is associated with a low level processing preference and a high level processing 
inhibition will be described. 
In empirical study 2, baseline scores on a number of behavioural measures of 
processing predisposition and ability were obtained from 79 graduate and undergraduate 
students. In order to assess the effect of hypnosis on processing bias, scores from a 
subset of these subjects on two of these measures, the triad classification and filtering 
interference tasks, were be compared with two further sets of such measurements, one 
obtained following hypnosis and the other obtained following a relaxation control. The 
triad classification and filtering interference tasks were selected for use in this study for a 
number of reasons. First and foremost, the absence of significant practice effects on these 
measures (Kemler Nelson, 1996, personal communication) makes them suitable for use 
in a within subjects design which, due to its greater control and power, is preferred to the 
independent design alternative. In the case of the remaining measures, practice effects 
are either common or alternate forms are not available. Second, the relatively opaque 
nature of the triad classification and filtering interference tasks makes it difficult for 
subjects to appreciate what the tasks are actually measuring and how. As such, it is 
unlikely that subjects will be able to anticipate the purpose of the study and give 
responses on the tasks that they believe are appropriate and in line with the wishes of the 
experimenter. Such a response set has often been cited by sociocognitive theorists as 
responsible for the pattern of findings obtained in similar studies, a criticism which may 
be avoided by this approach. Third, both triad classification and filtering interference 
tasks are based on the assumption that higher and lower level processing are opposite 
ends of a processing continuum; as such, the data obtained from these tasks is much 
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richer than if they were assessing the degree to which one or other of the types of 
processing were being used. 
A relaxation control condition was included in this study to assess the effect of 
hypnosis itself on responses to these measures, independent of any effect that increased 
relaxation, typically brought about by the induction of hypnosis, might have. In order to 
establish that the degree of relaxation in the two conditions is comparable and to provide 
a manipulation check, a measure of relaxation identical to that used in study 2 was 
presented to subjects before and after rclaxation/hypnosis. The inclusion of a baseline 
condition in this study allowed for an assessment of the possible role that relaxation per 
se may have on processing predisposition; as relaxation is typically a component of 
hypnosis and might contribute to the nature and frequency of suggested behaviours, the 
inclusion of a baseline condition was considered essential in this context. 
If the predictions of the current model of hypnosis are correct, then one would expect a 
characteristic pattern of responding on the triad classification and filtering tasks across 
the three conditions. If, as predicted, hypnosis involves a shift from a high to a low level 
processing preference then one would expect individuals in the hypnosis condition to 
show significantly more similarity based responses on the three triad classification 
measures than when in the relaxation and baseline conditions. Furthermore, as triad 
classification is known to be affected by relaxation one would predict that a significantly 
greater proportion of similarity-based responses would be found in the relaxation 
condition than in the baseline condition. If there is a shift towards a low level processing 
preference during hypnosis and this is due to a relative inability to engage in higher level 
processing, then one would expect a significantly greater interference effect on the 
filtering task during the hypnosis condition compared to relaxation and baseline, as well 
as more similarity based responses in triad classification. Inclusion of both high and low 
suggestibility groups allowed us to identify whether such effects, should they be present, 




Subjects were 34 graduate and undergraduate students from University College 
London, of which 7 were male and 27 were female. All subjects were volunteers who 
were contacted following their participation in empirical study 2. Mean age was 23.85 
years (s. d. 5.47 years; range 18-43 years). 17 of the subjects had scored between zero and 
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five on the HGSHS: A (average HGSHS score of 2.88; s. d. 1.73) and had all failed the 
amnesia item; together they formed the low suggestibility" group, which consisted of 5 
males and 12 females with a group average age of 25.76 years (s. d. 6.66 years; range 18- 
43 years). 17 of the subjects had scored between eight 70 and 12 on the HGSHS: A, with 
an average HGSHS score of 9.88 (s. d. = 1.11); together they fortned the high 
suggestibility group, which consisted of 2 males and 15 females with a group average 
age of 21.94 years (s. d. 3.11 years; range 18-30 years). Each subject received LIO for 
taking part. Informed consent was obtained from all subjects. 
8.2.2 Design 
This study employed a2x3 split-plot quasi-experimental design, using one within and 
one between subjects independent variable. The within subjeCtS71 independent variable 
was condition and had three levels, baseline, relaxation and hypnosis. The between 
subjects variable was suggestibility group and had two levels, high and low (see section 
7.2.1). Five dependent variables (for details see section 6.2.2) were employed in this 
study (i) filtering interference (angles); (ii) filtering interference (size); (iii) triad 
classification (squares); (iv) triad classification (triangles); and (v) triad classification 
(angles). It was predicted that subjects in the hypnosis condition would show 
significantly more similarity based (i. e. integral) responses on all three triad 
classification stimuli (angles, triangles and squares) compared to the baseline and 
relaxation conditions. In addition, it was expected that the relaxation condition would be 
associated with significantly more similarity based responses than the baseline condition, 
due to the reported influence that adopting a relaxed mode of responding has on triad 
' '9 In the majority of research using hypnotic suggestibility as a grouping variable, a score of less than three 
or four on the HGSHS: A is typically taken as representing low suggestibility. While such a practice is 
ideal, the poor response rate of subjects scoring within this range meant that a more generous low 
suggestibility criterion had to be adopted in this study. Failing the aninesia item on the HGSHS: A, which is 
generally considered to be one of the most difficult items on the scale, was taken as a further rough 
criterion for inclusion in the low suggestibility group to increase the likelihood of valid subject selection. 
70 One subject with a score of eight on the HGSHS: A had to be included in the high suggestibility group 
due to a similar lack of willing volunteers. Most researchers take a score of nine or ten and above on the 
HGSHS: A as the criterion for high suggestibility. 
71 The use of within subjects designs for studies investigating the effect of hypnosis has previously been 
contraindicated due to the possibility of so-called 'holdback' effects (see e. g. Barabasz & Barabasz, 1992). 
However, as such holdback effects predict an improvement in performance for highly suggestible subjects 
during hypnosis due to increased motivation, this possibility was not considered a problem in the current 
context. This is because increased motivation should lead to more dimensionally based responses on triad 
classification and a smaller interference effect in filtering (Foard & Kernler Nelson, 1984), which is the 
opposite effect to the one predicted here. As such, adoption of the more powerful within subjects design 
was considered justified. 
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classification performance. It was also predicted that subjects in the hypnosis condition 
would show a significantly greater interference effect on the filtering task (for both 
angles and size) compared to the baseline and relaxation conditions. Furthermore, it was 
predicted that both of these effects would interact with susceptibility level, such that the 
effect would only be shown for highly susceptible subjects. Analysis was by three 2x3 
mixed model analyses of variance 72 for the triad classification task (one for each type of 
stimulus) and two 2x3 mixed model analyses of variance for the filtering task (one for 
each primary dimension). Self-reported relaxation was compared across relaxation and 
hypnosis conditions in order to assess whether the two are comparable. The use of 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was considered and rejected due to the 
predicted heterogeneity of the regression between covariates and dependent variables for 
the high and low suggestibility groups (i. e. it is predicted that the relationship between 
relaxation and scores on each of these measures will be different for the high and low 
suggestibility groups in the hypnosis condition). 
8.2.3 Materials 
See section 6.2.2 for details of the filtering and triad classification tasks and the mood 
measures used in this study. See section 6.3 for details concerning the scoring of the 
filtering task. 
Hypnotic induction: A standardised hypnotic induction (see appendix IX) was presented 
via audio-tape to all subjects in the hypnosis condition to ensure control. Prior to the 
induction, all subjects received the instructions included in appendix X, which were read 
verbatim by the experimenter. The induction consisted of a set of progressive muscle 
relaxation instructions involving imagery aimed at tension-reduction (e. g. the image of 
elastic bands becoming looser), followed by 'special place' imagery which was left 
deliberately under-specified to allow the subject to adopt the images they felt most 
comfortable with. A descent image was then embedded into the special place imagery 
with the use of counting to accompany the descent. Followed by further elaboration of 
the new special place image, subjects were informed that the main part of the experiment 
would begin presently and told to wait for further instructions. Following completion of 
the experimental tasks the audio-tape was restarted and the deinduction routine (see 
appendix X) presented. The induction lasted approximately 14 minutes in total. 
72 Ile categorical nature of the triad set variable renders it unsuitable for inclusion as a covariate in the 
analyses presented here. 
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Relaxation control: It was decided that a formal relaxation procedure such as that at the 
start of the hypnotic induction (progressive muscle relaxation, imagery for tension- 
reduction etc. ) would not be used as a control in this context: the subjects' knowledge of 
the experimenter's research interests and the nature of the laboratory setting used were 
deemed such that any relaxation procedure of this sort would in itself be regarded as an 
hypnotic induction. As the belief that a procedure is hypnosis is arguably the most 
critical element to any hypnotic induction, inadvertently engendering this belief would 
entirely contradict the purposes of including a relaxation control in this study. 
Accordingly, as an analogue of the hypnotic induction, it was decided that subjects in the 
relaxation control condition would be played a short edited excerpt of comparable length 
(14 minutes) from Lewis Caroll's Alice in Wonderland (see appendix XI). In order to 
maximise the congruence between the hypnotic induction and the relaxation control, 
subjects were asked to close their eyes, think along with the story and imagine the events 
as they were described to them on the tape; they were also instructed to allow themselves 
to become as relaxed as possible. It is hoped that by such procedures the hypnotic 
induction may be simulated as closely as possible, in that a comparable level of 
relaxation can be achieved and similar cognitive processes will be engaged by its 
presentation. The particular excerpt chosen was selected for its relatively simplistic 
language, its emphasis on the vivid description of the narrative events (rendering it easy 
to image), and its emphasis on fantastic rather than realistic events, making the similarity 
to an hypnotic induction as complete as possible; hopefully, however, it will do so 
without creating the belief that it is an hypnotic induction procedure., 
Prior to the tape, all subjects received the instructions presented in appendix XII which 
were read verbatim by the experimenter. 
8.2.4 Procedure 
All subjects completed empirical study two prior to participation in this study, with 
study 2 scores on the triad classification and filtering tasks forming the baseline 
measures for use here. Following participation in study 2, subjects were contacted by 
letter and asked if they would like to take part in a study investigating the relationship 
between hypnosis and thinking style. They were informed that the study would consist of 
two sessions each of an hour in length, one of which would involve relaxation and two 
simple tasks and the other involving hypnosis and two simple tasks. All subjects were 
informed that the order of the sessions would be randomly determined on the day of the 
first session, and that a payment of LIO would be made following completion of the 
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second session. Presentation of the hypnosis and relaxation conditions was counter- 
balanced across both suggestibility groups, such that approximately half of the low and 
half of the high suggestible subjects received hypnosis first and relaxation second, with 
the opposite order being used for the remaining subjects. Upon arrival at the first session 
(excluding baseline), subjects were again informed of the purpose of the study and the 
nature of the two sessions. Subjects were then given the opportunity to ask questions and 
written consent for participation was obtained. They were then told which session they 
would be participating in on that day, and given the appropriate instructions (see 
appendices X and X11). The baseline relaxation measure was then taken and the audio- 
tape was started. Throughout both sessions subjects were seated in a comfortable chair in 
a well-lit room. Following the hypnotic induction or the relaxation script, the post-tape 
relaxation measure was taken and the triad classification and filtering tasks were given in 
that order (see section 6.2.3). The triad classification set given was counterbalanced 
across the three sessions according to a latin squares design; the filtering task received 
first (i. e. angle or size) was kept constant across the three sessions but counterbalanced 
between subjects, such that half of the subjects in each group received angles first and 
half received size first. Following completion of the tasks and, in the case of the hypnosis 
condition, the taped de-induction routine, subjects were told that the session was over 
and arrangements were made for participation in the next session. After completion of 
both sessions, each of which lasted approximately one hour, subjects were thanked for 
their participation and paid flO. , 
The experimenter remained blind to suggestibility group for the majority of subjects in 
this study. Blindness was achieved with the assistance of a confederate who examined 
HGSHS: A records, identified subjects of high or low suggestibility and presented the 
experimenter with a randomised list of suitable individuals to contact for study 
participation. Although blindness was achieved in the vast majority of cases, two 
subjects of known suggestibility had to be included in the latter stages of testing to 
ensure an adequate low suggestible group size. Although such a practice is not ideal, in 
the present context it was unavoidable for practical reasons; it is hoped that the highly 
standardised procedures used in this study would minimise the possible effect that any 
loss of blindness might have on the results. 
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8.3 Results 
8.3.1 Data screening and 12relimina[M analyses 
Prior to analysis the data-set was screened for missing values. Two missing values 
were identified, one each for the baseline relaxation and pre-tape relaxation (relaxation 
condition) variables. Each of the missing values were attributable to experimenter error; 
as the missing values appeared randomly distributed they were replaced by the series 
mean in each case. The data-set was then screened for univariate outliers; one case had a 
high z score on the baseline interference (angles) variable, making it a potential outlier. 
However, in order to preserve maximum power and avoid the problems associated with 
unequal group sizes, it was retained for analysis. 
Each variable was then assessed for normality. Most of the variables were normally 
distributed, with a small number of exceptions: (i) the triad classification (angles) 
variable showed significant negative skewness (p :50.01) for both groups in all 
conditions except hypnosis for the high suggestibles; and (ii) the interference (angles) 
variable showed significant negative skewness in the hypnosis and relaxation conditions 
for the low suggestibles and significant positive skewness for the high suggestibles in the 
baseline condition. In order to account for these deviations from normality, the triad 
classification (angles) variable in each 73 condition for both groups was transformed by 
reflection and inversion. In addition, the interference (angles) variable in each condition 
for both groups was reflected and logarithmically transformed. 
Prior to the main body of the analysis, the pre- and post- tape relaxation scores in the 
hypnosis and relaxation conditions were compared to assess the impact of the 
interventions on self-reported levels of relaxation. Table 8.1 provides descriptive 
statistics for pre- and post-tape self-reported relaxation in the relaxation and hypnosis 
conditions; figures 8.1 and 8.2 provide graphic representations of these data for the 
relaxation and hypnosis conditions respectively. Inspection of table 8.1 and figure 8.1 
73 In order to ensure consistency and hence interpretability it is necessary to perform transformations on all 
of the levels of a variable rather than just one or two, regardless of whether or not all of the levels show a 
non-normal distribution. This is, of course, assun-dng that the transformation itself does not make a 
previously normal distribution non-normal. 
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Table 8.1: Mean pre- and post-tape relaxation scores for high and low suggestible 





Low suggestibles (n = 17) 87.75 (26.62) 105.82 (23.11) 
High suggestibles (n = 17) 84.35 (29.88) 116.35 (18.70) 
Hypnosis 
Low suggestibles (n = 17) 83.18 (23.77) 114.82 (25.53) 
High suggestibles (n = 17) 92.18 (31.71) 122.06(23. 
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses 
Figure 8.1: Mean pre- and post-tape relaxation scores for 













Figure 8.2: Mean pre- and post-tape relaxation scores for 





















indicates that both high and low suggestible groups show comparably high levels of self- 
reported relaxation prior to the tape in the relaxation condition, and both groups show 
large and comparable increases in relaxation post-tape. In order to examine this 
observation statistically, a2x2 mixed model analysis of variance with one between 
(suggestibility group: high and low) and one within subjects variable (time: pre-tape and 
post-tape) was performed on the relaxation scores for the relaxation condition. A 
significant main effect for time was found, F(1,32) = 42.92, p -ý 0.0005 (one tailed), 
indicating that self-reported relaxation is significantly higher following the relaxation 
tape compared to before the tape (see appendix XVI, summary table 3A). Neither the 
main effect for suggestibility group or the group x time interaction was significant. 
Inspection of table 8.1 and figure 8.2 indicates that both high and low suggestible 
groups show comparably high levels of self-reported relaxation prior to the tape in the 
hypnosis condition, and both groups show large and comparable increases in relaxation 
post-tape. In both cases, however, the highly suggestible group showed higher levels of 
relaxation than the low suggestibles. A second 2x2 mixed model ANOVA with 
suggestibility group as a between subjects variable and time as a within subjects variable 
was performed on the relaxation scores for the hypnosis condition. A significant main 
effect for time was found, F(1,32) -'= 45-35, p _-ý 0.0005 (one tailed), 
indicating that self- 
reported relaxation is significantly higher following the hypnosis tape compared to 
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Figure 8.3: Mean post-tape relaxation in hypnosis and 
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before the tape. Neither the main effect for suggestibility group or the group x time 
interaction was significant (see appendix XVI, summary table 313). It can therefore be 
concluded that levels of self-reported relaxation for high and low suggestible subjects 
were significantly higher followifig both hypnosis and relaxation tapes as predicted. 
Having'ascertained that both hypnosis and relaxation tapes bring about significant 
increases in self-reported relaxation for both groups of subjects, we must now address 
the question of whether or not the overall levels of relaxation in the hypnosis and 
relaxation conditions are comparable as intended. Figure 8.3 shows the comparison 
between the post-tape relaxation scores in the relaxation and hypnosis conditions for 
both high and low suggestible subjects. Inspection of table 8.1 and figure 8.3 indicates 
that for both high and low suggestible subjects the overall level of relaxation in the 
relaxation condition is somewhat lower than in the hypnosis condition, with this 
difference being more marked for the low suggestible subjects. In order to assess these 
differences statistically, a2x2 mixed-model ANOVA with condition as a within 
subjects variable and group as a between subjects variable was performed on the post- 
tape self-rcported relaxation data. A significant main effect for condition was found, 
F(1,32)= 6.89, p: 5 0.05 (one-tailed), indicating that self-rcported relaxation is significantly 
higher in the hypnosis condition compared to the relaxation condition. Neither the main 
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effect for group or the group-condition interaction was significant (see appendix XVI, 
summary table 3Q. Although the relaxation condition was included to control for 
relaxation induced by hypnosis, this finding indicates that control has not been fully 
achieved. Unfortunately, this variable cannot be included as a covariate in statistical 
analysis due to the fact that it varies across levels of the within-subjccts factor. As such, 
the interpretation of any results obtained here must be tempered by the lack of perfect 
control achieved in this study. 
Finally, an assessment of the differences between the three classification sets for the 
triad classification (triangles) variable is required. As was demonstrated in chapter 6, the 
three triad classification sets do not yield the same proportion of similarity based 
responses, and it is possible that counterbalancing of set across conditions was not 
sufficient to completely remove any systematic influence of this variable in this study. 
Accordingly, the proportion of similarity based responses for the triangle stimuli across 
the three triad sets within each condition were compared using three separate one-way 
analyses of variance. No significant differences were found between any of the sets in 
any of the conditions, indicating that we can be relatively confident in assuming that 
triad set has not systematically influenced the findings of the present investigation. 
Having performed all data-screening and preliminary analyses, the main body of the 
analysis can begin. For the sake of explanatory ease, the data from the triad classification 
and filtering tasks will be examined separately. 
8.3.2 Main studv analvses 
Triad classification: Table 8.2 presents descriptive statistics for the triad classification 
task in baseline, relaxation and hypnosis conditions and for the high and low 
suggestibility groups. Inspection of table 8.2 indicates that there are few differences 
between conditions for any of the triad classification stimuli. For the low suggestible 
group, there is a degree of variation across conditions in the proportion of similarity 
based responses for angle classification, with similarity based responses highest in the 
relaxation condition followed by the hypnosis and baseline conditions (see note 2). This 
trend is not apparent for the highly suggestible subjects, however. For both high and low 
suggestible subjects there is an apparent trend in similarity based responses for triangle 
classification, with the most similarity based responses being made in the baseline 
condition, followed by the relaxation and hypnosis conditions for both groups. Neither 
high nor low suggestibles show any trend across conditions for square classification, 
196 
Table 8.2: Mean proportion of similarity-based responses for triad classification stimuli 
in baseline, relaxation and hypnosis conditions for low and high suggestibility groups. 
CONDITION 
STIMULI/GROUP Basclinc Relaxation Hypnosis 
Andes 
Lows . 96(. 05) . 87(. 
17) . 89(. 15) 
Highs . 93(. 09) . 93(. 11) . 
93(. 08) 
Sguares 
Lows . 36(. 18) . 31(. 30) . 34(. 27) 
Highs . 46(. 27) . 44(. 29) . 42(. 27) 
Triandes 
Lows . 52(. 23) . 40(. 35) . 39(. 29) 
Highs . 57(. 29) . 51(. 25) . 46(. 30) 
Note 1: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses 
Note 2: Values for the angle stimuli correspond to the transformed data; as transformation involved 
reflection, relatively small scores refer to relatively large proportions of similarity based responses. 
Note 3: Table contains descriptive data for the triad classification task without adjustment for relaxation or 
triad classification set. 
however. Finally, high suggestibles in general appear to show a greater proportion of 
similarity based responses for all types of classification stimuli compared to low 
suggestibles. 
Three 2x3 mixed model analyses of variance with one between subjects factor 
(suggestibility group: high and low) and one within sub ects factor (condition: baseline, j 
relaxation and hypnosis) were performed on the proportion of similarity based responses 
in triad classification, one each for the angle, square and triangle stimuli. Transformed 
data for the angle stimuli was used, rather than the raw scores. As in the previous 
chapteis, an alpha value of 0.05 was adopted for these a priori analyses. At this level, 
none of the main effects or interactions were significant for the angle and square triad 
classification stimuli (see appendix XVI, summary tables 3D and 3E); however, a 
significant main effect for the triangle stimuli was found, F(2,64) = 3.865, p<0.05 (see 
appendix XVI, summary table 3F). In order to ascertain the location of this effect, a 
planned orthogonal contrast comparing the proportion of similarity based responses 
(collapsed across susceptibility groups) in the baseline condition with the combined 
relaxation and hypnosis conditions was perfonned. The baseline condition differed 
significantly from the combined relaxation and hypnosis conditions, F(1,33) = 6.405, p 
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Table 8.3: Mean filtering task interference effect for size and angle dimensions in 
baseline, relaxation and hypnosis conditions for low and high suggestibility groups. 
CONDITION 
STIMULI/GROUP Baseline Relaxation Hypnosis 
Andes 
Lows . 47(. 09) . 47(. 12) . 
44(. 17) 
Highs . 40(. 37) . 45(. 15) . 45(. 20) 
Size 
Lows . 09(l. 29) . 25(l. 25) -. 13(. 83) 
Highs -. 09(l. 12) -. 25(l. 07) . 13(l. 55) 
Note 1: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses 
Note 2: Values for the angle dimension correspond to the transformed data; as transformation involved 
reflection, relatively small scores refer to a relatively large interference effect. 
0.05 (two-tailed), indicating that there is a significantly higher proportion of similarity- 
based responses in triad classification for triangles in the baseline condition than in the 
other two conditions (see appendix XVI, summary table 3G); such a finding runs in the 
opposite direction to that predicted. The contrast between the relaxation and hypnosis 
conditions was not significant (see appendix XVI, summary table 3H). 
Filtering task: Table 8.3 presents, descriptive statistics for the filtering task. Inspection of 
table 8.3 indicates that there are no apparent differences between any of the conditions or 
the high and low suggestible groups for either of the dimensions. Two 2x3 mixed 
model -analyses of variance with susceptibility group as a 
between subjects factor and 
condition as a within subjects factor were performed on the interference data for the 
angle and size dimensions. A per-comparison alpha value of 0.05 was again adopted. For 
ANOVA involving the angle dimension transformed data was used. None of the main 
effects or interactions were significant for either of the dimensions, confirming that no 
differences in the interference effect exist between any of the conditions or groups (see 
appendix XVI, summary tables 31 and 3J). 
8.4 Discussion 
No significant predicted differences between any of the conditions or groups on any of 
the tasks employed in this study was found, leading to the rejection of both experimental 
hypotheses. The findings obtained in this study therefore contradict the predictions laid 
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out by the model of hypnosis presented in chapter three: there is no evidence to suggest 
that hypnosis is characterised by an increased low level processing preference as 
indicated by a similar proportion of similarity based responses for all triad classification 
stimuli across baseline, relaxation and hypnosis conditions for all types of stimuli used. 
Similarly, there is no evidence to suggest that hypnosis is characterised by a relative 
inability to engage in higher level processing, as indicated by a similar degree of filtering 
interference for both size and angle dimensions in the three conditions. This latter 
finding also contradicts dissociated control theory which makes a similar prediction to 
the present theory regarding higher level inhibition during hypnosis. Furthermore, both 
findings contradict the assertion made by the ego-psychological and 
neuropsychophysiological. theories that hypnosis involves a shift towards holistic forms 
of cognition, at least by the definition of holistic processing adopted in the literature 
concerning perceptual integrality and separability. The absence of a significant main 
effect for suggestibility also contradicts the earlier finding (see chapter six) indicating a 
relationship between suggestibility and triad classification (square stimuli). While the 
absence of such an effect is disappointing, it may be the product of the relatively liberal 
suggestibility criteria used for subject selection in this study. 
In the case where there was a significant difference between conditions, that for triad 
classification with the triangle stimuli, there was a significantly greater proportion of 
similarity based responses in the baseline condition compared to the relaxation and 
hypnosis conditions, a difference which is in the opposite direction to that anticipated. 
Moreover, for these stimuli there was no difference between the hypnosis and relaxation 
conditions, despite there being a significant difference in self-reported relaxation 
between the two. It has previously been shown that instructing individuals to adopt a 
relaxed response set increases the proportion of similarity-based responses in triad 
classification (see Foard & Kemler Nelson, 1984). However, this result appears to 
suggest that the converse is true: asking someone to relax actually decreases the 
proportion of similarity-based responses in triad classification using triangle stimuli. 
There is no immediately obvious interpretation for this finding, although it is possible 
that subjects in the relaxation and control condition are simply more focused on the task 
due to their increased relaxation and display less similarity-based responses for this 
reason. Such an explanation raises the possibility that a distinction needs to be drawn 
between simple physical relaxation and a relaxed response set. 
One possible explanation for why no differences were found between any of the 
conditions on the filtering task specifically might be the procedural differences between 
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the use of the task in this study compared to previous research. J. D. Smith and Baron 
(198 1), whose research provided the basis for the filtering methodology employed in this 
study, employed six trials each for the interference and control sets on each dimension, 
whereas this study employed only five. The use of only five filtering trials was decided 
upon following pilot research which indicated that subjects very quickly lose motivation 
on this tedious task, often after only four or five trials in total. Such a loss of motivation 
was regarded as counter-intuitive to the rationale behind the task (in that it could 
differentially affect performance on the control and interference sets which vary in 
difficulty) and would consequently distort any findings obtained on it; accordingly, 
fewer trials were used than in previous research. However, it is possible that reducing the 
number of filtering trials in this study prevented subjects from reaching asymptotic 
performance on the task which is essential if valid interference effects are to be observed 
(Kemler Nelson, 1996, personal communication). If this task is to be used again in future 
research it is essential that this potential problem is countered by maximising the number 
of trials used, regardless of how unmotivated subjects become whilst completing it. It is 
suggested that any motivational problems arising through the use of this task might be 
minimised by presenting it as computer-based task, which would reduce the amount of 
time between trials and have the added benefit of reducing measurement error resulting 
from human-based timing. 
Finally, some mention should be made of the relaxation control condition used in this 
study. A relaxation control was iticluded here to enable inferences to be drawn about the 
effect of hypnosis on processing ability and preference independent of the effects of 
relaxation and imaging brought about by the hypnotic induction. The validity of such a 
control condition rests on its ability to induce the same level of relaxation as the hypnotic 
induction without actually engendering the belief in subjects that hypnosis is being used. 
However, a comparison of the post-tape relaxation scores in the hypnosis and relaxation 
conditions indicated that equivalent levels of self-reported relaxation had not been 
achieved in the two conditions, with the hypnotic induction bringing about significantly 
greater levels of relaxation than its non-hypnotic counter-part. Howevers as none of the 
predicted findings were obtained the importance of controlling relaxation across 
74 conditions is less pressing . While such a difference in self-reported relaxation 
somewhat undermines the usefulness of the relaxation control condition used here, 
74 Unless, of course, one believes that these non-significant differences are the product of relaxation 
obscuring the effect that hypnosis would otherwise have had on the study measures. As there are no 
theoretical grounds on which to base such a view it is rejected here. 
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results nevertheless revealed that the control was successful in bringing about 
significantly greater levels of self-reported relaxation, with the difference in relaxation 
between hypnotic and non-hypnotic conditions actually being relatively small. Although 
it is conceivable that a more formal relaxation procedure would be more successful in 
inducing comparable levels of relaxation to an hypnotic condition than the control used 
here, if to do this requires instilling the belief that hypnosis is being used, then the 
relaxation control used here, although not perfect, still seems the most suitable 
alternative. 
In summary, the findings of this study contradict the prediction made by the model of 
suggestion and hypnosis outlined in chapter three: no evidence was found indicating that 
hypnosis is associated with an increased preference for low level processing or a high 
level processing inhibition. It is nevertheless conceivable that the non-significant 
findings obtained in this study are due to the use of tasks that are insensitive to the 
cognitive changes occurring as the result of an hypnotic induction. In the next chapter, a 
second study designed to assess the prediction that hypnosis is associated with high level 
processing inhibition will be described. In that study, high level processing ability will be 
assessed using a different methodology that provides an alternative approach to the 
research questions under examination here. 
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CHAPTER 9: Empirical study 4 
A comparison of critical thinking ability in relaxation and hypnosis conditions. 
9.1 Introduction 
In chapter eight, a study designed to assess the related hypotheses that hypnosis 
involves a shift towards low level cognitive processing and a high level processing 
inhibition was described. In this chapter, a second study designed to assess the latter of 
these hypotheses (i. e. that concerning high level inhibition) from a different perspective 
will be presented, in a bid to further understand the relationship between hypnosis and 
cognitive processing. The use of alternative methodologies to assess this hypothesis is 
important given the evidence reported in chapter seven indicating that the relationship 
between different measures of putative processing predisposition is not as high or 
pervasive as predicted by the model presented in chapter two. In addition, the application 
of alternative methodologies in this context extends the research base addressing the 
model presented here, and provides a more rigorous examination of the high level 
inhibition hypothesis. 
According to the model of hypnosis presented in chapter three, one of the mechanisms 
underlying the shift towards low level processing regarded as responsible for the more 
efficient operation of suggestion during hypnosis might be the reduction in critical 
thought assumed to be brought about by a state of intense absorption. The notion that 
hypnosis brings about a reduction in critical thought is central to the ego-psychological 
and neuropsychophysiological theories of hypnosis, and is implicitly adopted by the 
neodissociation and dissociated control theories in their assertion that hypnosis involves 
the inhibition of higher level cognitive processes. Moreover, the notion is central to the 
concept of absorption (see Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), which has been embraced by 
accounts of hypnosis from across the theoretical spectrum, both state and non-state alike. 
As such, it represents one of the most enduring elements of hypnosis theory to date. 
The idea that hypnosis involves a reduction in critical thought which is central to the 
production and maintenance of hypnotic behaviours stems, to a considerable extent, from 
the research of Martin Ome into the concept of so-called 'trance logic', or the tolerance 
for logical incongruities apparently displayed by susceptible subjects during hypnosis. In 
the original demonstration of the phenomenon, a susceptible subject given a suggestion 
for the visual hallucination of an experimental confederate expresses surprise, but no 
obvious concern, when the confederate steps into view and they see both real and 
hallucinated individuals simultaneously, the so-called double-hallucination effect. The 
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fact that the hypnotic individual expresses no concern at the clearly logically 
incongruous dual-presence of the experimental confcdcrate seems to suggest that the 
subject is thinking in an unusual fashion, or displaying 'trance logic'. Having 
demonstrated that this trance logic effect in visual hallucination is not shown by subjects 
instructed to simulate hypnosis, Orne (1959) concluded that the suspension of logical 
reality is part of the essence of hypnosis, and might be responsible for the seemingly 
unusual behaviours displayed therein. 
However, as was discussed in chapter one, the evidence for the trance logic effect has 
been widely criticised on both methodological and conceptual grounds, and alternative 
explanations which do not rely on the trance logic concept have been advanced for these 
findings. Furthermore, regardless of one's interpretation of the trance logic data, the 
methods that have been used to assess the validity of the concept have only examined the 
nature and incidence of apparently logically incongruous behaviour; such studies cannot 
therefore provide any information regarding whether or not the susceptible individual is 
actually capable of engaging in critical thought during hypnosis. If the temporary 
suspension of critical thought is one of the mechanisms underlying the greater 
suggestibility of hypnotic subjects as suggested by many hypnosis theorists, then one 
would expect such subjects to display not only logically incongruous behaviour but also 
a relative inability to perform logical tasks during hypnosis. However, a rigorous search 
of the literature using currently available software reveals that no direct test of this 
notion has been published, whith, given the ubiquity of the trance logic notion, is 
perhaps somewhat surprising. In a bid to remedy this situation, the study reported in this 
chapter provides such a test. 
One of the commonest ways by which logical or critical thought is assessed is through 
the use of syllogistic reasoning tasks, such as that employed in study two. Accordingly, 
in this study syllogistic reasoning performance in hypnotic and non-hypnotic conditions 
was compared for both high and low suggestible individuals. Whereas in study two, only 
total score was taken as a measure on the syllogistic reasoning task, in this study the 
amount of time taken to complete the task was also measured. As was discussed in 
chapter six, not including such a measure was an important oversight in study two that 
may have reduced any potential correlation between suggestibility and syllogistic 
reasoning performance. The inclusion of a time variable acknowledges the fact that an 
individual who correctly answers as many syllogisms as another, when the latter takes 
twice the time to complete them, has actually performed better on the task. In order to 
reduce the impact of impulsive responding which is likely to distort true reasoning 
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ability, subjects were told that they could take as long as they like to complete tile 
questions. 
Unlike study three, only two conditions were included in this experiment, one hypnotic 
and the other a relaxation control. The decision to include only two conditions was made 
entirely on practical grounds concerning the increased amount of testing time that the 
inclusion of a third condition would involve. This decision was considered justified 
given the inherent time constraints placed upon the current undertaking and tile relatively 
high probability that an independent design would need to be used in this study (see 
section 9.2.1): it was anticipated that not enough subjects of appropriate suggestibility 
levels could be obtained to provide sufficiently large group sizes if a thrce-condition 
independent design was required. As a relaxation condition provides a more appropriate 
control than a baseline condition, the former was chosen for inclusion in preference to 
the latter. Due to the problems with the syllogistic reasoning task used in study two, the 
construction of a new task was required here and comparisons between that study and 
this would therefore be inappropriate. However, as scores obtained on the syllogistic 
reasoning measure in study two provide some information about subjects' baseline 
reasoning performance, they were used here as covariates in analysis. 
If, as the model of hypnosis offered in chapter three predicts, hypnosis involves a 
temporary suspension in the ability to think critically, then one would expect syllogistic 
reasoning performance during hypnosis to be significantly worse than in a non-hypnotic 
control condition, assuming equivalent levels of relaxation for the two. Moreover, if 
highly suggestible individuals respond to more suggestions than low suggestibles in the 
hypnotic situation because only they experience a reduction in critical thought during 
hypnosis, then one would expect a significant interaction between suggestibility group 
and condition; accordingly, one would predict that high suggestibles will show worse 
syllogistic reasoning performance in an hypnotic compared to a non-hypnotic condition, 
while low suggestibles will show no reasoning performance differences between the 
conditions. Unlike in study three, if the levels of self-rcportcd relaxation in the hypnotic 
and non-hypnotic conditions arc not equivalent in the present investigation, the 
independent design used here renders relaxation suitable for use as a covariate in 
ANCOVA. 
As was discussed in chapter six, reasoning performance has been shown to be affected 
by the degree of positive emotion felt by the individual; as hypnosis and relaxation 
conditions could conceivably differ in terms of self-rcported happiness levels it is 
essential that variation between groups on this factor is assessed and used as a covariatc 
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in subsequent analyses if significantly different between groups. Accordingly, the self- 
report measure of happiness used in study two were also included in this study. 
One further measure was also be included in this study. In study three, one of the 
reasons behind the selection of the tasks used was that they were relatively opaque in 
terms of what they were testing and how, and therefore what patterns of responding 
might be expected or desired by the experimenter. However, this is not the case for 
syllogistic reasoning tasks which are entirely transparent both in terms of what they are 
measuring and the way that they do it. Should the predictions made here be upheld and a 
significantly inferior reasoning performance be found for the highly suggestible subjects 
in the hypnosis condition, it might be argued that such a result is simply the product of 
subject expectations concerning the nature of hypnosis. In other words, subjects may 
believe that an inability to think critically is characteristic of hypnosis and perform 
accordingly, either through conscious compliance with the experimenters desires or via 
the automatic expectancy mechanisms described in chapter three. In order to assess 
whether any differences in reasoning performance between conditions are the product of 
such expectations or are an inherent element of hypnosis itself, some measure of 
subjects' expectations concerning the relationship between hypnosis and critical thought 
is therefore required. Accordingly, a revised version of the McConkey and Jupp (1985- 
86) Opinions About Hypnosis Survey including additional questions concerning this 
issue was used here. The questions concerning hypnosis and critical thought were 
embedded in the McConkey and Jupp survey rather than presented alone in order to 
deflect subjects' attention away from the purposes of including such items, which could 
conceivably have an impact on their subsequent reasoning performance during hypnosis 
or relaxation. 
9.2 Method 
9.2.1 Prelimina[y design considerations 
Decisions about the design of the present study are considerably more complex than 
those concerning study three presented in chapter eight. As in that case, the present 
prediction stated that individuals would be worse in an hypnotic compared to a non- 
hypnotic condition, thus making possible the use of a within-subjects design. In the 
previous study, none of the tasks used had a history of showing practice effects in 
multiple testing, rendering them suitable for use with a within-subjects factor. In the case 
of syllogistic reasoning tasks, however, practice effects are common (see Johnson-Laird 
& Steedman, 1978) as the individual tends to work out over time the rules that are 
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required for their successful completion. Clearly, such practice effects are likely to be 
even more pronounced when the same measure is given on more than one occasion, as 
the individual has the benefit of memory as well as reasoning rules to complete the task. 
As the superior power and control of a within-subjects factor over the independent 
alternatives makes it the design of choice where possible, it was decided that every effort 
should be made here to secure its appropriate use. Accordingly, two further equivalent 
syllogistic reasoning tasks comparable to that used in study two were constructed. If in 
pilot work no significant practice effects are obtained on the two alternate forms of the 
syllogistic reasoning task given in counter-balanced order, and a sufficient level of 
alternate-forms reliability is attained, then their suitability for use with a within-subjects 
factor would be ensured. If, however, significant practice effects were obtained then the 
pilot data would nevertheless provide information concerning the internal reliabilities of 
the two forms, enabling the selection of the most reliable for use in an independent 
design. 
Unlike in study two, on this occasion the construction of the syllogistic reasoning tasks 
closely followed the recommendations of Johnson-Laird and Steedman (1978) 
concerning the possible role of subject beliefs and expectations about the content of the 
syllogistic premises. Thus, the plausibility of the premises was maximised by using an 
occupation to denote one term and two different hobbies or interests to denote the other 
two terms. Fifteen occupations and thirty hobbies/interests were selected and one from 
the first category and two froin'the second category were randomly selected for each 
syllogism. This was done for each reasoning task, with the constraint that no 
combination of occupations and interests could be the same on both tasks. The form of 
the fifteen syllogisms selected was the same as those used in the syllogistic reasoning 
task from study 2 (see section 6.2.2); the order of the syllogisms was randomised for 
each form of the task. Thus, the two forms are identical in terms of their 'deep' structure 
i. e. the number and form of syllogisms involved. However, they differ markedly in their 
'surface' structure i. e. the terms used in the premises and the order of the syllogisms. 
In response to the criticism of the syllogistic reasoning task used in study two, for each 
form subjects were presented with the instructions provided in appendix XV, which were 
designed to make the requirements of the task clearer, and further isolate the syllogisms 
from subject attitudes and expectations (see Johnson-Laird & Steedman, 1978). The 
syllogistic reasoning task and its instructions were placed together in an A4 response 
booklet which contained spaces for subjects' answers (see appendices XIII, XIV and 
XV). 
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Table 9.1: Means and standard deviations for fonns A and B of syllogistic reasoning task 
independent of test order. 
N=26 Form A Fonn B 
Mean reasoning score 9.69(2.43) 10.23 (2.05) 
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses 
Table 9.2: Means and standard deviations for first and second syllogistic reasoning 
testing occasions independent of form. 
N=26 First test Second test 
Mean reasoning score 9.54(2.30) 10.38 (2.14) 
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses 
The two forms of the syllogistic reasoning task were presented to twcnty-six graduate 
and undergraduate students in a counter-balanced order, with half of the subjects 
receiving fonn A first and half fonn B first. The two fonns were given in equivalent 
testing conditions but on separate days. Descriptive statistics for the two tasks are 
presented in table 9.1 and table 9.2; in line with the purposes of this study, results have 
been broken down both into individual forms (table 9.1) and testing occasions (table 
9.2). 
Examination of table 9.1 reveals that form A is slightly harder than form B. However, a 
one-way repeated measures analysis of covariance taking test order as a covariate 
revealed that this discrepancy is not significantly different to zero. Examination of table 
9.2 reveals that sYllogistic reasoning perfonnance is greater on the second testing 
occasion than on the first, suggesting that a practice effect is in operation. A paired 
samples Mest indicated that the difference between the two testing occasions was 
significantly different from zero, t(25) = 2.12, p -: 5 
0.05, confirming the presence of a 
practice effect in reasoning perfonnance. As such, the use of a within-subjects factor in 
the current study was proscribed and an independent design was therefore be adopted. 
The internal consistency of the two forms was calculated; form A yielded a Cronbach's 
alpha of . 6297, while form B yielded a Cronbach's alpha of . 5279. As form A clearly 
possesses superior internal consistency to form B, it was selected for use in this study. 
9.2.2 Design 
A2x2 independent quasi-experimental design with matching on hypnotic 
susceptibility between subjects in the two conditions was used here. The two 
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independent variables were suggestibility group (high vs. low) and condition (relaxation 
vs. hypnosis). There were two dependent variables in this study, number correct on the 
syllogistic reasoning task and the time taken to complete it. It is hypothcsised that highly 
suggestible subjects will show significantly greater syllogistic reasoning performance in 
the relaxation compared to the hypnosis condition, while low suggcstibles will not show 
such a significant difference. Analysis was by 2x2 multivariate analysis of covariance 
taking syllogistic reasoning performance scores obtained in study 2 as a covariate. The 
use of MANOVA allows an analysis of the differences between the conditions in terms 
of overall syllogistic reasoning performance (i. e. a combination of both dependent 
variables) as well as differences between time and number correct independently. Should 
there be a significant difference between the relaxation and control conditions in self- 
reported relaxation, this will be taken as a further covariatc. 
9.2.3 Subjects 
Subjects were 40 graduate and undergraduate students from University College 
London, of which 8 were male and 32 were female. All subjects were volunteers who 
were contacted following their participation in empirical study 2. Mean age was 24.45 
years (s. d. 4.87 years; range 18-43 years). 20 of the subjects had scored between zero and 
five on the HGSHS: A (average HGSHS score of 2.85; s. d. 1.63) and had all failed the 
amnesia item; together they formed the superordinate low suggestibility group. These 20 
subjects were then pseudo-randofnly divided into two groups of 10 subjects such that the 
average suggestibility score in each group was roughly the same. One group, consisting 
of 3 males and 7 females with an average age of 25.3 years (s. d. 3.68 years) and HGSHS 
score of 2.9 (s. d. 1.45) was then randomly assigned to the hypnosis condition. The other 
group, consisting of 2 males and 8 females with an average age of 27.6 years (s. d. 6.74 
years) and an average HGSHS score of 2.8 (s. d. 1.87) was assigned to the relaxation 
condition. 20 of the subjects had scored between eight and 12 on the HGSHS: A, with an 
average HGSHS score of 9.85 (s. d. = 1.18); together they formed the superordinate high 
suggestibility group. These 20 subjects were then pseudo-randomly divided into groups 
of 10 subjects on the basis of suggestibility score such that the average suggestibility 
score in each group was roughly the same. One group, consisting of 1 male and 9 
females with an average age of 24.0 years (s. d. 3.8 years) and an average HGSHS score 
of 9.9 (s. d. 1.32) was then randomly assigned to the hypnosis condition. The other group, 
consisting of 2 males and 8 females with an average age of 20.9 years (s. d. 1.79 years) 
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and HGSHS score of 9.8 (s. d. 1.14) was assigned to the relaxation condition. Each 
subject received E5 for taking part. Informed consent was obtained from all subjects. 
9.2.4 Materials 
McConkey and Jupp (1986) Opinions About Hypnosis Survey: A revised version of the 
McConkey and Jupp (1986) opinions about hypnosis survey was constructed. The 
McConkey and Jupp (1985-86) survey comprises twenty-five statements corresponding 
to commonly held beliefs about hypnosis which subjects must rate their agreement with 
on a four point Likert scale ranging from I (agree strongly) to 4 (disagree strongly). Four 
additional items concerning the relationship between hypnosis and critical thinking were 
constructed and added to the scale. The four additional items were: (1) 'during hypnosis 
responsive subjects are able to think more clearly than when not hypnotised'; (2) During 
hypnosis responsive subjects seem to understand things better; (3) During hypnosis 
responsive subjects tend to be more irrational than when not hypnotised; and (4) 
Hypnosis makes responsive subjects less able to think properly than when not 
hypnotised. Items one and two refer to a positive relationship between hypnosis and 
thinking (i. e. hypnosis makes thinking easier or better) while items three and four refer to 
a negative relationship between hypnosis and thinking (i. e. hypnosis makes thinking 
more difficult or worse). Both positive and negative items were included in order to 
minimise the possible influence of response bias, and will be treated as separate because 
agreement with the positive items does not necessarily imply disagreement with the 
negative items and vice versa. 
The order of the twenty-five original and four additional items was randomised with 
the constraint that the additional items could be no less than two items apart. Questions 
were then put together in an A4 response booklet. In order to maximise the variance in 
subjects' responses to the questionnaire, the original four-point Likert scale was changed 
to a five point scale, with the additional point corresponding to a 'neither agree nor 
disagree' option that was placed in the middle of the scale. Inclusion of this point has the 
additional advantage of reducing the likelihood of subjects missing items out because 
they feel neither agreement nor disagreement with them, a problem apparently 
responsible for some of the missing data in study one. 
(i) For details of the syllogistic reasoning task used here see section 9.2.1. A stopwatch 
was used to time subjects' completion of the task. 
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(ii) The hypnotic induction and relaxation control tape used in study 3 were also 
employed here. See section 8.2.3 and appendices IX and XI for details. 
(iii) As in study 3, self-report measures of relaxation and happiness were used here as a 
manipulation check, and as a potential covariate should the conditions not be comparable 
in terms of self-reported relaxation and happiness. See section 6.2.2 and appendix VIII 
for details. 
(iv) Syllogistic reasoning scores obtained in study 2 represent a rough baseline measure 
of reasoning ability for the subjects used in this study, and were used as a covariate here. 
See section 6.2.2 for details of this task. 
9.2.5 Procedure 
Subjects were contacted following their participation in study 2 and asked if they 
wished to participate in a further study investigating the relationship between hypnosis 
and thinking style. They were told that they would participate in a single session lasting 
approximately fifty minutes, consisting of either an hypnotic induction or a relaxation 
tape (which would be randomly determined on the day of testing) followed by one 
simple task. Subjects were not told which condition they would be participating in prior 
to the testing session despite the fact the information was actually known at this time; 
this was done in order to minimise the potential role of expectancies concerning the 
nature of the session. Upon arrival at the experimental situation, subjects were informed 
which condition they would be participating in and what it would entail, after which 
informed consent was obtained. Subjects then completed the attitudes to hypnosis 
questionnaire and then the relaxation measure; after this, the main part of the experiment 
began. At this point, subjects in the hypnosis condition listened to the hypnotic induction 
tape (see appendix IX) preceded by the instructions'in appendix X, which were read 
verbatim by the experimenter. Subjects in the relaxation condition listened to the 
relaxation tape (appendix XI) preceded by the instructions in appendix XIL Following 
the tape subjects then completed the post-tape relaxation and happiness measures and 
were handed the syllogistic reasoning response booklet. They were asked to read through 
the instructions at the start of the booklet and begin the task when they were ready. 
Subjects were informed that they had as long as they liked to complete the task but that 
they would still be timed to get an idea of how long they took; they were told not to feel 
as though they were working against the clock. At this point the experimenter started the 
210 
stopwatch. After completion of the task, the stopwatch was stopped and the completion 
time noted. At this point, subjects in the hypnosis condition were played the de-induction 
routine; at the end of the experiment subjects were thanked for their participation and 
paid ES. 
9.3 Results 
9.3.1 Data screening and prelimina1y analyses 
Prior to analysis the data-set was screened for missing values. Three missing values 
were identified, one on the syllogistic reasoning (time) variable for a subject in the low 
susceptible relaxation group, and two on the pre-tape relaxation measure, one for a high 
susceptible hypnosis subject and one for a low susceptible hypnosis subject. The missing 
value for timing was due to a stopwatch failure, while experimenter error was 
responsible for the two relaxation missing values. In each case the missing values were 
replaced by the group mean. 
The data-set was then screened for univariate and multivariate outliers and violations 
of the assumptions of analysis. All of the variables showed normal distributions and no 
outliers were identified. 
Prior to the main body of the analysis, the pre- and post- tape relaxation scores in the 
hypnosis and relaxation conditions were compared to assess the impact of the 
interventions on self-reported levels of relaxation. Table 9.3 presents descriptive 
statistics for pre- and post-tape self-reported relaxation in the relaxation and hypnosis 
conditions; figurcs 9.1 and 9.2 provide a graphic representation of this data for the 
relaxation and hypnosis conditions respectively. Figure 9.3 presents a comparison of 
self-reported relaxation levels for the hypnosis and relaxation conditions and the high 
and low suggestible groups. Inspection of table 9.3 and figure 9.1 indicates that both high 
and lový suggestible groups show comparably high levels of self-reported relaxation prior 
to the tape in the relaxation condition, and both groups show large increases in relaxation 
post-tape. However, it is apparent that the high suggestibility group show a larger 
increase in self-reported relaxation over time compared to the low suggestibility group. 
A2x2 mixed model analysis of variance with one between (suggestibility group: high 
and low) and one within subjects variable (time: pre-tape and post-tape) was performed 
on the self-reported relaxation scores for the relaxation condition. A significant main 
effect for time was found, F(1,18) = 58.04, p :50.0005 (one tailed), indicating that self- 
reported relaxation is significantly higher following the relaxation tape compared to 
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Table 9.3: Mean pre- and post-tape relaxation scores for high and low suggestible 





Low suggestibles (n = 10) 96.10 (16.59) 116.00 (15.90) 
High suggestibles (n = 10) 88.50 (23.12) 123.20 (11.98) 
Hypnosis 
Low suggestibles (n = 10) 82.80 (19.56) 110.80 (19.56) 
High suggestibles (n = 10) 94.60 (12.26) 118.50 (17.48) 
Note: Standard deviations arc shown in parcnthescs. 
Figure 9.1: Mean pre- ajid post-tape relaxation scores for 













Figure 9.2: Mean pre- and post-tape relaxation scores for 
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before the tape, as predicted; the main effect for suggestibility group was not significant 
(see appendix XVI, summary table 4A). The group x time interaction was also 
significant, F(1,18) = 4.26, p:! ý 0.05 (one tailed), confirming the observation that the high 
suggestible group show a significantly greater increase in relaxation following the 
relaxation tape than the low suggestibles. For all ANOVA summary tables, see appendix 
XVI. 
Inspection of table 9.1 and figure 9.2 indicates that the highly suggestible group 
reported greater levels of relaxation than the low suggestible group in the hypnosis 
condition both pre- and post-tape; both groups showed large and comparable increases in 
self-reported relaxation post-tape. 
A second 2x 1mixed model ANOVA with suggestibility group as a between subjects 
variable and time as a within subjects variable was performed on the relaxation scores 
for the hypnosis condition. A significant main effect for time was found, F(1,18) = 76.69, 
p :50.0005 (one tailed), indicating that self-reported relaxation is significantly higher 
following the hypnosis tape compared to before the tape, as predicted. Neither the main 
effect for suggestibility group nor the group-time interaction was significant (see 
appendix XVI, summary table 4B). 
It can therefore be concluded that levels of self-reported relaxation for high and low 
suggestible subjects were significantly higher following both hypnosis and relaxation 
tapes as predicted. 
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Figure 9.3: Mean post-tape relaxation in hypnosis and 
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Having ascertained that both hypnosis and relaxation tapes bring about significant 
increases in self-reported relaxation for both groups of subjects, we must now address 
the question of whether or not the overall levels of relaxation in the hypnosis and 
relaxation conditions are comparable as intended. Figure 9.3 shows the comparison 
between the post-tape relaxation scores in the relaxation and hypnosis conditions for 
both high and low suggestible subjects. Inspection of table 9.3 and figure 9.3 indicates 
that levels of self-reported relaxation are roughly comparable between hypnosis and 
relaxation conditions and high and low suggestibles. A2x2 factorial ANOVA (one- 
tailed 75) with condition and group as between subjects variables was performed on the 
post-tape self-reported relaxation data. Neither of the main effects or the group x 
condition interaction was significant, confirming that the relaxation and hypnosis 
conditions are comparable in terms of self-reported relaxation (see appendix XVI, 
summary table 4C). The similarity between the two conditions in terms of self-reported 
relaxation supports the validity of the relaxation control condition, contrary to the 
findings of study 3. Accordingly, self-reported relaxation will not be used as a covariate 
in any analyses performed here. 
75 One-tailed analysis was used here following the finding in study 3 that hypnosis produced greater levels 
of relaxation than the relaxation control condition. 
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Table 9A Mean post-tape self-reported happiness for high and low suggestible subjects 




Low 95.0 (20.07) 94.30 (26.34) 
High 107.50 (17.93) 98.80 (24.28) 
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses 
Having confirmed that the relaxation and hypnosis conditions are comparable in terms of 
self-reported relaxation, the question of whether this is also the case for self-reported 
happiness must also be addressed. Table 9.4 shows descriptive statistics for the post-tape 
happiness scores of the high and low suggestible groups in the hypnosis and relaxation 
conditions. Figure 9.4 shows the comparison between the post-tape happiness scores in 
the relaxation and hypnosis conditions for both high and low suggestible subjects. 
Inspection of table 9.4 and figure 9.4 indicates that high and low suggestible subjects are 
broadly comparable in terms of self-reported happiness for both relaxation and hypnosis 
conditions, although the high suggestible group reported generally larger levels of 
happiness than the lows, particularly in the relaxation condition. A2x2 factorial 
ANOVA (two-tailed) with group and condition as between subjects variables revealed no 
significant main effects or interaction, suggesting that the groups and conditions are 
comparable in terms of self-reported happiness (see appendix XVI, summary table 4D); 
it will not, therefore, be used as a covariate here. 
Figure 9A Mean post-tape happiness for high and low suggestibles 
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Table 9.5: Mean questionnaire response to positive items for high and low suggcstibles 




Low 3.05(. 50) 3.45(. 44) 
High 3.10(. 52) 2.60(. 84) 
Overall 3.08(. 49) 3.03(. 92) 
Note : Standard deviations are shown in parentheses 
Before addressing whether the hypnosis and relaxation condition differ in terms of 
syllogistic reasoning performance, an examination of the questionnaire items concerning 
the relationship between hypnosis and critical thinking must also be made. Table 9.5 
presents descriptive statistics for the positive (i. e. hypnosis is associated with superior 
thought) questionnaire items for the high and low suggestible subjects in the relaxation 
and hypnosis conditionS76 . Table 9.6 presents descriptive statistics for the negative (i. e. 
hypnosis is associated with inferior thought) questionnaire items for the high and low 
suggestible subjects in the relaxation and hypnosis conditions. Inspection of table 9.5 
indicates that both high and low suggestible subjects in the relaxation condition and the 
low suggestible subjects in the hypnosis condition neither agree nor disagree with the 
positive questionnaire items concerning the relationship between hypnosis and thinking. 
Highly suggestible subjects in the hypnosis condition do, however, show a tendency to 
agree with the positive questionnaire items, suggesting that these subjects believe that 
hypnosis makes thinking easier or better. However, a2x2 factorial ANOVA (two- 
tailed) on the positive item responses with condition and group as between subjects 
variables showed no significant main effects or interaction (see appendix XVI, summary 
table 4E). 
Inspection of table 9.6 indicates that subjects in all groups neither agree nor disagree 
with the negative questionnaire items concerning the relationship between hypnosis and 
thinking, suggesting that these subjects do not think that hypnosis makes thinking any 
worse or more difficult. A2x2 factorial ANOVA (two-tailed) on the negative item 
responses with condition and group as between subjects variables showed no significant 
76 A high score represents strong average disagreement with the questionnaire items while a low score 
represents strong agreement. A score of 3 represents neither agreement nor disagreement. 
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Table 9.6: Mean questionnaire response to negative items for high and low suggestibles 




Low 3.10(. 81) 3.45(. 44) 
High 3.55(. 50) 3.40(. 70) 
Overall 3.33(. 69) 3.43(. 57) 
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses 
main effects or interaction, confirming this observation (see appendix XVI, summary 
table 4F). Thus, should a significant difference in syllogistic reasoning performance 
between the relaxation and conditions be found as predicted, these findings indicate that 
such a difference would not be attributable to subject expectations concerning what 
hypnosis is likely to do to their thinking ability. 
9.3.2 Main analyses 
With all preliminary analyses complete the main body of the analysis can now proceed. 
Table 9.7 presents descriptive statistics for the syllogistic reasoning variables for each of 
the groups and conditions; baseline syllogistic reasoning scores are included for 
illustrative purposes. 
Examination of table 9.7 reveals that, for both high and low suggestibility groups, 
syllogistic reasoning performance (in terms of total score on the task) appears to be 
better in the hypnosis condition compared to the relaxation condition, contrary to 
expectation. However, the importance of including baseline syllogistic reasoning scores 
as a covariate here is highlighted by the pattern of syllogistic reasoning performance at 
baseline, as shown above: the two lowest and highest scoring groups at baseline are also 
the two lowest and highest scoring groups in the present study respectively. Thus, the 
apparent differences between the conditions and suggestibility groups appear to be 
accounted for by differences in baseline reasoning performance. Further examination of 
table 9.7 indicates that there is no systematic relationship between syllogistic reasoning 
score and the time taken to complete the task; however, ignoring total reasoning score, it 
appears that there is an interaction between condition and suggestibility group for the 
time variable: the high suggestible group in the hypnosis condition complete the 
reasoning task considerably quicker than those in the relaxation condition, with the 
converse being true for the low suggestibles. It is possible, however, that taking both 
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Table 9.7: Mean baseline reasoning scores and experimental syllogistic reasoning scores 
and times for high and low suggestibles in relaxation and hypnosis conditions. 
VARIABLE 
SUGGESTIBILITY/CONDITION 
Low suggestibles High suggestibles 
Relaxation Hypnosis Relaxation Hypnosis 
Baseline 
syllogisms 9.80(3.52) 11.60 (1.96) 10.80 (0.92) 11.80 (1.99) 
Experimental 
Syllogisms 10.50 (1.90) 12.00 (1.89) 10.90 (1.20) 11.70 (1.83) 
(total score) 
Experimental 
syllogisms 674.40 (142.0) 598.60 (153.79) 536.90 (142.29) 623.70 (127.02) 
(total time/sec) 
Mote: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses 
reasoning time and total score in combination might yield differences between the 
conditions that are not apparent from inspection of table 9.7. The use of multivariate 
analysis of covariance allows this possibility, and the possibility that there are also 
univariate differences between the groups and conditions, to be assessed. Accordingly, a 
2x2 MANCOVA was performed on the two syllogistic reasoning dependent variables 
total score and completion time, with condition and suggestibility group as between 
subjects variables. Baseline syllogistic reasoning performance was, used as a covariate. 
Using Wilks' criterion, there were no significant main effects or interaction on the 
combined dependent variable. Moreover, there were no main effects or interactions on 
the individual independent variables, although the group x condition interaction for the 
time variable approached significance (p = . 088) in line with the observation made above 
(see appendix XVI, summary tables 4G and 4H). 
9.4 Discussion 
No significant differences between the hypnosis and relaxation control conditions were 
found on either of the syllogistic reasoning variables or their composite for both low and 
high suggestible subjects, leading to the rejection of the experimental hypothesis; clearly, 
hypnotic subjects do not perform any worse on critical reasoning tasks during hypnosis 
compared to a non-hypnotic condition, nor do they take any longer to complete such 
tasks. The results obtained here therefore appear to contradict the model outlined in 
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chapter three which postulates that the increased suggestibility typically observed in the 
hypnotic situation is, in part, a product of a reduction in critical thought following the 
hypnotic induction. 
The results of this study also contradict the neuropsychophysiological and cgo- 
psychological theories of hypnosis which suggest that hypnosis involves a reduction in 
reality testing and a shift from an analytical to a holistic style of thinking. It is apparent 
that if such a shift is occurring during hypnosis, any reduction in reality testing or 
analytical thinking brought about as a result is not sufficient to produce any significant 
decrement in performance on a task testing the ability to engage in logical reasoning. 
Moreover, these findings contradict dissociated control theory which suggests that 
hypnosis involves the inhibition of frontal attentional systems, which control not only 
novel behaviour but also critical thought. Furthermore, the findings obtained here also 
cast a degree of doubt on the validity of the trance logic concept: if hypnosis is 
associated with an unusual tolerance for logical incongruities then it is perhaps unlikely 
that a task which requires the correct application of logical principles would be 
performed no worse during hypnosis than outside it. However, one must consider the 
possibility that there is a dissociation between a tolerance for logical incongruities and an 
inability to think critically. Conceivably, it is possible to possess the former without in 
any way experiencing the latter and, as such, the findings obtained here need not 
necessarily provide a problem for the trance logic concept. 
Although the findings obtained here appear to contradict, amongst others, the current 
model of hypnosis, there is an alternative explanation for why subjects do not appear any 
worse at critical reasoning during hypnosis, which nevertheless preserves the notion that 
hypnosis involves a reduction in critical thought. As this explanation is relevant both to 
the findings of the present study and those described in chapter eight, discussion of it 
will be postponed until the next chapter. 
Two further findings from this study are worth mentioning. First, unlike in study three, 
the relaxation control condition produced comparable levels of relaxation to the hypnosis 
condition, confirming the validity of its use, at least in this study. Why studies three and 
four should differ in this regard is not immediately apparent, but may be an artefact of 
the use of a within subjects design in the previous study and an independent design here. 
In study three subjects were aware that they were taking part in two experimental 
conditions, one involving hypnosis and the other simple relaxation, with the difference 
between the two clearly apparent. If subjects believe that hypnosis produces greater 
levels of relaxation that a non-hypnotic relaxation condition this may be reflected in their 
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subsequent self-reports in the two conditions, with a positive bias towards hypnosis. In 
this study where an independent design was used, subjects have no comparison condition 
and consequently their self-reports of relaxation are not influenced by this belief. Such a 
possibility highlights the limitations of self-report measures such as those used here, and 
underlines the importance of using more objective measures where possible. 
Second, this study provides information concerning subjects' beliefs about the 
relationship between hypnosis and thinking. It is apparent that neither high nor low 
suggestibles believe that hypnosis is associated with an inability to think clearly or 
rationally, but at the same time do not believe that hypnosis makes thinking any clearer 
or easier. Such information could prove useful to other researchers wishing to address 
the relationship between hypnosis and thinking, with the obvious implication being that 
one need not worry about the possible effect of subjects' beliefs concerning hypnosis and 
thinking ability. 
The study described in this chapter is the final empirical assessment described in this 
thesis of the model of suggestion and hypnosis outlined in chapter three. In the final 
chapter, the main findings from these studies will be restated and their implications for 
the models outlined in chapters two and three will be discussed. 
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CHAPTER 10: Summary and general discussion 
10.1 Summary of cbapters 1-9 
In chapter one a review of the hypnosis literature revealed that, although existing 
theories could account for certain aspects of hypnosis research, no single theory could 
account for the entire range of findings concerning the phenomenon. Despite popular 
belief to the contrary, it was argued that the ego-psychological, dissociated control, 
sociocognitive and neuropsychophysiological theories of hypnosis arc not actually 
mutually incompatible, but rather examine diverse aspects of the same phenomenon and 
describe them in the terms most closely allied to the domain under scrutiny. It was 
suggested that a single integrative theory, encompassing the central elements of each of 
the theories and describing the way in which the different levels of description 
correspond to one another, would provide a parsimonious and powerful account of 
hypnosis with which to organise existing findings and generate new hypotheses. 
In chapter two it was argued that the most appropriate way of approaching the 
explanation of suggestion and hypnosis was to begin by providing a general account of 
the cognitive system which could then be applied to the particular phenomena of interest. 
It was further argued that such an approach would not only bring the explanation of 
hypnosis firmly within the remit of mainstream psychology, but also allow an 
exploration of what hypnosis research could contribute to the understanding of cognition 
and consciousness in general. In line with recent theorising within the field, it was 
suggested that the model of behavioural control provided by Norman and Shallice (1986) 
offers a useful starting point in the explanation of hypnotic behaviours, and experiences. 
However, it was claimed that, in its original form, the model is inadequate for such an 
undertaking, and that a number of important revisions and extensions were necessary 
before this would be the case. Specifically, it was suggested that a more detailed account 
of how the model relates to perception and consciousness was required, and that the way 
in which the model conceives of automaticity and control would need to be reappraised. 
In addition, it was argued that a more refined understanding of individual and situational 
differences in behavioural control would need to be provided. 
As such, a model of the cognitive system, based on that provided by Norman and 
Shallice (1986) but taking such suggestions into account, was proposed. According to 
this revised account, the cognitive system is comprised of a distributed set of processing 
sub-systems subject to control at two levels, higher and lower. Lower level control is 
based on the automatic activation of representations through the receipt of information 
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from the internal and external environment, a default mode of cognition which is largely 
responsible for the control of behaviour in routine situations. In contrast, higher level 
control is based on the operation of sophisticated algorithms which serve to direct the 
operation of lower level systems through the allocation of attention. Such processes are 
typically, though not exclusively, employed in response to novel situational demands 
which lower level systems are not equipped to deal with. Thus, in its overall description 
of the cognitive system, this revised account preserves the general structure of the 
Norman and Shallice model. However, the model departs from that of Norman and 
Shallice in its adoption of the memory-based view of automaticity proposed by Logan 
(1988). Rather than viewing automatic processes traditionally as those which do not 
acquire attention, effort or intention for their operation, Logan's theory regards automatic 
processes as those which are based upon the single-step activation of memory 
representations. By this view, the encoding and retrieval of information in associative 
memory is the obligatory consequence of attending to the stimulus environment, a 
process which subserves the rapid and efficient control of well-learrit behaviours. In 
addition to addressing the problems associated with the traditional view of automaticity, 
Logan's theory also provides a basis for relating the Norman and Shallice model to 
perception and consciousness. According to the model presented in chapter two, the 
process of automatic memory retrieval brought about via attention to the stimulus 
environment may be regarded as an inferential process which serves to provide an 
interpretation, based on previousý experience, of the situation and what it involves. This 
not only allows the appropriate management of action, but also provides the basis for 
consciousness. By this view, low level attentional systems, which exist at the interface 
between the external stimulus world and the internal representational world, select those 
representations which provide the best-fitting interpretation of the current state of affairs 
and use them to organise sensory information into a coherent perceptual whole. This 
inforination is passed onto higher level attentional systems where it becomes the 
individual's conscious percept. Information that is available to high level attentional 
systems is subject to the conscious manipulations and transformations performed by high 
level processing algorithms for the management of novel behaviour. 
Although this model is in broad agreement with that provided by Norman and Shallice 
(1986) in its assertion that low level, automatic processes are largely responsible for the 
control of routine behaviour while high level processes are typically employed in novel 
situations, unlike Norman and Shallice it does not draw a strict control dichotomy 
between routine and non-routine circumstances. Rather, it proposes that high and low 
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level control processes exist in a dynamic relationship with the majority of complex 
situations being managed by the joint operation of the two. By this view, situations are 
relatively routine or non-routine depending on the number of behavioural elements that 
are or can be controlled by low level processes alone. Moreover, the relative degree to 
which high and low level processes are used to control behaviour depends, to a 
considerable extent, on individual differences in preferred processing mode and their 
interaction with situational demands. 
In chapter three this cognitive model was then applied to the understanding of 
suggestion, hypnosis and hypnotic susceptibility. On the basis of evidence suggesting 
that hypnotic and non-hypnotic suggestion operate according to the same psychological 
mechanisms, it was argued that the most appropriate way of approaching the explanation 
of hypnotic suggestion was to begin by providing an account of suggestion per se, and 
then address the differences, if any, between the two. Accordingly, an account of non- 
hypnotic suggestion was then proposed. By this view, suggestion is regarded as the 
automatic activation of low level memory representations by cues (typically, although 
not necessarily, linguistic) from the internal and external environment, following 
monitoring by low level attentional systems. As such, suggestion is viewed as a normal 
and ubiquitous phenomenon that is a fundamental aspect of everyday cognition and 
behaviour. According to this model, a successful behavioural suggestion involves its 
associated action representation reaching threshold activation, at which point it is 
triggered automatically. The serise of involuntariness that accompanies the suggested 
behaviour is not an inevitable concomitant of it, however, but is the result of a post hoc 
interpretation of its volitional status based on the pattern of activation across 
representational systems. In contrast, a successful suggestion for a perceptual or 
cognitive alteration involves the selection of a corresponding representation by low level 
attentional systems for the organisation of sensory information into a conscious percept. 
As such, the interpretive process is an inherent part of the successful execution of the 
suggestion, rather than a non-essential after-the-fact component of it. Such processing 
differences between behavioural and cognitive suggestions were cited as one of the 
central reasons underlying the differential response rates between the two (i. e. 
behavioural suggestions being successfully responded to significantly more often than 
cognitive suggestions). 
A number of factors influencing the likely success of a given suggestion attempt were 
then proposed, including the nature of the representations stored within the cognitive 
system, attentional input from higher level systems, and individual and situational 
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differences in the degree to which the automatic activation of representations is relied 
upon for the control of behaviour. On the basis of such factors, an account of the 
difference between hypnotic and non-hypnotic suggestion was then offered, with spccific 
reference to why the hypnotic situation is consistently associated with elevated levels of 
suggestibility compared to non-hypnotic situations. Theoretical emphasis was placed on 
the nature of the hypnotic situation and the expectational and contextual factors 
associated with it, which together serve to create a pattern of activation across 
representational systems corresponding to an interpretive set labelled the "hypnotic role" 
following the work of Sarbin (1950,1956). This interpretive set, which is an automatic 
consequence of entering the hypnotic situation, serves to provide a context for the 
appraisal of events during hypnosis, thereby shaping the occurrence and nature of 
behaviours and experiences encountered therein. The belief that hypnosis is associated 
with elevated levels of suggestibility was recognised as one particularly important factor 
in bringing about increases in suggestibility during hypnosis. In addition, the 
expectational and contextual demand to adopt a non-critical mode of responding during 
hypnosis was identified as being influential in bringing about certain state changes 
during hypnosis which have a significant moderating effect on suggestibility. 
Specifically, it was proposed that the induction of a state of absorption during hypnosis 
significantly augments the individual's responsivity to suggestions through increased 
attention and disattention being paid to relevant and irrelevant representations 
respectively. Moreover, the correýponding reduction in critical thought and bias towards 
lower level processing serves to minimise the activation of competing representations 
and maximise the degree to which behaviour and experience are controlled by lower 
level processes. By placing theoretical emphasis on both contextual/expectational factors 
and certain state changes during hypnosis, the account offered in chapter three provides a 
middle ground between sociocognitive theories and more state oriented models such as 
ego-psychological theory, dissociated control theory and the neuropsychophysiological 
model. 
According to this view, responsivity to suggestions is the product of the interaction 
between situational variables and a number of individual factors including motivation, 
attitude, expectation, the ability to focus and sustain attention (i. e. become absorbed), 
and high vs. low level processing preference. Certain factors (e. g. attitude, expectation) 
were identifled as being specific to the testing situation under scrutiny (e. g. hypnosis), 
while other factors (e. g. absorption, processing bias) were identified as relevant to 
suggestive responding in general. 
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In chapter four, some of the predictions made by the model of suggestion and hypnosis 
outlined in chapter three were identified and ways of assessing them discussed. Four 
predictions were identified as being central to the model: (i) suggestibility is positively 
related to a predisposition towards the low level control of behaviour; (ii) suggestibility 
is negatively related to a predisposition towards the high level control of behaviour; (iii) 
hypnosis involves a shift towards the low level control of behaviour; and (iv) hypnosis is 
associated with a relative inability to think in a critical fashion. Accordingly, four studies 
to assess these predictions were outlined, which form the basis of chapters five, six, eight 
and nine. 
In chapter five, a study assessing the relationship between processing bias and hypnotic 
suggestibility (predictions i and ii) was described. Three questionnaires comprising nine 
scales apparently assessing high and low level processing preferences were obtained 
from the literatures concerning personality, learning style and creativity, and presented 
to 209 graduate and undergraduate students who had been tested on the Harvard Group 
Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (HGSHS). The nine questionnaire scales used were the 
Rational (RAT) and Experiential (EXP) scales of the Rational Versus Experiential 
Inventory, short form (RVEI-S), the Left hemisphere (L), Right hemisphere (R) and 
Integrated (I) scales of the Human Information Processing Survey (HIPS), and the deep 
semantic (DS), deep thinking ý (DT), elaborative episodic (EE) and elaborative self- 
actualising (ES) scales of the Inventory of Learning Processes (ILP). Of these, the RVEI- 
EXP, HIPS-R, ILP-ES and ILP-EE were selected as putative measures of low level 
processing preference, while the RVEI-RAT, HIPS-L, ILP-DS and ILP-DT were 
selected as putative measure of high level processing preference. The HIPS-I was 
included as a measure of the preference for the flexible integration of high and low level 
processing. In addition, a social desirability scale (SDS) was used to control for response 
variation due to individual differences in the need for positive self-presentation; a small, 
positive correlation between the HGSHS and SDS was predicted, in line with the 
sociocognitive prediction that presenting oneself in a positive light is a fundamental 
aspect of hypnotic responding. 
Analyses concerning HGSHS scores revealed a slightly lower sample mean 
suggestibility score than that reported by Shor and Orne (1963) in the original norms for 
the scale. However, the sample mean was in line with those obtained for other European 
samples, as was the pattern of item response rates. The total scale showed good 
reliability as did most of the individual items, with the exception of the hand lowering 
item which did not show a significant corrected item-total correlation. Such a finding 
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raised the possibility that an additional element of measurement error had further 
increased random variation in suggestibility scores. Factor analysis provided no evidence 
for the notion that the HGSHS comprises a three factor solution corresponding to the 
ideo-motor, challenge and cognitive items, but indicated that differences in item 
difficulty had resulted in the extraction of spurious factors; accordingly, the total HGSHS 
score was taken as the suggestibility correlate in this thesis. 
Partial correlations controlling for the influence of social desirability were then 
calculated between the HGSHS and each of the low and high level processing preference 
scales. Contrary to the prediction that hypnotic suggestibility is negatively related to a 
high level processing preference, no significant correlations were found between any of 
the high level processing preference scales and the HGSHS. Nevertheless, in support of 
the prediction that hypnotic suggestibility is positively related to a low level processing 
preference, significant but very modest partial correlations were obtained between the 
HGSHS and the ILP-EE, HIPS-R and RVEI-EXP. However, contrary to prediction, no 
significant relationship was obtained between the HGSHS and ILP-ES. In addition, a 
small but significant positive correlation between the HGSHS and the social desirability 
was obtained as predicted. Standard multiple regression analysis revealed that the best 
unique predictor of hypnotic suggestibility was the social desirability scale followed by 
the RVEI-EXP, accounting for a unique 3.54% and 2.84% of the variance in 
suggestibility respectively; neither the ILP-EE or HIPS-R predicted significant unique 
proportions of the variance in siiggestibility. Hierarchical regression analysis revealed 
that, after controlling for the effects of social desirability, the RVEI-EXP, ILP-EE and 
HIPS-R together accounted for 7.33% of the variation in suggestibility. However, the 
presence of a suppression effect indicated that a small and non-significant proportion of 
this 7.33% is attributable to social desirability rather than low level processing 
preference. A mixed standard-statistical regression revealed, on purely statistical 
grounds, that after controlling for the effects of social desirability only the RVEI-EXP 
and ILP-EE are successful predictors of suggestibility; the RVEI-EXP entered the 
equation first and accounted for 5.1% of the variation in suggestibility, with the ILP-EE 
entering second and accounting for a further 1.8% of the variation in suggestibility. 
A factor analysis of the HGSHS, social desirability scale and high and low level 
processing preference measures (except the HIPS-I which was excluded on statistical 
grounds) yielded a three factor solution accounting for 60% of the total variance. Factors 
one (with strong factor loadings for the ILP-DS, ILP-DT, ILP-EE and kVEI-RAT) and 
two (loadings for HIPS-R, ILP-ES, RVEI-EXP and HIPS-L negatively) were interpreted 
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as representing high and low level processing preference variables respectively. The 
HGSHS showed a modest loading on factor two, loading most strongly on the third 
factor with the social desirability scale. Although such a pattern of factor loadings 
provides support for the notion that the different low (and high) level processing 
preference questionnaires are measuring common constructs, the low communalitics of 
the HGSHS, HIPS-L and ILP-ES indicated that caution should be exercised in the 
interpretation of this analysis for these variables. Nevertheless, these findings underline 
the importance of including a social desirability measure in research investigating the 
correlates of hypnotic suggestibility. 
In chapter six a second study designed to assess the relationship between hypnotic 
suggestibility and processing predisposition was described. In this study, the relationship 
between the HGSHS and a number of behavioural, and therefore hopefully more 
objective, measures of processing predisposition was assessed. In total, eight behavioural 
measures were presented to 81 graduate and undergraduate students who had all been 
screened on the HGSHS: three triad classification tasks, two perceptual filtering tasks, 
the Matching Familiar Figures Test (MFFT), a syllogistic reasoning task, and Raven! s 
advanced progressive matrices. In addition, social desirability was included as a partial 
correlate following the recommendations of study one. 
The triad classification and perceptual filtering tasks were obtained from the literature 
concerning perceptual integrality, and were designed to assess integral vs. separable (i. e. 
low vs. high level) processing preferences and abilities respectively. The three triad 
classification tasks used three different dimensional combinations (size and brightness 
using square stimuli, colour and form using triangle stimuli, and size and angle using line 
stimuli) each varying in the degree to which integral or separable processing is favoured. 
The proportion of similarity-based (i. e. integral or low level) responses given on each set 
of stimuli provides three related indices of the individual's preferred processing mode. 
The two perceptual filtering tasks, each using a different primary dimension (size or 
angle), assess the subject's ability to ignore variation on a correlated but irrelevant 
stimulus. Such measures provide an index of individual differences in integral versus 
separable processing predisposition that are the product of the relative ability/inability to 
effectively carry out high level perceptual analysis. 
The Matching Familiar Figures Test was obtained from the literature concerning the 
cognitive style dimension of reflection-impulsivity which corresponds to the distinction 
between higher and lower level cognition respectively. The syllogistic reasoning task and 
Raven's advanced matrices were included as measures of the ability to engage in higher 
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level analytical processing. The use of these measures (and also the perceptual filtering 
tasks) therefore extends the research base concerning the relationship between hypnotic 
suggestibility and processing predisposition to encompass the possibility that an inability 
to engage in higher level processes (as opposed to a simple low level processing 
preference) is associated with suggestive responding. 
The findings reported in chapter six provide partial support for the predictions that 
hypnotic suggestibility is positively related to a low level processing predisposition and 
negatively related to a high level processing predisposition. After controlling for the 
influence of social desirability, a small but significant positive correlation was obtained 
between the HGSHS and triad classification (squares) variables as predicted, indicating 
that highly suggestible individuals make signiflcantly more similarity-based (i. e. low 
level) responses in triad classification using the square stimuli than low suggestibIcs. 
This flnding was confirmed through ANCOVA comparing high and low suggestibility 
quartiles. Such a finding lends support to the notion that suggestibility is related to a low 
level processing preference. However, no significant partial correlations were found 
between the HGSHS and either of the other triad classification stimuli (triangles and 
angles), contrary to prediction; moreover, no differences were found between high and 
low suggestibility quartiles for these stimuli. Although only one of the three types of 
triad classification stimuli showed significant correlations with suggestibility, it is 
possible that such a pattern of findings is due to the fact that only the combination of size 
and brightness (i. e. square stimuli) is sufficiently biased towards dimensional (i. e. high 
level) responding to allow individual differences in similarity-based responding to reveal 
themselves in this context. The fact that the square stimuli yielded the lowest proportion 
of similarity based responses followed by the triangle and angle stimuli, a finding in line 
with the majority of previous research (e. g. J. D. Smith & Baron, 1981), offers some 
support for this notion. 
Also in support of the prediction that suggestibility is related to a low level processing 
predisposition, a small but significant negative partial correlation was found between the 
HGSHS and the MFFT time variable, demonstrating that high suggestibles respond 
quicker on the task than lows, indicative of a relatively impulsive (i. e. low level) 
cognitive style. This finding was also confirmed using ANCOVA comparing high and 
low suggestibility quartiles. However, no significant partial correlations were found 
between the HGSHS and the MFFT error variables, raising the possibility the highs are 
simply quicker than lows but not necessarily more impulsive. Nevertheless, the semi- 
partial correlation between the HGSHS and MFFT time variables was reduced to nearly 
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zero after controlling for the MFFT error variable in a hierarchical multiple regression 
analysis, providing support for the impulsivity interpretation of the relationship between 
suggestibility and MFFT time. However, this interpretation was tempered by chi-squarcd 
analysis which revealed that the frequency of high and low suggestibles in the impulsive 
and reflective categories of MFFT performance was not significantly different. 
In support of the prediction that hypnotic suggestibility is negatively related to a high 
level processing predisposition (as indexed by high level ability), after controlling for the 
impact of happiness a negative relationship was obtained between the HGSHS and the 
syllogistic reasoning task. This finding appears to suggest that high suggestible are more 
irrational (i. e. incapable of higher level reasoning) than lows, although no significant 
differences between high and low suggestibility quartiles were found in ANCOVA. 
Moreover, further doubt was cast on this relationship by the finding of a significant 
positive relationship between the HGSHS and Raven's matrices, suggesting that high 
suggestibles are actually better at reasoning than lows. Again, no significant differences 
were obtained between high and low suggestibility quartilcs, however. It is possible that 
these findings are a product of the syllogistic reasoning task being verbal and Raven's 
matrices being non-verbal, although it is not immediately apparent why such a pattern of 
relationships should be found on this basis. A more plausible alternative would appear to 
be possible differences between the two tasks in terms of the relative degree to which 
higher and lower level processes are involved in their completion, although further 
research would be required to asgess this possibility. At the very least, caution should be 
exercised in the interpretation of these relationships. 
Further doubt was cast on the notion that suggestibility is negatively related to high 
level processing ability by the lack of significant correlations between the HGSHS and 
interference on either of the perceptual filtering tasks. Clearly there is no evidence to 
suggest that high suggestibles are any worse than their low sugestible counterparts at 
high level analytical perception, at least as assessed by the filtering interference effect. 
Standard multiple regression revealed that, after controlling for the effects of mood, 
social desirability and triad classification set, the MMFT time, syllogistic reasoning, 
Raven's matrices and triad classification (squares) variables accounted for a further 
13.6% of the variation in suggestibility, significantly different from zero. On this basis, 
none of the variables accounted for a significant unique proportion of the variance in 
suggetibility. However, a mixed standard-statistical regression indicated that, on purely 
statistical grounds, the best predictor of suggestibility out of the processing 
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predisposition variables was triad classification (squares), which accounted for 5.2% of 
the variation in suggestibility after controlling for covariates. 
The model of suggestion and hypnosis outlined in chapter three is based on a novel 
model of the cognitive system described in chapter two. Although the model of the 
cognitive system is strongly supported by research findings concerning the theoretical 
work of Norman and Shallice (1986), Logan (1988) and Marcel (1983) on which it is 
based, the notion that there are higher and lower level 'modes' of processing each with 
distinct cognitive characteristics, aside from general control differences, is somewhat 
more speculative. It was for this reason that the studies reported in chapter five and six 
adopted an exploratory approach using a wide variety of putative low and high level 
processing measures, in the hope that such a broad approach would maximise the 
chances of obtaining significant evidence concerning the relationship between processing 
style and hypnotic suggestibility. The measures used in studies one and two were all 
selected on the basis of the primafacie similarities between the research and theory from 
which they were derived and the distinction between higher and lower level cognition 
outlined in chapter two. In chapter seven, the relationship between the different putative 
high and low level preference and ability measures was addressed in a bid to assess 
whether these apparent similarities translated into empirical reality, thereby providing 
evidence concerning the generality of the distinction between higher and lower level 
processing modes. 
Scores on each of the self-report and behavioural measures of low and high level 
processing preference and ability for the 74 individuals who had participated in studies 
one and two were correlated, taking social desirability and the relevant mood variables as 
partial correlates where appropriate. Correlations between each of the behavioural high 
level processing measures provided partial support for the notion that each is assessing 
related aspects of a common construct. As predicted, significant relationships were found 
between the syllogistic reasoning task, Raven's matrices and certain measures obtained 
from the MFFT, suggesting that both the syllogistic reasoning and Raven's matrices 
variables are measuring a high level reasoning ability which is associated with good 
performance on the MFFT. The lack of a significant correlation between any of these 
variables and the two perceptual filtering tasks again suggests that the filtering tasks are 
not measuring a high level processing ability, at least not one that is related to reasoning 
or MFFT performance. The finding of a significant correlation between the syllogistic 
reasoning and Raven's matrices variables again questions the pattern of relationships 
between these variables and the HGSHS reported in chapter six. Indeed, following the 
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removal of the seven subjects who had not completed the questionnaires in study one, the 
partial correlations between the HGSHS, the syllogistic reasoning task and Raven's 
matrices were reduced to non-significant levels. Clearly, the relationships between these 
variables and the HGSHS are not as robust as one would hope, and further research is 
required before any firm conclusions can be drawn concerning the relationship between 
hypnotic suggestibility and high level processing ability. This verdict is further supported 
by the discovery that the previously significant relationship between the HGSHS and the 
MFFT time variable is also reduced to non-significant levels following removal of the 
seven additional subjects. 
A significant predicted correlation between Raven's matrices and the RVEI-RAT 
seems to suggest that individuals possess some insight into their thinking ability and are 
able to report it accurately; moreover, such a finding indicates that self-report can, to a 
small extent, provide a valid index of the degree to which individuals are capable of high 
level processing. However, none of the other self-report measures of high level 
preference correlated significantly with any of the high level behavioural measures. 
Nevertheless, with the exception of the left hemisphere scale of the HIPS, all of the high 
level processing questionnaires correlate significantly with one another, supporting the 
conclusion of study one that each is assessing a similar construct. Taken together this 
pattern of findings clearly indicates that, at least on a methodological level, the generality 
of the high level processing construct is restricted to particular measure types (i. e. self 
report or behavioural), despite the prima facie similarities between the research and 
theory from which the different measures have been obtained. 
All of the self-report low level processing preference questionnaires showed significant 
partial correlations with one another as predicted, supporting the notion that each is 
assessing a related construct and validating the generality of the low level processing 
mode concept as assessed by self-report. As before, the RVEI-EXP, HIPS-R and ILP-EE 
all showed significant partial correlations with the HGSHS, underlining the strength of 
the relationships in each case. Moreover, with the restricted sample size used in this 
analysis the partial correlation between the HGSHS and ILP-ES is also significant, and 
to an even greater extent than with either the ILP-EE or HIPS-R. Why this correlation 
should prove non-significant with the larger sample is not immediately obvious; further 
research is clearly required before any firm conclusions can be drawn concerning the 
validity of the relationship between the ILP-ES and HGSHS. 
Findings concerning the behavioural low level processing measures are less 
encouraging. Although, as predicted, all of the triad classification tasks correlated 
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significantly with one another as did the two filtering interference tasks there were no 
significant correlations between the two measure types. Moreover none of the 
correlations between these variables and the MFFT proved significant. As such, there is 
no evidence to suggest that the different behavioural measure types are assessing related 
constructs, casting doubt over the generality of the low level processing construct. 
Nevertheless, the correlations between the ILP-ES and triad classification (triangles and 
squares) variables both approached, but did not quite reach, significance. As both the 
ILP-ES and triad classification measures were included in this thesis as putative 
measures of a low level processing preference (as opposed to processing ability) and 
there is evidence to suggest that both are related to suggestibility, such a pattern of 
findings is encouraging and suggests that the low level processing mode concept is a 
potentially fruitful avenue for the investigation of suggestion and hypnosis. Moreover, it 
helps to narrow down the range of variables of interest to future research concerning the 
relationship between low level processing and suggestibility. Furthermore, the finding 
that, unlike the MFFT, Raven's matrices and the syllogistic reasoning task, the 
correlation between the HGSHS and triad classification (squares) variables remains 
significant with the smaller sample size underlines the potential importance of such 
future research. 
Having examined the relationship between suggestibility and processing preferences 
and abilities in the first two studies, the studies reported in chapters eight and nine turn to 
the question of hypnosis itself. Irl chapter eight, the prediction that hypnosis is associated 
with a low level processing bias was investigated in a repeated measures design study 
comparing 17 high and 17 low suggestible subjects in baseline, relaxation and hypnosis 
conditions on the triad classification and filtering tasks used in study two. Neither the 
high nor low suggestibles showed any predicted differences between the three conditions 
on either of the tasks. Only one differences was found between the groups and 
conditions, that between the baseline and relaxation and hypnosis conditions combined 
for both suggestibility groups on the triad classification (triangles) measure. However, 
this finding was in the opposite direction to that predicted, with the baseline condition 
showing a significantly greater proportion of similarity-based (i. e. low level) responses 
than the relaxation and hypnosis conditions combined; moreover, there was no 
significant difference between the relaxation and hypnosis conditions. This finding runs 
contrary to the prediction, derived from previous research, that a relaxed response 
criterion is associated with similarity-based responding, although the possibility that 
physical relaxation and a relaxed response criterion are different entities must be 
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considered. At the very least, there is no evidence to suggest that hypnosis is associated 
with a bias towards low level processing as assessed by triad classification and 
perceptual filtering. 
In chapter nine the prediction that hypnosis is associated with a relative inability to 
think in a critical fashion was assessed in an independent design study comparing high 
and low suggestibles in relaxation and hypnosis conditions on a syllogistic reasoning 
task comparable to that used in study 2. The possibility of using a within subjects design 
for this study was considered and rejected on the basis of evidence showing significant 
practice effects in syllogistic reasoning. The reasoning task used was constructed on the 
basis of the recommendations of Johnson-Laird and Steedman (1978) thereby avoiding 
the criticisms associated with the task in study 2; in addition, both score and time 
measurements wcre taken on the task to provide a better estimate of overall reasoning 
performance. Evidence from a revised version of the McConkey and Jupp (1986) 
Opinions About Hypnosis Survey including additional questions concerning the 
relationship between hypnosis and thinking indicated that subjects did not associate 
hypnosis with superior or inferior reasoning performance. As such, the possibility of an 
expectational explanation of any significant findings was ruled out. However, results 
indicated that there were no differences in reasoning performance in relaxation and 
hypnosis conditions for both high and low suggestible groups when rough baseline 
measures of reasoning ability obtained from the syllogistic reasoning task in study 2 
were taken into account. Accordihgly, the hypothesis the hypnosis is associated with an 
inability to think in a critical fashion was re ected. i 
10.2 General discussion 
The aim of this thesis was to provide an integrative account of hypnosis and suggestion 
that incorporates the fundamental principles of the ego-psychological, dissociated 
control, sociocognitive and neuropsychophysiological models into a single explanatory 
framework. Having provided such an account on the basis of research and theory from 
cognitive psychology, four predictions made by the model have been assessed in four 
related studies, two concerning hypnotic suggestibility and two hypnosis itself. On the 
basis of these studies information has also been gathered concerning the validity of the 
cognitive model on which the proposed explanation of suggestion and hypnosis is based. 
The task now remains to explore the conceptual and methodological implications of this 
research for the theoretical position outlined here. 
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Before addressing this task, it should be noted that the author recognises that the 
significant findings on which this discussion will largely be based are, in many cases, 
less convincing in terms of effect size than one would hope. It should therefore be bomc 
in mind that any theoretical exploration of the current research must be considered 
tentative until more conclusive evidence can be obtained. To this end, the pcnultimate 
section of this chapter will provide a discussion of the practical limitations of the 
research reported here and their implications for future research in this domain. 
10.2.1 Hynnotic suggestibility and low level processing predisposition 
Of the four empirical studies carried out to assess the predictions of the model of 
hypnosis and suggestion described in chapter three, two concerned the nature of hypnotic 
suggestibility and two hypnosis itself. As the significant findings obtained in this thesis 
all pertain to the former rather than the latter it seems appropriate to begin the discussion 
here; the implications of studies three and four for the current conceptualisation of 
hypnosis will be addressed in section 10.2.3. 
To briefly summarise the relevant findings described more fully in chapters five and 
six, significant evidence in support of the prediction that hypnotic suggestibility is 
related to a low level processing preference was obtained using both self-report and 
behavioural measures. Specifically, significant positive partial correlations were found 
between the HGSHS and three of the four putative low level processing preference 
questionnaires completed by the entire sample of subjects in study I (ILP-EE, HIPS-R 
and RVEI-EXp)77. In addition, a significant correlation was found between the HGSHS 
and the fourth low level processing questionnaire (the ILP-ES) when analysis was 
restricted to those subjects who had also completed study 2. Furthermore, a significant 
positive correlation was found between the HGSHS and triad classification (squares). 
All of these variables showing significant correlations with hypnotic suggestibility 
were, without exception, included in this thesis as putative measures of a low level 
processing preference, a pattern of findings which broadly supports the model of 
hypnosis and suggestion outlined in chapter three. The finding that these measures, taken 
together, account for nearly 20% of the variation in suggestibility strongly implicates low 
level processing in suggestive responding, particularly given the amount of uncontrolled 
77 For the sake of descriptive ease, from this point onwards all partial correlations will be referred to 
simply as correlations. Apart from the social desirability scale (which will be dealt with specifically), none 
of the remaining partial correlates are considered to be of any great theoretical significance and will 
therefore not be discussed in this context. Information concerning all partial correlates pertaining to each 
study can be obtained from the individual chapters. 
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variance likely to be associated with the measurement of hypnotic suggestibility (see 
chapter five), and the variance attributable to nuisance variables such as social 
desirability18. Moreover, obtaining significant correlations between suggestibility and 
both self-report and behavioural measures of low level processing preference provides 
converging evidence for the validity of the theoretical framework outlined in this thesis, 
particularly given that no significant correlations were found between the bchavioural 
and self-report measures significantly correlated with suggcstibility9. Such findings 
clearly suggest that the current model of suggestion merits further investigation, using 
both types of methodology. It is also noteworthy that none of the existing theories of 
hypnosis, with the possible exception of Fromm's ego-psychological theory, would have 
predicted 80 the present pattern of findings which underlines the conceptual advance that 
the current theory provides. Moreover, it is of some significance that none of the 
measures correlating significantly with suggestibility in this thesis have been used before 
in published research within the field, with such findings providing a basis for cross- 
fertilisation between research in this domain and that in a number of others (i. e. 
perception, personality, learning style). 
Nevertheless, the low level processing mode concept is still very much in its infancy 
and it is essential that the concept be refined if it is to remain theoretically useful. The 
basic contention of the distinction between higher and lower level modes of processing 
made in this thesis is that there are differences in the relative degree to which individuals 
prefer to control behaviours, by higher or lower level processes given the option to use 
either. This notion was based on research and theory concerning perceptual 
integrality/separability which shows a striking convergence with the model of the 
cognitive system outlined in chapter two, and the fact that one of the triad classification 
tasks correlates significantly with suggestibility provides good evidence for both this 
model and the model of suggestion developed in chapter three. Such a finding clearly 
suggests that high suggestibles have a preference for a passive, non-deliberate (as 
78 Some sociocognitive theorists might argue that social desirability is less of a nuisance variable to be 
controlled for than one of the primary mechanisms by which suggested responses are brought about. While 
this may be so in the case of hetero-suggestion (assuming, by the present model at least, that social 
desirability operates in an automatic or non-deliberate fashion), such an explanation seems untenable in the 
case of auto-suggestion. 
79 Although the correlation between the ILNES and triad classification (squares) approached significance; 
the theoretical relevance of such a relationship will be addressed presently. 
so That is not to say that other theories could not accommodate these findings, however; it is the fact that 
the current model predicts them rather than just explains them that is of particular note. Moreover, given 
that the current model embraces the central principles of each major contemporary theory of hypnosis, one 
would want such theories to be able to accommodate this research in any case. 
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opposed to active and intentional) mode of processing, with the implication being that 
such processing has an important role to play in the explanation of suggestion. 
Complementary evidence is provided by Dixon and Laurence (1990,1992) concerning 
the greater verbal automaticity of high suggestibles. 
However, in chapter two it was argued that a basic difference in low vs. high level 
processing preference is likely to manifest itself in many different ways, not just on a 
purely cognitive level as with perceptual integrality, but also in an individual's 
personality and their behaviour and experiences in general. Indeed, the near significant 
correlations between the ILP-ES and triad classification (triangles and squares) provide 
tentative support for this assertion; however, none of the other low level processing 
questionnaires correlated significantly with any of the triad classification tasks, despite 
all correlating with both the ILP-ES and HGSHS. Moreover, the HGSHS correlates with 
both the ILP-ES and triad classification (squares), at least in the restricted sample. How 
is one to explain such a pattern of findings? 81 
To begin with, it is pertinent to note that in other research areas measures do not 
always correlate significantly with one another despite clear evidence to suggest that 
they are assessing related constructs. A relevant example is in the case of the converging 
operations used to establish the validity of the distinction between integral and separable 
forms of perceptual processing. Although both triad classification and perceptual 
filtering tasks have, for example, both been shown to converge on a common explanation 
of perceptual processing (e. g. Fohrd & Kemler Nelson, 1984), it is not unprecedented to 
find a lack of any significant relationship between the two (see e. g. J. D. Smith & Baron, 
1981), as was the case in the research reported here. One of the factors mediating the 
non-significant correlation obtained between the perceptual filtering and triad 
classification tasks is likely to be the fact that the former is measuring a processing 
ability while the latter is assessing a processing preference. Thus, the fact that the triad 
classification tasks do not correlate with most of the questionnaires used here still allows 
the possibility that they may be tapping different aspects of the same general low level 
processing mode construct. It is simply a question of addressing which aspect of the 
" Why the correlation between the ILNES and HGSHS should prove non-significant with the larger 
sample size is not entirely clear. One possible explanation is that the smaller sample was subject to a 
systematic sampling bias that the larger sample had not been exposed to. it is conceivable, for example, 
that the smaller sample included a higher proportion of individuals with an interest in hypnosis and a 
motivation to take part in experiments involving its use. Such a bias could inflate the level of correlation 
between suggestibility and other variables, thereby accounting for the pattern of findings observed here. 
That notwithstanding, the current discussion of the relationship between the IIGSIIS: A, the ILNES and 
the triad classification task will be limited to those subjects who completed all three. 
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construct each measure is assessing and providing an explanation of why these aspects 
should or should not correlate significantly with one another. 
Given that the ILNES correlates with both suggestibility and almost so with triad 
classification it seems appropriate to begin the discussion of this issue here. The five 
items on the ILNES are: (1) 1 believe in intuition; (2) 1 cram for exams; (3) Sclf- 
knowledge is the most important kind of knowledge; (4) My feelings arc a very 
important part of my decision-making or judgement; and (5) Ideas in books often make 
my mind wander to other topics not necessarily related to what I am reading. Items I and 
4 refer to the individuals' belief in or endorsement of intuition and emotion as important 
factors in decision making; in this regard, these items are similar to the ma ority of the 
items on the RVEI-EXP, which may account for the correlations between these two 
scales. However, the fact that the triad classification task correlated only with the ILNES 
and not the RVEI-EXP suggests that these items are not the determining factor in 
establishing this particular relationship. Of the remaining three items on the ILP-ES, only 
item 5 has any obvious relationship with the triad classification task. Item 5 apparently 
describes what might be considered a holistic behaviour, in that it refers to free- 
associative activities in leaming in which ideas are related on the basis of similarity 
rather than logical rules. It is conceivable that such a pattern of behaviour might result 
from an integrative as opposed to a separable style of processing; the inclusion of this 
item may therefore have been instrumental in establishing the near significant 
relationships between the ILNES and triad classification. Items 2 and 3 on the ILNES 
do not have anyprimafacie relationship to triad classification, although it is possible that 
item 2 relates to triad classification because individuals who adopt a more strategic style 
of information processing in triad classification also adopt a more strategic approach to 
exam study, and hence do not tend to cram unlike their less strategic counterparts; this 
may be one further factor underlying the relationship between the ILP-ES and triad 
classification. Clearly, an analysis of the correlations between individual scale items and 
the triad classification tasks would provide invaluable inforination in this regard, 
although such an analysis is beyond the scope of the current thesis due to time 
limitations. 
It is noteworthy that the ILNES items with potentially explicit links to triad 
classification are unlike any of the items on the remaining low level processing 
questionnaires, which may explain why none of them correlates significantly with triad 
classification while the ILP-ES does. Given that this is the case, the basis for the 
significant correlations between the ILP-ES, the ILNEE and HIPS-R must be the 
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relationship between items 1,3 and 4 on the ILP-ES and the other two questionnaires. As 
there are only 4 out of 40 items on the HIPS-R referring to emotion or intuition and none 
on the ILNEE, it would appear therefore that there are other behavioural and experiential 
events that tend to co-vary with an inclination to rely on or endorse emotions and 
intuitions as a basis for decision making. Indeed, such an interpretation is highly likely 
given that the RVEI-EXP correlates significantly with all of the other low level 
processing questionnaires and hypnotic suggestibility despite being composed entirely of 
items referring specifically to intuition and emotion. Moreover, the ILNES, RVEI-EXP 
and HIPS-R all load on the same factor in factor analysis, clearly suggesting that they are 
tapping related constructs. The fact that these three different measures, each selected on 
the basis of the prima facie similarities between the research and theory from which they 
were derived, all correlate significantly with one another despite their obvious 
differences provides support for the generality of the low level processing mode 
construct proposed in this thesis; the task remains to delineate which bchaviours are 
characteristic of a preference for low level processing and which are not. 
The majority of the items on the ILNEE appear to be addressing something akin to 
academic or intellectual curiosity which seems to be the source of its correlation with 
hypnotic suggestibility (cf. Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974). The finding that this scale 
correlates with all of the remaining low level processing questionnaires clearly suggests 
that there is some conceptual overlap between these measures. However, the fact that the 
ILNEE does not load on the sanie factor as any of the other measures in factor analysis 
appears to indicate that while academic or intellectual curiosity often co-varies with 
other markers of a low level processing preference, it is not characteristic of such a 
preference. From the point of view of the model of the cognitive system outlined in 
chapter two this is perhaps not surprising, given that there are no real theoretical grounds 
to assume that this should be the case. Similarly, however, it is not immediately obvious 
why intellectual curiosity should co-vary with low level processing preference 
behaviours at all, regardless of whether it is characteristic of them. It is nevertheless 
possible that the source of the correlations between the ILNEE and the other putative 
low level processing questionnaires is the inclusion of an item referring to fantasy 
("Fantasy is very important to me"). The relationship between fantasy, intuition, emotion 
and creativity is well documented (see e. g. Lynn & Rhue, 1986,1989) which may be the 
source of the significant correlations between the ILNEE and the RVEI-EXP and ILP- 
ES. Given the long-standing relationship between fantasy and hypnosis (see e. g. 
Sheehan, 1979) the inclusion of this item may also have been instrumental in 
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establishing the relationship between the ILP-EE and hypnotic suggestibility. 
Furthermore, the HIPS-R contains six items explicitly referring to fantasy or 
imagination, four to intuition and emotion and five to creativity, something which may 
explain why, of all the low level processing measures, the ILP-EE correlates most 
strongly with the HIPS-R. Such a pattern of items on the HIPS-R may also provide an 
explanation of the correlations between this scale and the RVEI-EXP and ILP-ES. As 
has been suggested on a number of occasions in this thesis, an examination of the inter- 
correlations between scale items and a factor analysis of them would prove invaluable in 
determining the validity of these speculations. 
Having provided an account of the pattern of inter-correlations between the low level 
processing questionnaires, and the near significant correlations between the ILP-ES and 
triad classification, the question remains as to why none of the correlations between the 
other questionnaires and triad classification were anywhere near achieving significance. 
On the one hand it is possible that triad classification does not correlate significantly 
with the questionnaire measures because they are assessing entirely unrelated constructs. 
By this view, the near significant correlations between the ILP-ES and triad classification 
is an aberration that results from the inclusion of items that are related to an integral style 
of processing but which do not relate to the other sclf-report measures of processing 
preference. However, such an explanation is contradicted by the fact that these items 
were grouped with the remaining items on the ILP-ES into a single scale on the basis of 
their strong inter-correlations, dommon factor loadings and internal consistency in 
previous research. Moreover, both the triad classification tasks and low level processing 
questionnaires were selected for use in the present research on the basis of similarities 
between the conceptual and empirical work from which they were derived and the 
processing distinction made in this thesis. As such, the fact that each correlates 
significantly with suggestibility as predicted by the current framework strongly suggests 
that common constructs are being assessed in each case. 
An alternative explanation might be that the near significant correlations between triad 
classification and the ILP-ES are entirely the product of chance. However, the fact that 
near significant correlations were obtained between the ILP-ES and two different types 
of triad classification stimuli appears to contradict this hypothesis. Nevertheless, as with 
all of the significant findings described in this thesis, it is essential that these results are 
replicated using more exacting standards before this possibility can be rejected outright. 
A third possible explanation for this pattern of findings, and one that is endorsed here, 
might be that triad classification is a measure of relative processing preference (i. e. 
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higher versus lower level), whereas the questionnaires only provide information 
concerning subject attitudes towards low level behaviours and processes. The fact that an 
individual reports a favourable attitude towards low level processing, for example they 
endorse the RVEI-EXP item "I think there are times when one should rely on one's 
intuition", does not necessarily mean that they typically prefer intuition over more 
logical, higher level processes as a basis for decision making. All such a sclf-rcport can 
reveal is that the individual regards low level processing highly (assuming one can rely 
on self-report), and not whether they regard it more highly, or base decisions on it more 
often, than high level processing. Thus, in the case of the RVEI-EXP, the group of high 
scorers on this scale will be comprised of individuals who regard intuition as an 
important mental resource, some of whom will prefer to actually make the majority of 
their decisions on this basis and some of whom will not. As such, the RVEI-EXP does 
not provide a pure measure of processing preference and the correlation between this 
scale and triad classification will reflect this fact. A similar explanation could be offered 
for the non-significant correlations between triad classification, the ILP-EE and the 
HIPS-R, although in these cases items typically refer to behaviours rather than processes. 
Such an explanation can also accommodate the significant correlations between the 
different low level processing questionnaires and those between these and hypnotic 
suggestibility, as these are also unipolar scales of low level processing, rather than 
relative processing preference measures. However, by this view, one would need to 
assume that the near significant correlations between the ILP-ES and triad classification 
are due to the inclusion of items on the ILP-ES which do actually capture a relative high 
vs. low level processing preference, and not just endorsement of the latter. Existing 
information regarding the behaviours concerned is, however, insufficient to provide an 
answer to this question and further research is clearly required before any firm 
conclusions can be drawn in this regard. At the very least, however, this discussion raises 
the issue of what a good measure of processing preference actually is. One task for future 
research would be to address this issue by devising bipolar sclf-report scales that 
compare high vs. low level processing preference, rather than look at one or the other. If 
the generality of the distinction between high and low level processing holds firm, one 
can predict that triad classification would in this case show significant correlations with 
self-reported processing predisposition. 
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10.2.2 Hypnotic suggestibility. cognitive flexibility-and processing preference 
On the basis of the model presented in chapters two and three, it was predicted that 
hypnotic suggestibility would be (i) positively related to a low level processing 
preference; (ii) negatively related to a high level processing preference; and (iii) 
negatively related to certain high level abilities, namely the abilities to engage in 
problem solving and perceptual analysis. Although significant support for the first 
prediction has been reported here, no evidence was found in support of either of the 
predictions concerning higher level processing. The absence of significant correlations 
between the HGSHS: A and the RVEI-RAT, ILP-DS, ILP-DT and HIPS-R indicates that 
suggestibility and high level processing preference are unrelated. If engaging in higher 
level thought militates against suggested responding, as argued in chapter four, those 
individuals with a tendency to think critically clearly did not do so any more than anyone 
else during the presentation of the HGSHS: A. Alternatively, engaging in higher level 
thought may not militate against suggested responding at all, contrary to the current 
theory. Comparing the level of suggestibility displayed by individuals presented with 
instructions to relinquish critical thought prior to suggestibility testing with that of 
individuals not provided with such instructions may be one way of addressing this issue 
empirically. A study employing such a design is currently underway. 
The absence of a significant correlation between the HGSHS: A and filtering 
interference indicates that highly suggestible individuals are no less able to engage in 
perceptual analysis than their low suggestible counterparts, contrary to prediction. 
Significant negative correlations between the HGSHS: A and the MFFT (time) and 
syllogistic reasoning variables were nevertheless obtained in study 2, indicating that 
high suggestibles are more impulsive and less able to engage in higher level reasoning 
than lows. However, when analysis was restricted to those subjects who had also 
completed the questionnaires in study 1, the significant correlations between the 
HGSHS: A, syllogistic reasoning and MFFT (time) variables were reduced to non- 
significant levels. The fact that these correlations were significant using the original 
sample is potentially relevant theoretically, although the fact that the removal of only 
seven subjects could render these correlations non-significant casts serious doubt on the 
validity of these findings. Also contrary to prediction, a significant positive relationship 
between the HGSHS: A and Raven's matrices was obtained in study 2, suggesting that 
highly suggestible individuals are actually better at analytical problem solving than their 
low suggestible counterparts. Although this relationship was rendered non-significant by 
the removal of the seven subjects who had not completed the questionnaires in study one, 
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unlike those between the HGSHS, MFFT (time) and syllogistic reasoning, this 
correlation remained close to significance with this restricted sample. Thus, it may 
simply be a matter of inadequate statistical power that underlies the non-significance of 
this relationship, and not an artefact resulting from a small number of subjects exerting 
leverage on the magnitude of the correlation coefficient as appears to be the case with the 
syllogistic reasoning and MFFT (time) variables. 
Leaving aside the question of whether or not performance on Raven's matrices reflects, 
in part, lower rather than higher level processing abilities, this finding raises certain 
issues concerning the nature of suggestibility. Broadly speaking, the capacity to engage 
in analytical problem solving rests on two essential components: the presence of 
appropriate processing algorithms and the ability to use those algorithms effectively. 
While the former is ultimately dependent on an organism's learning history, the latter is 
related to the inherent ability to flexibly manipulate and transform representations 
through the use of attention. As such, an individual who is able to engage in effective 
analytical problem solving is able to do so, in large part, because of their capacity for 
attentional control82. Thus, if high and low suggestible individuals arc no different in 
their knowledge of problem solving algorithms (as the research here indicates), the 
positive correlation between the HGSHS: A and Raven's matrices may reflect 
suggestibility-related differences in the ability to control attention. Viewed from this 
perspective, such a finding is consistent with previous research concerning the 
relationship between hypnotic sfiggestibility and attentional ability (see e. g. Graham & 
Evans, 1977; Crawford et al, 1993). The significant correlations between the HGSHS: A, 
the ILP-ES and the ILP-EE may also relate to this notion. According to Schmcck, 
Giesler-Brenstein and Cercy (1991), the elaborative processing scale of the inventory of 
learning processes (comprising the ILP-ES and ILNEE) reflects a preference for a 
holistic (i. e. low level) style of learning given the ability to use both analytic and holistic 
strategies in an adaptable and integrated fashion. Taken together, these findings appear to 
indicate that suggestibility may actually be related to a low level processing preference in 
combination with good cognitive flexibility (cf. Crawford, 1989). How might the model 
of suggestion and suggestibility outlined in chapter three accommodate such a pattern of 
findings? 
92 Conversely, however, an individual with good attentional control will be unable to solve problems 
effectively without the appropriate processing algorithms. Indeed, the validity of the prediction concerning 
suggestibility and high level processing ability rests on this fact. 
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In the first instance, it is important to consider where the concept of cognitive 
flexibility fits within the model of the cognitive system described in chapter two. 
Crawford (1989) has defined cognitive flexibility as "the degree to which an individual 
has and uses one of several available types of information processing strategies or styles 
during different tasks ... as well as different states of awareness" (p. 155). Thus defined, a 
number of different sources of evidence may be viewed as indicative of a relationship 
between cognitive flexibility and hypnotic suggestibility (see e. g. Crawford, 1989; 
chapter one): (i) the tendency of highly suggestible individuals to engage in day- 
dreaming and intense everyday absorption (Crawford, 1982b), coupled with the positive 
relationship between suggestibility and sustained attentional ability (e. g. Crawford el al, 
1993); (ii) the ability of highly suggestible individuals to fall asleep at will (Evans, 
1977); (iii) the ability of highly suggestible individuals to produce and control vivid 
visual images (e. g. Crawford & Allen, 1983); (iv) the tendency of highly suggestible 
individuals to experience their emotions more intensely than lows (Crawford et al, 
1989); (v) the ability of highly suggestible individuals to disembed both words (Wallace 
et al, 1994) and figures (Wallace, 1988) from complex stimulus arrays; and (vi) the 
positive relationship between suggestibility and creativity (see e. g. Lynn & Sivec, 1992). 
Evidence suggesting a positive relationship between hypnotic responsivity and 
physiological flexibility could also be regarded in this light (Crawford, 1989). In each of 
these domains, the common element appears to be the role that attentional control plays 
in the generation of the phenomdnon in question. in some cases (e. g. increased imagery 
vividness; heightened affect intensity), the effect may result from the amplification of 
perceptual information by attentional systems, in others (e. g. absorption) sustained 
attentional processes appear to be the major underlying factor. Other phenomena are 
apparently related to the operation of control mechanisms governing attentional- 
switching (e. g. disembedding figures/words; sleep-control) and the manipulation and 
transformation of representations (e. g. day-dreaming). On the face of it, such processes 
reside within the realm of the supervisory attentional system (cf. Norman & Shallice, 
1986), a notion that forms the basis for certain aspects of the neuropsychophysiological 
model of hypnosis. By that view, the superior supervisory attentional abilities of highly 
suggestible individuals enables them to attend to the hypnotic induction while ignoring 
extraneous stimuli, a process that acts as the precursor to a 1etting go" of high level 
attentional control (see e. g. Gruzelier, 1998). Such an account is supported by the 
positive correlation between the HGSHS: A and Raven's matrices described here. We 
should not forget, however, that the ability of the SAS to control attention and 
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manipulate information is, in part, related to the efficiency with which low level systems 
direct the activation and inhibition of low level representations (cf. Shallice & Burgess, 
1996; Burgess & Shallice, 1996b). Given that this is the case, low level attentional 
competence may be regarded as an important element of cognitive flexibility also, as 
must the efficiency of the relationship between different levels of processing control. 
This is particularly pertinent given the observed relationships between the HGSHS: A, 
triad classification and the low level processing questionnaires. 
The notion that suggestibility is intimately related to attentional control has important 
implications for any account of the mechanisms operating in the production of suggested 
effects, particularly concerning the role of the subject in this process. It may be that the 
success of a given suggestion attempt rests on the active (i. e. high level) efforts of the 
participating individual to create the suggested experience in question. According to the 
model outlined in chapter three, however, high level intervention is not an essential 
aspect of the suggestion process. By this view, suggested effects are the product of low 
level attentional systems selecting relevant behavioural and perceptual representations 
for the subsequent control of action and experience. It is nevertheless likely that higher 
level systems are capable of aiding this process in a number of ways. For example, 
consciously directing the focus of high level attention towards (or away from) particular 
perceptual channels could amplify the degree to which low level attentional systems 
activate or inhibit representations under their control. Alternatively, the generation of 
appropriate high level schemata could trigger a search for suggestion-related 
representations by low level attentional systems (cf. Shallice & Burgess, 1996). The type 
of higher level process involved in the generation of a suggested effect is likely to vary 
according to the nature of the desired response. High level attention and disattention 
may, for instance, play an important role in the creation of suggested analgesia (see e. g. 
Crawford, Knebel, Kaplan, Vendemia, Xie, L'Hommedieu & Pribram, 1996), while the 
construction of high level schemata could contribute to the success of ideo-motor and 
challenge suggestions 83 . 
83 By this view, the construction of a high level schema could activate suggestion-related perceptual 
representations which serve as feedback indicating that the suggested state of affairs is veridical; this 
would maximise the activation level of the behavioural representation involved in the generation of the 
suggested effect, increasing the likelihood of success. Such a position is broadly consistent with that of 
Kirsch and Lynn (1997) who propose that the successful execution of suggestions involves the prior 
creation of the subjective experience associated with the desired response (e. g. a feeling of lightness during 
an arm levitation suggestion). High level schemata could also contribute to ideo-motor and challenge 
suggestions by specifying the type of behavioural representations that would be appropriate for the 
suggested response. 
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The conceptual implications of such a view for the model outlined in chapter three are 
far-reaching indeed. In the first instance, it demonstrates that regarding suggestion as a 
purely low level process may, in many cases, be inappropriate; clearly, higher level 
processes may play an important role in this process also. Secondly, it signals the need 
for an appreciation of the more temporal aspects of suggestive responding. Rather than 
identifying suggestion as a single-step process involving the activation of low level 
representations, it may, in some cases, be more appropriately viewed as a multi-step 
process extended over time. According to this line of reasoning, the actual execution of 
the suggestion (i. e. low level attentional selection of a suggested representation) is only 
the end result of the suggestion process, and may be preceded by a number of different 
psychological events. Thirdly, such a view highlights the fact that different cognitive 
processes are probably involved in the execution of different suggestions. As such, any 
comprehensive theory of suggestion must be able to provide explanations tailored to 
individual phenomena and not just speak to suggested effects in general. Moreover, 
different processes may be responsible for the generation of the same suggested effect, 
both within and between individuals. For example, some individuals may be able to 
produce suggested phenomena on the basis of purely low level mechanisms (e. g. as in an 
action slip; Reason, 1979), while others may require the intervention of higher level 
systems to produce the same effect (see R. Brown, in press). Future theorising within this 
domain should not, therefore, limit itself to the explanation of suggested phenomena by 
reference to single processes th4t apply in all situations, as has been the case in the 
majority of previous models (including that offered here). 
The idea that high level processes often play a central role in the generation of a 
suggested response also underlines the explanatory value of the self-suggestion concept. 
Self-suggestion may be regarded as the process by which a low level representation is 
automatically selected for the control of behaviour or experience as the result of 
triggering input from the internal rather than the external environment (see chapter 
three). The automatic activation of representations following the intervention of high 
level systems provides an archetypal example of this process. Such a phenomenon is 
most likely to occur during self-hypnosis, although it may also be a common component 
of hetero-hypnoSiS84. Suggested experiences may be produced, for example, as a 
84 It is probably true that self-suggestion is a ubiquitous phenomenon within everyday life also. The types 
of representations activated in these cases are nevertheless likely to differ from those activated during 
hypnosis, for obvious reasons. 
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consequence of deliberately repeating a suggestion to oneself, rather than through 
the 
direct action of the words of the hypnotist (cf. Woody & Bowers, 1994). 
It is important to consider how such a revised account of suggestion might relate to 
existing theories within this domain. The notion that higher level processes oflcn 
contribute to the process of suggestion is broadly consistent with the sociocognitive 
position concerning the role played by the subject in the generation of suggested effects 
(see e. g. Sarbin, 1950; Spanos, 1982). By this view, the participant is not simply a 
passive automaton at the mercy of environmental influences, but an active agent 
attempting to experience the suggested effect through the use of goal-dirccted strategies. 
As such, the present model embraces the sociocognitive assertion that suggested 
behaviours may occur as the result of intentional behaviours 85 performed by the 
participating individual. Although acknowledging the validity of such a view, the present 
account differs from that of certain sociocognitive theorists (e. g. Spanos, 1982) in its 
assertion that suggested phenomena, being the product of automatic cognitive processes, 
may also be generated unintentionally. It is in this sense that the current position differs 
from classical neodissociation theory (i. e. the theory of dissociated experience; Hilgard, 
1977, cf Woody & Bowers, 1994), which posits that suggested phenomena are the 
product of purely higher level processes (see chapter 1; Kirsch & Lynn, 1995). 
The recent sociocognitive theory offered by Kirsch and Lynn (1997) also embraces the 
notion that suggested responses result from the automatic activation of low level 
representations. Unlike Kirsch ahd Lynn (1997), however, the present model does not 
require that establishing a higher level goal is a necessary part of this process. While it 
may be a common component, particularly in the hypnotic situation, the present model 
asserts that suggested behaviours can occur as the exclusive product of lower level 
85 What constitutes an adequate definition of intentional behaviour remains a contentious issue within this 
sphere. One possibility is that intentional behaviours are those that are executed in the pursuit of a prc-set 
goal established by higher level systems, a view largely in line with that offered by Kirsch and Lynn 
(1997). Such a definition is appealing because it embraces the notion that behaviours can be considered 
intentional even if they have been carried out by lower level systems (Kirsch & Lynn, 1997). Common 
sense accounts of intention also fit neatly with this view. It is unlikely, for example, that a driver who 
swerves to avoid a pedestrian would claim that they had done so unintentionally, even if they were to 
acknowledge that their behaviour had been controlled automatically at the time. In this case, the action of 
swerving is a product of a low level process that is consistent with the higher level goal of driving safely. 
This is some way from a comprehensive explanation of the relationship between intention and behaviour. 
In particular, such an account fails to explain why we are often unaware of setting such higher level goals 
in the context of everyday action. It may be that the act of setting a goal for a routine behaviour such as 
driving is so undemanding of higher level systems that its expression within conscious awareness is too 
brief to establish an adequate memory trace for subsequent recall. How one might assess the validity of 
such a view empirically is far from certain, however (see Velmans, 1991, and the accompanying 




processing, as in the case of an action slip (see Reason, 1979). The notion that 
suggested phenomena may, in certain circumstances, be the product of purely 
unintentional cognitive processes (i. e. the direct activation of low level representations) 
is consistent with the model of suggestion outlined by dissociative control theorists (e. g. 
Bowers, 1990,1992; Woody & Bowers, 1994). In the present case, however, both high 
level inhibition and high level activation may facilitate the automatic activation of 
representations, implicating both unintentional and intentional cognitive processes in the 
generation of suggested effects. Viewed in this light, the present model offers even 
greater scope for conceptual reconciliation between the dissociative and sociocognitivc 
models than previously thought. 
The preceding discussion illustrates the type of role that high level processes might 
play in the generation of suggested effects. In each case, individual differences in both 
high and low level attentional abilities are likely to influence the probability of success in 
a given suggestion attempt. In line with the results described here, it may be that the 
most suggestible individuals will be those who have a preference for a low level style of 
cognition in combination with good cognitive flexibility. Such a disposition would allow 
for the use of high level strategies to augment an everyday tendency to control behaviour 
and experience on the basis of low level representations. That notwithstanding, the 
current model proposes that there are a number of different paths to good suggestive 
responsivity. For instance, individuals with a strong preference for low level cognition 
may not require good higher 1ývel abilities to respond successfully to suggestions, 
whereas those with very good higher level abilities may not require a low level 
processing bias to achieve the same results. Such a pattern of relationships could offer 
one further reason why the magnitude of the obtained correlations between the HGSHS 
and the low level processing predisposition questionnaires are not as large as one might 
hope. 
10.2.3 Hypnosis. 12rocessing bias and critical thouqht 
Having addressed the conceptual implications of studies 1,2 and 2b for the theoretical 
framework outlined here, the discussion now turns to the findings of studies 3 and 4. In 
study 3, the prediction that hypnosis is associated with an increased preference for low 
level processing was assessed by comparing high and low suggestible subjects in 
96 In such cases, the suggested phenomenon in question may be considered genuinely unintentional; it 
appears purposeful, however, as it involves the execution of a well learrit behavioural routine established in 
line with previous system goals. 
247 
baseline, relaxation and hypnosis conditions on the triad classification and perceptual 
filtering tasks employed in study 2. No evidence was found to suggest that there wcre 
any differences between the conditions or groups on either of the tasks. In study 4, the 
prediction that hypnosis is associated with a reduced ability to think in a critical fashion 
was assessed by comparing high and low suggestibles in hypnosis and relaxation 
conditions on a syllogistic reasoning task similar to that used in study 2. No evidence 
was found to suggest that critical thinking ability is any different in the two conditions 
for either group of subjects. As such, neither of these studies provide support for the 
theoretical model of hypnosis outlined in chapter three. 
The fact that the research described in this thesis supports only the current model's 
predictions concerning suggestibility and not hypnosis illustrates the preliminary nature 
of this explanatory framework. Clearly, there is some way to go before the model can 
provide a satisfactory description of such phenomena, and a considerable amount of 
empirical validation is required if this is to be achieved. Nevertheless, the findings 
obtained in this thesis will play an important role in shaping further theoretical 
development, with both significant and non-significant findings contributing 
substantially in this regard. The fact that significant evidence has been obtained with 
regards to suggestibility is particularly encouraging, indicating that the present account 
of suggestion (both hypnotic and non-hypnotic alike) and suggestibility is at least on the 
right track and therefore worthy of further investigation. The fact that no significant 
evidence concerning hypnosis itself has been obtained clearly demonstrates that the 
current model of hypnosis must be reconsidered and an alternative account provided. 
Importantly, the findings of studies 3 and 4 will be instructive in this regard. 
In the first instance, the possibility that the non-significant findings obtained in these 
studies was a result of an inadequate level of hypnotic depth (i. e. absorption) being 
achieved in each case should be considered. However, although the data obtained in 
these studies is insufficient to categorically reject this interpretation, there is an 
alternative account which arguably provides a more probable explanation of these 
findings, whilst still retaining the notion that hypnosis involves a shift in processing 
preference brought about by a reduction in critical thought. According to the model of 
hypnosis presented here, the most important state change occurring during hypnosis is 
the induction of a state of extremely focused attention or absorption. It is the induction of 
this absorbed state that, according to the present view, is responsible for the reduction of 
critical thought and resulting shift towards low level cognitive processin .g presumed to be 
occurring during hypnosis. Moreover, by this view it is the dynamic relationship between 
248 
attention, critical thought and low level cognitive processing that underpins suggestive 
responding, both during hypnosis and in the control of routine behaviour generally. 
However, the model does not suggest that the state of absorption obtained during 
hypnosis is immutable, only that a certain degree of attention 87 is required to successfully 
respond to a suggestion. Indeed, it is quite likely that the status of attention and cognition 
during hypnosis will be subject to considerable change, depending on the nature of the 
suggestions given and the activities engaged in. If this is the case, then giving an 
individual a syllogistic reasoning, triad classification or perceptual filtering task during 
hypnosis will simply create a demand, a suggestion even, to adopt a style of attention and 
cognition that is appropriate for the task in question. As a result, the individual will 
complete the task just as well during hypnosis as outside it, or possibly even slightly 
(although not significantly) better simply because they are more focused on it. Thus, one 
need not predict an increase in perceptual interference or similarity-based responding in 
triad classification and still retain the notion that a shift towards lower level processing is 
an inherent part of suggestive responding. Similarly, it can be argued that reduced critical 
thought is an important element in suggestive responding and a common element of the 
hypnotic experience without expecting an inferior reasoning performance following an 
hypnotic induction. 
Such a view, should its validity be established, would have important conceptual and 
methodological implications. On the conceptual side, it would suggest that absorption is 
not a state in which the critical faculties and attentional abilities of the absorbed 
individual are irrevocably inhibited as suggested by dissociated control theory. Rather, 
by this view absorption should be reconceived as a state in which the absorbed subject 
achieves greater control over their attentional processes 88 , endowing them with the 
ability to selectively attend (or disattend) to relevant information according to the nature 
of the suggestion or task given. Such an increase in cognitive flexibility (Crawford, 
1989) during hypnosis would have the same augmenting effect on suggestibility that an 
inhibition of higher control would have, but at the same time allow for the existence of 
self-hypnosis. Such a view is consistent with that presented in the previous section 
87 And therefore reduction in critical thought/increase in low level processing bias. 
88 Something of a similar view has been proposed by Spiegel (e. g. 1998) and the neuropsychophysiological 
theory of Crawford and Gruzelier (1992; see also Gruzelier, 1998), except in these cases attentional control 
is ceded to the hypnotist rather than retained by the hypnotic subject themselves. However, as virtually 
identical hypnotic phenomena are possible during self-hypnosis as hetero-hypnosis, it seems more 
appropriate to place control in the hands of the subject and not the hypnotist. That is not to say, however, 
that during hetero-hypnosis the hypnotist is not the one controlling the subjects' focus of attention and 
inattention; it merely suggests that this need not necessarily be the case. 
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concerning the relationship between suggestibility and cognitive flexibility and the role 
of higher level processes in suggestive responding. Nevertheless, one of the mechanisms 
by which this absorbed state is achieved, and perhaps one of the products of such a state 
unless otherwise directed, may still be a (deliberate) reduction in critical thought and a 
shift towards low level processing. Indeed, it is possible that such a state of enhanced 
attentional control could be the result of processes associated with both low and high 
level attentional systems, a notion which would fit neatly with the mechanisms of 
suggestion outlined here. 
According to this view, hypnosis researchers should stop speaking of hypnosis in static 
terms where one is in a particular state or not, but rather speak of it in fluid terms 
encompassing a variety of states and modes of processing that vary over time and 
instructions (cf. Kihlstrom, 1985). Indeed, with the advances made by recent 
neuropsychophysiological research and theory, the theoretical emphasis within the field 
has, to an extent, shifted towards a dynamic view of hypnosis with an appreciation of its 
more temporal aspects (see also section 10.2.2). One of the most important contributions 
of recent neuro-psychophysiological research is arguably the attention it has drawn to the 
fact that hypnosis involves considerable physiological change, which is largely 
dependent on how hypnosis is induced and what one does thereafter. If the field is to 
progress it is essential that our theories, and the methodologies we use to assess them, 
recognise this fact. 
The methodological implications of such a view are clear. Assuming that attentional 
absorption is actually controllable/flexible then assessing state changes through ability 
and preference measures, such as those used in studies 3 and 4, is unlikely to show 
anything of real interest because the individual, without further instruction, will simply 
complete the tasks in the same way as normal. The only such measures likely to yield 
findings of any interest by this view would be those assessing cognitive flexibility itself, 
with the clear prediction being that, given comparable baseline abilities, absorbed 
individuals will complete them better than those who are not absorbed. If one is aiming 
to understand the state changes associated with absorption alone then more indirect 
measures, such as physiological assessment, which do not create suggestive demands are 
required. Other indirect measures, such as the Stroop task, may also be instructive in this 
regard, although given the theoretical dispute surrounding the concept of automaticity a 
set of converging operations (as opposed to a single task) would be required before any 
firm theoretical statements could be made concerning the processes involved in 
absorption. 
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Of course, although these conceptual and methodological speculations are potentially 
important, one must not lose sight of the fact that the negative results concerning 
hypnosis reported in this thesis also support the alternative, less state-oricntcd position, 
that absorption has no effect on suggestibility at all. By this view, the increases in 
suggestibility typically observed following an hypnotic induction are simply the product 
of the interaction between expectations and contextual cues. Thus, while absorption may 
or may not be a common component of the hypnotic experience, it has no functional 
significance with regards suggestion and suggestibility and merely serves to detract 
attention away from the processes of real interest. If one is to reject this position then a 
direct and measurable (preferably not by self-report) manipulation of absorption is 
required to assess whether or not it has any significant effect on suggestibility levels. 
Simply comparing those individuals who have been given an hypnotic induction with 
those who have not would be insufficient unless one can be certain that the only 
difference between these conditions is in level of absorption. However, as this is unlikely 
given the functional role that the hypnotic label appears to play in determining the degree 
and nature of suggestive responding, this hypothesis would probably be best examined in 
a context entirely divorced from hypnosis. This obviously raises the question of how 
absorption can be manipulated without using explicitly hypnotic techniques, although the 
fact that absorption does not appear to be unique to hypnosis (Kirsch, 1998) at least 
suggests that this is possible. 
10.2.4 Methodological limitations and future research 
Although evidence concerning the relationship between suggestibility and low level 
processing preference has been obtained here, this evidence is not as convincing as one 
would hope. In each case, the correlations between suggestibility and low level 
processing preference are, despite being statistically significant, rather disappointing in 
tenns of effect size. Clearly, therefore, empirical replication using a more rigorous 
methodology is required before any firm conclusions concerning the relationship 
between suggestibility and processing preference can be drawn. Accordingly, this section 
will focus on the methodological limitations of the empirical research described here and 
their implications for future research in this domain. 
10.2.4.1 Task-related problems and modifications 
With the aid of hindsight, it is easy to identify certain limitations of specific measures 
used in this thesis. As with all self-report measures, the questionnaires used in study I 
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(see chapter five) are inherently limited by their subjective nature. Such measures arc 
subject to considerable variation from several sources unrelated to the construct of 
interest, namely processing preference. In particular, sclf-rcport responses arc 
inextricably linked to the criteria used by subjects to judge whether and to what degree a 
particular statement is characteristic of them. Individual value judgements regarding the 
behaviours and processes described in these questionnaires may also be a significant 
source of response bias. For example, a subject with negative opinions concerning the 
value of intuition is unlikely to endorse items relating to it, despite the fact that on a 
cognitive level they may have a relative tendency towards such processing. The fact that 
the questionnaires used here are relatively transparent regarding the object of their study 
may well contribute to any such effect. A related problem is that subjects' responses are 
ultimately related to their perceptions of their own behaviour and cognition, which may 
or may not be an accurate reflection of reality. Given the methodological limitations of 
questionnaires such as the RVEI and ILP it may not be surprising that the observed 
correlations between these scales and the HGSHS: A are modest at best. A further 
problem with the questionnaires used here is the fact that they do not provide 
comprehensive coverage of the domain of lower level processes identified in chapter 
two. While the RVEI, ILP and HIPS encompass the concepts of holistic processing, 
intuition, emotion and creativity, for example, they say little or nothing about impulsivity 
and the tendency to move into "automatic-pilot" for the control of behaviour. 
Accordingly, the author is curreiltly engaged in the psychometric validation of a new 
self-report instrument that, in addition to items from the appropriate sections of the 
RVEI, ILP and HIPS, includes others addressing these aspects of low level processing 
also. It is hoped that any pertinent findings concerning this measure, the so-called low 
level processing questionnaire (LLPQ), will be reported elsewhere. 
In contrast to the questionnaires used in study 1, measures such as the triad 
classification task and the MFFT do a better job at concealing what they are attempting 
to measure and may offer a more objective assessment of processing preference as a 
result. That notwithstanding, there are certain problems with these measures as they have 
been used here. For example, the triad classification measure consisted entirely of critical 
items, potentially encouraging subjects to adopt a rigid response strategy to complete the 
task. As a result, item responses may reflect the application of a rule rather than a 
predilection for a particular type of perceptual processing. This may be overcome in 
future research by presenting the critical items alongside filler items drawn from the 
same set of stimuli but not forming the target configuration (see figures 6.1 and 6.2). 
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Limiting the task to the stimulus dimensions of size and brightness (i. e. the square 
stimuli used here) would also be an appropriate step given the findings reported here. 
Research using such a task is currently underway to reassess the relationship between 
suggestibility and perceptual integrality-sep arability. 
In contrast to the triad classification task, the MFFT provides a performance measure 
specifically designed to tap individual differences in response strategy (Kagan, 1965; see 
also Kagan et al, 1964). Even given the relative objectivity that this may provide, 
however, the MFFT may not yield an accurate assessment of processing preference due 
to the way that it is scored. Although a short first-response latency may be indicative of 
an impulsive response set in many cases, such an interpretation may not apply when a 
quick initial response is followed by a more cautious approach on subsequent attempts. 
Deriving a performance measure from all response latencies rather than just the first 
would be one obvious solution to this problem. The uncertainty surrounding the 
relationship between suggestibility and reflection-impulsivity may be resolved by the use 
of such a modifled version of the MFFT in future research. 
One potential problem with Raven's matrices is the possibility that subjects may have 
arrived at correct solutions to certain items using holistic rather analytic cognitive 
processes (Hunt, 1974). Conducting a careful task analysis to identify those items that 
can only be solved through the use of analytical processing would be a necessary first 
step in the creation of a revised Raven's matrices measure for future research in this 
domain. It is hoped that the relatilonship between suggestibility and high level processing 
ability, only hinted at here, may be brought into sharper focus by the use of such a 
measure. 
10.2.4.2 The measurement of suggestibility 
Probably the most significant limitation of the empirical research described here relates 
to the assessment of suggestibility, provided in this context by the HGSHS: A. There are 
a number of methodological problems associated with the HGSHS: A which may have 
contributed to the equivocality of the current findings. In the first instance, the 
HGSHS: A may be subject to considerable measurement error associated with its group 
administration. Although group testing has the advantage of being practical, individuals 
may not behave in the same way in a group as they would on their own. The increased 
social demand of group testing may, for example, increase the likelihood of subject 
compliance, artificially inflating suggestibility scores as a result. Conversely, subjects 
may feel more inhibited in a group situation and feel less inclined (or be less able) to 
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respond in line with the scale suggestions. Similarly, participants may be exposed to 
additional distractions in the group environment that prevent them from concentrating on 
the suggestions to the required degree. The fact that HGSHS: A administration employed 
varying group sizes, ranging from two to fifty individuals, may also have contributed to 
measurement error in this context. Ultimately, however, employing a group administered 
test of suggestibility seemed the only realistic option given the practical constraints 
placed on the current undertaking. In retrospect, it may have been more appropriate to 
concentrate on conducting fewer studies using more reliable, individually administered 
measures. 
A second major problem with the HGSHS: A is the potential for it to overestimate 
suggestibility levels (Bowers, 1983). Compared to a measure such as the SHSS: C 
(Wcitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962), the HGSHS: A incorporates only a small number of 
difficult cognitive items (e. g. negative hallucination) and concentrates largely upon 
easier suggestions for ideo-motor movements and inhibition (e. g. arm levitation and hand 
clasp). As such, only a proportion of the individuals who score highly on the HGSHS: A 
would do so on other measures of suggestibility. The overestimation of suggestibility by 
the HGSHS: A, coupled with the relatively lax criteria used for participant selection, 
almost certainly resulted in the inclusion of subjects in studies 3 and 4 who would not be 
regarded as genuinely high in hypnotic suggestibility. It is possible that the absence of 
any significant findings in these studies is a product of such subject selection procedures. 
The HGSHS: A could also be'criticised for failing to provide an assessment of the 
subjective experiences associated with behavioural responses on the test. As the 
experience of suggestion-related involuntariness and effortlessness is arguably the 
hallmark of a successfully suggested response (Weitzenhoffer, 1953), any test which 
fails to consider such experiences can only provide a limited assessment of suggestibility 
(Spanos, Salas, Menary & Brett, 1986). With this in mind, a measure such as the CURSS 
(Spanos, Radtke et al, 1983), which incorporates both objective and subjective scales, 
may have provided a more suitable instrument for the assessment of suggestibility in this 
thesis. It is possible that the correlations between suggestibility and low level processing 
preference obtained here would have been stronger if such a multidimensional scale had 
been used instead of the HGSHS: A. 
Probably the most substantive criticism of the data collection performed here concerns 
the use of a single testing occasion for the measurement of suggestibility. The decision to 
take only a single assessment of suggestibility was based on two things. First and 
foremost, taking two suggestibility measures would have increased the amount of data 
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collection to a level incompatible with the practical constraints placed on the present 
endeavour. Secondly, the test-retest reliability of the HGSHS: A (Hilgard, 1965) was 
considered high enough to render a further assessment of suggestibility unnecessary. 
There are a number of reasons, however, to assume that multiple testing provides a more 
reliable estimate of suggestibility than a single testing occasion (cf. Kurtz & Strube, 
1996). It is possible, for example, that subjects feel more distracted and less relaxed 
during an initial encounter with hypnosis and find themselves less able to engage in the 
suggestions than one would like. Any increase in rapport across testing occasions may 
also contribute to subsequent suggestibility test performance. Perhaps more importantly, 
if one takes the view that responding to suggestions involves an element of acquired skill 
(see e. g. Gorassini & Spanos, 1986), first test measurements of suggestibility are 
unlikely to provide an entirely accurate reflection of an individual's ultimate responsivity 
to suggestion". As such, it may have been more appropriate to address fewer empirical 
issues in this context and invest more time in establishing reliable suggestibility 
estimates through multiple testing. Such a practice is recommended for future research in 
this domain. 
In addition to such methodological limitations, there are certain conceptual problems 
associated with the measurement of suggestibility in the research described here. 
Throughout this thesis, the term 'suggestibility' has been used almost exclusively to refer 
to the individual difference dimension assessed by the HGSHS: A. Such a practice is 
based on the assumption that fests of so-called hypnotic susceptibility, such as the 
Harvard Group Scale, provide an effective measure of the degree to which individuals 
respond to suggestions, regardless of whether or not they have received an hypnotic 
induction. However, the Harvard Group Scale does include an hypnotic induction and 
scores obtained on it will, at least to an extent, have been contaminated by this. Indeed, 
one of the central assumptions of the current model is that hypnosis has a significant 
effect on suggestibility levels through the induction of an absorbed state involving a 
reduction in critical thought and an increase in low level processing preference. As such, 
the significant correlations obtained here with the HGSHS may be a product of the 
inclusion of the hypnotic induction on the scale; thus, a low level processing preference 
may have nothing to do with suggestibility per se, but rather is associated with 
absorption itself with this being the source of the significant findings reported here. 
'9 Indeed, this would be true of second experiences with hypnosis also. It is inevitable, however, that a 
second assessment of any skill would yield a better estimate of asymptotic performance than that provided 
by an initial test. 
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As such, a more careful usage of the terms suggestibility and susceptibility is 
recommended, as are methodological steps which take this caution into account. 
Accordingly, it is proposed that the term "suggestibility" be used to refer only to the 
degree to which individuals respond to suggestions, with a "hypnotic" qualifier bcing 
used when responsivity to suggestion is being assessed in an explicitly hypnotic context 
(i. e. one which has been labelled as such by all concerned). Following the current model, 
one would predict that suggestibility so defined will be related primarily to a low level 
processing predisposition, which is in turn influenced by attention, critical thought, 
expectations and contextual cues. In contrast the term "hypnotic susceptibility" should be 
reserved to refer specifically to an individual's receptivity to the state changes that the 
current model assumes are occurring during hypnosis, and the contextual and 
expectational cues that influence the induction of such changes. Thus, one would predict 
that hypnotic susceptibility as defined in this way will be related to the propensity to 
become absorbed, inhibit critical thought and experience a processing shift towards low 
level processing, as well as the belief that hypnosis involves these or similar state 
changes. 
Clearly, there is overlap between these two concepts, although the distinction has 
obvious conceptual and methodological implications. By this view, so-called hypnotic 
susceptibility tests such as the HGSHS: A are ill defined because they contaminate 
suggestibility and susceptibility as they are described here. Rather, these tests should be 
redefined as measuring hypnotib suggestibility (cf Kirsch, 1997), with information 
concerning hypnotic susceptibility being provided only by a comparison of suggestibility 
in hypnotic and non-hypnotic conditions (Kirsch, 1997). In this fashion, one could assess 
whether the low level processing measures significantly correlated with the HGSHS in 
this thesis are so related due to suggestibility or susceptibility factors; indeed, in all 
research investigating suggestion and hypnosis such a practice is recommended. 
10.2.4.3 Future directions 
If the present account of suggestion and hypnosis is to be established as a useful 
theoretical model within this domain, further conceptual and empirical development is 
essential. On the conceptual side, it is likely that the current model, which aims to 
account for all suggestions by reference to a common set of processes, fails to recognise 
important differences between suggested phenomena. As such, further work needs to be 
done to establish the functional differences between suggestion types. Such an analysis 
may provide important information concerning why some individuals respond well to 
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some suggestions and not others (see e. g. Bowers, 1983). In a similar vein, the notion 
that different cognitive processes can be responsible for the same suggested response 
should also be investigated. In each of these cases, a likely avenue for conceptual 
development may involve explorative research looking at the differences between and 
within individuals who respond successfully to different types of suggestions. Other 
aspects of the model, such as the concepts of absorption and post-hoc interpretation, also 
remain relatively ill defined and require further conceptual elaboration if they arc to 
prove useful. Conceptual development could also address the role of suggestion in 
contexts other than hypnosis. One potentially productive avenue for such development 
concerns the role of suggestion in the development of medically unexplained symptoms 
(Brown & Trimble, 1999, in preparation). Theoretical and empirical research based on 
this notion is currently underway. 
Regarding the model of the cognitive architecture outlined in chapter two, resources 
should be put into identifying the physiological and anatomical substrates of the 
cognitive processes and systems described here. The concept of low level attention also 
needs to be described in far more detail, with particular emphasis on the processes by 
which low level representations are selected and integrated to form a unitary perceptual 
whole for further, higher level processing. The theoretical work of Marcel (1983) may be 
particularly instructive in this regard. The present model is also a long way from 
providing a satisfactory account of the relationship between cognition, phenomenology 
and intentionality; without silch an understanding it is unlikely that a truly 
comprehensive account of suggestion and hypnosis will ever be possible9o. 
On the empirical side, a number of possible avenues for future exploration come to 
mind. In the first instance, an attempt at replicating the observed relationship between 
suggestibility and low level processing preference is essential, as is a re-examination of 
the relationship between suggestibility, reflection-impulsivity and analytical processing 
ability. Recommendations concerning the most appropriate empirical approach to these 
issues are presented in sections 10.2.4.1 and 10.2.4.2. The notion that the increased 
suggestibility typical of the hypnotic situation is jointly determined by context-related 
expectations, the generation of intense absorption and a reduction in critical thought 
should also receive greater attention in future research. As discussed in section 10.2.3, 
however, the empirical approach adopted in this thesis may not be an appropriate 
90 It is inevitable the many other aspects of the models outlined in chapters two and three are in need of 
conceptual elaboration. Those described here simply represent the most pertinent in the opinion of the 
author at the current time. 
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strategy for the evaluation of these hypotheses: if, as suggested by this view, "hypnotic" 
absorption is associated with an increased ability to control attention, one would not 
anticipate altered performance on tasks assessing perceptual processing preference and 
the ability to think critically. Rather than assessing whether hypnosis is associated with a 
reduction in critical thought or a low level processing bias, an alternative approach might 
be to assess whether the hypnotic context, absorption and reduced critical thought 
increase the ability to respond to suggestions. An appropriately designed study looking at 
these variables in combination 91 with one another may allow one to assess both their 
individual and their interactive affect on suggestibility, thereby offering a way of 
identifying the components of importance within a hypnotic induction. The author is 
currently involved in a study that adopts such a design. Research of this sort is essential 
if we are to establish whether increased suggestibility is a unique aspect of the hypnotic 
situation or something that can be achieved by other manipulations of state and context. 
If the latter were to prove possible, as one might predict following the model of 
suggestion outlined in this thesis, such research could lead to the eventual demise of 
hypnosis as a conceptual and practical entity, to be superseded by alternatives more 
confidently grounded in contemporary psychological research and theory. 
91 For example, a2x2x2 between subjects design taking context (non-hypnotic vs. hypnotic), absorption 
(instructions to become absorbed vs. no instructions) and critical thought (instructions to reduce critical 
thought vs. no instructions) as independent variables and change in suggestibility as a dependent variable. 
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APA Definition and description of hypnosis (taken from Kirsch, 1994) 
Hypnosis is a procedure during which a health professional or researcher suggests that 
a client, patient, or subject experience changes in sensations, perceptions, thoughts, or 
behaviour. The hypnotic context is generally established by an induction procedure. 
Although there are many different hypnotic inductions, most include suggestions for 
relaxation, calmness and well-being. Instructions to imagine or think about pleasant 
experiences are also commonly included in hypnotic inductions. 
People respond to hypnosis in different ways. Some describe their experience as an 
altered state of consciousness. Others describe hypnosis as a normal state offocused 
attention, in which they feel very calm and relaxed. Regardless of how and to what 
degree they respond, mostpeople describe the experience as verypleasant. 
Some people are very responsive to hypnotic suggestions and others are less 
responsive. A person's ability to experience hypnotic suggestions can be inhibited by 
fears and concerns arising from some common misconceptions. Contrary to some 
depictions of hypnosis in books, movies or on television, people who have been 
hypnotized do not lose control over their behaviour. They typically remain aware of who 
they are and where they are, and unless amnesia has been specifically suggested, they 
usually remembered what transpired during hypnosis. Hypnosis makes it easier for 
people to respond to suggestions, but it does notforce them to have them experiences. 
Hypnosis is not a type of therapy, like psychoanalysis or behaviour therapy. Instead, it 
is a procedure that can be used tofacilitate therapy. Because it is not a treatment in and 
of itsetf, training in hypnosis is not sujficient for the conduct of therapy. Clinical 
hypnosis is should be used only by properly trained and credentialed health care 
professionals (e. g. licensed clinical psychologists), who have also been trained in the 
clinical use of hypnosis and are working within the areas of their professional expertise. 
Hypnosis has been used in the treatment of pain, depression, anxiety, stress, habit 
disorders, and many other psychological and medical problems. However, it may not be 
useful for all psychological problems or for all patients or clients. The decision to use 
hypnosis as an adjunct to treatment can only he made in consultation with a qualified 
health care provider who has been trained in the use and limitations of clinical hypnosis. 
In addition to its use in clinical settings, hypnosis is used in research, with the goal of 
learning more about the nature of hypnosis itsetf, as well as its impact on sensation, 
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perception, learning, memory, and physiology. Researchers also study the value of 
hypnosis in the treatment ofphysical andpsychological problems. 
296 
APPENDIX 11 
Instructions for perceptual filtering task used in studies two and three 
The following instructions were read verbatim to subjects prior to completion of the task. 
Don presentation of flrst set of cards U 
Okay, I have here a set of cards. On each card there is a line, and there are two types of 
line: short lines (lines with a small angle 92 ) and long lines (lines with a large angle). All the 
long lines (large angles) are the same size and all the short lines (small angles) are the same 
size. Now, what I want you to do is sort the cards, as quickly as you call and with as few 
errors as possible, into two piles, one of short lines (small angles) and one of long lines 
(large angles). I am going to ask you to sort the cards ten times in all, with the first four 
sorts being practice trials as you don't know what constitutes a short (small angle) or long 
(large angle) line yet. I am going to be timing you while you do this and, after thefirstfour 
sorts, I will also tell you whether you have made any mistakes or not. Remember to sort the 
cards as quickly as you can and with as few errors as possible. Do you have any questions? 
(any questions are answered by paraphrasing the above instructions) Here comes thefirst 
sort: are you ready? Okay, when I say "go" start sorting the cards. (Timing begins with 
Experimenter saying "go"). 
After the first four card-sorts the following instructions are read verbatim to subjects 
Okay, that was thefinal practice trial, The next six trials arefor real. I will now tell you if 
you have made any mistakes after each sort. Are you ready? Okay, here comes the next sort. 
After the six experimental card-sorts the following instructions are read verbatim to subjects 
That was the final sort of that kind. I am now going to ask you to do ten more card-sorts 
which are slightly different this time. Before I asked you to sort the cards on the basis of line 
92 The instructions presented here arbitrarily take line length as the initial sorting dimension and line angle as 
the secondary sorting dimension. The phrasing for the alternative dimensions are presented in parentheses. In 
cases where angle was the sorting dimension, it was demonstrated to subjects that the angle in question was 
that measured from the horizontal as taken from the lowest point of the line. 
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length (line angle). Now I am going to ask you to sort the cards on the basis of line angle 
(line length). As before, there are two types of line, lines with a small angle (short lines) and 
lines with a large angle (long lines). . 411 the small angles (short lines) are the same size and 
all the large angles (long lines) are the same size. Now, what I want you to do is sort the 
cards, as quickly as you can and with as few errors as possible, into two piles, one ofsmall 
angles (short lines) and one of large angles (long lines). I am going to be timing you while 
you do this and, after the first four sorts, I will also tell you whether you have made any 
mistakes or not. Remember to sort the cards as quickly as you can and with asfew errors as 
possible. Do you have any questions? (any questions arc answered by paraphrasing the 
above instructions) Here comes the first sort: are you ready? Okay, when I say "go" start 
sorting the cards. (Timing begins with Experimenter saying "go"). 
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APPENDIX 111 
Instructions for triad classification task used in studies two and three 
The following instructions were read verbatim to subjects prior to completion of the task. 
Okay, I have here a set of cards. On each card there are three items, either three lilies, three 
triangles or three squares (subject is shown first card as an example). Now, what I want you 
to do is simply say, for each card, which two of the three items go together the best Yhat: r 
right, which two of the three go together the best Yhere are two points to note. First, there 
are no right or wrong answers. Second, you can take as long as You likefor any one card 
You can refer to the items as top, middle and bottom or you can simply point to the two you 
think go together the best. Do you have any questions? (any questions are answered by 
paraphrasing the above instructions) Are you ready? Okay, here is thefirst card. 
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APPENDIXIV 
Instructions for Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices (set II) used in study two 
The following instructions were read verbatim to subjects prior to completion of the task. 
Okay, I am now going to present you with a series ofpictures. Each picture consists of a 
three by three grid and the bottom right hand element of that grid is missing. Now, what I 
want you to do is simply say which of the eight alternatives at the bottom of each picture 
wouldfit in the missingportion ofthe grid. Only one of the eight alternatives willfit andyou 
must tell me which it is. Ifyou think you know the correct answer then tell me which of the 
eight alternatives you thinkfits. I am not timing you so you can take as long as you like. Do 
you have any questions? (any questions are answered by paraphrasing the above) There are 
twelve pictures in all. Here comes thefirst one. 
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APPENDIX V 
Instructions for Matching Familiar Figures Test 
The following (original task) instructions were read verbatim to subjects prior to completion 
of the task. 
I am going to show you a picture of a familiar item and then some pictures that look like it. 
You will have to point to the picture on the bottom of this page (point) that is just like the 
one on this top page (point). Let's do somefor practice. (Experimenter gives practice items. 
Now we are going to do some that are a bit harder. You will see a picture on top and eight 
pictures on the bottom. Find the one that is just like the one on top and point to it. 
(Experimenter gives main test items). 
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APPENDIX VI 
Syllogistic Reasoning Task used in study two 
The following fifteen questions were presented in an A4 response booklet with the 
instructions presented in appendix VII on the front page. Question answers are provided for 
instructive purposes. 
Question I 
All authors are bakers. 
All bakers are comedians. 
What follows? 
Answer: All authors are comedians. 
Question 2 
No accountants are butchers. 
All cooks are butchers. 
What follows? 
Answer: No accountants are cooks or (vice versa). 
Question 3 
No painters are teachers. 
All cyclists are painters. 
What follows? 
Answer: No cyclists are teachers (or vice versa). 
Question 4 
All bakers are authors. 
All comedians are bakers. 
What follows? 
Answer: All comedians are authors. 
302 
Question 5 
Some accountants are butchers. 
No butchers are cooks. 
What follows? 
Answer: Some accountants are not cooks. 
Question 6 
Some teachers are painters. 
All painters are cyclists. 
What follows? 
Answer: Some teachers are cyclists. 
Question 7 
All authors are bakers. 
No comedians are bakers. 
What follows? 
Answer. No authors are comedians (or vice versa). 
Question 8 
All butchers are accountants. 
Some butchers are cooks. 
What follows? 
Answer: Some accountants are cooks (or vice versa). 
Question 9 
All painters are teachers. 
Some painters are not cyclists 
What follows? 
Answer: Some teachers are not cyclists (or some teachers are cyclists). 
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Question 10 
All bakers are authors. 
All bakers are comedians. 
What follows? 
Answer: Some authors are comedians (or vice versa). 
Question 11 
All butchers are accountants. 
Some cooks are butchers. 
What follows? 
Answer. Some cooks are accountants (or vice versa). 
Question 12 
All teachers are painters. 
No painters are cyclists. 
What follows? 
Answer. No teachers are cyclists. 
Question 13 
Some bakers are authors. 
All bakers are comedians. 
What follows? 
Answer: Some authors are comedians (or vice versa). 
Question 14 
All accountants are butchers. 
Some cooks are not butchers. 
What follows? 
Answer: Some cooks are not accountants (or vice versa). 
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Question 15 
A painters are teachers. 
No cyclists are painters. 
What follows? 
Answer: Some teachers are not c lists. Yc 
End oftask 
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APPENDIX VII ' 
Instructions for Syllogistic Reasoning Task used in study two 
The following instructions were presented on the front page of the response booklet 
containing the syllogistic reasoning task described in appendix VI. 
In this task you will be asked to read two statements. Your task is to write down what 
logicallyfollows from these statements. Please take as much time as youfeel necessary. Do 
not wor? y ifyou find some of the questions difficult: some of them are meant to be hard. 
There are no trick questions. If you have any questions about the task please free to ask, 
preferably before you start writing. Obviously, we cannot help you in answering the 
questions themselves. Please answer all the questions. 
Here are a couple of examples: 
Example I 
All doctors are Egyptologists. 
All Egyptologists arefarmers. 
Ratfollows? 
Answer: All doctors are farmers 
Example 2 
All Egyptologists are doctors. 
Somejarmers are Egyptologists. 
natfollows? 
Answer: Some farmers are doctors 
Please turn over and begin the task when you are ready. 
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APPENDIX VIII 
Visual analogue scales for (a) happy; and (b) relaxed mood self-reports 
(a) 
At this moment in time, how HAPPY do you feel? Please indicate on the line below. 
As unhappy as As happy as 
I can be I can be 
(b) 
At this moment in time, how RELAXED do you feel? Please indicate on the line below. 
As unrelaxed as 
I can be 
As relaxed as 
I can be 
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APPENDIX IX 
Script for hypnotic induction and deinduction used in studies 3 and 4 
The following script was written by Dr. David Oakley in collaboration with the author. 
Three dots in the script indicate a brief pause in the reading of the text. The script was 
recorded verbatim on audio-cassette. 
Hypnotic induction 
OK just sit back as comfortably as you can with your eyes closed... just breathing nice and 
easy and gen fly... and as you breathe in be aware of the coolness of the air... and as you 
breathe out... the air slightly warmer and moister... and imagine yoursetr.. as you breathe 
easily and gently... as relaxed and comfortable as you can be at the moment. Imagining 
yoursetr breathing away the tension or stress in your body... It might help to imagine a 
colour... a particular colour which represents tension. natever colour come to mind to 
represent tension in your body... just imagining that colour now... and imagining yoursetr 
beginning to breathe out... breath which is coloured or tinged with that colour of tension ... 
and so you can almost see yourseý( breathing away the tension and stress in your body ... 
with every breath you take... just becoming more and more relaxed, more comfortable, 
easier and more relaxed... just breathing away the tension... with each breath tinged with 
the colour of tension... so that th'ose tense feelings can simply drift away as you breathe 
out... and the tension can just drift away... into the air... to be dispersed where it can't 
affect you anymore... and as time goes by you may be aware of the breath becoming lighter 
and lighter in colour as all the tension is just breathed away... and as you breathe out in 
particular ... feel yourset(sinking down into the support of the chair beneath you... andfeel 
yoursetf becoming more comfortable... more relaxed as time goes by ... also be aware of the 
muscles in your body becoming easier and looser and more relaxed ... begin, perhaps with 
the muscles in your legs and just imagine those muscles letting go of their tension... 
becoming relaxed and easy... perhaps like bands... rubber bands which have been stretched 
tight with all the tension and stress of the day... and now you can imagine those bands begin 
released safely and easily... becoming looser and slacker... as your muscles relax... easier 
and easier... you may become aware of the chair beneath your legs... supporting your 
legs... imagine that warmth spreading into the muscles... relaxing and easing them... and 
imagining those warm feelings spreading down your legs... from your upper legs to your 
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lower legs... to yourfeet... right down into your toes, just 'becoming more and more relaxed, 
more and more comfortable as time goes by... and as your body relaxes your mind can stay 
nice and alert and readyfor different thoughts and images later as your body relaxes more 
and more... also be aware of the muscles in your shoulders and back... imagine those 
muscles also becoming more relaxed, more easy, more comfortable... and ifyou're aware of 
the contact of the chair behind you, behind your back, behind your shoulders, you may be 
aware of that warm feeling... the warm contact with the chair... and you can imagine that 
warm feeling spreading into the muscles of your back... the muscles of your shoulders... 
loosening those muscles and easing them... relaxing more and more... just feel the warm 
relaxing feelings spreading into those muscles ... and your muscles respond 
by letting go... 
and becoming loose and easy, quiet and calm ... just feel those warm 
feelings spreading 
through the muscles o ur back... and shoulders... andfeel them perhaps... spreading into )fYO 
yourarms... into your hands... into yourfingers... right down into the tips ofyourfingers... 
warm, relaxing and comfortable... easy feelings... and you may also be aware of the 
possibility of those warm relaxingfeelings... spreading into the muscles ofyour neck... and 
face... andforehead and eyelids... all the muscles of your face and neck ... just relaxing 
more and more ... just letting go of their tension... muscles sinking down ... settling 
down 
into good... easy ... relaxed positions ... face settling down into a relaxed, easy expression as 
the muscles... just lose their tension... becoming loose and easy... and the muscles of your 
forehead in particular just becoming relaxed... and calm... and quiet... any feelings of 
tension or stress... just easing away as you let go of the tense and tight feelings in the 
muscles. 
So, just relaxing more and more deeply now... and as your body relaxes more and more... 
your mind can be clear... and alert... and ready to imagine a pleasant place... where you 
mightfeel particularly calm... and quiet ... just imagine some calm andpleasant scene... you 
might imýgine a beach or a garden... a hilltop or some otherplace... it may be a real place 
or an imaginary place... indoors or out ... it really doesn't matter so 
long as it is somewhere 
you can feel really good and relaxed ... gather up any goodJeelings you 
have now... any 
warm, relaxed an comfortablefeelings ... and take them with you to that place... 
be aware of 
the colours and sights around you... the objects and things nearby... or in the distance... be 
aware of the temperature of that place... it may be a warm and tranquil place... it may be a 
cool and refreshing place... just so long as youfeel good... and relaxed... and easy... and as 
you become aware of the sights aroundyou... you may also be aware ofsounds... maybe the 
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sound of the breeze blowing and disturbing leaves, or maybe some other sounds... there may 
be the sound of birds... maybe the sound of water... wherever you are just listen for the 
sounds aroundyou now... and enjoy those sounds as you relax more and more... and ifyou 
are in a very quiet place just enjoy the peace and calm... becoming more and more 
relaxed... and calm as you're there in that very pleasant, relaxing place... you may be ware 
of the surface you are sitting on... or standing on... or lying on... you mayfeel the surface 
beneath you... comfortable and easy... you may be aware of smells or scents... sounds and 
sights... just there now in these very pleasant surroundings. And as you look around you... 
you may be aware ofsome part of the scene... that you could approach and walk down... or 
descend in some way... tofind an even more calm and relaxedplace... even more calm and 
relaxedfeelings. Ifyou could nowjust... take yourseýf to that part of the scene... andpause 
for a moment or two... and when you're ready... begin to walk down... or run down... or 
float down, perhaps... to find an even more pleasant and relaxing place... and as you 
descend... gently... at your own pace... relaxing more and more as you go... I'll countfrom 
one ... to ten as you go 
down... into even more relaxed... and comfortable feelings. One... 
two ... just relaxing deeper and deeper... three ... 
four... more and more relaxed... more and 
more comfortable... five... six... seven... eight... nine... and ten just deeply and calmly 
relaxed. Andjust there now in that deeper... even more pleasant... more relaxed place. 
Again be aware of the sights around you... the colours... be aware of any sounds there may 
be in this special... relaxing place. Be aware of any scents or smells that you may find 
there... enjoying thefeeling of relaxing more and more ... 
deeper and deeper as you enjoy 
the scene around you... looking at things that are new ... or that you may not 
have noticed 
before ... pleasant reassuring things around you now ... and 
just relaxing deeper and 
deeper ... more and more comfortable... more and more relaxed... calm, quiet feelings... 
relaxed and easy feelings ... just relaxing deeper and deeper and enjoying all the sights 
around you... the colours ... the sounds... all thosefamiliar things... that make this such a 
pleasant... and relaxing place to be in. Just remaining as relaxed and hypnotised as you are 
now... remember that it is possiblefor you... to open your eyes... and to talk... and to carry 
out tasks without affecting how relaxed and hypnotised you feel... without affecting any of 
those goodJeelings... and in a moment someone else will give youfurther instructions. Until 
then continue to enjoy the special relaxing place. [the tape is then stopped, the subject is 
asked to open their eyes, and the task is presented; after completion of the task, the tape is 
restarted and the deinduction routine begins]. 
310 
Deinduction 
Good... Stillfeeling nicely relaxed and com rtable... with your eyes closed ... just enjoy the 
feelings of calm and relaxation... and ifyou'd like to spend a few more moments... in the 
place you were relaxing in before... that special place... just return there now... and enjoy 
the sights and sounds again... of that particular place ... and any smells and scents... and all 
the things around you... just relaxed and comfortable ... quiet and easy. [pause 30 seconds]. 
And remember that you cannot be deeply relaxed ... or hypnotised... accidentally... or 
against your will... but only ifyou decide to relax Yoursetf .. or agree to go through these... 
or similar hypnosis procedures again ... just staying relaxed and calm now. 
In a moment I'M going to count backfrom ten to one... and when Ido... just return to 
nice... wide awake feelings... return to the room you were in when you started... leave the 
specialplace behind... leave the deeply relaxed or hypnotisedfeelings. Bring back with you 
though ... any good... or calm... or quiet feelings you'd like to help you through the rest of 
the day ... the week... thefuture. And when I get to one ... just open your eyes ... feeling really 
good, pleasantly relaxed and comfortable... but wide awake ... back to normal wide awake 
feelings... just returning now then... to wide awake feelings ... ten, nine, eight, seven, six, 
five, four, three, two... more and more awake... back to good wide awakefeelings... and 
one... andjust open your eyes when ready. 
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APPENDIX X 
Experimental instructions for hypnosis condition in studies 3 and 4 
The following instructions were read verbatim to all subjects participating in the hypnosis 
condition in study three. 
Okay, before we begin the experiment I'm going to say a few words about the hypnosis 
procedures that you will be encountering today. The hypnotic induction that you will receive 
has been recorded on audio-tape and lasts aboutfifteen minutes. "at I would like you to 
do is listen to the tape, think along with the instructions that you are given, and try to 
imagine what the tape asks you to imagine. Most importantly, allow yourseýf to become as 
relaxed and hypnotised as possible. At a certain point in the tape I will stop the tape- 
recorder, ask you to turn to me, and then I will give you the experimental tasks. After the 
tasks I will switch the tape-recorder on again and you will hear the remainder of the tape. 
When the tapefinishes the session is over. 
There are no documented dangers associated with hypnosis; however, if at any point you 
want to end the session then simply say so and I will stop the tape. If this occurs, you will 
simply come out of hypnosis andjeel no ill effects afterwards. The same will happen if the 
fire alarm goes off In either case, I will give you suggestionsfor having left hypnosis. 
There are two final points I wan 
*t 
to make about this session. First, you should remember 
that it is possible for you to talk and perform tasks during hypnosis without in any way 
affecting how relaxed and hypnotised you feel. Second, if at any point during the tape you 
want to change position, or cough, or scratch then you will be able to do this without 
affecting how relaxed and hypnotisedyoufeel. 
Before I start the tape, do you have any questions? (questions are answered by 
paraphrasing the above). Okay, let's begin. 
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APPENDIX XI 
Script for relaxation induction used in studies 3 and 4 
The following is an edited transcript taken from pages 68-80 of Lewis Caroll's Alice in 
Wonderland". It was recorded verbatim on audio-cassette. 
Yhere was a table set out under a tree in front of the house, and the March Hare and the 
Hatter were having tea at it; a Dormouse was sitting between them, fast asleep, and the 
other two were using it as a cushion, resting their elbows on it, and talking over it's head. 
Yhe table was a large one, but the three were all crowded together at one corner of it. "No 
room! No room! " the cried out when they saw Alice coming. "Yhere's plenty of room! " Y 
said Alice indignantly, and she sat down in a large arm-chair at one end of the table. 
"Have some wine, " said the March Hare in an encouraging tone. 
Alice looked all round the table, but there was nothing on it but tea. V don't see any 
wine, " she remarked. 
"Yhere isn't any, " said the March Hare. 
"Then it wasn't very civil ofyou to offer it, " said Alice angrily. 
"It wasn't very civil ofyou to sit down without being invited, " said the March Hare. 
"I didn't know it was your table, " said Alice, "It's laidfor a great many more than three. 
"Your hair wants cutting, " said the Hatter. He had been looking at Alice for some time 
with great curiosity, and this was hisfirst speech. 
"You should learn not to make personal remarks, " said Alice with some severity: "It's 
very rude. " 
Yhe Hatter was the first to break the silence. "nat day of the month is it? " he said, 
turning to Alice: he had taken his watch out of his pocket, and was looking at it uneasily, 
shaking it every now and then, and holding it to his ear. 
Alice considered a little, and then said "Thefourth. " 
"Two days wrong! " sighed the Hatter. '7 told you butter wouldn't suit the works! " he 
added, looking angrily at the March Hare. 
"It was the best butter, " the March Hare relied meekly. 
"Yes, but some crumbs must have got in as well, " the Hatter grumbled, "you shouldn't 
haveput it in with the bread-knife. " 
" In Complete Works ofLewis Carroll, 1966, London: The Nonesuch Press. 
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The March Hare took the watch and looked at it gloomily: then he dipped it into his cup of 
tea, and looked at it again: but he could think of nothing to say than hisfirst remark, "It was 
the best butter, you know. " 
Alice has been looking over his shoulder with some curiosity. "glat ajunny watch! " she 
remarked. "It tells the day ofthe month, and doesn't tell what o "clock it is! " 
"Ny should it? " muttered the Hatter. "Does your watch tell you what year it is? " 
"Of course not, " replied Alice very readily, "but that's because it stays the same yearfor 
such a long time together. " 
"nich isjust the case with mine, "said the Hatter. 
Alice felt dreadfully puzzled The Hatter's remark seemed to her to have no sort of 
meaning in it, yet it was certainly English. "I don't quite understand you, " she said, as 
politely as she could. 
"the dormouse is asleep again, " said the Hatter, and he poured a little hot tea upon its 
nose. 
The Dormouse shook it's head impatiently, and said, without opening its eyes, "Of course, 
ofcourse: just what I was going to remark mysetf " 
"Have you guessed the riddle yet? " the Hatter said, turning to the March Hare again. 
"No, Igive up, " the March Hare replied. "What's the answer? 
"I haven't the slightest idea, " said the Hatter. 
"Nor I, " said the Dormouse. 
Alice sighed wearily. "I think you might do something better with the time, " she said, 
"than wasting it in asking riddles that have no answers. " 
"Ifyou knew Time as well as I do, " said the Hatter, "you wouldn't talk about wasting it, 
it's him. " 
"I don't know what You mean, "saidAlice. 
"Of course you don't! " the Hatter said, tossing his head contemptuously. "I dare say you 
never even spoke to Time! " 
"Perhaps not, " Alice cautiously replied, "but I know I have to beat time when I learn 
music. " 
"Ah! That accounts for it, " said the Hatter. "He won't stand beating. Now, ifyou only 
kept on good terms with him, he'd do almost anythingyou liked with the clock. For instance, 
suppose it were nine o'clock in the morning, just time to begin lessons: you'd only have to 
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whisper a hint to Time, and round goes the clock in a twinkling! Hat(-past one, time for 
dinner! " 
"I only wish it was, " the March Hare said to itsetf in a whisper. 
"Yhat would be grand certainly, " said Alice thoughyully, "but then -I shouldn't be 
hungryfor it, you know. " 
"Not atfirst, perhaps, " said the Hatter, "but you could keep it to hatf-past one as long as 
you liked " 
"Is that the way you manage? " Alice asked 
The Hatter shook his head mournfully. "Not I! " he replied. "We quarreled last March - 
just before he went mad you know -" (pointing with his teaspoon at the March Hare, ) "- it 
was at the great concert given by the Queen ofHearts and I had to sing. Well, I had hardly 
finished thefirst verse, " said the Hatter, "when the Queen bawled out 'He's murdering the 
time! Offwith his head! "' 
"How dreadfully savage! " exclaimed Alice. 
"And ever since that, " the Hatter went on in a mournful tone, "He won't do a thing I ask! 
It's always six o'clock now. " 
A bright idea came into Alice's head "Is that the reason so many tea-things are put out 
here? " she asked. 
"Yes, that's it, " said the Hatter with a sigh, "it's always tea-time, and we've no time to 
wash the things between whiles. 
"Then you keep moving round, I suppose? " said Alice. 
"Exactly so, " said the Hatter, "as the things get used up. 
"But what happens when you come to the beginning again? " Alice ventured to ask. 
"Suppose we change the subject, " the March Hare interrupted, yawning. "I'm getting 
tired of this. I vote the young lady tells us a story. " 
"I'm afraid I don't know one, " said Alice, rather alarmed at the proposal. 
"Then you shouldn't talk, " said the Hatter. 
This piece of rudeness was more than Alice could bear: she got up in great disgust, and 
walked off: the Dormouse remained asleep, and neither of the others took the least notice of 
her going, though she looked back once or twice, haýf hoping they would call after her: the 
last time she saw them, they were trying to put the Dormouse into the tea-pot. 
"At any rate I'll never go there again! " said Alice, as she picked her way through the 
wood. "It's the stupidest tea-party I ever was at in all my life! " 
315 
Just as she said this, she noticed that one of the trees had a door leading right into it. 
"That's very curious! " she thought. "But everything's curious today. I think I may as well 
go in at once. "And in she went. 
Once more she found herseIr in the long hall, and close to the glass table. "Now, I'll 
manage better this time, " she said to herseU, ' and began by taking the little golden key, 
unlocking the door that led into the garden, and walking down the little passage; and then - 
she found hersey'at last in the beautiful garden, among the bright flower-beds and cool 
fountains. 
A large rose tree stood near the entrance of the garden: the roses growing on it were 
white, but there were three gardeners at it, busily painting them red. Alice thought this a 
very curious thing, and she went nearer to watch them, and, just as she came up to them, she 
heard one ofthem say: "Look out now, Five! Don't go splashingpaint over me like that! 
"I couldn't help it, " said Five, in a suk tone. "Seven jogged my elbow. " 
On which Seven looked up and said: "That's right, Five! Always lay the blame on others! 
'You'd better not talk! " said Five. "I heard the Queen say only yesterday you deserved to 
be beheaded. " 
" "atfor? " said the one who had spoken first. 
"That's none of your business! " said Five, "and I'll tell him - it wasfor bringing the cook 
tulip-roots instead of onions. " 
Seven hadjustflung down his brush and hadjust begun: "Well, of all the unjust things... 
when his eye chanced tofall upon Alice, as she stood watching them, and he checked himseIr 
suddenly: the others looked around also, and all of them bowed low. 
"Would you tell me, please, " said Alice, a little timidly, "why are you painting those 
roses? " 
Five and Seven said nothing, but looked at Two. Two began in a low voice, "Why, thefact 
is, you see, Miss, this here ought to have been a red rose-tree, and we put in a white one by 
mistake; and, if the Queen was tofind out, we should all have our heads cut off, you know. 
So you see, Miss, we're doing our best, afore she comes, to... " 
At this moment, Five, who had been anxiously looking across the garden, called out "The 
Queen! Yhe Queen! " and the three gardeners threw themselves flat upon theirfaces. There 
was a sound ofmanyfootsteps, and Alice looked around, eager to see the Queen. 
First came ten soldiers carrying clubs: these were all shaped like the three gardeners, 
oblong andflat, with their hands andjeet at the corners: next the ten courtiers: these were 
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all ornamented all over with diamonds, and walked two and two, as the soldiers did. After 
these came the Royal children: there were ten of them, and the little dears camejumping 
merrily along, hand in hand, in couples: they were all ornamented with hearts. 
Next came the guests, mostly Kings and Queens, and among them Alice recognised the 
nite Rabbit: he was talking in a hurried, nervous manner, smiling at everything that was 
said, and went by without noticing her. Then followed the Knave of hearts, carrying the 
King's crown on a crimson, velvet cushion; and, last of all in this grand procession, came 
THE KING AND QUEEN OF HEARTS. 
Alice was rather doubtful whether she ought to lie down on her face like the three 
gardeners, but she could not remember ever having heard of such a rule at processions; 
"and besides, what would be the use of a procession, " thought she, "ifpeople all had to lie 
down on theirfaces, so they couldn't see it? " So she stood where she was, and waited. 
nen the procession came opposite to Alice, they all stopped and looked at her, and the 
Queen said, severely, "no is this? " She said it to the Knave ofhearts, who only bowed and 
smiled in reply. 
"Idiot! " said the Queen, tossing her head, impatiently, and, turning to Alice, she went on: 
nat's your name, child? " 
"My name is Alice, so please your majesty, " said Alice, very politely, but she added, to 
hersel( , "Why, they're only a pack ofcards, after all. I needn't be afraid ofthem. 
"And who are these? " said the Queen, pointing to the three gardeners who were lying 
around the rose tree; for, you see, as they were lying on theirfaces, and the patterns on their 
backs was the same as the rest of the pack, she could not tell whether they were gardeners 
or soldiers, or courtiers, or three of her own children. " 




Experimental instructions for relaxation condition in studies 3 and 4 
The following instructions were read verbatim to all subjects participating in the relaxation 
condition in study three. Every effort was made to ensure the similarity between these 
instructions and those presented in the hypnosis condition in the same study. 
Okay, before we begin the experiment I'm going to say a few words about the relaxation 
procedures that you will be encountering today. The relaxation procedure that you will 
receive has been recorded on audio-tape and is an extract from a popular novel - with 
which you are probablyfamiliar - lasting aboutfifteen minutes. What I would like you to do 
is listen to the tape, think along with the story, and try to imagine the events occurring in the 
story. Most importantly, allow yourselCto become as relaxed as possible. At a certain point 
in the tape I will stop the tape-recorder, ask you to turn to me, and then I will give you the 
experimental tasks. After the tasks the session is over. 
If at any point you want to end the session then simply say so and I will stop the tape. If 
this occurs, you will simply come out of relaxation andjeel no ill effects afterwards. The 
same will happen if thefire alarm goes off. 
There are two final points I want to make about this session. First, you should remember 
that it is possible for you to talk qnd perform tasks after relaxation procedures without in 
any way affecting how relaxed you feel. Second, if at any point during the tape you want to 
change position, or cough, or scratch then you will be able to do this without affecting how 
relaxedyoufeel. 
Before I start the tape, do you have any questions? (questions are answered by 
paraphrasing the above). Okay, let's begin. 
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APPENDIX XIII 
Syllogistic reasoning task (form A) used in study 4 
The following fifteen questions were presented in an A4 response booklet with the 
instructions presented in appendix XV on the front page. Question answers are provided for 
instructive purposes. 
Question 1 
Some of the cooks are cyclists. 
All of the cyclists are inventors. 
What follows? 
Answer: Some of the cooks are inventors or vice versa. 
Question 2 
None of the dancers are cheese-lovers. 
All of the film-fans are dancers. 
What follows? 
Answer. ý None ofthefilm-fans are cheese-lovers or vice versa. 
Question 3 
All of the fishermen are shopkeepers. 
All of the shopkeepers are wine-drinkers. 
What follows? 
Answer: All of thefishermen are wine-drinkers 
Question 4 
Some of the footballers are students. 
All of the footballers are swimmers. 
What follows? 
Answer: Some of the swimmers are students or vice versa. 
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Question 5 
None of the greengrocers are birdwatchers. 
All of the bridge-players are birdwatchers. 
What follows? 
Answer: None ofthe greengrocers are bridge-players or vice versa. 
Question 6 
All of the accountants are hockey-players. 
Some of the radio-listeners are not hockey-players. 
Answer: Some of the radio-listeners are not accountants. 
Question 7 
Some of the builders are bowlers. 
None of the bowlers are yachtsmen. 
What follows? 
Answer. Some of the builders are notyachtsmen. 
Question 8 
All of the musicians are pet-owners. 
None of the gymnasts are pet-owners. 
What follows? 
Answer., None of the gymnasts are musicians or vice versa. 
Question 9 
All of the gardeners are golfers. 
None of the surfers are gardeners. 
What follows? 
Answer: Some ofthe golfers are not surfers. 
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Question 10 
All of the architects are coffee-drinkers. 
Some of the architects are not painters. 
What follows? 
Answer: Some ofthe coffee-drinkers are not painters. 
Question 11 
All of the psychologists are science-fiction fans. 
None of the science-fiction fans are walkers. 
What follows? 
Answer. None ofthe psychologists are walkers or vice versa. 
Question 12 
All of the archers are comedians. 
All of the archers are climbers. 
What follows? 
Answer: Some ofthe comedians are climbers or vice versa. 
Question 13 
All of the sailors are poets. 
Some of the antique-collectors are sailors. 
What follows? 
Answer: Some of the antique-collectors are poets or vice versa. 
Question 14 
All of the technicians are chess-players. 
All of the model-makers are technicians. 
What follows? 
Answer: All ofthe model-makers are chess-players. 
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Question 15 
All of the draughtsmen are gourmets. 
Some of the draughtsmen are drivers. 
What follows? 
Answer. Some of the gourmets are drivers. 
End of task 
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APPENDIX XIV 
Syllogistic reasoning task (form B) used in study 4 
The following fifteen questions were presented in an A4 response booklet with the 
instructions presented in appendix XV on the front page. Question answers are provided for 
instructive purposes. 
Question I 
All of the shopkeepers are yachtsmen. 
All of the radio-listeners are shopkeepers. 
What follows? 
Answer. All of the radio-listeners are yachtsmen. 
Question 2 
All of the technicians are bridge-players. 
Some of the painters are not bridge-players. 
What follows? 
Answer: Some of the painters are not technicians. 
Question 3 
All of the footballers are drivers. 
Some of the footballers are not inventors. 
What follows? 
Answer: Some of the drivers are not inventors. 
Question 4 
Some of the gardeners are cheese-lovers. 
All of the cheese-lovers are bird-watchers. 
What follows? 
Answer: Some ofthe gardeners are bird-watchers or vice versa. 
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Question 5 
All of the students are film-fans. 
Some of the students are walkers. 
What follows? 
Answer: Some ofthefilm-fans are walkers. 
Question 6 
All of the draughtsmen are wine-drinkers. 
Some of the surfers are draughtsmen. 
What follows? 
Answer. ý Some of the surfers are wine-drinkers or vice versa. 
Question 7 
All of the dancers are archers. 
None of the swimmers are archers. 
What follows? 
Answer: None ofthe swimmers are- dancers or vice versa. 
Question 8 
Some of the gymnasts are greengrocers. 
All of the gymnasts are chess-players. 
What follows? 
Answen Some of the chess-players are greengrocers or vice versa. 
Question 9 
None of the musicians are model-makers. 
All of the coffee-drinkers are musicians. 
What follows? 
Answer: None ofthe coffee-drinkers are model-makers or vice versa. 
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Question 10 
All of the architects are climbers. 
None of the climbers are fishermen. 
What follows? 
Answer: None of the architects arefishermen or vice versa. 
Question 11 
All of the golfers are accountants. 
All of the accountants are poets. 
What follows? 
Answen All of the golfers are poets. 
Question 12 
Some of the psychologists are hockey-players. 
None of the hockey-players are antique-collectors. 
What follows? 
Answer: Some of the psychologists, are not antique-collectors. 
Question 13 
None of the sailors are cyclists. 
All of the bowlers are cyclists. 
What follows? 
Answer: None ofthe sailors are bowlers or vice versa. 
Question 14 
All of the builders are gourmets. 
None of the walkers are builders. 
Answer. Some of the gourmets are not walkers. 
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Question 15 
All of the science-fiction fans are cooks. 
All of the science-fiction fans are pet-owners. 
What follows? 
Answer. ý Some of the cooks arepet-owners or vice versa. 
End of task 
326 
APPENDIX XV 
Instructions for syllogistic reasoning tasks used in study 4 
The following instructions were written on the front page of the response booklets 
containing the syllogistic reasoning tasks presented in appendices XIII and XIV. 
In this task you will he presented with fifteen questions concerning the hobbies and 
professions of a number of individuals assembled in a room. Each of the questions consists 
of two statements about some of the individuals' hobbies and professions. Your task is to 
write down whatfollowsfrom each pair ofstatements. 
Please note thefollowing points 
1. All ofyour answers should be in one ofthefollowingforms: 
(a) all of the..... are ..... 
(b) none ofthe ..... are ..... 
(c) some of the ..... are ..... 
(d) some of the ..... are not ..... 
2. Your answers should be based solely on what can be deduced with absolute certainty 
from the initial statements 
3. For each question there is always at least one valid conclusion that can be drawn 
4. You can take as long as you like to complete the questions 
Here are a couple of examples 
Example I 
All of the salesmen are cricketers 
All of the cricketers are beer drinkers 
Whatfollows? 
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Answer: All of the salesmen are beer-drinkers 
Example 2 
None of the Egyptologists are poker-players 
Some ofthe Egyptologists are hill-climbers 
natfollows? 
Answer. Some ofthe hill-climbers are notpoker-players 
Please turn over and begin when you are ready to do so. 
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APPENDIX XVI 
ANOVA summary tables for study 2, study 3 and study 4 analyses 
Study 2 analyses 
(2A) Summary tablefor univariate F tests comparing the three triad classification sets on 
the proportion of similarity based responses for square, triangle and angle (transformed) 
stimuli. 





T. C. Angle stimuli 0.02092 2 0.01046 . 996 . 374 Error (angles) . 798 76 0.01050 T. C. Square stimuli . 131 2 0.06568 1.123 . 331 Error (squares) 4.445 76 0.05848 
T. C. Triangle stimuli . 634 2 . 317 4.371 . 016 Error (triangles) 5.508 76 0.07248 
(2B). Summary table for one way ANCOVA comparing high and low suggestibility 
quartiles on triad classification (square stimuli). 





Covariate (SDS) . 110 1 . 110 2.405 . 129 Covariate (TC set) . 278 1 . 278 6.098 . 018 Covariate (Relaxation) . 119 1 . 119 2.622 . 113 Suggestibility group . 235 1 . 235 5.169 . 029. Error 1.777 39 0.04555 
(2C). Summary tablefor one way ANCO VA comparing high and low suggestibility quartiles 
on triad classification (triangle stimuli). 





Covariate (SDS) 0.04454 1 0.04454 . 710 . 405 Covariate (TC set) . 513 1 . 513 8.177 . 007 Covariate (Relaxation) . 366 1 . 366 5.827 . 021 Suggestibility group 0.02086 1 0.02086 . 332 . 568 Error 2.447 39 0.06275 
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(2D). Summary tablefor one way ANCO VA comparing high and low suggestibility quartiles 
on triad classification (angle stimuli, transformed data). 





Covariate (SDS) 0.01009 1 0.01009 . 884 . 353 Covariate (TC set) 0.009058 1 0.009058 . 794 . 378 Covariate (Relaxation) 0.003015 1 0.003015 . 264 . 
610 
Suggestibility group 0.001006 1 0.001006 . 088 . 768 Error . 445 39 0.01141 
(2E). Summary tablefor one way ANCO VA comparing high and low suggestibility quartiles 
onfiltering interference (size stimuli). 
Source Sum of df Mean F Sig. 
Squares Square 
Covariate (SDS) 
. 175 1 . 
175 
. 115 . 737 Covariate (gender) 3.298 1 3.298 2.160 . 149 Suggestibility group 1.287 1 1.287 . 843 . 
364 
Error 61.068 40 1.527 
(2F). Summary tablefor one way ANCO VA comparing high and low suggestibility quartiles 
onfiltering interference (angle stimuli). 
Source Sum of df Mean F Sig. 
Squdres Square 
Covariate (SDS) . 140 1 . 140 . 126 . 724 Suggestibility group 1.055 1 1.055 . 949 . 336 Error 45.572 41 1.112 
(2G). Summary tablefor one way ANCOVA comparing high and low suggestibility quartiles 
on syllogistic reasoning (transformed data). 
Source Sum of Df Mean F Sig. 
Squares Square 
Covariate (SDS) . 172 1 . 172 2.690 . 109 Covariate (happiness) 0.01961 1 0.01961 . 306 . 583 Suggestibility group 0.02574 1 0.02574 . 402 . 530 Error 2.563 40 0.06406 
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(2H). Summary tablefor one way ANCOVA comparing high and low suggestibility quartiles 
on Raven's matrices (transformed data). 
Source Sum of Df Mean F Sig. 
Squares Square 
Covariate (SDS) 10.677 1 10.677 4.182 . 047 Covariate (happiness) 3.976 1 3.976 1.557 . 219 Suggestibility group 9.650 1 9.650 3.779 . 059 Error 102.137 40 2.553 
(M). Summary tablefor one way ANCO VA comparing high and low suggestibility quartiles 
on MFFT (time). 
Source Sum of df Mean F Sig. 
Squares Square 
Covariate (SDS) 45.965 1 45.965 . 175 . 678 Suggestibility group 1369.228 1 1369.228 5.203 . 028 
Error 10790.579 41 263.185 
1 
(2J). Summary tablefor one way ANCOVA comparing high and low suggestibility quartiles 
on MFFT (errors). 
Source Sum of df Mean F Sig. 
Squares Square 
Covariate (SDS) 82.500 1 82-500 1.753 . 193 Suggestibility group 73.343 1 73.343 1.559 . 219 Error 1929.409 41 47.059 
Study 3 analyses 
(3A) Summary table for 2x2 mixed model ANOVA with one between subjects factor 
(suggestibility group: high and low) and one within subjectsfactor (time: pre-tape and post- 
tape) calculatedfrom relaxation scores in the relaxation condition. 





Time 10656.27 1 10656.27 42.915 . 000 Error (time) 7945.99 32 248.312 
Suggestibility group 216.199 1 216.199 . 217 . 644 Error (sugg. group) 31821.25 32 994.414 
Time x Group 824.273 1 824.273 3.320 . 078 
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(3B) Summary table for 2x2 mixed model ANOVA with one between subjects factor 
(suggestibility group: high and low) and one within subjectsfactor (time: pre-tape andpost- 
tape) calculatedfrom relaxation scores in the hypnosis condition. 





Time 16089.94 1 16089.94 45.352 . 000 
Error (time) 11352.82 32 354.776 
Suggestibility group 1120.235 1 1120.235 1.096 . 303 Error (sugg. Group) 32701.53 32 1021.923 
Time x Group 13.235 1 13.235 . 037 . 848 
(3C) Summary table for 2x2 mixed model ANOVA with one between subjects factor 
(suggestibility group: high and low) and one within subjectsfactor (condition: hypnosis and 
relaxation) calculated from post-tape relaxation scores in the hypnosis and relaxation 
conditions. 





Condition 919.118 1 919.118 6.888 . 013 
Error (condition) 4269.765 32 133.430 
Suggestibility group 1341.235 1 1341.235 1.490 . 231 
Error (sugg. group) 28800.00 32 900.00 
Condition x Group 46.118 1 46.118 . 346 . 561 
(3D) Summary table for 2x3 mixed model ANOVA with one between subjects factor 
(suggestibility group: high and low) and one within subjects factor (condition: baseline, 
relaxation and hypnosis) calculated from the proportion of similarity based responses in 
triad classification (transformed angle stimuli). 





Condition 0.04818 2 0.02409 2.541 . 087 
Error (condition) 0.607 64 0.009479 
Suggestibility group 0.0135 1 0.0135 . 677 . 417 Error (sugg. group) 0.638 32 0.01993 
Condition x Group 0.02051 2 0.01913 2.081 . 141 
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(3E) Summary table for 2x3 mixed model ANOVA with one between subjects factor 
(suggestibility group: high and low) and one within subjects factor (condition: baseline, 
relaxation and hypnosis) calculated from the proportion of similarity based responses in 
triad classification (square stimuli). 





Condition 0.0359 2 0.0179 0.937 . 397 Error (condition) 1.225 64 0.0191 
Suggestibility group . 286 1 . 286 1.655 . 207 Error (sugg. group) 5.527 32 . 173 
Condition x Group 0.00132 2 0.0618 0.323 . 725 
(3F) Summary table for 2x3 mixed model ANOVA with one between subjects factor 
(suggestibility group: high and low) and one within subjects factor (condition: baseline, 
relaxation and hypnosis) calculated from the proportion of similarity based responses in 
triad classification (triangle stimuli). 





Condition 0.269 2 0.134 3.865 . 026 Error (condition) 2.225 64 0.0347 
Suggestibility group 0.142 1 0.142 . 777 . 385 Error (sugg. group) 5.829 32 0.182 
Condition x Group 0.0190 2 0.0095 . 273 . 762 
(3G) Summary table for planned orthogonal contrast comparing proportion of similarity 
based responses in triad classification (triangle stimuli; collapsed across susceptibility 
groups) in the baseline condition with the combined relaxation and hypnosis conditions. 
Source Sum of df Mean F Sig. 
Squares Square 
Contrast . 191 1 . 191 6.405 . 016 Error (contrast) . 982 33 0.02975 
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(3H) Summary table for planned orthogonal contrast comparing proportion of similarity 
based responses in triad classification (triangle stimuli; collapsed across susceptibility 
groups) in relaxation and hypnosis conditions 
Source Sum of df Mean F Sig. 
Squares Square 
Contrast 0.01471 1 0.01471 . 519 . 476 Error (contrast) . 935 33 0.02834 
(M) Summary table for 2x3 mixed model ANOVA with one between subjects factor 
(suggestibility group: high and low) and one within subjects factor (condition: baseline, 
relaxation and hypnosis) calculatedfrom filtering interference scores (angle dimension). 





Condition 0.008158 2 0.004079 . 116 . 
891 
Error (condition) 2.255 64 0.03523 
Suggestibility group 0.02072 1 0.02072 . 388 . 
538 
Error (sugg. group) 1.710 32 0.05342 
Condition x Group 0.02502 2 0.01251 . 355 . 
703 
(M) Summary table for 2x3 mixed model ANOVA with one between subjects factor 
(suggestibility group: high and low) and one within subjects factor (condition: baseline, 
relaxation and hypnosis) calculatedfrom filtering interference scores (size dimension). 





Condition . 000 2 . 000 . 000 
1.000 
Error (condition) 107.662 64 1.682 
Suggestibility group . 
471 1 
. 471 . 472 . 
497 
Error (sugg. group) 31.921 32 . 998 Condition x Group 2.509 2 1.254 . 746 . 478 
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Study 4 nalyses 
(4A) Summary table for 2x2 mixed model ANOVA with one between subjects factor 
(suggestibility group: high and low) and one within subjectsfactor (time: pre-tape andpost- 
tape) calculatedfrom relaxation scores in the relaxation condition. 





Time 7452.900 1 7452.900 58.037 . 000 Error (time) 2311.500 18 128.417 
Suggestibility group . 400 1 . 400 . 001 . 977 Error (sugg. group) 8541.500 18 474.528 
Time x Group 547.600 1 547.600 4.264 . 054 
(4B) Summary table for 2x2 mixed model ANOVA with one between subjects factor 
(suggestibility group: high and low) and one within subjectsfactor (time: pre-tape andpost- 
tape) calculatedfrom relaxation scores in the relaxation condition. 





Time 6734.025 1 6734.025 76.695 . 000 
Error (time) 1580.450 18 87.803 
Suggestibility group 950.625 1 950.625 2.092 . 165 
Error (sugg. group) 8179.650 18 454.425 
Time x Group 
_ 
42.025 1 547.600 . 479 . 498 
(4C) Summary table for 2x2 factorial ANOVA with one between subjects factor 
(suggestibility group: high and low) and one within subjectsfactor (condition: hypnosis and 
relaxation) calculated from post-tape relaxation scores in the hypnosis and relaxation 
conditions. 
Source Sum of Df Mean F Sig. 
Squares Square 
Condition 245.025 1 245.025 1.034 . 316 Suggestibility group 555.025 1 555.025 2.342 . 135 
Condition x Group . 625 1 . 625 . 
003 . 959 
Error 8531.700 36 236.992 
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(4D) Summary table for 2x2 factorial ANOVA with one between subjects factor 
(suggestibility group: high and low) and one within subjectsfactor (condition: hypnosis and 
relaxation) calculated from post-tape happiness scores in the hypnosis and relaxation 
conditions. 
Source Sum of df Mean F Significant. 
Squares Square 
Condition 220.900 1 220.900 . 440 . 511 Suggestibility group 722.500 1 722.500 1.439 . 238 Condition x Group 160.000 1 160.000 . 319 . 576 Error 18072.200 36 502.006 
(4E) Summary table for 2x2 factorial ANOVA with one between subjects factor 
(suggestibility group: high and low) and one within subjectsfactor (condition: hypnosis and 
relaxation) calculatedfrom positive questionnaire item responses. 





Condition . 100 1 . 100 . 052 . 821 Suggestibility group 6.400 1 6.400 3.339 . 076 
Condition x Group 8.100 1 8.100 4.226 . 047 
Error 69.000 36 1.917 
*p=. 094, two-tailed test 
(4F) Summary table for 2x2 factorial ANOVA with one between subjects factor 
(suggestibility group: high and low) and one within subjectsfactor (condition: hypnosis and 
relaxation) calculatedfrom negative questionnaire item responses. 





Condition . 400 1 
_ 
. 400 . 253 . 618 Suggestibility group 1.600 1 1.600 1.011 . 321 Condition x Group 2.500 1 2.500 1.579 . 217 
Error 57.000 36 1.583 
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(4G) Summary table for 2x 2 factorial ANCOVAs *ith one between subjects factor 
(suggestibility group: high and low) and one within subjectsfactor (condition: hypnosis and 
relaxation) calculatedfrom syllogistic reasoning scores. 





Baseline reasoning 35.590 1 35.59- 15.846 . 000 Condition 3.543 1 3.543 1.578 . 217 Suggestibility group . 757 1 . 757 . 337 . 565 Condition x Group . 114 1 . 114 . 051 . 823 Error 78.610 35 2.246 
(4H) Summary table for 2x 2 factorial ANCOVAs with one between subjects factor 
(suggestibility group: high and low) and one within subjectsfactor (condition: hypnosis and 
relaxation) calculatedfrom syllogistic reasoning times. 





Baseline reasoning 1414.397 1 1414.397 . 069 . 795 Condition 763.906 1 763.906 . 037 . 848 Suggestibility group 29014.678 1 29014.678 1.410 . 243 
Condition x Group 63477.596 1 63477.596 3.084 . 088 Error 720361.40 35 20581.754 
(4> 
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HYPNOTIC SUSCEPTIBILITY AND HOLISTIC/EMOTIONAL 
STYLES OF THINKING 
R. J. Brown and D. A Oakley 
University College London, UK 
Abstract 
It has been suggested that an everyday preference for holistic and emotional thought 
is related to the ability to enter hypnosis, although research addressing the idea has 
often yielded inconsistent results. This study correlated hypnotic susceptibility, as 
measured by the Harvard Group Scale (Shor and Orne, 1962), with three measures of 
a holistic/emotional thinking style: the experiential sub-scale of the Rational Versus 
Experiential Inventory (RVEI) (Epstein et al., 1995), the right hemisphere sub-scale 
of the Human Information Processing Survey (HIPS) (Taggart and Torrance, 1984) 
and the elaborative processing sub-scale of the Inventory of Learning Processes 
(ILP) (Schmeck et al., 1977). A social desirability measure was also included. Only 
the experiential scale of the RVEI and the social desirability scale showed significant 
positive correlations with susceptibility; a multiple regression analysis showed the 
RVEI scale to be the best predictor of susceptibility. The implications of these results 
for the analytic-holistic hypothesis in hypnosis are discussed. 
Key words: hypnosis, hypnotizability, cognitive style, analytic thinking, holistic think- 
ing, social desirability 
Introduction 
The notion that hypnosis involves some sort of temporary inhibition of reality-based, 
logical thought allowing more emotional, intuitive and holistic cognitive processes to 
predominate - the so-called analytic-holistic hypothesis (Brown and Oakley, 1997) - 
has an extensive history within hypnosis research, and represents a point of signifi- 
cant correspondence between accounts of hypnosis from across the theoretical spec- 
trum (Brown and Oakley, 1997, in prep). Evidence indicating that hypnosis is 
characterized by an increase in imaginative processing (e. g. Crawford and Allen, 
1983) and heightened affect (e. g. Crawford et al., 1989) has often been cited in sup- 
port of this idea, and the widely popular and well researched notion of hypnosis as a 
state of absorption (Tellegen and Atkinson, 1974) also rests on similar premises. 
Moreover, there is some evidence to indicate that the ability to enter hypnosis is 
related to heightened affect intensity (Crawford and Brown, 1987) and an everyday 
preference for holistic processing (e. g. Wallace, 1990) that, in some cases, involves 
considerable engagement in fantasy-related behaviour (Lynn and Rhue, 1986). 
However, despite the popularity of the analytic-holistic hypothesis, an examina- 
tion of the evidence cited in support of the idea indicates that its validity is far from 
having been unequivocally established (see Brown, 1996). For example, although 
imaginative processes clearly bear some relation to hypnosis and hypnotic susceptibil- 
ity, a series of inconsistent findings have led to considerable uncertainty regarding the 
nature of that relationship (Sheehan, 1979; deGroh, 1989). Similarly, while there is 
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some evidence to suggest that high susceptibles possess a superior holistic processing 
ability to lows (e. g. Crawford, 1981; Wallace, 1990), this finding has not proven partic- 
ularly robust and there is some evidence to indicate that high susceptibles may in fact 
have a superior analytic processing ability compared with lows (e. g. Wallace et al., 
1994). Clearly there is a need for much more research before we can say with any cer. 
tainty whether hypnosis represents a state of increased holistic processing, or whether 
hypnotic susceptibility is related to an everyday preference for processing in this way. 
In this paper evidence will be presented that bears on the latter of these two possi- 
bilities. The distinction between analytic and holistic cognitive processes has existed 
for many years within the wider sphere of psychology as a whole, and the notion of 
individual differences in analytic and holistic processing preference has been a popu- 
lar one within the learning style and personality literatures. The research presented 
here attempts to assess the relationship between hypnotic susceptibility and three 
self-report measures obtained from these literatures. By assessing the relationship 
between sub-scales obtained from these measures and standard measures of hypnotic 
susceptibility, we aim to shed some light on the validity of the analytic-holistic 
hypothesis in hypnosis. The measures that we selected were the Rational Versus 
Experiential Inventory (RVEI) (Epstein et al., 1995), the Human Information 
Processing Survey (HIPS) (Taggart and Torrance, 1984) and the Inventory of 
Learning Processes (ILP) (Schmeck et al., 1977). 
The RVEI is based on Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) (Epstein, 1983, 
1994), a global theory of personality that postulates the existence of two separate pro- 
cessing systems, the rational and the experiential. The rational system operates via the 
conscious manipulation of symbols in a logical and analytical fashion, while experiential 
processing is holistic, emotional and imaginative. All behaviour is determined by the 
dynamic balance that exists between the two systems, and the RVEI attempts to assess 
the relative degree to which individuals prefer to process rationally or experientially. 
The HIPS is derived from the creativity and learning-style literatures and is based 
on a biological metaphor that distinguishes between left cerebral hemisphere activi- 
ties involving language, logic and analysis, and more image-based, emotional and 
holistic activities that are the putative remit of the right hemisphere. While the valid- 
ity of the biological metaphor has been questioned since the development of the 
HIPS (Beyler and Schmeck, 1992), a number of studies have supported the validity of 
the behavioural distinction underlying the scale (Taggart and Torrance, 1984). 
Like the HIPS, the ILP was also developed within the learning-styles literature 
and is designed to assess the processes that students go through in the course of 
learning. It comprises four sub-scales representing particular styles of learning of 
which one, the elaborative processing sub-scale, is of interest here. A number of stud- 
ies have suggested that the elaborative processing scale measures the degree to which 
students are flexible processors, capable of using both analytic and holistic learning 
strategies (e. g. Schmeck and Geisler-Brcnstein, 1989). However, although the elabo- 
rative processing sub-scale is designed to measure flexible functioning of this sort, 
individuals who score high on this particular measure reportedly demonstrate a pref- 
erence for a more intuitive, holistic style of thinking despite the capacity for process- 
ing analytically. If a significant positive correlation were found between susceptibility 
and scores on this scale, it would suggest that the ability to enter hypnosis is related 
to both a holistic style of thinking, and the ability to flexibly shift between different 
cognitive styles and structures according to task demands. As Crawford (1989) has 
pointed out, there is good evidence to suggest that this 'cognitive flexibility' is indeed 
related to hypnotic susceptibility. 
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Each of the measures that we have selected uses the analytic-holistic processing 
distinction as a useful descriptive and predictive construct. If the ability to enter hyp- 
nosis is related to an everyday preference for thinking in a holistic fashion, we should 
expect to find a positive relationship between standard measures of hypnotic suscep- 
tibility, such as the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility (HGSHS) (Shor 
and Orne, 1962), the experiential sub-scale of the RVEL the right hemisphere sub- 
scale of the HIPS, and the elaborative processing sub-scale of the ILP. 
Method 
Subjects 
Subjects were 93 graduate and undergraduate students from University College 
London, of which 33 were male (mean age was 21.83 years, sd 4.66, range 18-48 
years). All were homogeneous in terms of educational level and socio-economic 
status. Informed consent was obtained from all subjects. Each participant was paid; E7 
for taking part. Subjects were recruited on a volunteer basis for participation in a 
hypnotizability study. 
Measures 
Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility 
The Harvard group scale comprises an initial hypnotic induction followed by 12 test 
suggestions of roughly increasing difficulty. The more suggestions passed, the higher 
the susceptibility score. Although the Harvard is perhaps not as sensitive to differ- 
ences in susceptibility as the Stanford scales, it demonstrates good test-retest reliability 
(Fellows, 1988) and its format allows the testing of groups of up to 30 subjects, making 
the test a good practical alternative to the individually administered Stanford scales. 
Rational Versus Experiential Inventory, shortform 
The short form of the RVEI consists of four main sub-scales sub-divided into a fur- 
ther eight lower-order sub-scales; of these, only the experiential scale is of relevance 
here. The experiential sub-scale was derived from the sensing-intuiting sub-scale of 
the Myers Briggs Type Inventory (MBTI) (Briggs and Myers, 1976) and is designed 
to assess the degree to which individuals prefer to rely on their emotions (e. g. J tend 
to use my heart as a guide for actions') and intuitions (e. g. 'A solution to a problem 
will often come to mind without having to consciously reason it out') when making 
decisions. Although the experiential scale is divided into separate preference and 
ability dimensions, for the sake of conceptual clarity and statistical power we have 
collapsed the two sub-scales into one. The combined scale is composed of 10 state- 
ments, to which subjects must rate the truthfulness as it relates to them on a five- 
point Likert scale ranging from 'completely false' to 'completely true'. 
Human Information Processing Survey 
The HIPS is composed of 40 multiple choice questions, each of which has three possi- 
ble answers corresponding to right hemisphere, left hemisphere and integrated sub- 
scales. Right hemisphere responses consist largely of behaviours associated with 
intuition, emotion and imagination, while left hemisphere responses correspond to 
more linguistic and logical behaviours; no preference between left and right hemi- 
sphere options represents an integrated processing response. In the present context, 
we are only interested in scores on the right hemisphere sub-scale. 
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Inventory of Learning Processes 
The ILP is composed of four main sub-scales, each corresponding to an aspect of learn- 
ing behaviour. Of the four, only one is of relevance here: the elaborative processing 
sub-scale. According to Beyler and Schmeck (1992) this sub-scale measures the degree 
to which students are capable of flexibly shifting between analytic and holistic styles of 
thinking. However, those scoring highly on the elaborative scale also generally prefer to 
process holistically, relying on their intuitions and 'gut-feelings' in decision-making situ- 
ations regardless of processing flexibility. Although the recently revised version of the 
ILP (ILP-R) (Schmeck et al., 1991) further sub-divides the elaborative processing sub- 
scale into two additional thinking styles, we will retain the original super-ordinate divi- 
sion for the sake of clarity and statistical power. The scale comprises 10 statements* 
concerning holistic (five items, e. g. 'Ideas in books often make my mind wander to 
other topics not necessarily related to what I am reading'), intuitive (two items, e. g. 'I 
believe in intuition') and emotional (three items, e. g. 'My feelings are a very important 
part of my decision-making or judgement') styles of thinking, which subjects must rate 
on a six-point Likert scale indicating the extent of their agreement with it. 
Social Desirability Scale 
Many of the statements forming the questionnaires used here have potentially 
socially desirable responses; as such, we will use the Crowne and Marlowe (1960) 
Social Desirability Scale to be included as a predictor in subsequent regression analy- 
ses. The scale is the most commonly used instrument for assessing the influence of 
individual differences in the need for good social presentation (A. Furnham, 1996, 
personal communication). It comprises 34 true-false statements of which each has a 
desirable and a socially undesirable response; the total score is given by the number 
of desirable responses made. 
Design and procedure 
The nature of the study is correlational by definition. In addition to assessing simple 
correlations, an explorative regression analysis will also be performed in order to 
account for the potential influence of social desirability. 
Questionnaires were presented together in a random order and completed under 
supervised, quiet and well-fit conditions. Testing occurred in small groups but all sub- 
jects were kept separate. Completion of the questionnaire package took approxi- 
mately 25 minutes. 
Susceptibility testing took place in a separate session after completion of the ques- 
tionnaires. Again, testing occurred in small groups but all subjects were kept sepa- 
rate. Completion of the Harvard took approximately one hour for each group. 
Anonymity of responses was maintained throughout the experiment in an attempt to 
minimize the possible influence of social desirability. 
Results 
Scores on each of the measures fell within the standard range for a student popula- 
tion, and each sample of scores conformed to a normal distribution. Table 1 shows 
the inter-correlations between each of the measures. All correlations shown corre- 
spond to the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (r). To take into 
*These items have been identified by the present authors as either holistic, intuitive or emo- 
tional on the basis of face validity; no such distinction is made by Schmeck, Ribich and 
Ramaniah (1977) due to common factor loadings for these items. 
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Table 1. Correlation matrix 
HARV HIPS-R ILP-E RVEI-E 
HIPS-R 0.1154 
ILP-E 0.1660 0.3539** 
RVEI-E 0.2629* 0.3451** 0.3992** 
SDS 0.2573* -0.1252 -0.0014 0.1129 
*Significant at p<0.01 
**Significant at p<0.0001 
account the high number of correlations being carried out, a relatively conservative 
alpha value of 0.01 will be used in this study. 
As can be seen from Table 1, the experiential scale of the RVEI, the elaborative 
processing sub-scale of the ILP and the right hemisphere sub-scale of the HIPS all show 
moderate inter-correlations with one another. This is to be expected given that each of 
the scales purports to be measuring a similar construct. However, contrary to expecta- 
tion, neither the right hemisphere sub-scale of the HIPS nor the elaborative processing 
sub-scales of the ILP show significant correlations with the Harvard scale of susceptibil- 
ity. Indeed, of the holistic processing questionnaires, only the experiential sub-scale of 
the RVEI showed a significant, but modest, positive correlation (r 0.2629; p<0.01) 
with susceptibility. However, a significant positive correlation (r 0.2573; p<0.01) 
between social desirability and hypnotic susceptibility was also found. 
An explorative step-wise multiple regression was performed on the susceptibility 
scores with each of the measures as predictors. The best predictor of susceptibility 
was the experiential scale of the RVEI (adj R2 = 0.06; 171,88 = 6.78, p<0.01). Of the 
other measures, only the social desirability scale contributed to any further variance 
in susceptibility (adj. R2 = 0.10; F2,87 = 6.13, p<0.005). 
Discussion 
The findings obtained here provide only partial support for the analytic-holistic 
hypothesis in hypnosis. Consistent with our hypotheses we found a significant, though 
modest, positive relationship between hypnotic susceptibility and scores on the expe- 
riential sub-scale of the RVEL Despite a significant association between susceptibil- 
ity and social desirability, a multiple regression indicated that the experiential scale of 
the RVEI was the best predictor of susceptibility. However, contrary to our predic- 
tions no significant relationship was found between susceptibility and scores on the 
right hemisphere sub-scale of the HIPS, or the elaborative processing sub-scale of the 
ILP. Nevertheless, consistent with our expectations all of the holistic processing 
scales correlated significantly with one another, suggesting that each measure is tap- 
ping, to an extent at least, a similar construct. 
Given the significant intercorrelations between each of the holistic processing 
measures, the fact that only the experiential scale of the RVEI correlated signifi- 
cantly with susceptibility is somewhat surprising. In order to account for these find- 
ings, an examination of the items in each of the questionnaires is required. All of the 
items comprising the experiential scale of the RVEI refer to the use of gut-feelings, 
instincts, emotions and intuitions when making decisions. However, although both 
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the right hemisphere sub-scale of the HIPS and the elaborative processing sub-scale 
of the ILP contain items of this nature, there is a significant departure from this 
theme in many of the other questions. Given the unidimensional nature of the experi- 
ential scale of the RVEI, we would argue that, in this sample at least, the significant 
(but moderate) inter-correlations between each of these measures reflects more the 
consistency in their inclusion of emotionally based items than any sort of assessment 
of a general holistic thinking style. Indeed, we believe that the pattern of findings 
here highlights the problem in using 'holistic processing' as a generic term that 
includes aspects of imagery, a preference for wholes over parts and the importance of 
intuition and emotion. A more precise operationalization of the term appears to be 
needed, something on which we are currently working (Brown and Oakley, in prep). 
The significant positive correlation between susceptibility and the experiential 
scale of the RVEI would seem to suggest, then, that the ability to enter hypnosis is in 
some way related to the degree to which individuals rely on their gut-feelings and 
intuitions when making decisions. This finding lends support to the analytic-holistic 
hypothesis in its present form (see Brown and Oakley, 1997). Such a findings is also 
consistent with evidence indicating that high susccptibles experience their emotions 
more strongly than lows do (Crawford and Brown, 1987): clearly, the more intensely 
that a particular emotion is felt, the more likely that subsequent decisions will be 
made on the basis of it. Moreover, this finding is consistent with evidence suggesting 
that hypnosis is characterized by an increase in emotionality (Crawford et al., 1989). 
It seems reasonable to suggest that individuals who regard their emotions as funda- 
mental to their everyday decision-making processes are more likely to allow them- 
selves to enter a state in which emotions are heightened. This may be of particular 
relevance clinically, particularly if the client regards hypnosis as a way of achieving 
insight into the nature of their emotional problems. 
It could also be argued that these findings support the notion that hypnosis is a state 
of higher level functional inhibition, the basis of the dissociated control theory of hypno- 
sis (e. g. Woody and Bowers, 1994). It is possible that individuals who rely more on their 
emotions and intuitions than logic and reason when making decisions do so because of a 
relative inability to think about situations in a logical way. Given that the conscious and 
analytical processes involved in logical thought are governed by higher level control 
functions (Brown and Oakley, 1997), and that the covert interpretations that underlie 
emotions and intuitions are controlled at a lower level, it seems reasonable to assume 
that an everyday bias towards lower level processing facilitates the entry into a state of 
higher level processing inhibition. However, there are a number of alternatives to this 
explanation that are equally, if not more, feasible. For example, if an individual associ- 
ates hypnosis with unconscious, emotional processes and a lack of control and logical 
thought, then completing a set of questionnaires quite transparently designed to assess 
ones preference for emotional and intuitive decision-making might in some way affect 
their subsequent performance on a susceptibility test. Thus, a high scorer may believe 
that they are likely to be highly susceptible and consequently allow themselves to 
become more engaged in the hypnotic experience. Conversely, individuals who believe 
(or desire) themselves to be highly susceptible may be inclined to complete the question- 
naires according to the belief that high susceptibles are more emotional or intuitive. 
These potential effects are liable to be exacerbated by presenting the questionnaires 
within a hypnotic context as they were in this case, a factor that should be taken into 
account when planning further research of this sort (cf Laurence, 1997). 
One other finding of importance is the significant positive correlation between 
susceptibility and social desirability, a finding that supports the socio-cognitive pre- 
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diction that high susccptibles possess a need for positive self-presentation. Given this 
evidence, we would argue that the inclusion of a social desirability measure is an 
essential requisite of research concerning hypnotic susceptibility, particularly when 
susceptibility is being measured by self-report (as in the case of the HGSHS) and 
where other questionnaire measures are being used. 
The findings presented here provide partial support for the analytic-holistic hypoth- 
esis in hypnosis, in that susceptibility appears to be modestly related to an everyday 
preference for making decisions on the basis of intuitive and emotional feelings. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, other apparently holistic behaviours as measured by the 
right hemisphere sub-scale of the HIPS and the elaborative processing sub-scale of the 
ILP do not appear to be related to susceptibility. Furthermore, the present research is 
unable to assess whether a self-reported emotional bias is related to susceptibility as a 
function of belief and expectation about hypnosis, or as a cognitive predisposition 
towards experiencing certain information processing alterations during hypnosis. 
Although the use of questionnaires can be constructive in identifying areas of potential 
interest, when it comes to accurately assessing questions of this sort more research using 
more precise and objective measures is clearly needed. Moreover, in order for this to be 
done in a constructive way, a sound and well-defined theoretical foundation is required. 
We (Brown and Oakley, in preparation) are currently working towards this end. 
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HYPNOSIS AND COGNITIVE-EXPERIENTIAL SELF-THEORY: 
A NEW CONCEPTUALIZATION FOR HYPNOSIS? 
Richard L Brown and David A. Oakley 
Hypnosis Unit, University College London 
ABSTRACr 
Evidence for a shift from analytical to holistic processing during hypnosis is presented 
as a basis for a new conceptualization of hypnosis in terms of Epstein's integrative 
theory of personality, Cognitive-Experiential Self-lbeory (CEST; e. g., Epstein, 1973, 
1990,1994). Support for this view comes from parallels between the hypnotic state 
and the experiential system as embodied in CEST and from converging lines of 
enquiry from cognitive psychology. It is concluded that there is significant heuristic 
value in such a conceptualization, which can form a framework within which to orga- 
nize data and generate research, and can serve as an interface between cognitive psy- 
chology, the psychology of individual differences and hypnosis theory. 
Despite pervasive theoretical differences within the field, the notion that hypnosis 
involves some sort of temporary suspension of critical thought to allow a more holis- 
tic, intuitive, emotional and imaginal way of thinking to predominate has proved 
extremely popular (e. g., Spanos & Barber, 1974; Crawford, 1982). Such an idea is 
appealing for a number of reasons. For example, a number of studies have indicated 
that hypnosis is characterized by an increase in imaginative processing (e. g., 
Crawford & Allen, 1983; for a review see Sheehan, 1979), heightened creativity (e. g., 
Raikov, 1983) and affect intensity (e. g., Crawford, Clarke, Kitner-Triolo & Olesko, 
1989). Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that the ability to enter hypnosis might 
be facilitated by an everyday preference for a holistic style of thinking (e. g., Tellegen 
& Atkinson, 1974; Wallace, 1990) that, in extreme cases, involves considerable 
engagement in fantasy-related behaviour during normal waking - the so-called fan- 
tasy-prone personality (Lynn & Rhue, 1986) 
The idea that hypnosis involves a shift from an analytic to a more holistic style of 
processing -a notion we shall refer to as the analytic-holistic hypothesis - is well 
represented, albeit often implicitly, in many contemporary cognitive accounts of hyp- 
nosis. For example, both neodissociation theory (e. g., Hilgard, 1977), and its more 
recent interpretation dissociated control theory (e. g., Bowers 1992), regard the dis- 
ruption and inhibition of higher executive functions (the seat of conscious, analytical 
processing) as central to the induction and maintenance of hypnosis. Ile neuropsy- 
chophysiological model of Crawford and Gruzelier (1992) embodies a more explicit 
version. Citing evidence indicating a cerebral activity shift from left frontal to right 
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posterior sites during a hypnotic induction (e. g., for a review see Crawford, 1994), 
Crawford and Gruzelier argue that hypnosis is characterized by a switch from a 
focused to a diffuse style of attentional processing corresponding to a shift from an 
analytical to a more holistic mode of cognition. 
However, although the analytic-holistic hypothesis has played a major role in 
shaping cognitive theorising about hypnosis, it suffers from one fundamental short- 
coming. Generally speaking, within the literature 'holistic processing' has been used 
as an umbrella term to describe such concepts as intuition, imagination and emotion 
with no clear indication as to the relationships, should they actually exist, between 
these constructs. Clearly, as a definition of holistic processing 'that-which-is-not-ana- 
lytic' is unsatisfactory. In short, what is missing is an adequate theoretical framework 
to organize data concerning hypnosis and the analytic-holistic hypothesis and to gen- 
erate research in order to assess the validity of the notion. We attempt to address this 
shortcoming in the remainder of this paper by presenting a conceptualization of hyp- 
nosis in terms of an established theory of personality, Cognitive-Experiential Self- 
Theory (e. g., Epstein, 1973,1990,1994). 
HYPNOSIS AND COGNITIVE-EXPERIENTIAL SELF-THEORY 
Epstein's (e. g., 1973,1990,1994) Cognitive-Experiential Self-'Ibeory (CEST) is a cogni- 
tively oriented, global theory of personality which postulates the existence of a superor- 
dinate division of mental functions into two systems: the rational and the experiential 
systems. According to Epstein, conscious, deliberative thinking is not the natural mode 
of processing for humans as it is a highly inefficient way of dealing with the vast amount 
of information presented to the individual. The majority of information, he argues, is 
processed automatically and effortlessly outside conscious awareness, providing an effi- 
cient and adaptive method of responding to incoming data. CEST postulates that these 
forms of information processing are carried out separately by the rational and experien- 
tial systems respectively - the dynamic balance between both mediating all behaviour. 
Table I presents a comparison of the attributes of these systems. 
According to CEST, the rational system operates within established rules of infer- 
ence: it is conscious, logical, analytical and is affect-free. Epstein suggests that this sys- 
tem is, evolutionarily speaking, relatively 'new', coming about through the gradual 
acquisition of language by our forebears. In contrast, the experiential system is a rela- 
tively crude system, evolved over millions of years and present in both animals and 
humans, that automatically processes information and directs behaviour according to 
the emotional valence of prior experience. It is thus fundamentally pre-conscious and 
operates according to a holistic process based, in part, on maintaining a favourable 
pleasure-pain balance. Such a view has much in common with that of Oakley (1985). 
All behaviour is a result of the dynamic interplay between the operations of these two 
systems; the relative degree to which either is used in preference to the other is deter- 
mined jointly by individual differences and the processing demands of the situation. 
The essence of our conceptualization is that hypnosis represents one situation 
where the balance of processing is altered in favour of the experiential system. Such a 
notion is consistent with the reduction in planning functions, critical judgement and 
reality testing which many have suggested are inherent to the hypnotic experience 
(e. g., Shor, 1959; Woody & Bowers, 1994). Moreover, the form in which Epstein pro- 
poses the experiential system encodes information, namely imagery, metaphors and 
narratives, are assumed by many to be integral to the induction and maintenance of 
hypnosis (e. g., Waxman, 1989). 
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Table 1. Comparison of the experiential and rational systems 













Affective: Pleasure-pain oriented 
Associationistic structure 
Behaviour mediated by 'vibes' from 
past experiences 
Encodes reality in concrete images, 
metaphors and narratives 
Rapid processing: Oriented towards 
immediate action 
Slower to change: Changes with 
repetitive or intense experience 
More crudely differentiated: Broad 
generalisation gradient; stereotyping 
More crudely integrated: 
Dissociative; context-specific 
processing 
Experienced passively and 
preconsciously 
Self-evidently valid: 'Experiencing 
is believing' 
1. Analytic operation 
2. Logical: Reason oriented 
3. Logical structure 
4. Behaviour mediated by conscious 
appraisal of events 
5. Encodes reality in abstract symbols 
(words and numbers) 
6. Slower processing: Oriented towards 
delayed action 
7. Changes more rapidly: Changes with 
speed of thought 
8. More highly differentiated 
9. More highly integrated: Cross-context 
processing 
10. Experienced actively and consciously 
11. Requires justification via logic and 
evidence 
From 'Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory: An integrative theory of personality' by S. 
Epstein, in R. C. Curtis, The Relational Self Theoretical Convergences in Psychoanalysis and 
Social Psychology, New York: Guilford Press. Copyright 1991 by Guilford Press. Adapted by 
permission. 
Should hypnosis represent a significant shift towards holistic, experiential process- 
ing one would also expect to find an increase in the emotionality of hypnotized sub- 
jects, a hypothesis borne out by a small number of studies (e. g., Crawford et at., 1989). 
Moreover, the fantasy-prone subjects of Lynn and Rhue (1986) proved more likely to 
report physical reactions to violence in films and on television than their less fantasy- 
prone counterparts. Clearly, responding to emotionally arousing material in this way 
would suggest that fantasy-prone (and therefore hypnotically susceptible) subjects 
are more sensitive to the unconscious emotional evaluation of stimuli than those less 
prone to fantasy. Given that hypnosis involves a bias towards experiential processing, 
one might predict that the more prone to processing experientially during everyday 
life one is, the more susceptible one will be to hypnosis. Furthermore, the observed 
relationships between fantasy-proneness, hypnotic susceptibility and creativity (e. g., 
Lynn & Rhue, 1986) are also consistent with the conceptualization advanced here, as 
CEST regards the experiential system, due to its holistic and associationistic nature, 
to be the seat of intuitive wisdom and creativity. 
CEST proposes a division of mental function that is prima facie very similar to 
that proposed in traditional psychoanalytical theory, with the primary and secondary 
processes corresponding to the experiential and rational systems respectively. 
However, there is one fundamental difference. Unlike psychoanalytic theory, CEST 
has a strong evolutionary component, suggesting that the experiential system is phy- 
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logenetically ancient and present in both human and non-human species alike. 
Conversely, the rational system is evolutionarily recent - being based on language 
- and is unique to humans. Such a notion is strongly supported by Reber's (1992) 
evolutionary argument for a dissociation between explicit and implicit memory 
processes. Citing the 'developmental lock' model (Wirnsatt, 1986; Schank & Wimsatt, 
1987) Reber argues that, given the relative evolutionary infancy of consciousness, 
explicit memory systems must have developed on the basis of a pre-existing system of 
implicit processes. This system is highly resistant to change and, because of its phylo- 
genetic antiquity, should be present in many species other than our own. 
Furthermore, if one assumes that analytical processes require consciousness for their 
operation, then it follows that the implicit system must operate according to non-ana- 
lytical rules. This not only furnishes CEST with a strong evolutionary backbone, it 
could provide a significant source of cross-fertilization between hypnosis research 
and cognitive psychology should our conceptualization prove valid. 
We would make a strong claim, therefore, that CEST is a useful heuristic within 
which to organize data concerning hypnosis and the analytic-holistic hypothesis. As a 
cognitive account of hypnosis, however, it is not sophisticated enough to allow detailed 
explanations and predictions to be made on the basis of it. In short, it is the barest of 
bones of an information processing theory - what is needed is some empirical flesh. To this end, an examination of research concerning the analytic-holistic dichotomy 
within cognitive psychology as a whole has yielded a number of potentially fruitful 
avenues for investigation (see Brown, 1996). Work from the fields of attention, per- 
ception, memory, problem solving and cognitive style demonstrate a remarkable con- 
vergence in favour of the conceptualization of mental processes that is fundamental to 
CEST. For the sake of brevity, we provide only a brief illustration here. 
The question of whether multidimensional stimuli are perceived analytically or 
holistically has enjoyed a significant resurgence in recent years (Smith, 1989). Much 
of this revival stems from earlier research concerning dimensional integrality and sep- 
arability (Shepard, 1964; Lockhead, 1972; Garner, 1974) and is firmly rooted in the 
best standards of cognitive psychology. This research has shown that certain dimen- 
sional combinations lend themselves more to a holistic form of processing; these have 
been described as 'integral stimuli' (Lockhead, 1972; Garner, 1974). Conversely, 
other combinations of dimensions have been described as 'analysable' (Shepard, 
1964; Lockhead, 1972) or 'separable' (Garner, 1974) because they are more likely to 
be processed analytically. 
However, more recently research has indicated that both integral and separable 
stimuli may, under certain conditions, be processed separably and integrally respec- 
tively. For example, a set of stimuli composed of dimensions of size and brightness, 
the prototypical example of separable stimuli, are often processed holistically under 
incidental conditions or concurrent task demands (e. g., Foard & Kemler-Nelson, 
1983). Thus, it is not simply the stimulus that determines the nature of the processing 
operation performed, but task requirements also. One clear prediction from our con- 
ceptualization might be that hypnosis represents one such task manipulation that 
motivates the holistic processing of stimuli usually processed analytically. 
Furthermore, a number of findings indicating that subject factors influence the 
nature of the processing operation performed n-dght also be of relevance here (see 
Foard & Kemler-Nelson, 1983). For example, several studies have shown that cogni- 
tive development appears to proceed in parallel with a shift from a holistic to a more 
analytical form of perceptual processing (e. g., L. B. Smith and Kemler, 1977). 71bus, 
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young children tend to process stimuli commonly perceived as separable by adults in 
a holistic fashion, with this tendency diminishing as the child matures. Such a develop- 
mental trend from integral to separable processing might go some way towards explain- 
ing the observed pattern of superior hypnotic susceptibility in children (e. g., Hilgard, 
1965). An investigation of the relationship between hypnotic susceptibility and integral 
versus separable processing preference may shed some light on this matter. 
On the basis of this perceptual research, Foard and Kemler Nelson (1983) con- 
cluded that holistic processing is a primitive fall-back mode of cognition that operates 
in the absence of the ability or inclination to process analytically. Clearly, such a con- 
clusion is consistent with the organization of mental processes that we have presented 
here. Furthermore, this research offers tried and tested methodologies with which to 
test the validity of our ideas. Work is currently under way in our laboratory in an 
attempt to do just this. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our conceptualization of hypnosis in terms of CEST provides a useful heuristic 
within which to organize data concerning the analytic-holistic hypothesis. 
Furthermore, extension of this conceptualization to incorporate research from psy- 
chology as a whole provides not only theoretical substance but a number of poten- 
tially useful methodological paradigms with which to assess the validity of our claims. 
In addition, through such a process of cross-fertilization it is hoped that our conceptu- 
alization offers considerable potential for hypnosis research and theory to enrich our 
understanding of the nature of intuition, and the relationship between cognition and 
emotion. 
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